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It is He Who has made the sea suhject, that ye nwy eat thereofflesh that 
isfresh and tender, and that ye may ex1ract therefrom ornatitents to wear, 
and thou seest the ships therein that plough the waves, that ye may seek 
(thus) of the hounty of Allah and that ye may he gratefuL 
(Verse 14: Chapterl 6- 77ze Holy Qw'an) 
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We have honoured the sons ofAdam; provided them with transport on 
land and sea; given them for sustenance things good andpure; and 
conferred on them specialfavours above a great part of Our Creation. 
(Verse 70: Chapter 17- Ae Holy Quran) 
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Introduction 
The oceans play a most important role in world-wide interdependence. 
Marine transportation is the key to international trade, and the mineral and 
petroleum resources of the seabed and the continental shelves, together with the 
living resources are of interest to most nationsi. 
Thus, turning tov,, ards the 21 st century, no-one can doubt that we are living 
in the era of oceans. In the last few decades, the international commuruty has 
sho%, v'n increased interest in maritime questions in international relations. There are 
four general reasons, which led to this situation: first, the growing importance of 
the ocean as a major source of food, with the resulting fisheries disputes among 
states, second, the impact of advanced marine technology on scientific research and 
exploration-, third, the considerable attention paid to marine environmental issues; 
and finally, the increasing military uses of the oceans, especially by naval powerS2. 
The increasing importance of the sea has given rise to increasing interest, 
on the part of the international community, in laying down a general legal 
framework to govern its use. To this end, four international conferences have been 
held, i. e. the Hague Codification Conference of 1930, the First Geneva Conference 
of 1958 (UNCLOS 1), the Second Geneva Conference of 1960 (UNCLOS 11) and 
the Third United Nations Conference (UNCLOS 111), which was held in Caracas, 
Geneva, and New York in the period 1973-1982. However, the complexities of 
maritime questions and conflicts of interest have overshadowed these conferences. 
The 1930 Conference failed to reach any result. The 1958 Conference, although it 
succeeded in adopting four conventionS3, failed with regard to certain vital issues, 
specifically, the breadth of the territorial sea and the fisheries limit, and so did the 
1960 Conference. However, it was UNCLOS III which succeeded in adopting the 
1982 United Nations Convention (LOSC), as the most comprehensive political and 
leoislative work ever undertaken by the United Nations. tn 
Despite the international community's concern about maritime questions 
and related legal aspects, there have been few systematic studies concerning 
Current national marine policies, particularly with regard to how states formulate 
I 
these policies and hovv the%, implemerit them through effective organisational 
structures. The ma'ority of existing studies are restricted to the major ocean-using .11-- ltý 
states. sucli as the United States. the Urilted Kiiwydom, the former Soviet Union. 
Japan and Canada. while many aspects of ii-iost developing countries' marine 
policies ha\ e riever been Studied. or. at the best. liave been the subject of only 
limited studic,,. Even where there are i-narine policy studies, they are open to 
criticism t'or tlicir narrow fOCLIS Ori orik, a -, cqiiient of the entire ocean policy 
process 
Saudi Aribia is a i-naritinic cOL11111", ' witli vital interests. both past and 
prescrit. in the and has sho%N. -n its conccrn with the de\, elopi-nents in the law of 
the sea, havinq ,. cti%, elv participated in the three United Nations Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea. cspecially the 1958 and 1960 Conferences. Despite all this, there 
ha\, e been few studies conceminu the Saudi . -\rabian practice, and those that exist, 
deal with isolated issues, such as the statutes of the territorial sea, fisheries and 
some other Issues. The only attempt prevIOLISIV made to discuss the Saudi 
maritime policy was undertaken by Nasser Al-Arfaj in the 1970s, in his work, 
Saudi . 4rabia 's Ifai-itune Polic. y, ('1948-1978)'. However, this study 
focused 
particularly on the political dimension. Moreover, because the study was 
concerned with the Saudi maritime policy before 1978, it could not cover all the 
legal developments that have occurred in the law of the sea since then, whether 
internationally or at the national level in Saudi Arabia. Thus, it paid little or no 
attention to the legal developments and Saudi Arabia's position on major recent 
rnantime questions, such as the newly-created regime of the 200 n. m. exclusive 
economic zone, marine pollution control and marine scientific research. The 
organizational structure and the process by which Saudi Arabia's marine policy is 
made were not examined. Nor was the question of sovereignty over the two 
islands of Tiran and Sanafir addressed. MacDonald's comparative work, Iran, 
Saudi Ai-abia, and the Law of the Sea 7, which was also completed in the 1970s, is 
even less comprehensive, since it is only concerned with comparing the behaviour 
of the two countries on limited questions in the context of the Arabian Gulf, and in 
the period of time that preceded the huge recent developments in the law of the sea 
in general and the legal developments within the Saudi domestic framework in 
particular. 
The growing importance of the sea for Saudi Arabia makes it necessary to 
have a comprehensive and systematic study of Saudi Arabia's practices in the law 
of the sea. This study, then, is designed to meet that need. It will try to assess and 
evaluate the marine policy of Saudi Arabia in its mantime zones. Moreover, 
whenever it is appropriate, the policy of neighbouring states with regard to certain 
aspects of the international law of the sea will be considered, also, with a view to 
understanding the effects of that law on basic commuruty policies within the Red 
Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Thus, there will be an attempt to examine and analyse 
comprehensively Saudi Arabia's policies and practices starting with the policy- 
i-naking mechanism and the governmental organizations that deal with the oceans. 1: ý _n 
The analvsis will include national legislation and all other official documents and 
plans, It will include also the Kingdom's attitudes, as expressed at the Law of the 
Sea Conferences, and relevant bilateral and other regional agreements. The study 
focuses on Saudi Arabia's responses to the new ocean regime and her policies with 
regard to various issues in ocean affairs. A central focus will be given also to the 
background and circumstances that have contributed to the formulation and 
drawing up of these policies. Ultimately, it may be possible to judge, in the light of 
all those aspects, whether the Saudi marine policy is a success or failure. 
This study of Saudi Arabia's behaviour will be conducted in the light of the 
international ocean regime. Therefore, the reader will find this study has two 
dimensions. First, light will be thrown on the relevant principles of international 
law In general and the international legal background of these principles, with 
particular reference to developments in the Law of the Sea Conferences. Second, 
Saudi Arabia's practice will be examined within the context of these principles. 
The discussion in this thesis reflects not the whole law of the sea, but only those 
areas of it where Saudi Arabia has a particular interest or there is documented 
Saudi practice. Thus, for example, the reader will find no discussion on topics 
such as the new LOSC archipelagic regime, nor of the more esoteric provisions 
relating to such features as atolls, deltas and mouths of rivers, which appear indeed 
to be of no relevance to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have been concerned primarily 
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%vith the protection of their ri(, ýhts withM their maritime zones, and they ha%e paid 
little attention to those aspects of international law which fall beyond the limits of 
natiomil 
_I Urisdiction. even if such aspects may 
be of interest to Saudi Arabia in one 
way or anothcr. Such is the case. for example. with the deep sea-bed mining 
reL, imc- 'Saudi Arabia, in its onk, statemem on this topic during UNCLOS 111, 
supported in principle the approach considering the -sea-bed and ocean floor and 
SUbSoil thereof beyong the limits of iiatiomil 'urisdictiorill 
-1 111 as 
the "common heritage 
of mankind-. ý' But apart from that. Saudi , \rabia was satisfied with its role through 
the ()f 77 consistim of iicýirlv I developi n Y states which strongly 
advocated the cstablishment of a central aiid stroiig authority to orovern mining in 
the Arei. ý SaLtdi Arabia has passed no Icgislation claiming deep sea mining n(-Yhts 
in the Sea-Bed Area, nor is she a party to an%, treaty or reciprocating regime on this 
issue. The case is almost the same with regard to the Saudi attitude towards the 
exercise of j urisdiction on the high seas. Of the various aspects of this question, 
the Saudi legnslation speaks only of the case where a vessel may have Saudi 
nationality. " and the registration requirements of a ship in Saudi Arabia. " Nor has 
the question of jurisdiction on the high seas received attention from the Saudi 
dele-(Yations to the Law of the Sea Conferences. 
Conducting research on Saudi Arabia's practice in the law of the sea is not 
an easy task. There is a dearth of existing literature, and only a small amount of 
w ing exists in the periodical literature on the sub ect. In addition such sources rit* 
of infon-nation as exist are difficult , indeed in some cases, almost 
impossible to 
obtain. 
In this study, a central focus will be given to those Saudi Government 
actions that serve the national interest in uses of the oceans. Thus, primary source 
materials, o-athered from the Saudi Govenunent marine-related documents as well 
as fi-om international legal documents that affect national use of the oceans, will be 
consulted. The existing literature will supplement these primary sources. Available 
Saudi statements and viewpoints will be discussed. 
The research is organized into seven chapters, followed by general 
conclusions and recommendations. Since the research is designated to study Saudi 
Arabia's practice within the context of the law of the sea, this approach will be 
f'ollowed in each division, so far as it serves the purposes of the study. Thus, 
following this introduction, Chapter I provides a brief historical analysis of the law 
of the sea in general. It then proceeds to present a general geographical, historical 
and legal background information about Saudi Arabia and its relationship with the 
sea. Other related maritime questions, such as the way the Saudi marine policy is 
made and managed, and the legal status of the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea are 
also considered. 
Chapters 11-VII discuss various junsdictional claims of Saudi Arabia and 
her attitudes toward certain ocean issues, as mentioned above , in comparison with 
the provisions of the intemational law of the sea. 
In Chapter 11, the present state of the law as to the baselines, internal 
waters and gulfs and straits is considered. There follows an analysis of Saudi 
Arabia's policies and attitudes on these regimes. 
Chapter III is devoted to the two legal regimes of the territorial sea and the 
contiguous zone. The juridical nature and extent of these concepts, in addition to 
the method of delimitation of the territorial sea, are discussed. This discussion is 
followed by an examination of Saudi Arabia's position and an evaluation of her 
national policies in this respect against the background of international law. 
The first part of Chapter IV is devoted to the concept of the continental 
shelf and its delimitation Linder conventional rules and case law. In the second 
part, an attempt is made to examine the principles upon which Saudi Arabia based 
her continental shelf claims and her agreements with neighbouring states as to the 
shelf boundary. 
The general legal framework of the regime of the exclusive economic zone 
established by the LOSC, Saudi Arabia's attitudes toward this regime and marine 
fisheries in general are dealt with in Chapter V. 
Chapter VI examines Saudi Arabia's domestic legal rules with regard to the 
regime of marine scientific research, against the background of this regime as 
established in the LOSC. 
In Chapter V11, a brief review is first presented of international legal 
principles governing marine pollution control. This is followed by an examination 
5 
of Saudi Arabia's attitudes and I)olicies in this regard, including all approaches 11: 11 -- 
followed b-,., Saudi Arabia., nationally, reoionally and intemationally. 
Each chapter is followed by a concluýion. and a general conclusion follows 
at the end of the thesis. In this general C011CILISIon. Saudi Arabia's practice and 
marine policies as a whole are asscs,., cd and evaluated and some policy 
recommendations are sug-gested. 
Footnotes are cited at the crid of cach chapter. 
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
Alfred. A. H. Kcil, "The USA and the Oceans-. I HP. (ý 1977), pp. 16-25, at p. 16. 
R. P. Barston and P. W. BI II The Maritime Dimens'on, London, George Allen & 
Unwin, (1980), p. 103. 
See inli-a. Chapt. 1. pp. 14-15. 
4. R. L. Friedheiin and R. E. Bowen, "Assessing the State of the Art in National Ocean 
Policy Studies", 7 ODIL, ( 1979), p, 179, at p. IS 1. 
Due to the existence of Israel at the Head of the Gulf of Aqaba, secunty considerations 
imposed themselves as major elements in the Saudi participation in UNCLOS I and 
UNCLOS 11. Three questions dominated the Saudi participation in these two 
Conferences: historic bays, navigation through straits and the breadth of the territorial 
sea. The determination in the 1958 TSC (Art. 16(4)) of the status of navigation through 
the straits linking one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas and the 
territorial sea of another state, on the one hand. and the tendency of the international 
community to favour 12 n. i-n. for the breadth of the territorial sea, on the other hand, 
decreased the i-nornenturn of the Saudi participation at UNCLOS 111. See infra pp. 95- 
10') 
N. Al-Arfaj. The Maritime Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1948-1978), Jeddah. 
Okaz Publications, ( 1983). 
7. C. G. MacDonald, Iran. Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea, London, Greenwood 
Press, (1980). 
8. See infra, p. 249. 
9. With regard to the international sea-bed regime, the controversy of UNCLOS III was 
over the question -who may exploit the area" and the conditions of exploitation (i. e. 
rules and regulations governing mining). On the one hand, the Group of 77 sought an t: ) Z__ 
international sea-bed authority having the power to engage in sea-bed mining itself, and 
to control inining by other licencees, who would pay it royalties which, along with its 
own profits, would be distributed among all states as the "common heritage of all 
mankind". On the other hand, the developed states proposed initially that the Authority 
should be little more than a registry of national claims to sea-bed mining sites, having 
few, if any. powers to interfere with the exploitation of the Area by their companies. 
However, the two camps agreed eventually upon a compromise providing for the 
establishment of a "parallel systerný', under which the Area would be exploited both by 
the International Sea-Bed Authority and by commercial operators. For further details, 
see 1982 Convention, Part XI (Arts. 133-91), and R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The 
Law of the Sea, 2nd ed., Manchester, Manchester University Press, (1988), Chapter 
Twelve. 
10. In this respect, Art. 166 of the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations reads: 
A ship is not deetned to be of Saudi Nationality iinless it is registered in one of the ports 
oj'the Kingdoni. For the text of the Regulations, see L. A. Glick, Trading with Saudi 
Arabia, London, Croom Helm, (1980), p. 22. 
Art. 165 of the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations provide that: the conditions 
required. for the registration qf ships in the Kingdom are: 
1, That the owner ql'the ship should be a Saudi national. 
?, Or that the shipshould be owned by a Saudi company, establishment or organization. 
3, Ot- that the ship should be owned by a compan , v, establishment 
or organization which 
is registered it? the Kingdom, provided that the proportion of the Saudi capital 
contributing therein should not be less than 51%. Ibid. I! ) 
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Chaioter I 
Le2al and Historical Back2round 3 
Introduction 
From inciciit tirrics. the sci whicli covers around three quarters of the 
world's surface has been utilised by nian for essential purposes. It has represented 
a considerable ý., ()urcc of food. a protective barrier, and a means Of COMMUnication 
and conveving people and transporting goods. The significance of seas, ho%vever. 
has intensified. along with the intensity of the political, strategic, military and 
econornic interests of the modern state. The conflict of such interests between 
nations has shaped the history of the regime of oceans. 17, 
Before giving general background information about Saudi Arabia in Part 
11, Part I of this chapter considers briefly the historical development of the law of 
the sea. 
Part 1: The Law of the Sea: A Historical Surve 
The evolution of the law of the sea cannot be viewed separately from 
international law generally, which is widely seen to have begun with the emergence 
of the independent states in their present structures'. According to O'Connell, the 
law of the sea is a central feature of international law due to the fact that: 
the sea i. s the international arena whereinfor centuries states have 
daily had to regulate their conduct bly rejýrence to rules other than 
qftheir own making 2. 
In the following pages, light will be thrown upon the historical evolution of the law Z-1) Z: ) 
of the sea. For simplicity, the subject will be divided chronologically into five 
phases. 
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Pre- the 19 ation Conference 
In ancient times, the seas were used for communication and commerce. 
They were common to all nations, but not as a province of influence and 
domination. The civilized nations, which centred at the time around the 
Mediterranean, made no effort, as far as is recorded, to establish maritime rules to 
3 oro-anize the uses of the sea It; 
However, this situation was changed by the changing of the political 
position in Europe, which led to the emergence of many states therein. Thus, both 
Denmark and Sweden claimed sovereignty over the Baltic. The Danish expanded 
their soverei. (-Y-nty to all the northern Seas between Nonvay, Iceland and Greenland. 
The Italian city states of Genoa and Pisa attributed to themselves the sovereignty 
of the Lig-urian Sea, while Venice claimed the Adriatic'. 
These attempts to control the oceans of the world culminated in 1493 when 
Pope Alexander VI published his celebrated Papal Bulls to partition the oceans, as 
spheres of influence, between Spain and Portugal. These Bulls, which were given 
IeLyal effect in the next year ( 1494) by the Treaty of Tordesillas, were issued as a 
result of the areat voyages of discovery by Columbus and others'. The exercise of Z7) 
maritime sovereignty by the said nations was expressed in the following practical 
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actions 
maritime ceremonials, whereby a state which claimed sovereignty over a part of 
the open sea required foreign ships navigating therein to honour her flag, which 
represented a recognition of her maritime sovereignty; 
levying of tolls from foreign vessels; 
interdiction of fisheries to foreigners; 
control or even prohibition of foreign navigation through the respective part of 
the ocean. 
This right of "sovereignty" was coupled with the duty of preservation of 
law and order at sea, since it meant states had undertaken to organize navigation 
and keep the passage of vessels free from the depredations of pirateS7 . Thus, the 
period of the end of the fifteenth century, coupled with the great voyages of 
discovery, gave a new importance to the law of the sea and may be taken, Z. 1) 
according to Smith, as the staningpoint of the new law's. 
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Bv the second half ofthe s' I ims over the ixteentli century, the monopolist clai 
high seas by dic oreat maritime powers started to be challenged. Thus, the n 
principle of the "enclosure of the oceans" gradtially be(Tan to shake in favour of the ltý 
new concept of' the "freedom of the liiuyli scas". The expansion of the manitime 
navies, the emm,, ence of new maritime powers. and the flourishing of maritime 
trade ifter the discoverv of America were the main reasons for this development. 
The First clear assertion of the frecdoni of the seas came from Queen 
Eli/abcth I in I 55, ý in response to a protest by the Span'sh ambassador to London, 
a Mcndoza M-amst Drake's vova(ic M the Golden Hind whIch had been undertaken 
witliout previous pen-nission from the Spanisli authorities. In her reply, the QUeen 
sa 1 d: 
The zt, sc (ýOhcsca und ai .r is common to all; nel'thcr can all-I, title to 
d7c occan hclonlg- to anY people or private man, Jbi-asinitch as 
17citlicl. naffire 1101, re(yard 0/' thc public use permitteth am, 
posscssion tlzcrqý. 
This declaration of Elizabeth was supported, later on, by the Dutch author, 
Grotius, commonly regarded as the father of modern international law. In his 
celebrated work, Mai-e Liberuin, published in 1609, Grotius criticized the claims of 
Portugal to exclusive rights of trade with the East Indies. His intention was to t ID 
vindicate the claims of the Dutch East India Company, by whom he was employed, 
to commerce in the Far East' 0. Grotius justified his argument saying that: 
the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot 
become a possession qf any one, and because it is adaptedfor the 
use qf' all, whether we consider it jrom the point of view oj* 
navig-ation or offisheries 11. 
It is clear that the national interests of the Dutch were the main reason behind the 
enthusiasm of Grotius in his defence of the freedom of the high seas, since he 
wanted to assure the right of his nationals to navigate and trade with the Indies. 
However, these views of Grotius were attacked by nations whose sovereign 
interests over the seas had begun to be threatened. These nations called upon their 
national lawyers to confront the new principle of the freedom of the high seas 
advocated by the Dutch scholar. Accordingly, Gentilis defended English and 
Spanish claims in his work, Advocatio Hispanica (1613), Welwood defended 
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English claims in lus book, De Dominio Maris (1613), and so did Seldon In his 
12 book,. Ware Clausum (1635) 
Thus, two contradictory schools emerged; the first called upon the freedom 
of the high seas and the other adopted the defence of the concept of "enclosure of 
the oceans". It is qUIte obvious, however, that national interests were the real 
motives underlying both theories, or rather what was believed to be in the interests 
of a nation Lfave rise to differences in interpretation from one specific area of the 
freedom to another and from one time to another. Although Queen Elizabeth 1, 
declared for instance, as mentioned above, in 1580 the freedom of the seas for all, 
tier successor. James 1, prevented foreigners from enjoying the freedom to fish in 
the "British Seas" and forced them to apply for fishing licences 13 . As Brown put it: 
The notion Qffteedonz is used as an ideological tool where the 
national interest so requires. Freedoin is good when it allows 
Elizabeth to challcizge Spains and Portugal's 'freedom" of 
monopo4l,; fi-cedonz is had when it prevents James from excluding 
the Dutchfi-oin theNorth Seaflisheries 14 . 
The debate between the two concepts went on for about a century, but at 
the end of the day, Grotius's argument on the liberty of the seas was destined to 
triumph and to become the basis of subsequent doctrine on the freedom of the 
seas. 
Later, however, the debate came to centre on the much narrower and more 
practical issue of the extent to which nations might legally claim exclusive rights in 
the oceans bordering them". By the beginning of the nineteenth century, claims to 
sovereignty over the oceans were everywhere restncted and yet, the freedom of the 
sea, along with the right of coastal states to sovereignty over the maritime areas 
nengffibour-ing their shores (territorial waters), gradually crystallized as a general 
principle of customary international law. Nevertheless, with the exception of those 
attempts made by certain non-goverrimental learned societies", there was no 
official attempt by the international community to codify the existing rules. Thus, 
there has always been some uncertainty and a lack of uniformity with regard to the 
jurisdictional content and nature of the limits between these two doctrines. 
II 
2. The 1930 Ijagme Conference: Attempts at Codification 
Under the auspices of the League of Nations. a Conference for the 
Codit'ication of International Law met in the HLIUTLIe from March 133 to Apnl 12 
1930 and was attencled by abOUt forty stL atc. s. It was the first of its kind to be held 
specifically to consider the codification of subjects Nvithin international law. Before 
this, in 192-4. the Lea(gue of Nations had Lippointed a sixteen-member expert 
committee for the nroL)-rcssive codification of international law". 
'Flic C]U,, ý'ýUOFI of territorial wLiters was one of the Subjects considered in the 
oil t'ý2'rkmce Commission on Territorial Waters was set up, which dISCUSSed 
rnam, legil a,, ýpects rclated to the territorial Such as its breadth, the points 
froiii whiý: h thc icrritorial sea is to be rneaSLired (baselines). the outen-nost points to 
\vhich the coastal state rnay extend her authority to control her customs, sanitary 
and ýCCUMV I-CI-TUlatIOnS (conti(-ILIOLIS zoi-ic), and the methods whereby the territorial 
seas of islands and groups of islands are to be deteri-nined. The most controversial 
point was the breadth of the territorial sea and contiguous zone. There were 
distinct differences of viewpoint among the dele-o-ations on this question. Although 
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twcnty states- were in favour of the three mile territorial sea limit, proposed at the 
Conference. a considerable number of states claimed otherwise" 2. These 
differences led to the failure of the conference to adopt a convention. Despite that 
conclusion, the Conference was the first real attempt to codify the rules and 
customary rules of the law of the sea, and succeeded in focusing the attention of 
the international community on the serious importance of the subject and paved the 
way for further meetings. Moreover, the draft articles adopted by the Conference 
on the legal status of the territorial sea 23 on the one hand and the replies of 
governments and the reports of some international law-yers submitted to the 
Con-imittee, on the other, represent important evidence of state practice of the 
period. 
Commenting on the partial success of the conference, Reeves has described 
the draft produced by the Conference, by saying: 
It became, there/0're, notwithstanding thefact that it is a draft only, 
a verv important document in the history of'international law and a 
24 landmark in the long process of codi/ication now begun 
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Indeed the influence of the Hague Conference was apparent In the discussions and tn 
meetingrs that followed. I 
3. Changes Folio-wing World War 11 
The 1940s witnessed radical changes in international relations which were 
reflected in international law. The United Nations Organization was established to 
replace the League of Nations, which collapsed due to the War. By this time, the 
number of independent states had considerably increased. Most of these states 
were developing)-, or of limited technological abilities. On the other hand, 
technoloalcal advances tempted several states to claim sovereignty over maritime 
areas beyond the territorial sea limits, with the aim of exploiting their natural 
resources. These two factors, generally speaking, shaped the features of the 
developrnent of the law of the sea at the time. 
1945 witnessed the birth of a new maritime legal regime, when the United 
States issued the celebrated Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf In this 
Proclamation, President Truman announced that: 
the Government qfthe United States regards the natural resources 
oj'the continental sheýfbeneath the high seas but eontiguous to the 
coasts of'the United States as appertaining to the United States, 
subject to itsjurisdiction and control25. 
The Truman Proclamation was followed in 1949 by similar claims by 
several states, amongst them Saudi Arabia 26 and nine sheikhdoms in the Arabian 
Gulf under United Kingdom protection 
27 
. 
The above claim was coupled with claims of another kind by some Latin 
American states. In 1949, Chile became the first country to assert national 
sovereignty over a zone of 200 miles from her coasts and offshore islands, 
including jurisdiction over the resources of her continental shelf and the water 
column above. In doing so, Chile aimed at the protection of her whaling industry. 
The neighbouring states of Peru and Ecuador followed Chile in 1947 and 1951 
respectively2'. Hence , it can 
be said that the new legal regime known today as the 
exclusive economic zone has its roots at that period of time 2', as a result of the 
concerns of these states to protect their economic interests in the said areas, from 
the impact of the growing fleet of technologically advanced states. The rise of 
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thý2, sc two coi-iccpts (the continental Shelf MICI CXCILISIVC economic zone). formed 
important progressive developments in the long march of the law of the sea. 
4. Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea 
In 194,1. the International Law Commission OLC) was established PURI= 
to 1he P\' Geiieral Assembly (GA) Resoluttoii I -,, 74 of ",, "ovember 21,1947"'). Two 
law ot'die sea items were selected f, or codlticLitioii: the re(-I II )-*me of territorial waters 
and the regiiiic of' the high scLi, ). 111 195(). the ILC drew Lip Its final report 
(coiisistlii(i 4 ý, cvciity-three draft arucle,, ) oi-i both regimes, accompanied by a 
31 recornmci-idation that the UN coiivene a geiierfl conference on the law of the sea . 
The GA \vas i-iot theii prepared to hold i sHigle conference on law of the sea 
questioi-is. However, on February -'1.1957. the GA of the UN called for a 
coriferci-ice of its members through its Resolutiot-I 1105 (XI)32 . The first United 
Natioi-is Confercrice on the Law of the Sea (U, NCLOS 1) was held from February 
24 to Api-il 27,1958, with representatives of 86 countries (amongst which was 
Saudi Arabia), seven specialized agencies and nine intergovernmental 
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organizations 
During the deliberations of the Conference, many controversies and 
conflicting claims arose, concerning national authority over the territorial waters. 
While the great mantime powers were, generally, in favour of restricting the 
coastal state's sovereignty over the nearby areas of the seas, most of the developing 
countries and the Soviet block, impelled by their security and economic interests, 
were of the contrary vieW34. Moreover, the political background, specifically the 
East-West Cold War, overshadowed the Conference. Nonetheless, the Conference 
was successful, ultimately, in the codification of many of the customary rules of the 
law of the sea current at that time. Four conventions were adopted: Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (hereafter TSC)35, Convention on the 
High SeaS36 (hereafter HSC), Convention on the Continental Shelf37 (hereafter 
CSQ and Convention on Fishing,, and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High SeaS38 (hereafter FCC). In addition, UNCLOS I adopted an Optional 
Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 3' and 
rune ResolutionS40 Despite the fact that two fundamental issues had been left 
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undecided (i. e. the breadth of the territorial sea and exclusive fishery limits), 
UNCLOS 1, by adopting the above-mentioned Conventions, without a doubt 
constituted a landmark in the codification of international law generally, and the 
law of the sea in particular. 
In a renewed attempt to find a solution for the two problems referred to 
above, the General Assembly of the United Nations called for the convening of a 
second conference, by its Resolution 1307 (XII) of December 10,1958 41 . 
Accordingly, the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS 11) met in Geneva from March 17 to April 26,1960, and was attended 
by the representatives of eighty-eight states 42 . 
Several proposals were rendered to 
the Conference, but it failed - in the light of its rules and procedures - to reach 
43 a(, -qeement on any of these proposal s. Rather, the compromise formula providing 
for a six-mile territorial sea plus a six-mile fishery zone was defeated by only one 
vote. Thus, the two questions remained unsettled by the Conference, although its 
work was very limited in scope compared with LTNCLOS 1. However, the lack of 
international agreement in both the Conferences to the breadth of the territorial sea 
and the associated question of the fishery question did not dim the great result 
achieved by UNCLOS 1, which formed a basic framework for important aspects of 
the law of the sea. 
5. The Third United National Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS 111) 
In the wake of the failure of UNCLOS 11, countries proceeded to take the 
law into their own hands 44 . Moreover, the world saw 
fundamental shifts during the 
1960s, at the economic, political and technological levels. These changes were 
reflected in turn in international law. The absence of an agreement on limits to 
fishing rights led most states to extend their claims. Thus, the claims of territorial 
seas (where coastal states have exclusive fishing rights) with a breadth of twelve 
nautical miles or more tripled from about twenty to sixty during the decade, and 
many coastal states claimed a so-called exclusive fishing zone of varying breadth 
45 
In addition, some South Ai-nerican states held out for their existing 200 mile zones. 
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The fishing industry represented the most valuable economic use of ocean 
reSOL11-CeS In thC I 960s, since the total value of fish taken in 1966 was about S9 
billion, more than t,, vice the value of ocean mineral resources recovered, including 
petrolCUI-n-"'. A further matter of growing concern was that the major fishing 
nations (, -about tv,, enty states) harvested fol-ir times as much as the rest of the world 
to(-Yctllcr 47. However. although sorne regional agreements were concluded with the 
aim of reaching a solution to the overfishingy problem, such as the 1964 European 
Fishcries Comcntion". and other agreenients elsewhere49 , the scope of the 
prob1cm too great for stich partial solutions to be sufficient, and it was 
esscritial to took 1'6r successful i-neaSUres at international level. 
In terms of' politics. several developments had taken place on the 
international scene. Many territories gained independence, especially after the 
issue of Resolution 1514 (XV), passed by the General Assembly on 14 December 
1960 ý () . 
The newly independent states joined the economically weak countries 
(developino- countries) in confronting the rich nations in defence of their interests. 
This North-SoLith division was obvious frorn the first meeting of the United t: ) 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U-NCTAD) in 1964 5 '. Both East- 
West contradictions and North-South differences imposed themselves on the 
subsequent developments in the law of the sea. 
Another of the most important characteristics of the time was the rapid 
development in technology, which produced new fishing techniques, the expansion Z7ý 
of marine scientific research, and advances in naval and anti-submanne warfare 
abilities, and made accessible the enon-nous mineral resources In and on the sea- 
bed 52 . Clearly, the existing rules were inadequate to cope with these scientific 
discoveries. Thus, questions were raised with regard to the classical rules included 
in the 1958 Geneva Conventions, dealing with the breadth of the territorial sea, 
limits of the freedom of the high seas, and legal status of the contiguous zone, 
continental shelf and fishery zones. Unfortunately, technological advance was 
accompanied with certain harmful effects, such as marine pollution. This dilemma - 
with the exception of very limited and general provisions in the 1958 Convention 
on the High Seas 53 - was not dealt with in the Geneva Conventions, which were 
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supposed to deal with all legal aspects concerning the sea, including the marine 
environment54 . 
All the above factors deepened the differences between most of the Third 
World States on the one hand and the Western States on the other. The former 
group was keen to obtain extensive rights over a 200 mile zone beyond the 
territorial sea and to establish international control over the deep seabed in order to 
prevent the technologically-advanced states from being able to extract minerals 
from this vital and vast source, freely and without political constraint. The 
Western States' desire was to protect their economic interests through free 
exploitation of the resources of the high seas and the deep seabed and also to 
protect their navigation routes by rejecting any attempt to weaken the freedom of 
passage through international straits in particular 55 . 
Thus, under these pressures, it was deemed appropriate to convene a world 
conference to discuss the fresh developments and review the traditional law of the 
sea. The official initiative in this direction was taken by Pardo, the Ambassador of 
Malta to the United Nations, and specifically through the question of the access to 
the mineral resources of the deep sea 56 . 
In a famous speech before the General 
Assembly in 1967, Pardo suggested that there should be drawn up a: 
Declaration and Treaty concerning the reservation exclusivelyfor 
peaceful put-poses of the seabed and ocean floor underlying the 
seas beyond the present limits of national jurisdiction, and the use 
of their resources in the interests of mankind". 
In a positive response to the proposal, the General Assembly on 18 
December of the same year (1967) established by Resolution 2340 (XXII) an ad 
hoc Committee to study the Peaceful uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor 
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction 5 8. Three years later, a new concept and 
a new regime known as the "common heritage of mankind" were established. The 
UN General Assembly by Resolution 2749 (XXV)59 declared on December 17, 
1970 that: 
the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits oj' national jurisdiction ... are the common 
heritage of 
mankind. 
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Moreover, the GA declared that the provisions of the new regime ýhall be 
cv(ihli'. ýhcd hi, un intei-national lrcclO' Qi'a universal chai-actei-'O. In Resoluti ion 
2750 (XXV) (paragraphs 2 and 6), the GA reqUired the Committee to prepare 
draft treaty articles embodying the iiew international regime of the area lying 
beyond the national PILIS the other regirnes of the sea. In accordance 
with these preparatory works of the Comi-nittee. the GA had decided to convene in 
197 -3' a conference on the la%\, of the sea"'. This decision was confirmed bv the GA 
Resolutions 'ý029 (XXVII) and '067 (X-XV111)ý"'. The latter had expressly stated 
that: 
the I) I tl 1 7d(1 tC of the (-'oq1crcncc shall he to adopt a convention 
dealing with till mattcr-s' relatin, (4- to the law ofthe sea. 
The or-owilzational session of the Conference was held in New York 33-15 
December, 197-33. The Conference in-volved a very wide range of states and 
intemational org izations. Its neaotiatioiis lasted for nine years and contained )-ani I 
eleven session S63 After these loncy years and hard negotiations, the Conference 
managed finally to adopt the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (L OSC)64 . 
The LOSC made significant innovations, such as the Sea Bed 
Regime (Part XI) and the comprehensive machinery for settling disputes (Part 
XV). In addition, the main changes provided for by the LOSC are: 
0 The adoption of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit, (Part 11, Article 3) which 
had remained undetermined since UNCLOS I and 11; 
a The adoption of a 200 nautical rmle exclusive zone (EEZ) for coastal states, 
within which they enjoy jurisdiction over all natural resources, whether living 
or non-living (Part V, Articles 56-57); this jurisdiction may extend further, if 
the continental shelf of a state extends further (Part VI, Articles 76(6), (7) and 
7 7); 
The concept of transit passage through international straits (Part 111, Articles Z: ) 
7,3 8 and 3 9); 
The concept of archipelagic states (Part IV); 
Further rights for land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states (Part V, 
Articles 69 and 70, Part X, Article 125); 
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0 International co-operation in certain questions, such as marine scientific 
research, and the transfer of marine technology to developing countries 
(Articles 202,242,274); 
0 A comprehensive system for the protection of the marine environment (Part 
XII). 
In its 320 articles, the Convention repeats verbatim or in essence some of 
the earlier Geneva Conventions provisions, or elaborates on others. It also cod1fies 
CLIstomary rules which had arisen since the said conventions, and creates new legal 
regimes. 
The LOSC was opened for signature on 10 December, 1982, and on the 
first day, it was signed by 119 states 65 . 
However, it came into force only on 16 
November 1994, twel,,,, ýc months after the deposit of the sixtieth instrument of 
ratification by Guyana, as required by the Convention itseIP'. As of 8 May 1996, 
ninety states have acceded to or ratified the Convention". 
The Convention did not receive general acceptance among the 
industrialised states and most of the ratifying states at the time of entry into force 
of the Convention were developed stateS68 . The reluctance of developed states to 
accept the Convention is attributable to their dissatisfaction with the terms of the 
sea-bed minIng regime included in Part XI of the Convention 69. This situation 
overshadowed the effectiveness of the Convention, something that led the then 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, to initiate in July 1990 
inforinal consultations with the object of achieving universal participation in the 
Convention. In 1992 his successor, Ghali, continued these consultations which 
ended in July 1994 with the approval by the UN General Assembly of a 
Resolution'O, adopting the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of 
71 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 . 
The title of the Part XI Agreement suggests that it is intended to implement the 
LOSC, but the examination of its provisions shows that it goes far beyond mere 
implementation and does, in fact, amend the provisions of Part XI of the LOSC 
and its Annexes quite substantiallY72 . The LOSC and the 
Agreement are, in any 
case, to be interpreted and applied as a single instrument. In this respect, Article 2 
of the Agreement provides that: 
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the provisions ýf[thej A, (-""cc-"nent and Part XI shall be inteipreted 
and applied together as a sinule inst, -1117, c17 t. In the event of am, il 7 CO I ISI'S tCI 7 CV between this AgI'CC17IC17t and Part XI, the p"Ovisions 
ofthis .4 greementshall prevail. 
The Part XI Agreement can thus be seen as a protocol of amendment". 
The adoption of the Part XI provisions is aimed at meeting the concerns of the 
developed countries and providing the means whereby they will feel able to ratify 
or accede to the LOSC. Indeed, the specific problems voiced by these countries 
following the adoption of the LOSC, have been satisfactorily addressed. and many 
of them Lire now en(-Ya(-)-ed on submitting to both the LOSC and the Agreement to 
their leunslatui-cs v,, Ith a view to securing, consent to ratification or accession. The 
UTS Government, for example, has already taken concrete steps in this direction 74 - 
The British Government, for its part, announced on 20 July 1994 that it would 
accede to the Convention in due course, once the necessary procedures were 
cornplete-ý . 
A significant problem that was not satisfactorily resolved in the LOSC is 
the issue of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. This problem has resulted 
from the creation of the 200 mile EEZ regime, placing significant fish resources 
ide the new coastal regime without providing for their adequate governance in outsi 11Z: ý 
the high seas regime 76 . The issue was recognised by the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) to be in urgent need of further 
elaboration and development77 . 
The UN General Assembly accepted the 
UNCED's recommendations and convened the UN Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which held its first substantive session in 
New York in July 12-30,1993 78 
. The 
Conference succeeded finally in 1995 in 
adopting the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks 79. This Agreement provides specific instructions for both coastal states 
and distant-water fishing states, on how to deal with some valuable stocks of fish 
located both within the EEZ and in the high seas8'. It is to be noted that this 1995 
Agreement was preceded by the adoption in 1993 of the Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
-)0 
Vessels on the High Seas, under the auspices of FA081, which confinns the flag 
state's responsibility in respect of vessel fishing on the high seas, and ensures the 
free flow of infon-nation on high seas fishing operations 
82. 
However , in the light of its comprehensive characteristic as a package 
deal", aimed to govern all aspects of the law of the sea, the LOSC is regarded as 
described by Freestone and Mangone as "unfinished agendas"". Undoubtedly, the 
1982 United Nations Convention, which runs to 320 articles and IX Annexes, 
along with its recent and future expected amendments, are considered as an 
exceptional example of internationalism and contribute significantly to the rule of 
law among nations. Therefore, it is not surprising to find one commentator who 
compares the adoption of the Convention with the discovery by Columbus of 
America on 12 October 1492 ý4 . 
In view of what it contains of developed and detailed pnnciples that find 
their origins in customary and conventional rules, judicial decisions and the 
writings of publicists, which are seen as a package deal, the LOSC represents the 
greatest landmark in the codification process of the law of the sea, and a 
momentous event in the history of international law as a whole. 
Part 11: Saudi Arabia: General Background 
Saudi Arabia was formally founded, carrying the official name of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 23,1932, by King Abdulaziz Al Sa'ud and 
became a member of the United Nations on June 26,1945 85 . The Kingdom, which 
has a population of about 17 million (according to the 1991 official census), is 
divided for administrative purposes into thirteen provinces 86 . 
1. Saudi Arabia and the Sea 
1.1 Geographical Setting_of the Kinedom 
Geographical position is a very important factor in granting power to a 
state. Throughout history, it has become clear that the great nations are those 
which overlook oceans and have long coastlines. Mahan identified six conditions 
which influenced the sea power of states: the location of the state, the nature of its 
coastline, the length of its coastline, the number of citizens, the national character, 
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and the quality of governments'. The first three of these conditions refer to 
geographical setting. No doubt strategic position gives a state several advantages 
that cannot be enjoyed by a land-locked state. Thus, a favourable geographical 
location is one which affords a state access to the oceans and influences the extent 
to which it can control strategic shipping routes and important natural resources88. 
As far as Saudi Arabia is concemed, it is located in the south west of Asia, 
with a land area of 2,240,000 square kilometres (i. e. 865,000 square miles). It Is 
the largest country in the Arabian peninsula, occupying some 80% of the total 
area89. It is bounded by Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan to the north, Yemen and Oman to 
the south, the Red Sea to the west, and the Arabian Gulf, Oman, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait to the east. The country (as shown in Map 1) has a 
very distinguished location. On the one hand , it is bordered by two strategically 
and economically significant seas: the Arabian Gulf to the east and the Red Sea to 
the west. The latter connects the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean. On the 
other hand, the Kingdom represents a link between mainland Asia and Affica. 
With a coastal length of about 2320 kilometres (1760 on the Red Sea and 560 on 
the Arabian Gulf)90, the Kingdom has many scattered islands, most of which are 
uninhabited. Among them are Al-Arabyah, Tarat and Hanna in the Gulf and 
Farasan, Tiran, Sanafir, Sa'ad, Reman, No'aman, Zafer, Wagdah and Lobenah in 
the Red Sea. 
1.2 The Saudi Economy and Marine Resources 
Petroleum and its products are the most important industry in Saudi Arabia. 
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities at Dammam in 1938 by the American 
fin-n, Standard Oil Company of California, which had been granted a petroleum 
concession for exploration in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom on May 29, 
193391. Saudi Arabia has the world's biggest proven resources of petroleum, 
officially stated to be 255,000 million barrels in January, 1990. The Kingdom is the 
biggest petroleum Producer within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) (with 27.0% of the organization's output in 1990), and the third 
biggest producer in the world (with around 10.3% of world output in 
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Map 1: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as surrounded by the Red Sea in the west 
and the Arabian Gulf in the east. 
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1990)"-1. Saudi Arabia is a fOLIndingy member of each of the OPEC and the 
Oroanization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPE C)93. Most oil fields 
sprcýid within the territorial waters in the Gulfand opposite to it landwards. This 
arý2, i contains the laruest submemed oil t-icid in the world., namely At-Saffaniah 
fi CId, )-4 . All these factors are reflected in the Saudi Arabian marine policy. whether 
concci-ning national claims or the metliod of determining maritime boundaries with 
opposite or , idjacý-, nt states in the Gulf. 
Bý2sid,, s oil. -(, as is anotlier irilpOrtallt I-CSOLII-Ce in Saudi Arabia. According 
to i , wdy niadc hy --\RAMCO in JL111LIL-11-V I 9, ý"). the Kingdom's proven (gas reserves 
3 were estiniated at 1 1-1 71.3 billion Cubic fcet". \Liny iiatural gas fields are also %vithin 
the territorial waters of the Kinudoin in the -\rabian Gulf. The country is also 1-ich 
in mineral deposits. According to the Fourth Five Year Plan (1985-1990), (gold has 
been discovered at some 600 sites around the Kingdom. Other minerals have also 
been discovered. such as silver. bauxite, copper. iron, lead, tin and zinc"". Many of 
these deposits are in the Red Sea. 
Historically, the Arabian Gulf was noted for its pearls. Vaptel made special 
mention of these resources saying in his Le di-oit des gens sou pi-incipes tie la loi 
i wtw-clle in 1785: 
I'T'ho can doubt the peai-I fisheries qf'Bahi-ain and Ce_vIon niay be 
,ý 17 laii. fid objects of oivnei-ship . 
Although commercial pearling is considered now as defunct, 
98 the fishing industry 
is an important one. In 1988, the Kingdom's total fishing catch was 46,773) tons, 
an amount which satisfied about one half of the total local demand. The 
contribution of the agriculture sector (including forestry and fishing) of the gross 
domestic product was 7.3% in 1989". 
Moreover, the waters of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf are of special 
significance to the Kingdom, which has no rivers and suffers a lack of rainwater. 
In the light of these facts, the waters of the Red Sea and the Gulf, after 
desalination, are one of the Kingdom's main sources of drinking water, especially 
for the people of the Western and Eastern areas respectively. In 1995, Saudi daily 
production of desalinated water was more than 5 nullion gallons, produced by 
22 
24 
desalination plants. This quantity, which amounts to some 30% of the world total. 
is unequalled anywhere else in the world'oo. 
Finally, the industry of maritime transport is of essential significance to 
Saudi Arabia. Ninety per cent of the Kingdom's imports, and 95% of her exports 
are transported via the sea"'. In 1994 the trade exchanges of the Kingdom via the 
102 sea (excluding crude oil) amounted to more than 83 million tons . Some 9,000 
tankers and ships arri,,,, ed in the Saudi ports in 1993"'. These statistics reflect the 
, (), reat importance of the sea for Saudi Arabia in terms of economy and commerce. 
The sea for Saudi Arabia, however, is not significant only in terms of its 
commercial and economic benefits. Strategically, the Red Sea and the Arabian 
Gulf have been of exceptional significance throughout the ages, not only to the 
Kingdom or even to the region, but to the whole international community. The I= I, -) 
geographic setting, the strategic and economic aspects and lecral regimes of both Z: ý - t: ) 
seas, will be separately discussed in the following pages. 
2. The Red Sea 
The Red Sea, an area of sea resulting from the Great African Fault, 
separates the Arabian Peninsula from the African Continent. Its area is about 
128,000 square nautical miles, and it is connected to the Arabian Sea and Indian 
104 Ocean through the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb . 
In the north, the Red Sea branches 
into two subsidiary water bodies, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of Suez, which in 
turn, is linked with the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. The length of the Sea 
from Bab-el-Mandeb to the Gulf of Suez is about 1380 miles and its average 
breadth is around 170 miles. The Sea is narrow in the north and the south; the 
greatest distance between its coasts , around 190 miles, is 
between the Kingdom 
and Eritrea, but at its narrowest, between Eritrea and Yemen, the Sea is only some 
40 miles wide. The waters of the Red Sea are shallow; 10,000 feet at the deepest 
point. It has eight littoral states (Jordan, Israel, Egypt, the Sudan, Eritrea, 
Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia), and about 379 islands 105, of Which 144 belong 
to Saudi Arabia'0'. 
The predominant bathymetric features of the Red Sea are: 
(a) a sheýf along the shore; 
(b) a inainjýult trough running almost the entire length, within which 
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there is'. 
(I dccp axial I/ zh 
The Red Sea is regarded as one of the most important routes In the world. 
The economic and strategic significance of this sea motivated the great powers to 
seek to assert a dominant Influence over it ind the surroundint4 temtories I (' S. Via 
the Strait of Jubal (at the entrance to the Suc/ Canal in the north) and the Strait of 
Bab-cl-Vlandcb in the south, the Red Sci has been seen as a communication artery 
cast-wcst ind a main transit I-OLItC bem-c-ci-I the Northern and Southern 
hernisplicres, ýInce the Suez Canal was excavated in 1869. reducing the distance 
from Britain. t-or cxample, to Bombav (India). Singapore, and Hong Kong. by 
43300, 
-333300. anýd '). ')()0 miles respectively Thus. the Red Sea has become the 
ideal medium ý'or transporting international trade. not only for littoral states, but 
also for the International community. 
Militarily. the Red Sea, which links the Mediterranean with the Indian 
Ocean, has been an arena of dominion between the two super powers during the 
Coid War. -\]so, the existence of Israel since 1948 at the head of the Gulf of 
Aqaba has created a new strategic dimension for the Red Sea within the context of 
the long conflict between Israel and the Arab States including Saudi Arabia' 1 0. The 
Red Sea and its straits are of (,. ),, reat significance at the regional level, representing a 
vital source of natural resources, whether living or non-living. Experiments made 
by scientific research vessels have proved the existence of many kinds of minerals, 
such as gold, lead, copper, magnesium, iron, nickel, zinc and silver'. Moreover, 
some one thousand different species of fish are known to inhabit the Red Sea. Of 
these, about one hundred have not been found outside of the Red Sea and are 
therefore known as Red Sea endemics' 
For several reasons, Saudi Arabia has a particular interest in the Red Sea , in 
terms of economy and politics. The Red Sea coastal area is the most fertile part of 
the state. On its coasts, there is the largest dry cargo port of the Kingdom, Jeddah, 
which is considered also as a passage to the holy places in Mecca and Medina. On 
the Red Sea, there are also the sea ports of Jizan and Yanbu. The latter contains 
one of the most important industrial cities in the country. With these three ports, 
the Red Sea is a key route for Saudi imports and exports. The pipeline from the oil 
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fields in the Eastern Province has enhanced the Red Sea's importance as a major oil 
traffic lane. In addition to what the Red Sea contains of natural resources , its 
waters (after desalination) are, as mentioned earlier, a major resource of drinking 
water, especially for the people of the western areas. 
3. The Arabian Gulf 
Beside the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf'" represents the other arrn of the 
Indian Ocean. It cm,, ers an area of approximately 70,000 nautical Miles and has 
97/0 of its periphery occupied by land. It is joined to the Gulf of Oman to the 
south, by the Strait of Hormuz. The length of the Gulf from this strait to the Shatt- 
al-Arab (the outermost edge in the north) is approximately 430 nautical miles; 
while its maximum width is around 160 nautical miles. The narrowest part of the 
Gulf is in the Strait of Honnuz, which is the only outlet, 20.75 nautical Miles wide. 
The Gulf is a relatively shallow basin with an average depth of less than 40 metres 
and a maximum depth of about 100 metres' 14 . 
The Gulf has many coral reefs and 
15 more than 130 islands' , some of which are of serious strategic importance in 
relation to the shipping lanes within the Gulf at the approach to the Strait of 
Hormuz' 16 Eight states overlook the Gulf: Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Historically, the Arabian Gulf has played a prominent role. In addition to 
its (Teographical position as a transit route of the international trade east-west, the 
Gulf is regarded as a centre of the ancient civilizations, such as Babylon, Sumer, 
Akkad and Persia. 
Since oil was first discovered in 19081 17 , the 
Gulf has been the focal point 
for much of the superpower competition and conflict throughout the Middle East, 
North Affica and South Asia. The significance of the Gulf region today, whether 
for its states or to other powers outside it, is defined largely in terms of oil and gas, 
with 57% of the world's proven oil reserves and 26% of the world's natural gas 
reserves in the region''s. This particular economic importance of the Gulf was the 
main reason behind the intensive presence of the military fleets of the superpowers 
therein during the eight year Iran-Iraq war''9. Also, the desire to maintain the free 
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flo, Iv of oil and gas from the i-egion %vas a major purpose of the intemational 
111111tarv expeditloii following the Iraqi IflVaSIOll Of KLIwait in 
Au_(TUSt 1990. 
To SaLIC11 Arabia. the Gulf IS her second marine lung. The Gulf territorial 
sea and its adjacent coasts coi-it, -. iiri. Lis iiieiitioiied earlier, the main sources of (Tross 
domestic proclLict. petroleLin-i and its proCILICts and natural gas' On the Gulfs 
coasts irc situated Dammam sea port. SaLidi Arabia's second most important 
commci-ý2ial -ýcLi port. and Ribavl sca port. which constItLites the other bi-(), indLIStnial 
c1tv Hi the Kim-rdom. FLirthermore. its waters. after desalination, are a main source 
of drinkmL, water f'or the population of thc Eastern Province of the Kinadom. In 
rel, ition to fislierics, less si(mificai-it, bUt m importance, is the fishing 
potential III thC GUlf' ". Fimilly, the GLIlf Witil its pleasant coasts and cities, is an 
attractl\ e arca for tourists. 
4. The Leý! al Status of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf as Enclosed or 
Semi-enclosed Seas 
The notion of "enclosed or semi-enclosed seas" was not an international 
issue until the 1970s. For instance, the Geneva Conventions are silent on the 
question. The concept of "enclosed or semi-enclosed seas" was raised only in the 
debates of UNCLOS 111, in connection with the concept of the EEZ, and was put 
on the ao-enda of the Second Committee of the Conference. 
During the deliberations of the Conference there were different views on I: ) 
this question. The discussion focused basically on the definition of the concept, its 
probable legal status, the preservation of the marine environment In such seas, 
international navigation through such seas, and the rights of bordering states. The Zý 
Soviet argument, for instance, was based on its idea of securing recognition of 
closed or regional seas as a separate concept withiin the international law of the 
sea. It was in this context that the delegate of the Soviet Union to UNCLOS III 
declared: 
First: a clear distinction must be made between enclosed and semi- 
enclosed areas. From a juridical point of view, enclosed seas were 
comparatively small, had no outlet to the ocean, and did not serve 
as international shipping routes in the broadest sense. In the case 
qf'such seas, the legal regime might include certain peculiarities 
on the basis of existing international agreements and international 
custom. Semi-enclosed seas, on the other hand, were large bodies 
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oj'water with several outlets through which passed international 
wateriva - vs. 
They had never been subject to an 'v special regime. Almost an 'v sea could 
be called semi-enclosed, and to compare 
122 such seas ivith enclosed seas would be quite unjustified ... 
In so arguing, however, the Soviet Union wanted some enclosed seas, such as the 
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Okhotsk Seas and the Sea of Japan as "closed" or 
"regional" seas, and held that such seas should be governed by a regime established 
by agreement between the littoral states only 123 Several states such as Finland, 
Denmark, Sweden, France, Greece and Iran shared the same view 124 Iran, a 
bordering state to the Arabian Gulf, had this to say on this issue: 1. 
the problems raised h-v the semi-enclosed seas with regard to the 
management oJ'their resources, international navigation and the 
preservation oJ'the marine environment justified granting them a 
particularstatits constituting an exception to the general rule. 125 
Iran held that the said problems of these seas could only be solved within the 
framework of regional or bilateral arrangements. The likely reason for this was 
that Iran, as a strong state in the Gulf, wanted to keep her control over navigation 
through the Strait of Hormuz. 
Iraq, on the other hand. the other northern littoral state on the Gulf (with a 
coastline of only some 10 nautical miles), was of the view that special rules on 
enclosed and semi-enclosed seas should be incorporated into the Law of the Sea 
Convention. Although the Iraqi representative described the regional arrangement 
as : 
essential to ensure the implementation oa joint policy for the ýf 
conservation and management of living resources, pollution 
prevention and control, 
he considered it as: 
vital to his countn, to haveftee transit through that Strait (Strait of 
Hormuz) andfi-eedoin of navigation in the area as a whole. 
Therefore, (according to the Iraqi representative), 
the convention should embody principles regulatin-o, the legitimate 
uses o semi-enclosedseas and the rights of coastal states. )f 
The other Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, did not participate in this 
debate during the Conference deliberations. However these states were divided 
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with re, -Yard to the legal status of the Gulf. On the one hand Oman, a state 
strategically placed at the entrance of the Gulf (in the south) was of the view that 
the entire waters of the Gulf should be approached within the territorial waters, 
since such an approach would enable her. along with Iran, to control navigation 
thrOLH-111 the Strait of Horrnuz'l On the other hand, all the other Gulf states. 
includhig SaLidi Arabia, were in faVOUr of the traditional status of the Gulf as an 
open sea for international navigation beyond the territorial waters 128 . 
As to the Red Sea, navigation was the most important obsession for the 
delcuatioi-is of the states concerned, during, the debates of the Conference. SLich 
%vas the case witi-i Israel and former Democratic Yernen. Having referred to the 
Red Sea and its straits (Juba and Tiran in the north, and Bab-el-Mandeb in the 
South), the Israeli representative expressl. y said: 
The 
. 
11-ccdolns q( nai, iaation and oi-ci * -111*ghi inust t-etain 
theh* 
pi-ioi-i'ýi, in ihosc semi-enclosed scas, esj)ccialh, as thel, did not 
aftect the consumptNe itse ofthesea and iis i'csow'ces 
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. 
In response to this statement (without mentioning the Israeli delegation by name), Zý 
the representative of the fon-ner Democratic Yemen expressed the view that such 
an approach was unrealistic, for several reasons: 
First, the Red Sea was a semi-enclosed sea only in respect of 
matters relating to pollution. SecondIv, the Red Sea was not semi- 
enclosed in respect of* international shipping. ... 
Thirdly, his 
delegation could not accept the con(-, cpt of free passage for all 
vessels orfree oveýflightjbr all aircrqft in a vital region that was 
subject to heavy straits traffic. Application of that concept would 
lead to chaos and would threaten international shipping and the 
security, political independence and territorial integrity of the 
coastal states. Fourthlv, the question qf navigation in the straits 
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must he decided on the principle of innocentpassage. 
Although Saudi Arabia did not participate in this debate during the 
Conference, the Saudi practice has been supportive of the idea of allowing innocent 
passage in the territorial sea 13 ' and through international straits. The Saudi 
understanding on the concept of international straits was, until recently, that only 
those straits which link two parts of the high seas are international straits 
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. 
However, the product of UNCLOS 111, the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea earmarked Part IX for the question of "enclosed 
.3 
or semi-enclosed seas". Article 122 defines two categories of sea spaces as 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. The first one is those seas surrounded by more 
than one state and connected to the open sea by a narrow outlet. As for this 
category, no specific dimensions are identified; indeed, the issue of size is omitted. 
The second category is the seas which are limited in area and consisting entirely or 
pni-narily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more 
coastal states, regardless of whether or not they have outlets to the open sea' 33 . 
According to this definition and its requirements, both the Arabian Gulf and 
the Red Sea (in the light of their geographical features mentioned above) fall within 
the category of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. In relation to the Gulf, it is 
connected to the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Horrnuz, while its waters consist 
entirely of the territorial waters and exclusive zones of the littoral zones. The Red 
Sea is also subject to this status. It is connected to the ocean through the Strait of 
Bab-el-Mandeb in the soLith, regardless of the doubts around the Suez Canal (as an 
artificial outlet) linking it with the Mediterranean. Moreover, like the Gulf, the 
Red Sea consists entirely of the exclusive economic zones of the littoral states. 
However, the description of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf as semi- 
enclosed seas under the LOSC definition (Article 122), not only accords with the 
geographical features of both seas, but is also in keeping with the historical facts I-D 
and the essential economic and strategic interests of the littoral states therein as 
marine outlets for the imports and exports of such states. Turning to the relevant 
provisions of the LOSC, what is worth noting is that despite the fact that the 
Convention introduced the new concept of closed and semi-enclosed seas, the legal 
status of such seas and the rights and duties of littoral states have not been 
identified in the LOSC. Article 122 was satisfied with defining the term, and the 
only other article dealing with the concept (Article 123) was content with inviting 
the bordering states to co-ordinate their efforts concerning the issues of the 
management of scientific research and living resources, and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. Thus, under the Convention no new 
rights have been granted to the coastal states, nor have duties been 
imposed upon a 
third party. Instead, the LOSC invites the relevant states to co-ordinate and 
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cooperatc in th, ý exercise of their rights and obligations established by the 
Convention. This. however, represents one of the failed attempts of the 
Convcntion to create a more meaningful regirne to govem enclosed and semi- 
enclosed seas. 
it], n-'spect to the Gulf and Red Sea , tatcs. there were some indications of 
this co-orcration. even before the LOSUs Invitation. Such indications could be 
found III the agreements conclUded between the coastal states of both regions. In 
the Arabian (julf we find that Lill the C1211t GLI]f states (Iraq, Iran, Oman, United 
Arah Emirates. Oatar, Bahrain and SLILICII ArLibia) are in,,,, olved in the Kuwait 
ConNý2ntlon tbr Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
POHLItIOn Of 197/8 ýind its Protocols' On protecting the environment of the Red 
Sea. there Is the Jecidah Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Marine 
Environment of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden of 1982, and its protocol 135 - 
The I)arties to this convention are Jordan. Somalia. Palestine (represented by the 
Palestine Liberation Organization), Sudan and Saudi Arabia (these are all Arab 
states). fsrael is not a party, since it was not recognized by the Arab states. Egypt 
and Ethiopia (before the recent independence of Eritrea) were not parties either, 
because of political disagreements, namely the conclusion of the 1979 Camp David 
Agreement between Egypt and Israel and the existence of diplomatic relations 
between Ethiopia and Israel at that time. 
Another model of co-operation is represented by the 1974 Agreement 
between Sudan and Saudi Arabia Relating to the Joint Exploration of the Natural 
Resources of the Sea-Bed and Sub-Soil of the Red Sea m the Common Zone 136. It 
is clear that these forms of co-operation are modest and do not fulfil the 
requirements of Article 123 of the LOSC. There is no co-operation in the fields of 
scientific research policies and the management of the living resources of the two 
seas. What is more, even the collective efforts to protect the marine environment, 
represented in the said conventions and their protocols, as the clearest form of co- 
operation, have not been effective and have been affected by the political 
disaggreements between the parties. This was obvious during the eight year war 
between Iran and Iraq, when both sides resorted to mining the Arabian Gulf waters 
and bombing each other's oil tankers, which led to pollution of the Gulf water. 
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This, however, took place, even though both states are parties to the 1978 Kuwait 
Convention and its protocols. In 1990, a similar thing happened, but in a different 
way. Some 10- 15 million barrels of crude oil from the Kuwaiti oil fields were 
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poured into the Gulf waters' . This action was deliberately taken by Iraq, a state 
party to the Kuwait Convention! Without doubt, disagreements between the 
region's states have always been the major obstacle in the way of achieving more 
co-operation in the different fields referred to in Article 123 of the LOSC. 
Although there are differences among the states of the region with regard to 
broader political issues. there is no reason why these states should not be 
persuaded to come together to address the marine issues of the region. Such co- 
operation has been achieved in many other parts of the world. However, to 
achieve more co-operation on the various marine issues, the states concerned are 
invited to undertake to resolve problems of direct relationship to these co- 
operation issues, such as those related to maritime boundaries. 138 
5. The Legal Sj, stem of Saudi Arabia 
5.1 Islamic Sharia as a Source of Laws 
Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state and its laws and regulations are entirely 
based on the Shat-Pa. For Muslims, the Sharia is a perfect and comprehensive 
system of life. It is regarded as divine law, taking the fon-fl of a communication 
concerning human behaviour, whether ordering, prohibiting or authorising actions, 
and moreover, it is viewed by Muslims to be a body of commandments, religious, 
legal and social, given by Allah (God) through his Prophet Moharnmed 
139. The 
adopting of the Sharia as a source of laws in Saudi Arabia has been time and again 
mentioned by the Saudi monarchs 
140 
. This principle is also confirmed 
in the new 
Basic Regulations of Rule 
141 
of 1992 and the Consultative Council (The Shura 
142 
Council) Regulations of 1992 
Islamic Sharia has four primary sources: 
(1) The "Quran", which Muslims believe to be the very word of God; 
(ii) The "Sunna", which means the sayings and deeds of the Prophet 
Mohammed, 
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(iii) The "Ijcmah". or the COIISCIISLIS of . ýcholars. 
This source is resorted to 
when there is no specific text in the two previous sources to deal with a 
Specific qLIeStIOII: 
Ov) I The "Kias' or analogy. This the application of specific rules 
that h, -, id been applied in similar previous cases, to the matters In 
ql. ILý', 11011. in the absence of limited and specific rules in the Quran and 
the ', --)Linna" 
AS SOUrCCS Of ISIal-1-11C laW. , Iic Quran and the Sunna contain very 
detailcd proviýions on questions Linchangeibic by the passa(-,, e of time (e. (-Y. personal 
status. such a,,, divorce. heritage. lcý-! itunacv as well as cnminal law etc. ). 
BUt as a comprc liens i ve system of life. Islati-i1c law does not cover every single 
hunian action. in detail. otherwise there would come a time when the Islamic rules 
\VOUld be OUt of date. which would coiiflict \\ith the view of the Sharl"a as a 
SyStC111 belICVCd by N11LISIMIS to apply to all time and all places. In the light of these 
dealings, MUS11111 scholars began to devise guidelines and provisions based on the Z7 
principles of the Sharia. to cope with recent developments. This led to the 
emergence of several schools of Islamic law: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali 
schools. Differences among these schools, however, are related to the 
interpretation of some texts of the Quran and the Sunna, and of no antagonistic 
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nature Saudi Arabia officially follows the Hanbali school, which is regarded, by 
and large, as more conservative. The Organic Instructions of the Hijazi Kingdom 
of 1926 (as amended m 1932 and 1958) state that the main source of law in Saudi 
Arabia is the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence 145 . 
Nevertheless, the other 
schools are not excluded. This was affirmed by King Abdalaziz, the founder of the 
Kingdom, when he ordered the judges: 
not to be bound by the rules of one school oj'jurisprudence to the 
exclusion of all others, even ivhere this would constitute a violation 
of the rights of a party who expects the decision to be made in 
accordance with the school oj'his ajfzliation "'. 
5.2 The Constitution 
It has been stated above that all Saudi regulations are derived basically from 
the Shm-ia. However, in the contemporary sense of the term, until recently, Saudi 
Arabia's constitution was embodied in the Council of Ministers Regulations 
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of 1958 as amended 147, . On March 2,1992, two major new laws were issued: the 
Basic Regulations of Rule and the Consultative Council Regulations 148 . In 
addition, the 1958 Council of Ministers Regulations were amended on August 20, 
1993 149 . These three laws represent the constitutional system of Saudi Arabia"O. 
Among these, the Basic Regulations of Rule, in its 83 articles, lays down a 
comprehensive constitutional framework for government. It was stated that these 
Regulations, as such, did not bring about a completely new constitutional 
framework, but rather. a mere codification of fragnnented constitutional principles 
%vhich had been adopted and applied in the country and derived main-ly from 
Islarnic, traditional and international theories". This is true,, but , in any case, the 
tliree aforesaid laws are of major importance , in that, together they 
form the first 
contemporary extensive written constitution in the Kingdom. 
5.3 The Judiciarv 
The Saudi judiciary system consists of two kinds of courts: 
I. The Shari'ah Courts: The Shari'ah Courts are administered by the Ministry 
of Justice (established in 1970, subject to the detailed rules laid down in the 
Judicial Regulations of 1975 152 . 
There are several levels of these courts 153 
(a) Courts of first instance. These courts contain two categories: 
(1) The lower courts which deal only with minor claims and sit with one 
judge; 
(ii) General courts which have universal jurisdiction over all civil and 
criminal cases. 
(b) Courts of Appeal. There are two appellate courts, one based in Riyadh 
and the other in Mecca. Their task is to hear appeals from the lower 
courts. 
(c) The Supreme Judicial Council. This Council which is constituted from 
among the body of Saudi religious scholars, is the highest authority in the 
system. Its functions are: reviewing all major criminal cases before 
judgement is executed, interpreting novel points of the Sharia, reviewing 
cases where the Appeal Court fails to reach the requisite majority *in 
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I-CLISSCS's I, (, existl . 'no- principIcs. or %vhere the Minister of Justice withholds 
his approval, and ISSUin(! opinions (lataiva) on Shana questions at the 
,, eqLie, -, t of the Minister of Justicc. 
Administrative Tribunals: In addition to the Shan'ah Courts, numerous 
SCIIII-JUdICUll orgrans haNe been cstablished by royal decrees. These 
Specialized tribunals are COIICCMCd With SCCI-Ilar matters, nonetheless. the 
SILIl'i''(1 I) Still thC SUPFC111C 'LILItlI0rItV in every case 1ý4 Of these tribunals 
0 -C 1LýI 
:: -, the R)oLird of Grievances'5". 
11-ic Commercial Papers Committee. 
the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes; 
the Commercial Agyency Commission, 
I- 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary . -\gency Committee for Banking Disputes, I-- 
the Primarv and Supreme Commission for Labour Disputes, 
the Civil Rights Directorate. 
In addition to the Shan'ah courts and the specialized tribunals, arbitration is 
recog), nized as a means for the settlement of disputes within the Saudi jurisdiction. 
157 This systern is oro-anized by the Regulations on Arbitration of 1983 
tt is to be noted, finally, that concerning the international Jurisdiction of the 
Saudi courts, these courts apply the nationality principle, according to which, 
disputes against a Saudi national can be heard even if his domicile is outside the 
Saudi territory (Article 23 of the Civil Procedure Rules of the Shari'ah. Courts of 
1989'ý". On the other hand, the Saudi courts' jurisdiction can extend to contain 
foreigners whose residence is outside the Kingdom under the following 
circumstances: 
If the subject matter of the dispute is assets located within the Kingdom; 
If the dispute emerges in connection with a contract concluded in the Kingdom; 
If the dispute arises in connection with a contract which specifies the Kingdom 
as the place of contractual performance; 
If the dispute arises in connection with bankruptcy declared in the Kingdom; 
If there are several defendants, one of whom is domiciled in the Kingdom'ý9, 
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5.4 The Executive and Lep-islative Powers 
The executive and legislative authorities are centred, in the Council of 
Ministers headed by the King. Article 19 of the Council of Ministers Regulations 
of 1993' indicates that ... the Council shall: 
prescribe the state'S policy on domestic and foreign affairs, 
finance, the eco170111_1', education, defence and all public affairs and 
shall supervise the implementation thereqf It discusses the 
resolutions of the Consultative Council. It is invested with the 
c, ývecutive power, it IS the final authority with regard to financial 
-s and all inattcrs concerned with ti7e various ministries of the 
state and other coverinnent departments. lt5 
The Council and its indi%'idUal ministers have also wide powers to enact delegated I 
le(_Tislation pursuant to Royal Decrees (Articles 67 of the Basic Regulations of 
Rule, and 21 and 22 of the Council of Ministers Regulations). 
As far as the law-making process is concerned, while traditional spheres of 
law, such as personal status are, as mentioned above, governed by the provisions of 
Islarnic Sharla, other aspects of law (such as oil, immigration and sea) are subject 
to the provisions contained in Royal decrees and delegated orders, codes, and by 
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regulations The formal procedure of legislation starts with the competent 
minister. Under Article 22 of the 1993 Council of Ministers Regulations, each 
minister has the right to submit draft regulations or a bill relating to his ministry. 
After that, the draft is to be submitted to the Consultative Council, which is, 
according to Article 15 of its Regulations, authorised to study the laws and make 
suggestions and then submit them to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the 
King). Such a draft is studied afterwards according to Article 21, by the Council, 
whose members then vote on each of the proposed articles, one by one, before the 
bill is sanctioned finally by the King. However, for those fields of law, where there 
is not a specific ministry or where there is more than one relevant ministry, a 
committee of experts in co-ordination with the Council of Ministers is to be 
entrusted to prepare the draft text of the regulation concerned. The draft is 
brought before the Council for discussion, and then submitted to the King for 
approval. This approval, which takes the form of a Royal decree, shall be 
promulgated in the Official Gazette (Umm AI-Qura), and the regulation will come 
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into force as of the date of promulgation, except where another date has been 
Provided for"''. 
It shOUld be noted. fimilly. that the tcrm "law" (qanun in Arabic) is not 
rneritioried M the Saudi legislation. Instead. terms such as Shai-ia, reg-, ulation and 
bill Lire used. The reason for this is that in the perspective of the conservative 
Saudi society. the term "law" relates specificLilly to the positive law or man-made 
laws. which do not have the same deuyrec of aLithority that Islamic Shw-i'a has. 
Ho%ýcvcr. M practice, this difference has tio significance because the Saudi 
IcL, Islation. tti-ider w'hatsoever iiarrie, has the same force, authority, and 
sai-ictiotis Lis aw, ' appropriate legislation would ha\'c in any other jurisdiction "". 
International Treaties in the Saudi Municipal Regulations 
U-ider intemational law. a state is free to adopt its own constitutioi-ial 
arram-yernent to exercise its treaty-making power. In Saudi Arabia, the making- and 
amending of treaties is usually entrusted to the competent authorities. but subject 
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to a final approval of the King in the form of a royal decree . 
Before this 
approval, the treaty is to be examined by the Council of Ministers'". As a 
consultative body, the role of the Consultative Council is limited to studying the 
agreement in question and making suggestionsl'ý. The constitutional rules on 
adoption of international treaty to which the Kingdom is party are contained in the 
Council of Ministers Resolution 1214 dated 23/9/1397 AH, as amended by 
Resolution 41 dated 12/5/1412 AH. These rules can be summarised as follows: 
(a) The Council of Ministers is the constitutional organ in charge of granting 
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full powers to the person representing the King om . 
(b) Unless provided with authorization, the minister or the representative in 
charue is not entitled even to initial a text of a treaty. Instead, the 
"initialling ad referendian" is the measure that has to be taken by the 
166 
representative - 
(C) The King, has the final authority to approve a text of treaty, but before that, Z: ) 
the text is considered in the Council of Ministers, which in turn issues a 
resolution adopting the treaty. 
(d) The Saudi representative shall formulate reservations on the text pending 
the receipt of necessary directions from the Council of Ministers 
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which 
has the right to make any amendments or reservations to the text. The 
representative is to be informed about these amendments and reservations, 
169 
pursuant to a royal direction 
At this stage, the Council shall issue a resolution authonsing the representative to 
sigm the treaty, provided that the other party accepts the said amendments and 
reservations 170 . The reservations and amendments of the other party are subject to 
the acceptance of the Council of Ministers"' 
The Kingdom, then, follows monism, since, when a royal decree is issued 
adopting a text of a treaty, it becomes part of the internal regulation without need 
to be reissued in the form of Internal legislation. 
It is clear that Resoltition 1214 was simply formulated and deals only with 
bilateral treaties. There is no mention of multilateral treaties or those which may 
be concluded with international organizations. 
5.6 Manav_ement of the Law of the Sea Issues in Saudi Arabia 
In view of the diversity of maritime issues, various nunisters and 
governmental authorities supervise one or more aspects of these affairs as follows: 
The Ministry of Communications has overall responsibility for all public law 
aspects of shipping. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the formulation of Saudi 
foreign policies, including the maritime policy. 
The Ministry of Health is in charge of the necessary procedures to prevent 
infectious diseases from coming into the country through the sea outlets. 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Water is responsible for the evaluation, 
management and development of fisheries (a company known as the Saudi 
Fisheries Company owned by the Government and a substantial number of 
private shareholders. has also been established for this purpose). 
The Ministry of Defence and Aviation, in addition to its classical task as a main 
governmental body in securing the maritime boundaries against external 
dangers, practises other roles through: 
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1. The Meteorological and Environmental Protection Administration (MEPA) 
in charge of the control of pollution and protection of the environment. 
I The \Iilitary SUrvey Department (%ISD), responsible for drawing mantime 
maps and re(LyUlatino- the operations of scientific research in the mantime zones 
of the Killudoin. 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Miiieral RCSOUrces oversees the extraction of 
oI] and minerals. 
The Ministry of Interior. through the Gencral Department for Frontier and 
Coast (-Juard. is i-csponsible for watching and (-TLiarding the marine boundaries. 
The Nfinlstrv of Commerce is of particular importance to shipping; among 
other responsibilities, it super%ises the Committee for Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes, whicli is the coiiipemit tribunal in most shipping 
disputes. 
The Saudi Seaports Authority is in charge of the administration of the country's 
ports. 
The National Commission for Wildlife is responsible for flora and fauna in both 
the marine and terrestrial environments. 
The Environmental Protection Co-ordinating Committee (EPCC), has the task 
of co-ordinating the activities of the various government bodies involved in 
environmental protection. 
The Planning Mimstry is responsible for formulating national development 
plans to which the other Ministry's plans must conform. 
These are the main ministries and institutions in charge, directly or 
indirectly, of the Nation's maritime affairs. The existence of this relatively great 
number of government organs might result in some conflict of interest or 
overlapping of responsibilities. Therefore it would be very useful if there were a 
committee (similar to the EPCC), the function of which would be to co-ordinate 
the activities of all bodies whose responsibilities include maritime issues. 
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5.7 Saudi Arabia and the Law of the Sea Conventions 
As a country with a coastal length of more than 2300 kilometres, Saudi 
Arabia must be one of the states concerned with the law of the sea. Indeed, the 
King-dorn participated in the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the 
Sea. Nonetheless, the Kingdom (as well as all Arab States with the exception of 
Tunisia which made reservation on Article 16(4) of the TSC) did not sign the 1958 
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, mainly because of the rejection of the 
Saudi proposal calling for a twelve mile territorial sea, and the recognition of the 
rio-l-it of innocent passage for Israel through the Gulf of Aqaba and its Straits' 72. 
However, since it is impossible to separate legal positions fTom political 
considerations, the perspective of concerned states in the Middle East on certain 
issues of the law of the sea has started to shift as a result of the climate of peace, 
which emerged in the area since the visit of Sadat of Egypt to Israel in 1979. 
Although the TSC principle of innocent passage was reproduced in Article 45 of 
the Law of the Sea Convention, the Kingdom signed the Convention on 7 
December 1984 173. Some twelve years later (24 April 1996), the Saudi 
Government ratified the Convention 174 ý 
by virtue of the Royal Decree No. M/ 17, 
dated 31 January 1996' 15 In this Decree, Saudi Arabia has also accepted the 
provisions of the Part XI Agreement. During the period 1984-1996, the Kingdom, 
however, did not challenge the Law of the Sea Convention, but rather, she, as a 
signatory state, refrained from acts defeating the object and purpose of the t) 
Convention. In that respect, Saudi Arabia's behaviour was in conformity with 
Article 18(9) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
confirms this principle"'. Benefiting from the text of Article 310 of the Law of the 
Sea Convention 177 , 
Saudi Arabia, when ratifying, issued a number of declarations in 
%, ý,, hich she clarified 
her position towards certain issues, particularly navigation 
178 
through the straits and territorial sea of the coastal state 
Conclusion 
The sea for Saudi Arabia is a matter of life. The economy of the country 
depends to a large extent on the sea, as a commercial waterway, a source of 
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desalinated waters. living resources. and i-nore importantly as a source of oil and 
natural (-Yas. Security considerations have also been present, particularly since the 
creation of Israel in 1948. Aware of these facts. the Kingdom has given serious 
attention to the law of the sea and w, -cis accordinufly an effective participant at the 
Law of the Sea Conferences. The Kingdoi-i-i was at the forefront of the Region's 
countries in Issuing- its own national legrisiation identifying and affirming its 
Jurisdiction , ind sovereignty over its i-naritinic zones. The increased number of 
marinc issue,, is also evident from the creation and diversification of governmental 
sti-LICtures tliat deal with the oceans. Although. as will be seen below, 
chronologically. it was accidental in certain cases. Saudi Arabia's practice in the 
law of the sea has been to some extent in parallel with the development of the 
inter-national law of the sea itself. This is evident in the recent ratification by the 
Saudi Government of the Law of the Sea Convention (April 1996), which only 
entered into force in November 1994. 
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Chapter 11 
Baselines, Inland Waters and Gulfs and Straits 
Introduction 
Thi,, chapter is divided into two parts. Nrt I will discuss the question of 
baselines froni %ý, hich all niaritinic zones are measured. Light will be thrown upon 
their geography mid the evolution (I their drawing, through Juristic opinion, 
Judicial decisions, international custoni and conventional rules. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the Saudi Arabian practice. which will be assessed in the 
11-(Tht of international standards. Part 11 %%, ill examine first the development of the 
legal regime of internal waters, includi (-,, ýý III in_ ports, 
bays and straits. Afterward, the 
Saudi policy and attitudes on the internal waters will be discussed. At UNCLOS f, 
Saudi Arabia claimed the Gulf of Aqaba as an internal closed Arab sea, and denied 
the application of the principle of non-suspendable innocent passage as to the Strait 
of Tiran linking the Gulf of Aqaba with the Red Sea. At UNCLOS 111, Saudi 
Arabia raised the question of straits coni'iectin(1- two parts of the high seas or EEZs 
(such as the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz), along with that of 
straits linking one part of the high seas with another part of the high seas or the 
territorial sea of another state. Thus, these issues, in addition to the impact of the 
1979 Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel over the Saudi position, 
and the question of sovereignty over the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir, will be 
examined in Part III of this chapter, against the provisions of international law. 
Part 1: Baselines 
In the international law of the sea, the term "baseline" has an essential 
importance, since it represents the line from which the outer limit of the maritime 
legal regimes(the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf) are measured. Claims of national jurisdiction over coastal waters 
have varied through the ages. Nevertheless, there is consensus among jurists that 
such claims should be measured from a common base point', at which land and 
water meet the coast2 . For legal purposes, the term "coast" is controversial and no 
constant meaning is attributable to It3. In many instances, this expression has been 
used in terms of the land, but it can also include the waters adjacent to the land, 
thouGh it is questionable whether it includes offshore features'. In the legal sense, 
there is also a division of opinion, whether the "coast" means the line where the 
inainlai-id meets the salt water, or the line representing the general trend of the 
i-nainland, excluding indentations. However, in the Alaska Bounda case, the 
Ariulo-Arnerican Arbitral Tribunal found that the term "coast" used in the Anglo- 
Russian Treaty of 1825 was not intended to include either the fringe of offshore 
islands or the continental rnainland'. 
In practice, the geographical nature of the coast has great influence on the 
coastal state's marine policy. The coastal topography determines a state's baseline 
wl-iich, as mentioned above, is used for determining the claims to different maritime 
zones. For instance, coastlines which are deeply indented, such as the fjord coasts 
of Norway and Southern Chile, or which have a chain of islands in the vicinity of 
the coast,, are entitled to draw straight baselines and convert the landmark waters 
to internal waters. A state with a wide offshore continental margin may claim more 
natural resources found on or beneath the continental shelf Moreover, the use of 
offshore areas will be influenced by the coast's characteristics and by the nature of 
the offshore waters and atmosphere'. 
The "coast" was established in the legal sense by the mid-nineteenth 
century, as there was general consensus among states that the "sinuosities of the 
coast" should be followed in order to draw the baseline from which the maritime 
zones are to be drawn'. In reality, the use of the "coast" for the said purpose is not 
so easy, but is surrounded by difficulties. There are numerous reasons why the 
meeting-point of sea and land varies over time. Some of these reasons are 
predictable, but others are random. Most of the variations in the location of the 
coastline are due to movements of the sea surface produced by several factors, 
such as tidal forces, meteorological conditions(e. g. winds and air pressure), and 
oceanographical conditions(e. g. water temperature or current velocities). Sea level 
rise, for example, is one of the more likely consequences of global warming and for 
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M-Istal arcLls. it will certainly be one of' its i-nost important impacts 9. A small but 
extremely significant long-term change in sea level is caused by the melting of 
(flaciers. thus increasing the total volume of water. Besides, random oceanic and 
atmospheric forces, Such aS storm SLIMICS. earthquakes, landslides, human 
interventions and climatic changes affect the constructure of the coast. Other 
chanues may take place as a resLilt of i-novenients of the land surface'o. 
Despite all these probicnis. the "coast" In a legal sense has been established. 
but a question has arisen over the (geographical points on the coast that mav, be 
Used to draw the baseline. an issLIC Which Will be discussed in the following section. 
Basefines under International Law 
Under international law, two kinds of lines are adopted: the low-water 
linc'' and the , traluht baseline. 
1.1 The Low-Water Line (Normal Baseline) 
The low-water mark was first pointed to in the Fishery Convention of 1839 
between Great Britain and France'2, and was reaffirmed as a practical standard in 
the North Sea Fishery Convention of 1882". The question was also discussed in 
14 
the Intemational Hydrographical Conferences of 1919,1926 and 1952 . States 
have always favoured this concept, rather than the high-water mark or the average 
level of all vertical movements, since the further the baselines are placed from the 
coast the greater the area of sea under coastal state sovereignty as the outer limit is 
also extended'ý. 
In terrns of codification, the history of baselines has generally paralleled that 
of the territorial sea. With regard to low-tide mark, the first co-ordinated attempt 
to codify customary rules at the international level, saw the light of day in 1926. In 
its Report of 1926, the Sub-Committee appointed by the League of Nations 
Con-u-nittee of Experts(establi shed in 1924), declared that: 
the aeneral practice of states, all projects of codification, and the 4t) 
prei,, ailing doctrine agree 1. n considering that the baseline should 
be the low--vvater niark- along, the coast 16 . 
At the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, the question was discussed and the 
discussion on the topic provided that the low-water line along the entire coast was 
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the appropriate baseline, except where particular configurations required deviations 
from the main coastline''. Although efforts to reach agreement on a common 
definition of the concept failed, the preparatory work at the Conference shaped the 
(), round on which the friternational Law Commission based its work when it was 
required to consider the topic of the territorial sea again in the early 1950s. 
The most decisive effect on the low-water mark as a baseline, was achieved 
by the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwe(gian Fisheries case of 1951. The Court was mainly 
required to decide whether the straight baseline method used by the Norwegians to 
define their territorial sea was within international law. The Court held that: 
it had no di iculti, infinding that, for the purpose of measuring the 
breadth Ql'the ierritorial sea, it is the low-water mark as opposed 
to the high-water mark, or the mean between the two tides, which 
has generally been adopted in the practice oj'states. This criterion 
is the most javourable to the coastal state and clearly shows the 
18 character oj'territorial water as appurtenant to the land territory . 
This judgment gave a very important impetus to the customary rule of adopting the 
low-water line as the base from which to measure the breadth of the territorial sea 
and subsequently the other maritime zones. 
In the codification context, the efforts of the International Law Commission 
resulted in the adoption of Article 3 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, which 
provides that: 
the normal baseline 
- 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea 
is the low-watcr line along the coast as marked on large-scale 
charts officialýv recognized by the coastal state. 
This text, which has been reproduced in Article 5 of the LOSC, points to the low- 
water line as the "normal baseline". Describing the rule as "normal" reflects the 
extent to which it has been accepted by states. Clearly, the wording reflects the 
national interests of the coastal states, since the adoption of the low-water line 
rather than the high-water line, means in reality, pushing the outer limit of the 
maritime zones(including the territorial sea) farther seawards and yet enclosing 
larger areas of the sea within the state internal waters, especially on coasts where 
there is an extensive tidal range'9. But, it should be noted on the other hand that 
the expression "low water mark" may have different meanings. As noted by the 
International Law Commission: 
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thc traditional expression "low-water mark" may have dyftrent 
MCC1171*11,14S, - there is no imijol'M SIM I (/(I/-(/ b, V Which states in practice 
dcicrmillc the linc ... various states used (it 
least the followin(o,, 
dillcrent siandards. - the 'mcan low-tidc spring ti'de', - 'the line of 
low tidc, (it yi-ijig ticics ',. 'ilic 11'nc q1' lower low ti'de', - and the 
'lowest-water n7ai-k"o. 
Moreovcr, on the (-)round. the application of the lo, \N, -tide line in whatsoever 
form. is not alwavý, an easv task. since the geographical offshore features are not 
alwaý,, "normýtl". bLit contain in some case, ý. bays. islands, deep indentations. low- 
tide elevations. rcefs or harbotir installations. SLICII cirCLII'nstances cast doubt as to 
whetim- the low-tide rule can be (Tenci-ally applied with success. Having 
recoumized this fact. the Law of the Sea Convention in Article 14 entitles the 
coastal state to: 
dc, tcriniiie the /, 1, '/' h -ovidedJor )cj, ýejj,, ( 17 t"' Y all. " of 117c incthods pi 
... to mill 
dýftcrent condi . 11 .01 7S, 
Given the fact that the low-tide mark method does not serve as a baseline In 
some geographical situations, it became a matter of urgent necessity to have rules In - 
on baselines which may deal with a wide variety of geographical features. Thus, 
the concept of straight baselines has emerged. 
1.2 The Strai2ht Baseline 
The employment of the straight baselines principle to measure the breadth 
of the territorial sea and other maritime zones gained significant support in the 
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
case of 1951. This method finds its origins in the national legislation of certain 
states. In the French Fisheries Act of 1888 21 , 
France adopted the straight baseline 
system on the Mediterranean Coast between Marseilles and Menton, to enclose 
within her jurisdiction all sinuosities and offshore islands. In the 20th century, 
se,,, eral states have followed, such as Iran Mi 1934 
22 
, 
Finland in 193 92 ', Brazil *in 
194024 
, and 
Saudi Arabia in 194925 . 
The concept was also adopted in The Aaland 
Islands Convention of 192 1, ratified by eight stateS26 . 
To defte the Islands, 
Article 22 of the 
Convention referred to lines linking nominated geographical points 
in order to enclose the islands, islets and reefs of the archipelago. 
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However, as mentioned above, it was the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
case which had a major influence on the sanction of the straight baselines principle. 
In this case, Norway, pursuant to its Decree of 1935, had departed from employing 
the normal base 11 ne(low-tide mark) for the delimitation of her fisheries zone. The 
Norwegians constructed a series of straight baselines connecting the outermost 
parts of the land running along the 'skjaergaard' or rampart of rocks and islands 
which frin2es much of the Norwegian coastline. As a result, some parts of what 
would non-nally have been the high seas - if the low-tide line had been used - were 
enclosed within the Norwegian territorial water limits. This situation led to a series 
of incidents involving British fishing vessels. The United Kingdom brought the 
case before the International Court of Justice asking for compensation for what 
was considered by the British authorities as interference by Norway with the 
British fishing boats. The British Government denied the validity of the straight 
baseline method adopted in the 1935 Royal Decree of Norway on the grounds that: 
the baseline inust he Imi-water mark- on permanentýy dry land 
vi, hich is a part ol'Morivegian territoi: y, or the proper closing line of 27 Norivegian internal ivaterS 
When the United Kingdom in 1949 took the case to the ICJ In order to decide 
whether the straight baseline principle adopted by the Norwegian Royal Decree of 
1935 for the delimitation of the fisheries zone, was within the recognized rules of 
international laW28 , the reply of the 
Court to the question was clear and crucial. It 
concluded that: 
The Norwegian Government in fixing the baselines for the 
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone by the 1935 Decree 
has not violated international law 29 . 
The Court mentioned three ways of effecting the use of the low-water mark 
principle: 
the trace parallel(i. e. drawing the outer limit of the territorial sea 
ýv JbIlowing the coast in all its sinuosities), the coastline 
tangent(i. e. drawing arcs of circlesfrom points along the low-water 
line) and straight baselines, where the coast is deeply cut into or 
fi-inged ky islands 30 . 
The Court found that the trace parallel method was not applicable in this case, in 
view of the extreme indentations and irregularity of the 
Norwegian coast, which 
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II WOUld make the charting process very complicated . Affin-ning that the stral(yht 
baseline method is a customarv rule. the Court pointed out that despite the fact that 
N11orway had been applying the rule over many years, the UK had not protested 
ag-amst Such practice until much later' Rather, the said method, according to the 
Court: 
hm/ /? CC'II coll, wliclatc(l va convant an(lsqfflicientýv longpi-acti . ce, 
I. /I I/Ic /('I('C of 11-hich I/Ic CIttI'1II(IC 0/' I, 'OVC1'1711W17tS beai-, s, witne. ýs to 
117CI. 1('ICI 111(it I/le. 1, (/1(1 not coaýidcr it to be conti-cn-v to intei-national 
/aw". 
HC11CC. the Court confirmed the validity of the straight baselines as a 
principle of intcriiational law, but at the same time, the application of the principle 
was subject to : ý. i number of qualifications by the Court. The Imes drawn in such a 
way should not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the 
coast", the lines should be drawn in a manner that makes the sea area lying within 
them sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waterS3 and finally, the Court gave special consideration to certain 
economic interests peculiar to a region, the importance of which to the coastal 
s evidenced by long usage, when drawing the stral 1 S36. state 11 ght baseline 
It is clear that the Court has laid down, as a condition of use of the straight 
baseline method, that such a line must not depart from the general direction of the 
coast, but the concept is ambiguous. However, in what seemed to be an attempt to 
remove this ambiguity, Judge Hsu Mo, who described the concept as: one of 
Not-wq. vs oit'n adoption 37 made it clear in an individual opinion, that the coastal 
state should follow the configuration of the coast and not cause distortion to the 
overall outline of the coast3 S. On the other hand , it 
is noted that there was a strong 
element of the progressive in the Court's emphasis upon the "legitimate interests" 
of the coastal state, but this, according to O'Connell: 
looks less imaginative today than it did when the Court'sjudgment 
39 
was given - ktý 
This is so, however, due to the creation by the LOSC of the new regime of the 
EEZ, recopising the right of the coastal state to living and non-living resources 
within 200 n. m. from the baselines. 
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It is worth mentioning finally, that although the Court, as pointed to above, 
allowed the coastal state to choose the baseline that suits the geographical features 
of her coast, on the one hand, and recognized, on the other hand, her discretion to 
delimit her maritime areas -40 , it indicated that: 
the delitnitation qJ'sea areas always had an international aspect 
and could 170t he dependent inereýv upon the will of the coastal 
state as is eývpressed in its inunicipal law 41 . 
There is no doubt that the Court's judgment, which was descnbed by 
Lauterpacht as "a daring- piece of judicial legislation' 42 is regarded as a landmark in 1. 
the history of case law and what confirms this is that the principles adopted by the 
Court, as will be seen, are incorporated in the Territorial Sea and Law of the Sea 
Conventions. 
1.2.1 Conventional Rules of the Straight Baselines 
The rules related to straight baselines, stipulated in each of the Territorial 
and the Law of the Sea Convention, are mainly based on those of the International 
Court of Justice in its judgment in the Anglo-Norwegian _Fisheries case of 
1951. 
Under both Conventions, a system of straight baselines may be used in localities 
where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a ffinge of islands 
along the coast in its immediate vicinity. In identical language, the Conventions 
provide that: 
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or 
if there is a fi-inge of islands along the coast in its immediate 
vicinitv, the method of straight baselinesjoining appropriate points 
maY be emplo-ved in drawing the baselinesfrom which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured. (TSC, Article 4(l) and LOSC, 
Article 7(l)). 
From the wording of the text, it is obvious that notwithstanding the Convention's 
recognition of the straight baseline as a distinct method for delimiting the territorial 
sea, the use of the word "may" means that the coastal state has discretion to resort 
to another method. In particular, the adoption of the rule, as indicated in the 
formula, is intended to be applied in the existence of special geographical 
circumstance: "where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there 
is a 
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fring, e of islands along the coast in its immediate ý'icinity". However, not all coasts I- 
are characteriscd by these features. 
On the other hand. botli Conventions lay down some conditions that should 
be observed when employing the straight baseline method. The LOSC has more 
details on this matter. These conditions are represented in what follows: first, the 
lines must not depart from the general direction of the coast and should be drawn 
in sLicli a wav that the sea area lving- within them is sufficiently closely linked to the 
land dornain to be subject to the regnine of internal waters 43 . 
In this respect, the 
Conventimis repeat a provisioii provided for in the above mentioned ICYs 
Judo-mem. Second. the lines shall not be dra\vn to and from low-tide elevations, 
except if lighthoLises or similar installations \vhich are permanently above sea level 
have been bt, i It oil theM44 . 
To this, the LOSC adds: 
or exccp/ in instances it, here thc drawinc, ol'baselines to andjrol? l 
such clevations has received owncral international recognition. 
(Article 7(4)). 
Third, the coastal state is not allowed to draw straight baselines In such a way as to 
Cut off from the high seas (or the exclusiý, e economic zone, according to the Z- 
LOSC) the territorial sea of another state 45. Finally, the Conventions require the 
state utilising this system to indicate the lines on charts to which "due publicity" 
must be (Ti,,,, en 46. Similarly to the stipulations of the ICJ in the Anglo-N III orwegia 
Fisheries case. the two Conventions give special consideration to the: 
econoini .c1. nterests peculiar to 
and the importance of which 
47 
usage 
the region concerned, the reality 
are clearIv evidenced by a long 
It is clear that the law goveming the use of straight baselines, whether 
customary or conventional, is imprecise, something which led to the abuse by 
states of the straight baseline systems, to the extent that, as stated by Prescott: 
it ivould now be possible to draw a straight baseline along any 
section of coast in the world and cite an existing straight baseline 
as a precedentý'- 
It is apparent that the customary rules of baselines in general today are 
reflected in the conventional rules. In this respect, Churchill and Lowe put forward 
the following arguments: First, the rules in question were adopted in the TSC and 
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later on in the LOSC with little discussion and some minor additions. Second, the 
TSC's rules have been incorporated by reference into other treaties, some of the 
parties to which are not parties to the TSC itself, for example, the 1962 and 1969 
amendments to the International Convention of the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil, (Annex A and Article 2); the 1964 European Fisheries Convention 
(Article 6), and the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor 
(Article 2 )49. 
From the previous review, it is apparent that the low-water mark and 
strai(, )-ht baseline have been established under international law as methods for 
measuring the various maritime zones. However, it has been recognized that 
certain offshore geographical features need to be treated m special ways. These 
facts are reflected in international conventions, as specific rules have been 
generated to define the base points of measurement in such circumstances. 
1.3 Rules Determining Base Points in Special Circumstances 
In practice, the question of ascertaining the baselines is not a simple one. 
That is so due to the diversity of the geographical situations In which these Imes 
may have to be drawn. To deal with a wide variety of geographical circumstances, 
the Law of the Sea Conventions laid down a number of rules (TSC, Articles 4-11 
and LOSC, Articles 6,7 and 10-13). Of these circumstances, however, the 
discussion in what follows Will be confined to those that have some relevance for 
Saudi Arabia, or in other words, to those where a Saudi policy exists. 
Bavs 
The controversy surrounding bays has always been whether their waters are 
regarded as internal,, territorial or high seas. In international customary law, bays 
have been considered as part of internal waters rather than territorial waters; 
nevertheless, there has not been a legal definition of the term 
50. In the judgment of 
the Pen-nanent Court of Arbitration in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case of 
1910' the Court held that there was no general principle of international law to 
describe a bay. However, the Territorial Sea Convention (Article 7) and the Law 
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of the Sea Convention (Article 10) contain detailed provisions, although these are 
not %VIthOLIt difficulties in their practical application. Having provided a 
geographical definition of the termý" , the 
Conventions specify that for an 
indentation to be considered as a bay in the legal sense, its area must be at least as 
laraye as that of the semi-circle. the diameter of which is a line drawn across the 
mouth of that indentation 53. When a bay rnects this condition, the next step is to 
rneaSUre the distance between the low-%vater marks of the natural entrance points 
to such a bav. If the distance does not exceed 24 nautical miles, here, the baseline 
is that connectincy the two marks. However. if the said distance exceeds 24 
nautical miles. the base points are those bemcen which a straight baseline of 24 
natitical miles may be drawn ý4. It should be noted that these provisions do not 
apply, either to cases where the straight baseline method may be used, or to 
historic bays or bays bordered by more than one stateýý'. 
1.3.2 Ports and Roadsteads 
Under the Territorial Sea and the Law of the Sea Conventions (Articles 8 
and II respectively), the outermost permanent harbour works are regarded as 
forming part of the coast. However, to have this status, such installations should 
forrn an integral part of the harbour system. The LOSC, in Article 11, itself 
excludes offshore installations and artificial islands from the classification of 
permanent harbour works. 
As to roadsteads, under customary international law, roadsteads, which are 
usually used for loading, unloading and anchoring of ships, were usually regarded 
as being part of internal waters. This has been affinned by the Preparatory 
Committee of the Hague Codification Conference, which proposed giving 
discretion to the coastal state to demarcate her roadsteads 56 However, the 
conventional provisions goveming the subject represent a departure from the 
customary rules. Article 9 of the TSC and 12 of the LOSC provide in identical 
wording that: 
Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading, 
and anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be situated 
wholly or partly outside the outer limit of the territorial sea, are 
included in the territorial sea. 
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Under both Conventions (Article 9 of the TSC and 16 of the LOSC) the coastal 
state has to demarcate such roadsteads or, alternatively (according to the LOSC) a 
list of geographical co-ordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be 
substituted. It follows that coastal states, according to the said articles, must give 
due publicity to such charts and list of points, before depositing them with the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. It is clear that the conventional rules take 
a moderate position on the topic. On the one hand, roadsteads are not considered 
as internal waters, as the position was under customary law, but on the other hand, 
such roadsteads, if used for loading and unloading of ships, are governed by the 
regime of the territorial sea, even if situated wholly or partly outside the outer 
limits of this zone. 
1.3.3 Low-tide Elevations 
The rules governing the baselines of the maritime zones when there exist 
low-tide elevations are mainly derived from conventional law, and the role of 
custom in this respect is uncertain. The Territorial Sea Convention (Article 11) 
and the Law of the Sea Convention (Article 13), define a low-tide elevation as: 
a naturallyformed area of land which is surrounded by and above 
water at low tide but submerged at high tide. 
For the purpose of specifying the base points, the location of the low-tide 
elevations in relation to the temtorial sea is regarded as the criterion. Thus, 
according to the Conventions: 
where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance 
not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland 
or an island, the low-vt, ater line on that elevation may be used as 
the baselinefor measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. 
However, where: 
a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the 
breadth of the territorial seaftom the mainland or an island, it has 
no territorial sea oj'its own 
57 
. 
These provisions clearly entitle the state adopting 12 n. m. 
for its territorial sea, to 
haN7e twenty-four miles territorial sea measured from the mainland. 
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1.3.4 Islands 
Under the TSC (Article 10(2)) and LOSC (Article 121(l)), the term 
"island" is defined as: 
a natural4v- , 
formed area ofland, surrounded by water, which is 
above watcr at high tide. 
Thus. two criteria have been established., for an elevation to be treated as an island 
generating a territorial sea: formation must be natural, and the emergence of such 
an clevation niust be at high tide. There is no reference to the island's size or 
capacity for occupation- '. The Conventions provide that the territorial sea of an 
island is measured according to the general rules on baselines (Articles 10(2) of the 
TSC and 12 1(2) of the LOSC). The question which may arise, then, is whether 
these are the baselines for the territorial sea only, or for all maritime zones. 
Specific mention of the territorial sea is made in the TSC but by implication it 
includes also the contiguous zone (Article 24(2)) of the TSC. The LOSC goes 
further to provide expressly that every island (in the above-mentioned definition) 
has a territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf However, the 
LOSC in Article 121(3) excludes rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own, from having an exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf, though they still generate a territorial sea and contiguous zone. It has been 
stated that the exclusion implied m paragraph (3), when properly applied and 
interpreted, does not affect the major principle set out in paragraph (2) of the same 
article 9. 
The case of archipelagic states was not expressly dealt with in, the 1958 t) 
Territorial Sea Convention. However, the Law of the Sea Convention (Article 47) 
provides that an archipelagic state may draw straight baselines joining the 
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago, 
which would then serve as the relevant baselines from which the maritime zones 
are measured. A number of conditions are set out by the Convention, which must 
60 be fulfilled before this may be done 
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Saudi Arabia's Baseline Position 
Baselines are, as it were, the key features for the demarcation of all 
maritime areas. A baseline is the furthest seaward limit of internal waters and the 
inner boundary line of the territorial sea. The matter of baselines was first covered 
in the Saudi legislation by Article 6 of Royal Decree No. 6/4/5/3711 of May 28, 
1949 concerning the Territorial Waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 61 . 
The 
Kingdom redefined her territorial waters in 1958, but the baselines rules remained 
unchanged and were reintroduced verbatim M Article 5 of Royal Decree No. 33 of 
February 16,195 862. Saudi Arabia is one of those states which has adopted two 
systems for drawing baselines, i. e. the low-tide line and straight baseline. 
2.1 Saudi Arabia's Practice on Low-Tide Line 
Article 6(a) of the 1949 Decree (Article 5(a) of the 1958 Decree) provides 
that: where the share oj'the mainland or an island isfully exposed to the open sea, I 
the baseline from which the territorial sea of the Kingdom is measured is the lowest 
low-water mark on the shore. In addition, this method has been adopted in certain 
maritime boundary agreements between Saudi Arabia and some neighbouring 
states. For example, Article I of the 1965 Agreement between the State of Kuwait 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relating to the Partition of the Neutral Zone 63 , 
reads: 
the boundaty line between the two sections of the Zone is to be the 
line which ... begins 
fi-om a point at the mid-eastern shore on the 
low-tide line. 
Also. ) Article 
I of the 1968 Agreement concerning the Sovereignty over Al-Arablya 
and Farsi Islands and Delimitation of Boundary Line Separating the Submarine 
Areas between Iran and Saudi Arabia 64, provides that the twelve nautical mile 
territorial sea of each of the two islands is to be measuredfrom the line of lowest 
low ivater on each of the said islands. The low-water line method, as mentioned 
earlier, was recognised in international decisions, and also in the Law of the Sea 
Conventions. However, the Conventions do not go further to deal with the 
technical question of what is to be regarded as the line of low water: the mean low- 
water at spring tide. the line of low tide at spring tide, or the lowest water mark. 
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Instead, the Conventions provide a general formula and avoid giving a direct 
definition of the low-water mark. 
This generality in fonnulation, as is clear, has not been followed in the 
Saudi legislation, where specific mention of "the lowest low-water mark" was 
made. By this formulation, the Saudi legislator, first of all, might have desired to 
take advanta(ge of the vagueness surrounding the definition of the "low-tide mark", 
since as noted by the ILC the expression "low-water mark" may have different 
meanings, amongst which is the "lowest water mark' 65 . 
Secondly, the Saudi claim 
did not raise any protest; rather, at the regional level, as mentioned earlier, in the 
1968 Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the expression "lowest low-water 
mark" was used, while Egypt M its Decree of 15 January 1951 used the same 
expression when defining the term "island"66 . 
Thirdly, it is true the Saudi claim is 
not identical with the TSC and the LOSC, but from the general formula of the TSC 
and the LOSC, it may be inferred that it was the intention of the drafters, in the 
light of the uncertainty of relevant state practice, to place the responsibility for 
"low-water mark" definition on the accepted practice of each coastal state within a 
regional context. However, it seems that the difference as to the meaning of the 
expression "low-water mark" is of little importance. On this ground, the special 
rappor-teur to the ILC and the Commission itself as a whole decided in 1956 not to 
resolve the existing divergence in practice with regard to low-tide lineS67. 
2.2 Saudi Arabia's Practice on Straight Baseline 
Many parts of the Saudi coast are heavily "indented and cut into" and 
fringed by islands. These geographical features of Saudi Arabia's coasts in the Red 
Sea and the Arabian Gulf required Saudi Arabia to make specific claims to the use 
of straight baselines. In so doing, Saudi Arabia preceded the decision of the ICJ in 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951, which is regarded as the cornerstone 
in validation of the use of the straight baselines system68. In this regard, 
detailed 
provisions have been laid down in the Saudi legislation to deal with 
bays, shoals, 
ports and islands. 
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2.2.1 
In 1949, Saudi Arabia claimed that: where a bay confronts the open sea, 
lines drawn from headland to headland across the mouth of the bay are the 
baselines (Article 6(b) of the 1949 Decree). This claim was repeated in 1958 
(Article 5(b) of the 1958 Decree). It is clear that the Saudi claim is general in 
formulation, as no closing lines have been explicitly decreed. In other words, the 
claim contains no reference to the semi-circle test, nor to the length of the bay's 
entrance. This position reflects the Saudi view that the waters of the bays along 
the Saudi coasts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are internal waters (Articles 4(a) 
of the 1949 Decree and 3(a) of the 1958 Decree). In closing off the said bays 
without referring to the two geometrical conditions included in the Law of the Sea 
Conventions (TSC, Article 7(1-5); LOSC, Article 10(1-5)), the Saudi claim seems 
to be incompatible with the Conventions. 
However, this claim might have been based on the principle of historic title, 
although no explicit justification was given when the claim was declared. If that 
was the case, the Saudi claim could be warranted under international law. There 
are a number of international decisions which affirm the historic character of 
certain waters and dwell on the constitutive elements of historic waters. These 
elements include, as we will see below, the exercise of state authority, long-lasting 
duration of this exercise, and acquiescence by other states. 
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the ICJ held that: 
By historic waters are usually meant waters which are treated as 
internal waters but which would not have that character were it not 69 for the existence of an historic title 
In the Tunisia/Libva case, the Court stated that: 
Historic titles must enjoy respect and be preserved as they have 
always been by long usage ... It seems clear that the matter 
continues to be governed by general international law, which does 
not provide for a single "regime " for "historic waters " or 
"historic bays ", but only for a particular regime for each of the 
concrete, recognised cases of "historic waters " or "historic bays 
... The regime 
is based on acquisition and occupation 70 . 
The "special character" of "historic bays" has been recognised by the Law of the 
Sea Conventions. These bays have been excluded from the provisions concerning 
69 
the dCfi111t]O11 of a "juridical bay" (TSC. Article 7(b), LOSC. Article 10(6)). 
However. to compiv with the criteria ot'historic bays. Saudi Arabia should sho%%,, a 
SLIfficiently long-standing claim to the 1-71) 1 
dentatioi-Is as waters. In addition. 
Saudi Arabia should show the exel'CISC Of Ct , fCCti\ C jurisdiction therein, and lastly. 
I 
ShC ShOUld show that other stzatcs have acquiesced in the claim. These conditions 
do 'lot ý, cclll to he difficult for SýWdi Arabia to iiiect. In practice, Saudi Arabia has 
SLIffiCIC110V exci-ciscd jurisdictioii on the waters of the said grulfs for about half a 
century. Furthcrmore- the SaLIdI prL acticýý has iiiet with no protest, whether from 
W101111 OF Offl'ýIde thC region. The gencral acccptance of the behaviour of a state is 
Undoubtedly of particular S1,0--nificance to the validity of a claim. As Churchill and 
Lowc J)LIt It: 
In borclcrline cascs - jol. example, whevc there is doubt as to 
wlicilicr a state 's stral'uht baseline -ývstcin conlorms to till the 
(-Titelltl laid down 1,17 ci/s/01)WIT C111d ('017VC1711onal law - the attitude 
01 . other states in acqui . esci . lig I. n or ob/ccting to the baseline is 
likeli, to prove crucial in detei-177h7ill 
iLý V(I litli, 
. 
1"71. 
Nevertheless, the (Teneral claim to a straiaht baseline remains very difficult to -17) _n 
under the historic bays doctrine. Those bays which have been recognised as 
historic are generally large bays, such as the Gulf of Fonseca, bordered by El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
With regard to the Saudi claim, the responsibility rests on the Saudi I 
authorities to issue an official enactment or statement to reflect the Saudi thinking Z7) 
on the historic characteristics of the bays along her coasts. Until such a statement 
is issued, the legal status of these bays may be considered as controversial. 
2.2.2 Ports 
As for ports and harbours confronting the open sea, Saudi Arabia followed 
the formula adopted in the Report of the Second Committee of the 1930 Hague 
Codification Conference which provided that: 
In determining the breadth oj'the territorial sea, in front of ports, 
the outermost permanent harbour niarks shall be regardeci as 
'forin 
ing part of the coastl 2. 
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Saudi Arabia claimed in 1949 that the baseline of ports and harbours confronting I= 
the open sea would be: 
lines drawn along the seaward side of the outermost marks of the 
port or harbour and between such marks, (Article 6(d) of the 1949 
Decree). 
The same claim was repeated in 1958 (Article 5(d) of the 1958 Decree). This 
provision is parallel to what is included in the TSC (Arti I icle 8) and LOSC (Article 
11), which each provide that: 
For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost 
permanent harboin- inarks which form an integral part of the 
harbour system are regarded asjbrmingpart oj'the coast. 
The LOSC excludes offshore installations and artificial islands as being entitled to 
consideration as basepoints for drawing baselines, while this exclusion is absent in 
the TSC and the Saudi legislation. 
2.2.3 Shoals 
Saudi Arabia has made specific claims concerrung shoals. The term "shoal" 
was defined under the Decrees of 1949 and 1958 as: 
an area covered bv shallow water, a part of which is not 
submerged at lowest low tide. (Article 2(d) of both Decrees. ) 
Saudi Arabia hasadopted the straight baseline system with shoals. In 1949 
(Article 6(c) of the 1949 Decree), and subsequently in 1958 (Article 5(c) of the 
1958 Decree), Saudi Arabia claimed that: 
where a shoal is situated not more than twelve nautical milesfrom 
the mainland orfi-om a Saudi Arabian island, the baselines would 
be: lines draw'n froin the mainland or the island and along the 
outer edge oj'the shoal. 
The 12 n. m. distance condition remained unchanged in the Saudi claim of 1958, 
although Saudi Arabia extended her territorial sea to 12 n. m. in 1958. 
Furthennore, Saudi Arabia defined as internal waters: 
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T17c "'(11c"s above cind lcimlival-(l 1' '0/11 C117 ,v shoal not inoi-e than lik'CIlve Ilaillical miles 
, 
li-oin Ilic mainhin(I oi*. p-om ci Saudi Ai-abian 
islý'/'(/- (, Articles 4(b) of the 1949 Decree. and 33(b) of the 1958 
Decree. ) 
Comparim-r these pi-misions %ý ith the corresponding provisions of the 
Com-cmions. we find, first, that the Saudii Icgislator used the term "shoal". while 
the term used in the Conventions is -Iow-tide elevations". Nevertheless. the 
definitions of both tcrms are similar. since the -Iow-tide ele%, ation- is defined under 
the LIS: 
ýl (H-ca (ýOand which is sun-oundcd bv and abovc 
11 1OW-lidC, bilt S, 'hill cl*, (,, c, (/ (it high ticic. (TSC, Article II(I 
and LOSC, Article 13(l ). ) 
Secondk. the SýMdi legfislation is in line witli the Com, entional law in that they both 
allow, in principle, the shoal to (), 'enerate a territorial sea, and they also adopt. in 
principle. the tise of shoals as base points to draw baselines. As to the effect of 
shoals on the delimitation of the territorial sea. it appears that the Saudi claim, as it 
stands now, is incompatible with the TSC, but it may be warranted under the 
LOSC. However, it is worth notincy that, at the time of enactment of the Saudi 
claim in 1949 or subsequently, when it was readopted m 1958, customary 
international law was not certain on the question 73 . 
The Saudi legislation differs 
from the TSC on two points. First, the Saudi legislation fixes the maximum 
distance at which a shoal may be entitled to generate a territorial sea of its own to 
12 n. m. from the Saudi mainland or a Saudi island. The TSC, on the other hand, 
does not stipulate a fixed distance for the location of the shoal. According to the 
Convention, for a low-tide elevation to have a territorial sea, it must be situated 
wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from 
the mainland or an island (Article 11), but in an extreme case, the Convention does 
not allow the coastal state to have more than 12 n. m. territorial sea (Article 24(2)). 
Second, ývhile the Saudi legislation adopts unconditionally the possibility of using 
shoals as base points in drawing baselines, the TSC provides that: 
Baselines shall not he drawn to and ftom low-tide elevations, 
unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently 
aboi, c sea level have been built on them. (Article 3(2). ) 
. 7-., 
However, the LOSC may validate the Saudi claim since, first. the 
Convention allows the low-tide elevation situated wholly or partly within the 
territorial sea limits to generate a territorial sea, and at the same ti 11 'me it entitles the 
coastal state to extend its territorial sea up to 12 n. m.; thus, the doubts about the 
Saudi adoption of the 12 mile distance for a shoal from the mainland or a Saudi 
island have been removed. Second, with regard to the use of low-tide elevations as 
base points, Saudi Arabia may take advantage of the Convention's qualifications to 
validate her claim. In this regard, Article 7(4) of the Convention provides that: 
Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide 
elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are 
permanentIv above sea level have been built on them or except in 
i. nstances where the drawing of baselines to and from such 
elevations has received (),, eneral international recognition. 
Thus, Saudi Arabia as a party to the LOSC may, in order to remove any doubts 
coricerning her previous claims, construct on the shoals in question, lighthouses or :D 
any similar installations, such as towers or any of the navigation aids, or she may 
rely on the fact that her claim met with no protest from any other state. 
2.2.4 Islands and Island Groups 
Saudi Arabia has a large number of islands and shoals, both in the Red Sea 
and in the Arabian gulf The majority of these islands cannot sustain human 
habitation. Some of them are grouped so as to fonn archipelagos. Examples of 
these archipelagos are the "Farason Archipelago" which confronts the port of Jizan 
on the Red Sea, and the "Tiran-Sanafir Archipelago", located at the entrance of the 
Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea. 
Before examining the Saudi claim with regard to islands and island groups, 
it would be logical, first, to examine the definition given to the term "island" 
in the 
Saudi legislation. In the initial claim of 1949, the ten-n "island" was defined as: 
any islet, reef, rock, bar or permanent artificial structure not 
submerged at lowest tide. (Article I (c) of the 1949 Decree. ) 
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This definition was repeated in the 195, ý Decrcc (Article I (c)). The inclusion of 
arti ici 'al structure" into the definition is obvIOLIS]y a departure from what is 
stipulated in the Lavv, of the Sea Com, entions. which provide that, for an area of 
land to be treated as an island in the legal ýcnsc. it must be "naturally formed" 
(TSC. Article 10( 1) and LOSC, Article 12 1(II )). However, it is worth noting that 
this SLIUdi detinition of the term is not WlthOLIL precedent. Consideration of the 
RCp()rt Of SUb-Cornnilace 11 of the Seconcl Conirnission to the 19330 Hague 
Conference mIght 11CIP to reveal whai Xýis behind the Saudi thinking. In this 
rcportý it was ýtatccl that: 
Thc clefinin'on of the term ''island" docs not (-ýYclude artijicial 
islailds", providcc I thesc are true portions ofthe territory and not 
Inercli-floating inarks, anchored hiio. v. ý, ctc 4. 
The (-Yeo-uraphical features of the Saudi coasts, which have many islands in 
flicir vicinity. required Saudi Arabia to make specific claims to the use of straight 1: ) 
baschnes. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has made detailed and explicit claims regarding the 
use of straight baselines to delimit the boundary between the internal waters and 
the territorial sea for islands and island groups. In the Saudi initial claim of 1949 tn 
(Article 6 of the 1949 Decree), the following were claimed as the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea was to be measured: 
(e) where an island is not more than tivelve nautical milesfrom the 
mainland, lines drawn from the mainland and along the outer 
shores oj'the island; 
where there is an island group which mtýy be connected ky 
lines no more than twelve nautical miles long, of which the 
island nearest to the mainland is not more than twelve nautical 
miles froin the mainland, lines drawn from the mainland and 
along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the 
islands form a chain, or along the outer shores of the 
outermost islands of the group if the islands do not form a 
chain; and 
where there is an island group which may be connected by 
lines not more than twelve nautical miles long, of which the 
'17 
island nearest to the mainland is more than tvvelve nautical 
milesfi-om the mainland, lines drawn along the outer shores of' 
all the Islands oj'the group ifthe islands form a chain, or 
along the outer shores qfthe outermost islands of the group if 
the islands do not /Orm a chain. 
The sarne provisions were reintroduced verbatim M the 1958 Decree (Article 5). 
As for the characteristics of waters enclosed within the said baselines, Saudi Arabia 
(Article 4(c-d) of the 1949 Decree, Article 3(c-d) of the 1958 Decree) considered 
as internal waters: 
the waters between the mainland and a Saudi Arabian island not 
more than Avelve nautical milesfi-om the mainland; and 
The waters betiveen Saudi Arabian islands notfarther apart than 
Avelve nautical miles. 
Before assessing these Saudi claims against modem international law, it 
should be noted first, that, until recently the utilization of the straight baselines 
system for islands and island groups has been one of the highly controversial t:: ) 
questions In the development of the law of the sea. The most pertinent questions 
which have been raised include the right of an island to generate a territorial sea, 
the location of the island as to the mainland, the use of straight baselines to connect 
islands with the mainland or as a group and the length of these lines and the legal 
status of enclosed waters. 
The examination of the Saudi claims reveals that the Saudi legislator was, in 
many respects, very much influenced by the conclusions of the 1930 Hague 
Conference on the one hand and a considerable part of state practice on the other. 
The Saudi legislation, for example, provided for the island's right to have a 
territonal sea, the same approach which was adopted in the Report of the Second 
Commission to the Hague Conference, as it was recognised that every island has 
its oiv, n territorial sea". This was also recognised in Article 10 of the TSC and 
subsequently in Article 121 of the LOSC which expressly stipulates, the entitlement 
of an island to a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone and a continental 
shelf of its own. The Saudi Arabia s baselines claim also seems to be inspired by 
the suggestion of the League of Nations Preparatory Committee for the Hague 
Conference, which reads: 
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ill 117C CUSC 0/'c-l (ill-ollp ofi. ýJýjiidy which he-Iong to a single state and 
I. T 117c circumlerencc ol thc group is not separated fi-oln one 
anollicr bY more then tivicc thc breadth ofterritorial waters, the 
belt (? / territorial ivaiers shall /)c nicasured 
. 
11-oln the outermost 
ofilic group. Watcrs includcd within the Ol-oup shall also 
hc tcri-itorial waters. 
The same ritle shall applY as rcgur(k islands which lie at a 
di. ýmncc Irom the mainland not ý), rcutcr than Avice the breadth of 
Icl-rilorial lvatcrs. _6 
the SLILICII claim diffei-s From this suggestion in its provision 
for i f-ixccl distanc, -, between the mainlai-id and the nearest island of the Island group 
or between the islands themsek cs. However. given the considerable disao-reernent 
oii the breadth of Lhe island's territorial sea and the length of straight lines Joining 
these islands, it was not possible to achicve agreement at the Hague Conference 
with rc-, rard to the question of island grOLIPS. The controversy surrounding the 
question, at the time, was best described by Sir Humphrey Waldock who noted 
that: 
Unquestionably, there was a marked tendency in 1930 to Jývour 
the introduction qfa special ridejOr archipelagos, whether coastal 
or ocean, but subject to a limit qfvvidth ('10 miles) between the 
islands and ivith a stronlg reservation hYsolne states ao.., ainst lvatel's 
bein1g, treated as inland waters 
7. 
On the other hand, the Saudi claim inight have relied upon a considerable zn 
part of the then state practice. Writing in 195 1, Sir Humphrey Waldock stated that 
quite apart from coasts to which a system of straight lines may properly apply, 
there was a "considerable body of state practice" supporting the principle that 
under certain conditions, coastal islands may be treated as part of the mainland's, 
However, whether or not Saudi Arabia had applied them properly, the system of 
straight baselines has been a matter of controversy, since the approach of the 
international community itself, in relation to the status of off-shore areas adjacent 
to islands and island groups, was a highly controversial area in the law. 
As to the legitimacy of the Saudi claim under the Law of the Sea 
Convention, it is to be noted that the latter not only readopts the TSC's principle 
that an island is entitled to have its own territorial sea, but it provides further, that 
the territorial sea could extend up to 12 n. m. Accordingly, many doubts around 
the Saudi claim have been removed. In practice, however, a large number of the 
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Saudi straight baselines do connect points where there is a "fringe of islands" in the 
immediate vicinity to the coast. Nevertheless, the texts of Paragraphs (f) and (g) of 
the Saudi claim could su(-Y((, Test that several of the lines may connect isolated islands 
and rocks off the Saudi coast. This, in turn, may suggest that the Saudi claim, at 
least in part, is incompatible with the Law of the Sea Convention. The question, 
then, arises as to whether Saudi Arabia could avail itself of the vague qualification 
contained in Article 7(5) of the LOSC (Article 4(4) of the TSC, which provides for 
account to be taken when determining particular baselines, of economic interests 
pecullar to the reggion concerned, the reality and the importance of which are 
clearli, ei, idenced bY a 1017, ýT usage (emphasis added). No doubt Saudi Arabia 
might invoke strong inshore fishery interests in such areas to benefit from this 
vag-ue qualification to the general r-ule, which makes as a condition for the use of I'D 
the straight baselines system ýý,, here there is a fringe of islands along the coast, that 
such islands should be in its immediate vicinity. 
Apart from the question of legitimacy, it is to be noted that the legislation 
does not address all the issues that should be addressed. For example, the 
legislation deals only with certain, but not all geographical features of the Saudi 
coasts. In this respect, the legislation is silent on the effect of coral reefs and 
roadsteads on the delimitation of the territorial sea. Moreover, the legislation does 
not speak of the requirements of the "showing on charts/lists of geographical co- 
ordinates" and "due publicity" for the baselines. In practice, neither baselines 
charts, nor geographical co-ordinates have been produced in Saudi Arabia, 
although Article 16 of the LOSC says: 
1. The baselines. 1br measuring the breadth of the territorial sea ... 
shall be drawn on charts of a scale or scales adequate 
for 
ascertaining their position. Alternatively, a list of geographical 
co-ordinates oj'points, specifying the geodetic datum, may 
be 
substituted. 
ý The coastal state shall give due publicity to such charts or lists 
ofgeographical co-ordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such 
chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
No specific reasons were announced by the Saudi authorities, 
but it may be 
thought, that in not producing such charts or lists, Saudi Arabia wanted to leave 
doors open when negotiating maritime boundaries with its neighbours. 
These 
Z: ) 
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niattý2rs need to he considered by the SaUdi marine policy makers, especially now II- 
Saudi Arabia has become a party to the LOSC. 
Part 11: Internal Waters 
Intornal waters are those waters Iving- on the landward side of the baseline 
(TSC Article 5( 1 ): LOSC Articlc (S( I )). ThcY comprise ports, gulfs, straits, rivers 
and lakcs. Intcrnal waters (otherwise known Lis national or interior waters) have 
bcen treated under custornarv la%v as an inte(-Tral part of the coastal state's 
TIL I 'Illllaiid. and ýýo thcv are not subject to dctalled provisions in the Law of the Sea 
Conventions. Thýý coastal state's sovercionty extends also to the bed of the waters 
and the SUbSO11 bericath thern. 
I. The Legal Status of Internal Waters 
In its internal waters, the coastal state elljoys full territorial sovereignty. 
therefore. the ships of foreign states, as a general rule, may not exercise the right of 
innocent passa(ge through these waters. However, there is an exception to this I- 
rule. Where straight baselines are drawn along an indented coast, enclosing as 
internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, the right of 
innocent passa(-Ye should not be denied by the coastal state 79 ID 
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, she declared in her initial claiM of 
1949 that: 
The territorial waters of Saudi Arabia, as well as the air space 
above and the soil and subsoil beneath them, are under the 
sovercignty of the Kingdom, subject to the provisions of 
international laiv as to the innocent Passage of vessels of other 
nations through the coastal sea. (Article 2 of the 1949 Decree. ) 
The "territorial waters" were defined in Article 3 of the same Decree to be: both 
the inland vvaters and the coastal sea of the Kingdom. Two matters attract 
attention in this claim. The first concerns the question of terminology. In this 
regard, Saudi Arabia used the term "territorial waters" to refer to both the "coastal C) 
sea", known today as the "territorial sea" and the internal waters. In so doing, 
Saudi Arabia followed the approach of the international community at that time, 
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whereby the waters adjacent to a state's territory, whether internal or coastal, were 
considered as territorial waters. Secondly, Saud' Arabia recognised the right of 
foreign ships to innocent passage not only in the "coastal sea ýI , but also in her 
internal waters, a matter in which Saudi Arabia went beyond international law, 
which imposes the right of innocent passage only in the territorial sea. It, 
However, when Saudi Arabia redefined her territorial sea in 1958, these 
considerations were taken into account. The terms "territorial waters" and 
"coastal sea" were omitted in the 1958 Decree. The term "territorial sea" was 
Used. No mention was made as to the right of innocent passage m the internal 
waters. In that respect, Saudi Arabia is compatible with international law, whether 
on the question of terminology or the extent of sovereignty. The Saud' legislation 
does not refer to the exception to the right of innocent passage included in the 
Conventions, however, this Issue was never at any time a matter of discussion by 
the Saudi authorities". 
1. The Right of Access to Ports 
The general rule of the non-existence of innocent passage through internal ZD 
waters, together with the principle of sovereignty of the state over these waters, 
logically imply the absence of any right in customary international law for foreign 
vessels to enter a state's ports". Nevertheless, Hall In his award of 1958 in a case 
in which Saudi Arabia itself was involved, Saudi Arabia v. Aramco, said that: 
according to a great principle ofpublic international law, the ports 
of everv state must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can 
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onh, be closed when the vital interests of the state so require 
This judgment was based on the 1923 Geneva Convention and Statute relating to 
the Intemational Regime of Maritime PortS83 . 
Article 2 of the Statute provides 
that: 
every Contracting State undertakes to grant the vessels of every 
other Contracting State equality of treatment with its own vessels, 
or those of an -v other 
state whatsoever, in the maritime ports 
situated under iLý sovereignty or authority as regards freedom of 
access to the port ---- 
However, under Article 16, every contracting party is allowed to deviate from 
these provisions in case of emergency affecting the safety or the vital interests of Z: ) 
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sucli a state. Supporting this view. Colombos finds that an unlimited power of the ltý II 
state to prohlbit the use of its ports by foreign nationals: 
would inipýv a lle(()'Ic('t ()f its dwl*cs Jbi- the promot'oll ol' 7ý 1 
I. 1110,17(itiolial ill tcl, (, Ol Irse, navi-all . on and irade which custonzarv 
inici-national law imposes zipon I t, 4. 
In his comment on Hall's award in the SaUý11--Arabia v. Aramco case. O'Connell 
tinds that: 
iti. s qucs[ionable whet/Icl. I/Ic rule ol'international law to it, hich lie 
rc,, 1crrcd is a ritle that ports MZI, ý I be 01)('17 to trade, or the corollai-v 
01 (1 di'lle'rent rule of Internalional law which jorbids 
(1111017, (T 0 ily 117 j rc', n ships iis' ports a counti. -v 
choo, w. ý to close its Ports alto , (,, ethcr, that would seem to 
be an act 
ol sovcrc1'(Yntj,, but ifit opens them, it nizist open them at least to 
thc partl . es to this Convention [Geneva Convention of 1923], and 
arg-liahli, also to all comers, on a basis'ý 
On the other hand, Lowe put forward the followingy ar, (2111-nent: 
ClearIv, the "ureat principle o 'public into-national law " setjbrth ltý 
Y 
in the Arainco case had no substawivc basis, and customaij, law 
establiShcs no basis j6r a right qfenný, into maritime ports. In 
other words, a coastal state ina 
,v 
close its ports to foreign shipping 
ivhenever it chooses, suýject on4v to any rights of enti: v granted 
ý6 under ti-cati, 
In the light of the previous legal dealings, the latter view, however, seems 
to be closer to the reality, since it takes into account the right of the coastal state's 
sovereignty over its territory including its inland waters. I ID 
What is unquestionable, in any case, is the right of the port state to lay 
down conditions for the access of its ports. This conclusion has been supported by 
the Intemational Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. The Court said in this 
regard that: 
bY virtue oj'its sovereigntv ... a coastal state may regulate access to its polts 87. 
The Law of the Sea Conventions are silent on this issue, although a number 
of treaties, whether multilateral or bilateral, have adopted the entry into ports as a 
,, al right under certain conditions. 
Examples are the previously ment oned lea I 
Geneva Convention of 1923 and the 1964 UK-USA Agreement relating to the Use 
of United Kingdom Ports and Territorial Waters by the Nuclear Ship, Savannah". 
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The Law of the Sea Conventions refer indirectly to the right of the coastal 
state to set up conditions, by virtue of which, it is entitled to prevent the entry of 
foreign vessels. With regard to the rights of protection of the coastal state, both 
Conventions provide that: 
in the case Q1'ships proceeding to internal waters (the LOSC has. - 
or a call at the port. lacility outside internal waters), the coastal 
state ... 
has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent anýy breach qf the conditions to which admission of those ships to 
I. nternal waters (the LOSC has. - or such a call) is subject89. 
The necessary steps" referred to here could mean , in my view, the right of states 
to prohibit the entry of the violating ships to their ports, which can suggest, even if 
indirectly, that such entry has not been firmly established as a general right under 
conventional law. 
As to Saudi Arabia, the relevant rules on the issue in question are found in 
three sets of regulations: the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations (SLR) of 
)0 1974' 
, the 
Rules and Regulations for Saudi Arabian Seaports of 1980 (RSS)91 and 
the GCC Seaports Rules and Regulations of 1985 (RRS)92 . The latter set of 
Regulations (RRS) is very much influenced by the RSS, and in relation to the 
access to ports, it repeats the same conditions laid down in the RSS. Under Article 
14 of the SLR, the arrival of a ship at any Saudi port or harbour should be notified 
in advance to the port authorities, either by wireless or through an agent, at least 
twenty-four hours before the expected time of arrival. Under the RSS and RRS, 
there are two levels of notification. First, a preliminary notice about the intended 
arrival time is to be given to the port authorities, again by the wireless or through 
an agent, at the first sole loading port, before loading commenceS93 . 
Further notice 
of the arrival time is to be given 5 days, 2 days and I day prior to the arrival at the 
port 94 . Nevertheless, these provisions are not absolute. 
According to these sets of 
legislations, there are a number of exceptionS95: 
I-A ship in a situation of compelled entry; 
A ship whose entry is rendered necessary byforce majeure; 
A ship requiring- medical assistance; and finally (the RSS and RRS adds): 
4. A ship in danger. 
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For the entry to a port, the RSS and RRS provide further for the Master of 
the seagoing, vessel to obtain prior permi i CS96 from the port authoriti, - The 
(Tnanti n Ly of stich perm*ss'oll II has been left to the estimation of the port authorities in 
a number of , ItLiLitlOlIS"- 
Undoubtedly, in laying, down the -, a]*Ci I-L)ICS. whether those concerning the 
notification system or those on obtaini Isslon, the Saudi behavioLir I III-L' ciltrY perm 
conics within Intcrnational law. which is mentioned earlier, by Virtue Of 
sm, creignity. allows the coastal state to re(. ZLIIItC the access of foreign ships to its 
ports ýmd f1irther to take the necc,, san, ' ineast. ircs to prevent any breach of the 
conditions to which admission of those ships to its maritime ports is subject. 
jurisdiction in Internal NN"aters 
The qLicstion Of jurisdiction in internal %vaters is not subject to detailed 
provisions in the Law of the Sea Conventions, due to the fact that these waters 
form an integral part of the coastal state's mainland, where the coastal state enjoys 
ftill sovereignty. However, under international customary law, it is generally Zýý 1-71 1 
recoo-nised that in its internal waters. the coastal state in the absence of an I'D I 
agreen-ient to the contrary, is entitled to enforce its laws against foreign ships, 
subject to the rules concerning sovereign and diplomatic immunities. 
With regard to the enforcement policy, the practice of states in general, is 
rernarkably consistent despite some differences on the details. States commonly do 
not exercise local jurisdiction m respect of the internal affairs of foreign ships, 
although they would be entitled to do so. They usually enforce their laws M cases 
where their interests are engaged. Thus, the local jurisdiction is usually exercised 
in the case of an affair affecting the peace or good order of the port. The coastal In Z: ) 
state will also assert jurisdiction where its intervention is requested by the 
shipmaster or consul of the flag state or when a non-crew member is involved. 
Moreover, the coastal state will enforce its laws in cases such as pollution, pilotage 
and navigation, and may exercise its right in arresting a ship in the course of civil 
proceedings". 
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, the Saudi legislation laid down some 
provisions with regard to the exercise of national jurisdiction in ports. These 
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provisions are Contained in the RSS and RRS. Saudi Arabia allows in principle the 
right to board and visit a ship in any Saudi port, but this was made subject to 
special pen-nission from the port authorities. As Article 6.16.1 of the RSS says: 
No person other than a member of the crew or a passenger is to 
board an 
,v vessel 
in a port without the special permission of the Port Managetnent"9. 
This right was exclusively o-i given to what are, in the legislation, called "authorised 
persons"'00, who are entitled to examine the vessels' documents, and to enter and 
I. nspect accommodation roonis, should it be necessai-v for the maintenance of' 
sccuriýv and good order'O'. 
In exercising her jurisdiction over foreign ships in her ports, Saudi Arabia's 
concern is manifest on matters where her interests are engaged. Article 2.13.2 of 
the RSS, for example, provides that: 
A vessel is not pcrinitted to leave port bef6re completing all 
formalities and settling all bills covering services rendered to the 
vessel and ýt, ithout the necessary permit from the Authorities 
concerned' 02 . 
Saudi Arabia makes pilotage compulsory for all vessels entering, navigating 
03 
ývithin or leaving the pilot zones located within the limits of the Saudi ports' . In 
addition, Saudi Arabia has shown its concern with regard to the question of 
observance of her national laws by the crew of foreign ships in Saudi ports. As 
Article 6.14.1 of the RSS says: 
The Master or Owner of'every vessel is held directly responsible 
for the conduct and behaviour of the crew of his vessel while in a 
port andfor the strict observance of the Laws of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Special attention is drawn to those laws concerning 
the sale, transftr, or consumption of any narcotics or of alcoholic 
04 drinks of any kind' . 
However, the danger of pollution is viewed by the Saudi Authorities as the Z7) 
, (Yreatest concern. The Saudi legislation elaborated on this question more than any 
other question. The Saudi legislation deals with this question through two 
dimensions: the duties imposed on the shipmaster and the rights of the national 
auithorities to intervene. A number of obligations have been imposed on the 
shipmaster: 
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The disch(lig op (/c-, po. s, -1 ol-(117.1,01*1, od-watcr mixture, rubbish. e 
,, arbage, carcasses or waste inailer is strictývjorbidden within 
thC I)OI-t 11170S""ý. 
- In the event ofany discharg)-c or leakalge ofoil oJ'anY kind oi- 
Ol/Y Inixture into the w(l, tcl*S ol'a pori. 1rom a vessel, the master 
must itnmediateýv report the circumstances to the Port 
Alana-rcinent and steps iakcn to stop or check- the discharge or 
- I)iivin(ý bunkcring opcrations or othcr handling, ofol'I or oj*l 
mi-mircs, till scuppers on dcck shall he closcd to prevent 
Spil/age or leaks inio ilic watcr ) I)- - 
- Evc-cssliv smoke jrom thc . 
1inincls oi- exhaust gas lines Qf 
vcsscls is prohibi . tecl l OS . 
tn the same regard, the port aLlthOl-ItIeS have been granted the right to 
supervise vessels visiting the Saud ports, to inspect the Oil Registers and to enforce 
the discharge of deleterious materials which may create a nsk of accidents or 
pollution, at the expense of the vessel. To this end, the RSS says: 
V`essels visiting Saudi Arabian ponsshall be subject to supen4sion 
bY the appropriate authorities. An. v AuthoriSed Person has the 
rigght to inspect the Oil Registcrs required to be kept ... 
bY 
vessels 1 09. 
The Port Management is entitled to enforce the discharge of any 
oil, oili, mixture, rubbish, garbage or ivaste matter to special 
installations or receptacles fbr the account of the vessel if the 
accumulation of such materials on board creates a risk of 
accidents andlor pollution" 0. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that Saudi Arabia has laid down 
provisions enforcing its jurisdiction only in its ports and on questions which are 
immediately related to her interests. No mention is made of matters such as the 
case where a non-crew member is involved or where there is a request for 
intercention by the captain or consul of the flag state nor to the other areas of the 
internal waters. Thus, such matters and areas, which have not been included, 
remain governed by customary international law, which as mentioned earlier, 
authorises the coastal state to enforce its jurisdiction in its internal waters against 
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ships and those on board, subject to the non-nal rules concerning sovereign and 
diplomatic immunities. 
As far as exercise of cnminical jurisdiction is concerned , it is noted that the 
Saudi legislation is silent on this question. Thus, one has to assume that general 
Saudi criminal law would apply. This, however, would be in confon-nity with 
intemational law and the the viewpoint that: 
B-v entering fibreign ports and other internal waters, ships put 
themselves It 'ith il I the territorial sovereignty oj'the coastal state' ". 
Part III: Gulfs and Straits 
The legal regime of gulfs and straits has been the issue dominating the 
Saudi participation in the Law of the Sea Conferences, by reason of the Israeli 
presence at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. At UNCLOS 1, Saudi Arabia claimed 
the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba as internal waters, and she denied the 
"international character" of the Strait of Tiran. At UNCLOS 111, Saudi Arabia 
maintained its UNCLOS I position but, having in mind the two cases of the Strait 
of Bab El-Mandeb and Hormuz, the Saudi delegate raised the question of straits 
linking two parts of the high seas or EEZs, alongside with the question of straits 
connecting one part of the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of another 
state. In the following pages, the Saudi Arabian position on these issues will be 
examined, but before that, the position of international law towards the two 
regimes of gulfs and straits will be discussed in some detail. 
1. Gulfs under International Law 
The words "bay" or "gogulf' are basically geographical tenns, and in this 
context, they are used to describe penetrations of the coastline, without necessarily 
12 
being based on the depth of penetration' . Under the terms of the 
Law of the Sea 
Conventions, as mentioned earlier, for an indentation to be considered as a bay, it 
must constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast, and moreover, it must be 
as large as or larger than. the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the 
niouth of that indentation' 13 . Under international 
law, there exist three distmct 
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types of bays: those bordering the shores of a single state, those surrounded by the 
coasts of two or more states, and historic bays. The "conventional" definition 
mentioned earlier, however, is confined to the first category' 14 , the second and 
third categories of bays are not even dealt Nvith by either the 1958 Territorial Sea 
and COMIULIOLIS Zone Convention or the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 
Controversy has existed for a lom. 1, time. regarding the legal description of waters 
enclosed within bays. DisaLyreernents have fOCLIsed on the legal status of such 
watcrs and when thev are to be treated as internal waters, territorial sea, or part of 
the high seas. Custornary intermitional ]a\\, had no precise niles on the two criteria 
of bays StIPLIlated in the Law of the Sea Conventions: the size of the indentation 
and the maxinium length of the closing, line across the entrance of the bay. fn the 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case between Great Britain and the United States, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration stated that: 
... 110 principle of international law recognizes aim specijied 
relation between the concavlýi, fthe hav and the requirementsJbi- 
control bY the territorial sovereigntv... I Cs 
With regard to the criterion of the "maximum length", the International Court of 
Justice, on the occasion of its reply to the British argument implying that the 
Norwegians had departed from the customary ten-mile rule, in the Anglo- 
Norwegian Fisheries case, held that such a rule had not yet acquired the authority 
qf'a general rule of international law"'. According to O'Connell the relevant 
rules of the TSC and LOSC pertaining to the enclosure of bays are a piece of 
legiSlation and not a codification' 17 . 
However, as for the bays, the coasts of 
which belong to a single state, the waters enclosed by the closing line drawn 
between the low-water marks of the natural entrance point are regarded as internal 
waters, if the distance between such points does not exceed twenty-four miles"'. 
Otherwise, the internal waters are those enclosed landward by a straight baseline of 
twenty-four nautical miles, drawn within the bay" 9. 
As mentioned above, bays which are surrounded by the shores of more than 
one state are not dealt with by the Law of the Sea Conventions, although there are 
over forty such bays in the world; therefore, their legal regime remains governed by 
customary international law 12 0. In relation to territorial sovereignty over these 
bays, the matter is not free from controversy and authors are divided on the 
86 
question. Some find that the coastal states may, by common agreement among 
them, acquire sovereignty, eitherpro diviso orpro indiviso, and yet the territorial 
sea is to be measured from straight baselines. Others, on the other hand, reject 
such an appropriation 12 ' and thus, a strong tendency has manifested itself according 
to which the temtorial sea is to be measured from low-water mark 122 . However, 
the states bordering such bays may, replying on the pnnciple of "historic title", 
prove that the position is different. Such is the case with the Gulf of Fonseca 
bordered by Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. In the El Salvador v. 
Nicaragg case of 1917, the then Central American Court of Justice held that the 
said Gulf is an historic- baj, possessed by the characteristics of a closed sea'7 3. 
The Court further added that the three countries were co-owners of the Gulfs 
waters except as to the littoral marine league which was the exclusive property of 
each' 2'. In the Case ConceminL)- the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute of 
25 1992' , the 
Chamber of the ICJ endorsed the 1917 decision concerning the Gulf of 
Fonseca and described it as a valid decision of a competent Court 126 . 
The 
Chamber took the said 1917 Judgment into account as a relevant precedent 
decision 1 27 
, and 
held that: 
The opinion of the Chamber on the particular regime of the 
historic waters oj'the Gu4f parallels the opinion expressed in the 
1917 Judgement ofthe Central American Court of Justice. The 
Chamberfinds that the Gu4f waters, other than the 3-mile maritime 
belts, are historic waters and subject to a joint sovereignty of the 
three coastal states 128 . 
Historic bays do exist and may not be eliminated. Such bays could be 
within the confines of single state, or they could be surrounded by more than one 
state (pluri-state bay). The existence of "historic bays" in the legal sense and the 
sovereignty rights of the coastal state/states over such bays have been recognised 
time and again. In addition to the above mentioned Judgments, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, for example held in the 1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
case that: 
... conventi . ons and established usage might 
be considered as the 
basis for claiming as territorial those bays which on this ground 
might be called historic bays, and that such claim should be held 
valid in the absence of any principle of international law on the 29 
subject' . 
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In the Anglo-Nonvegian Fisheries case ( 19-51 ), the Intemational Court of Justice 
held that: 
hY historic waters are Its'll(14" mcant lvalcrs which are treated as 
internal waters, hut w/11. ch would 170t have that character ivere it 
1701 for thc c-viStCl7(. c 01, C117 historic lille 1-)0 
. 
In the Tunisia Libya case of 1982, the ICJ stated that: 
Histoilc II'tICS 117"St cl'/0Y l'csj)cct and be preserved cis theY have 
bcell bY 10171()- liscil"e 11)) . 
13- The coi-icept of *'historic bays" is recogymsed in the le, (-,, al literature ' and also in the 
Law of the Sea Conventions (TSC, Article 7(6). LOSC, Article 10(6)). 
Nevertheless, the leoal definition of the concept of "historic bays" is today tD 
more confused than ever 133 .A suggested definition of "historic bays" i t) is: 
waters over which the 
applicahle rules qf 
continuousýv, and over 
soillei, el'all /'I . ghts with 
states 4 
coastal state, contran, to the general 
international law, clearlv, ejfectiveýv, 
a substantial period qf time, exerci . ses 
the acquiescence of' the communiq, oj' 
The criteria included in this definition for the establishment of an historic title are 
similar to those of the 1962 UN Secretariat's study on the question 135 . The criteria 
of "acquisition and occupation" were recognised by the 1CJ in the Tunisia/Libva 
case 136 . In the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 
the ICJ, having concluded that the Gulf of Fonseca is an "historic bay", stated that: 
The reasonsfor this conclusion, apartftom the reasons and effect 
qf the 1917 decision of the Central American Court of Justice are 
the, following. - ... the consistent claims of the three coastal states, 131 
and the absence ofprotestfrom other states 
However, despite the general agreement on the above mentioned criteria, 
there is a areat deal of controversy with regard to their interpretation. Thus, it It) 
remains with the coastal state to prove the historic characteristics of a bay. 
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2. Straits under International Law 
Geogral)hically, a strait means: 
a nat-row passage of water connecting two lai-ger bodies of 38 
watet*l . 
From a legal viewpoint, the ten-n is defined, in addition to the geographical 
criterion, in the light of its fitness to be used as an international waterway 
serviceable for international navigation. In this respect, O'Connell finds that: 
not everv strait so described by geographers is a strait in law, that 
I. sa watenvay susceptible of some autonomous rule of law. Only 
straits signýfiCal7t to international maritime traffic have fallen 
within the scope of'such a rule"9. 
The Law of the Sea Conventions do not give a direct definition of the term. 
However, the criterion for a body of water to be considered as a strait, in the legal 
sense, has been stated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case (1949): 
in the opinion oj' the Court, the decisive criterion is rather its 
geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and 
140 thefýct oj'its being usedfor international navigation 
Apart from the definition of the term, the legal regime governing straits has 
been a matter of controversy. The legal treatment of the issue by the international 
commun-Ity has, like any other vital issue of the law of the sea, been influenced by 
the political, economic and security interests of states. These have left their 
impression on the evaluation of the legal status of straits. 
2.1 Customary International Law and Passage through Straits 
A legal regime that takes into account the freedom of navigation through, 
over and under international straits, on the one hand, and the legitimate safety and 
environmental concerns of straits states, on the other, is of fundamental importance 
in ocean law 141 . The first decisive attempt to codify what constitutes a strait in a 
legal sense was carried out by the Institute de Droit International between 1894- 
1912 and similar attempts followed by the International Law Association (1895- 
19 10), the Hague Peace Conference (1907), the Codification Conferences (1924- 
1929), and the Hague Codification Conference (1930) 142 . Despite these efforts, 
with the exception of straits regulated by special agreements such as, the Danish 
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143 14-4 145 Straits the Turkish Straits the Straits of Aaland Islands and the Strait of 
Magellan 146 , there was no agreed g)eneral pnnciple concerning passage through 
straits. Nevertheless, the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case (1949) confirmed the 
existence of a customary rule and unveiled this rule. as it held that: 
it is, in the opinion qf' the Cow-t, 
'genei-affi, recognized and 
in 
accordance with intei-national custoin. that states 1. n ti . me of peace 
have a i-ight to sen(I theii- wai-ships (and yet, a fibi-tiori, merchant 
ships) thi-ough St7-aitS lised. 161- intcl-national navigation between 
pat-ts (ý/' the higah seas without the pl-evious authot-ization of a 
coastalstatc, pi-ovided the passagre is i -1717OCentI47 . 
The COUrt, on the other hand, recognized the right of the strait state, in exceptional 
circumstances, to issue regulations in respect of the passage of warships through 
the strai t14S . The Court was, however, silent as to whether the flag state has to 
notify to the strait state its passage in the strait in advance, in such circumstances. 
From that, it may be concluded that custornary international law accords only a 
non-suspendable right of innocent passage through straits connecting two parts of 
the high seas. and only in time of peace. 2: ) 
2.2 Position under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention 
The previous conclusion, based originally on the Corfu Channel case 
judgment, influenced the discussions of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
related to the right of passage through international straits"'. In its 1956 draft 
report to the General Assembly covering the work of the eighth session, the 
International Law Commission laid down a new paragraph, Paragraph 4 of Article 
18 150 (Paragraph 4 of Article 17) in the final draft 151 which provides that: Z: ) 
there must be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign 
ships through straits normally used for international navigation 
betiveen two parts of the high seas. 
Comments on the above draft were received by the ILC from several states, 
amongst which was Israel, bordering the Gulf of Aqaba at the head of the Red Sea. 
The Israeli argument 152 included first that the provisions governing the straits 
should be included as a separate chapter within those regarding the high seas. In 
that respect, Israel found that the interests of the international community had to 
take precedence over those of the littoral states whose territorial waters had to be 
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traversed in making for a given harbour, and yet passage through such straits 
(Israel had in mind the Strait of Tiran leading to the Gulf of Aqaba) was assimilated 
to the high seas themselves. Secondly, the word "normally" should be deleted, as 
its use, according to the Israeli Government, went beyond the law made by the ICJ 
in the Corfu Channel case. Having pointed out that Israel had intended, by that 
comment, the Gulf of Aqaba, the Special Rapporteur, on the occasion of his reply 
to the Israeli suggestion, indicated that the said provision related to straits linking 
two parts of the high seas rather than those open to the high seas at one end, and 
giving access to a harbour belonging to one state, at the other 153 
However, despite the noticeable opposition to the Israeli position, the 
Israeli theory was incorporated into the outcome of the First Conference on the 
Law of the Sea of 1958, (i. e. the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone) 154 . The Commission's phrase "normally used 
for international 
navigation" was dropped, making the rule of more general application and avoiding 
the arguments in relation to the amount of traffic through the strait in each 
particular case. Article 16(4) of the Convention extends the law in the Corfu 
Channel case by including the right of passage not only in straits connecting two 
parts of the high seas, but also between one part of the high seas and the territorial 
sea of a foreign state: 
there shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign 
ships through straits which are used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas 
or the territorial sea of a foreign state. 
It is clear, then, that the last part of the paragraph is "innovatory 
legislation", which was intended to cope with the geographical situation of the 
Strait of Tiran connecting the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. As was stated by 
Churchill and Lowe: 
... 
in extending the Article [16(4) of the TSC] to include not only 
straits connecting two areas of the high seas with the territorial 
sea of another state, the Conference was moving beyond mere 
codification. It is clear that Article 16(4) was primarily intended 
to secure the right of access to the Israeli port of Eilat, situated at 
the end of the Guýf of Aqaba, through the Straits of Tiran, which 
were then under Arab control 
155 
. 
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Nragraph 4 of -Article 16 of the TSC was adopted at the Geneva Conference of 
1958 bv a maýjority of one wte: thirtv-one votes in favour. thirty against (including 
Saudi ., Vabia) and nine abstentions' The addition of the said provision reflects 
the fact that problems related to a partICUlar strait mav occasion the formulation of 
a gencral rLIIC'ý 
2.3 At tl, ', \CLOS III 
thl'OLIý_111 international strait,,., was a central Issue In the ne(yotlations 
of the Third t-'ilitcd ",, ations Conference on the Law of the Sea 158 . As expected. 
two niaýjor tactors overshadow, ed the neg III the topic: (a) the lotiatioi-is relating to 
conflict between the various interests of the strait states, on the one hand. and the 
navigational interests of the superpowers on the other, (b) the common acceptance 
by states of a twelve infle territorial sea limit, which led to the enclosure of (Treater 
expanses of waters as territorial waters, which had formerly been high seas 
governed by the regime of innocent passage. 
At the second session of UNCLOS 111, four strait states (Malaysia, 
Morocco, Oman and Yemen), jointly submitted a set of draft articles on navigation 
thrOL12)"I'l the territorial sea, including straits used for international navigation'ý'- 
According to this draft, passage of foreign ships is generally guaranteed, even in 
straits lying within the limit of the territorial sea, but as to warships, the draft 
entitled the strait state to require prior notification subject to its laws and 
regulations, for such passage. On the other hand, proposals submitted by other 
states, such as the United Kingdom, the socialist states, Denmark and Finland 160 
and the United States 16 ' demonstrated clear desire to freedom of navigation for all 
ships and of overflight for all aircraft through and over straits. 
The extension of the breadth of the territorial sea to a maximum of twelve 
miles at UNCLOS 111, was a matter of serious concern with respect to international 
straits. When two opposite strait states each claim a 12 nautical miles territorial 
sea, this means the waters of the strait will constitute a territorial sea of both states, 
if the breadth of such a strait is 24 miles or less. As a result, there will be no high 
seas/EEZ corridor therein. Of 265 international straits, only 60 have been 
identified as being greater than 24 miles in width, thereby giving rise to the 
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existence of a corridor of high seas/EEZ through them. 52 straits were found to be 
less than 6 miles in width, while the other 153 straits were found to have a breadth 
of between 6 and 24 miles. Most of them would, accordingly, be closed off by zn 
overlapping territorial seas if the surrounding states claimed 12 nautical nules 
62 
territorial sea' . 
This situation of conflict of interests between the strait states, on the one 
liand, and the maritime states, on the other,, together with the lack of the existing 
rules, whether customary or conventional, influenced the firial outcome of the 
UNCLOS 111, concerning the straits used for international navigation (Part III of 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Thus, a new 
leOF 
al -11ý 
regirne for international straits, known as "transit passage" was created. This new 
e, r gime, proposed by the UK lo3 represents a compromise between the two opposing 1. 
positions mentioned above, in that it does not grant the same freedom of navigation 
on the waters of straits than is applicable on the high seas, while at the same time, 
allowing the strait state less control over ships enjoying passage than does the Z-7) 
regime of innocent passage. Article 38(2) of the Convention defines this right of 
passage as: 
the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of 
navigation and ovet. -fligaht solely for the purpose of continuous and 
expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or 
an exclusive econOMiCzone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone. 
This right, the practice of which does not require prior notification to or 
authorization from states bordering states, is according to Article 38(l), to be 
elljoyed by all ships and aircraft, and shall not be impeded. 
To ensure safe passage and the secunty of the strait states such states on 
the one hand and foreign ships and aircraft on the other, have certain rights and are 
subject to some duties towards each other (Articles 39-44). What is to be noted, 
however, is that while the LOSC has re-adopted the "innocent passage" regime 
(Article 45) and the criterion of "utility" recognized by international custom and the 
1958 Geneva Convention, it has extended the scope of application of the strait 
regime to include straits connecting an area of the high seas or EEZ and another 
area of the high seas or EEZ 164 . 
The creation at UNCLOS III of the transit 
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pas, -, ige t-egimc was largely at the insistence of the superpowers, but with the 
knowled(ge and support of other coastal states! " However, whether it is a part of 
international custom is a matter of controversy. Some states such as the US and 
UK consider the regime as such This opinion is shared by some writers. Such as 
LanLyclon! " and Mahmoudil". On the other hand, Churchill and Lowe are of the 
view that is a (general right in CLIstomary international law. the transit passage has 
not ,,, ct become established"". However. it is , ti, (T,,. (, ), ested that this right represents 
ftii-thcr codification Lind development Of CLIstoniai-y international law, set forth in 
the 
_I 
LICILIMent Of the ICJ in the Corfu-Channel case'-". 
Turninu) to the regime of straits establlSllCd Linder Part III of the LOSC, Nve 
firid that the Con--, 'entlon distinguishes between several categories of straits: 
I. Straits not used for international navigation: 
Straits which have a high seas/EEZ l'OLItC thi-OLN-111 them, and 
I'. Straits SUbjeCt to their own long-standing re-almes. These straits are not subject 
to Part 111. and the rules applicable in Such Situations may be found in Part 11 in 
respect of those areas in such straits which are territorial sea, and Parts V, VI 
and VII (conceming the EEZ, the continental shelf and the high seas 
respectively) in the case of sea areas beyond the territorial sea. 
4. Straits used for international navigation, but not covered by (2) or (3): 
(a) Straits linking two parts of the high seas/EEZ, apart from those Zý 
excluded in Article 38(l). Here the transit passage regime applies. 
(b) Straits linking the high seas/EEZ and the territorial sea of a foreign 
state, and 
(c) Straits formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its 
mainland, where there is seaward of the island a route through the 
high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar 
convenience concerning navigational and hydrogoTaphical 
characteristics. 
In the case of the last two types of straits, the non-suspenda e innocent 
passage regime applies"'. 
Thus. the LOSC elaborated on the question of straits and created the new 
regime of "transit passage". However, as to what concerns Saudi Arabia, 
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specifically on the question of the Strait of Tiran, the LOSC repeated the regime of 
innocent passage, included in Article 16(4) of the TSC. 
3. The Question of the Gulf of Agaba and the Strait of Tiran 
The Gulf of Aqaba is one of the two arrns of the Red Sea (the other being 
the Gulf of Suez) on the western side of Saudi Arabia. It is about a hundred miles 
Iong and an average of fifteen miles wide. The coasts of the Gulf amount to about 
-130 nautical miles, and are occupied by Saudi Arabia (96 miles), Egypt (124 
miles), Jordan (4 miles) and Israel (5 miles). The entrance of the Gulf does not 
exceed nine nautical miles, and therein, there exist a number of islands, the biggest 
of which are Tiran and Sanafir, belonging to Saudi Arabia, although still under 
E(gyptian control 172 . At the junction 
between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, 
there is the Strait of Tiran. The principal navigation route lies between Tiran island 
and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula shore. It is approximately four i-rules in breadth 
and has two channels, Enterprise Passage and Grafton Passage. The former is the 
main and safer shipping channel into the Gulf A series of reefs separate the two 
passages from each other. The eastem entrance to the Gulf passes between the 
two islands of Tiran and Sanafir and the Saudi Arabian coast, but navigation 
therein is risky, especially for big ships 173 (see Map 2). 
3.1 The Legal Regime of the Gulf and the Strait: Two Conflicting 
Positions 
Controversies on the status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran 
must, of necessity, be viewed in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much has 
been written and said on this question"'. There would seem to be little value 
reviewing here everything that has been said or written on the subject, especially Z: ) 
since the conflicting parties have already moved somewhat from the position they 
held in the fifties and sixties, in the light of the new climate of peace between the 
Arab countries and Israel. However, initially, the position of the Arab states 
bordering the Gulf of Aqaba (i. e. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan) over passage in 
the Gulf and through the Strait of Tiran lying at its entrance can be summarized as 
follows: The Gulf of Aqaba is an internal, closed, Arab sea, belonging to these 
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Map 2. The Gulf of Aqaba, Strait of Tiran and the islands of Tiran and Sanafir. Source: 
Charles B. Selak, "A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba", 
52 AJIL, (1958), at p. 66 1. 
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three Arab countries, the natural successors of the Ottoman Empire. which 
fon-nerly occupied the reg., ion. The waters of the Strait of Tiran were also viewed 
by the said Arab states as historic, and had no international characteristics. Since 
the Gulf is a historic bay, according to the Arab point of view, Israel which was In 
a state of war with the Arab states had no right to sail therethrough, nor in the 
Strait of Tiran which has no international characteristic. That is so due to the fact 
that the presence of Israel (repardless of the existence of Israel itself as a state), at 
the head of the Gulf was illegal and took place as a result of the Israeli occupation 
of Umm Rashrash (known today as Eilat) on 10 March 1949, following the 
conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Rhodes General Armistice Agreement of 24 
February 1949 175 
. 
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, she started to clarify her claims in the 
Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran due to the presence of Israeli warships 
therein, which was viewed by the Kingdom as an obvious threat to her security. 
The Kingdom expressed her fears in a number of complaints to the United 
Nations"'. In support of her argument that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and 
the Strait of Tiran are historic rather than international waterways, Saudi Arabia 
issued an official statement on 17 March 1957, to that effect, asserting that the 
Gulf used to be a natural passage for the caravans of Muslim pilgrims going to the 
177 holy places in Mecca and Medina In a subsequent statement in March 3 1, the 
Kingdom asserted that: 
the straits separating these two islands (Tiran and Sanafir) are 
under the control andjurisdiction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
... the straits of the 
Guýf of Aqaba may be by no means considered 
178 
open seas ... 
The Saudi statement invoked Article 10(3) of the 1888 Constantinople Convention 
179 Respecting the Free Naviuation of the Suez Maritime Canal the conclusion of 
which: 
ahned at leaving the Guýf of Aqaba and its straits outside the scope 
of the order oj'the fi-ee passage definedfor the Suez Canal ... is an 
asserted recognition that the Guýf of Aqaba is a locked Arab Guýf 
without anY international character ... 
1 80 
The issue was also raised by the Saudi Arabian representative to the United 
Nations, Ahmad Shukairy on 2 October 1957 during the Twelfth Session of the 
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Gencral Assernblvý" and also in 1959. a year after the conclusion of UNCLOS 11 ý2 
Practically. Saudi Arabia in anticipation of the conclusion of the First United 
Nations Conference (ei(ght days before the beginning of the Conference actions), 
redefined its claim to offshore authority. By the Royal Decree No. 33 dated 16 
FebrUary 1958'ý". the Kingdom, as i-witioned earl' I II ier. extended her territorial sea 
to 12 naUtICal miles. and moreover. the pro-vision permitting innocent passacre of 1) 
foreign sliips fl-ii-ougli its territorial waters 41 (according to the Royal Decree of 
19-49)1 was omitted. 
IncIced. the "security interests'' imposed themselves as a crucial factor on 
Saudi Ar,, ibia. as a result of which the questi II throu(Th of "navitgation 
interiiational straits" and "historic bays" dominated the Saudi participation in the 
works of UNCLOS 1. These two connected questions were put forward at the 
Conference bv the Saudi delegation in the context of the issue of innocent passage 
in the territorial sea and its demands to enlarge the breadth of the territorial sea to 
twelve nautical miles'". Rejectin, (. ), the "three-power" proposal amending the draft 
87 Article 17 of the draft Convention' , the Saudi representative stated that: 
the amended text no longer dealt ivith the general principles of 
international law, but had been carejUlA, tailored to promote the 
claims oj'one state'". 
Israel, on the other hand, maintained that it was a legitimate littoral state of 
the Gulf of Aqaba and that the capture of Umm Rashrash (Eilat) by Israel was not 
a violation of the Egyptian-Israeli General An-nistice Agreement of 4 February 
1949. Israel argued further that neither the Mixed A-rmistice Commission nor the 
U. N. Security Council'89 had ever stated that this action of Israel was illegal. Thus, 
according to the Israeli view, the Straits of Tiran are international waterways, 
therefore, navigation between the coasts of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, 
through the Strait should be respected and safeguarded under international law'90. 
This Israeli position was supported by a number of states, led by the United States. 
In an . 4ide-Meinoire 
handed to the Israeli Ambassador to the US on II February 
1957, the American Government stated that: 
with respect to the Gu4f of Aqaba and access thereto - the United 
States believes that the Guýf comprehends international waters and 
that lio nation has the right to preventfree and innocent passage in 
the Gu4' and through the Straits giving access thereto ..., the 
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United States ... is prepared to exercise the right of ftee and 
innocent Passage and to join with others to secure general 
recognition ofthis right'9'. 
The grantinay of international character to the Straits of Tiran was also 
recogynized by the UN Security Council. Following the break-out of the hostilities 
between Arabs and Israel in what is known as the "Six Day War", the Council 
ISSUed its Resolution No. 242 on 22 November 1976 , in which it was called for: 
guaranteeing fteedoin of navigation through international 
ivatervt-aý, s in the area 
192 
. 
However, Linder customary law, the Strait of Tiran does not have 
international character to be used for international navigation, since, first, for a 
strait to be regarded as an international one, it should connect two parts of the high 
seas; the ICJ reached this conclusion, as mentioned earlier, in the Corfu Channel 
case of 1949. This argUMC11t was also dominant at the ILC debates. Concentrating 
on the position of the Israeli Government that the Strait is international, and hence 
the right of free passage therethrough should be guaranteed, Francois, the Special 
Rapporteur of the ILC stated that the Corfu Channel case doctrine: 
related to Straits betit, een two parts of the high seas, and so did not 
apply to the Guýfqf'Aqaba which, though open to the high seas at 
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one end, inerely gave access to a port at the other 
In that, he was commenting on the position of the Israeli Goverm-nent, seeking a 
free passage through the Strait of Tiran. Secondly, the volume of traffic crossing 
the Strait of Tiran did not support the Israeli argument on the international nature 
of the Strait, especially in the period between 1948 (the creation of Israel as a 
state) and 1958 (the conclusion of UNCLOS 1)194 , and further, the Strait did not 
serve any except the littoral states, i. e. the traffic through the Strait was not 
destined for ports other than those of the coastal states. Therefore the Strait did 
not fulfil the criteria of an international strait. Writing in 1947, on the factors 
, iffecting the degree of importance of the particular strait to international sea- 
commerce, Briiel says: 
Hoiý,,, extensive and how deeply rooted this interest should be, 
cannot be determined kv any hard andfast rule, but is a question 
of fact, depending upon such facts as f i. the number of ships 
passing through the strait, their total tonnage, the aggregate value 
of their cargoes, the average size of the ships, and especially, 
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wheilier tl7ci, arc distributed amom! a ureater oi- sillaller 1711inbel- o 
17(111011S - (1110 
'WhiCh SCCIII 10 "I've good guidance, nosinglejýctor, 
195 holvevcr, belm! decIA11,61 
... 115 
In thc same retrard, Baxter states: 
... 
inicrnational watenva. vs initst be considered to be those rivers, 
canals, and straits which are itscd to a substantial extent hv th c 
con I'll c"cial shipping or warships I-)cloii(,, * 117f, " to sta tes other than 
IIIC IT11)(Il'iffl? 17CItiOI7 01- WIN . oll. ý 
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. 
Of this view is also O'Connell. who noted that: 
wlicii 1*1 i-ý said, then, that a ýtralt In law is a passagge of'territorial 
sca linkinl(),, nvo areas o1'hl'l(, -, h scal this is Ilot to be taken literallv, 
but rather construed (is 117CC117117(y (I pas'sage which ordinarili, 
carrics the bulk oj'intrizational ti-qffic not dcstined. jbr ports on the 
rc1c, vant coastlines""7. 
Despite all that, however, the TSC uicluded a provision mainly designed to 
cope with the situation of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Article 16(4) 
of the Convention reads: 
There shall he no suspension ql'the innocent passage of f6reign 
ships through straits which are used. 1br international navigation 
beti veen one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas 
or the territorial sea qj'a, fbreicrn state. 
This conclusion led Saudi Arabia and other Arab States (with the exception 
of Tunisia, which made reservations on signing the Convention) to refuse to sign 
any of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 
At UNCLOS 111, Saudi Arabia maintained its previous position on the 
definition of international straits and stressed that the regime of straits should be 
strictly confined to those cormecting two parts of the high seas. The Saudi 
representative, AI-Shahail, stated that: 
the Kingdom supported ftee passage in international straits 
connecti . ng different parts of the high seas... ' 98 
This view was further expressed by the Kuwaiti delegate to the Conference, 
Al-Sabah, who was speaking on behalf of six Arab States, including Saudi Arabia. 
AI-Sabah said that: 
the term 'straits used for international navigation' should be 
strictly confined to straits which connected two parts of the high 
seas. Because of that the Governments on whose behaýf he was 
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speaking had not acceded to the Convention on Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone qf'1958 ... which treated all straits alik-e'99. 
On 7 August 1974, a group of Arab states (including Saudi Arabia) 
submitted a proposal, in which they suggested a definition of the term "straits used 
for international navigation"), as follows: 
am, strait conn(-'Cti170- two parts of the high seas and customariýy 
itsedjbt- international navigation"00. 
Through these statements, it is clear that the said states had also in mind the 
two straits of Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb. The former connects the EEZs in the 
Arabian Gulf with the high seas in the Gulf of Oman, and the latter connects the 
Red Sea EEZs with the high seas in the Gulf of Aden. Saudi Arabia supported the 
application of the free navigation regime in those straits which lead to Saudi ports 
on the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Thus, the Saudi position was that straits 
should not be treated alike. To this end, Saudi Arabia with the other Arab states 
rejected the proposals submitted by the UK 20 ' and socialist stateS202 , both of which 
provided for the non-suspended innocent passage through the straits linking one 
part of the high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign state. They preferred the 
application of merely the innocent passage regime which is applied to the waters of 
the territorial seas. 
Israel, for its part, rejected the said proposals, but on a different ground. It 
was of the view that all straits without discrimination (including the Straits of Tiran 
linking one part of the high seas with the territonal seas of Saudi and Egypt) must :Dt: ) 
be open to free navigation and overflight i. e. transit passage 203 
The LOSC has adopted what seems to have been viewed by the Saudis as a 
compromise as to the question of straits as a whole. In straits connecting one part 
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and a territorial sea of a foreign 
state, the Convention repeated in its Article 45 the provisions of Article 16(4) of 
the TSC adopting the right of non-suspendable innocent passage, while the regime 
of 'transit passage' would apply in straits linlcing one area of the high seas or an 
EEZ and another area of the high seas and an EEZ. The latter provision satisfied 
the Saudi demands in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb. 
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\Vhat should be noted here is that the LOSC had readopted the right of 
non-SLIspendable innocent passage, in straits connecting one part of the high seas 
with another part of the territorial sea of a foreign state. The general acceptance of 
the Con%'ention by the international community may suggest that the provisions of 
Article 45 of the LOSC (Article 16(4) of the TSC) have now passed into 
customary international law, sornethim) which means that these provisions have to 
be observed even by the states which did not accede to the LOSC. However, by 
the conclLision of the 1979 Peace Treat,, - hetween Egypt and Israel, a nexv 
dimension was given to this question, thOLIgh. as will be seen below, Saudi Arabia 
has nothing to do %%, 'ith the terms of that Treaty. 
3.2 The Le2al Implications of the Egyptia n- Israeli Peace Treatv of 1979 
The right of passage through the Strait of Tiran was one of the issues that 
received special attention in the peace process between Egypt and Israel. Article 
V(2) of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Washino-ton, on 26 March 1979, reads: 117) 
the Parties consider the Straits qfTiran and the Guýf of Aqaba to 
be international watenva 
, 
vs open to all nations for unimpeded and 
non-suspendable fteedoln oj' navigation and overflight. The 
Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight 
fior access to either counti-v through the Strait of Tiran and the 
Gitýf qf'Aqaba 204 . 
As to the interpretation of this text, there are two conflicting approaches. 
On the one hand, there is the view that the Peace Treaty has created a liberal 
regime of freedom of navigation which prevails over the generally-accepted rules 
of international law governing passage in straltS205. On the other hand, there is the 
view that the intention of the parties (Egypt and Israel) was to establish a regime 
that goes beyond the regime of innocent passage prescribed by the Law of the Sea 
Conventions, for the Strait of Tiran, but that falls short of the freedom of 
navigation and overflight applicable in the high seaS206 . 
However, without going t: ý 
further into these debates, which seem to be of little significance for Saudi Arabia, 
it is clear that the Egyptian position towards the question of passage mi the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba has shifted to go beyond the long-established regime 
of innocent passage recognized by the Law of the Sea Conventions. The Treaty 
expressly describes the Gulf of Aqaba as "international waterways", where the 
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principle of "non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overfli S207. applie 
Nonetheless, under international law, this new regime remains binding only on the 
parties of the Treaty, i. e. Egypt and Israel, and does not concern Saudi Arabia. 
According to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969 )208: 
a treaty does not ereate either obligations or rights for a third state 
without its consent. 
Even if the Parties of this Peace Treaty intended to impose the obligation of 
freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, on the 
Kingdom, the country bordering the Gulf and the Strait, the latter from a legal 
point of view, would be free from such an obligation. In this respect, Article -335 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: 
an obligation arises. for a third state ftom a provision of a treaty if 
the parties to the treaiý, intend the provision to be the means of 
establishing the obligation and the third state expressly accepts 
that obligation in writing. 
Accordingly, on the part of Saudi Arabia, as a state party to the LOSC, 
navigation of foreign vessels in the Gulf and Strait remains governed by the terms 
of the LOSC, as the principle of non-suspendable innocent passage applies M the 
Strait while the right of innocent passage is enjoyable in Saudi Arabia's territorial 
sea in the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Apart from the complications of navigation, there is still the problem of 
sovereignty over the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir, located at the entrance of the 
Strait. These islands, as will be seen below, are under Egyptian control, although 
they belong to Saudi Arabia. Given the friendly relationship currently prevailing 
between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it is likely that direct negotiations would lead to 
the resolution of this question, although neither party has so far taken any practical 
steps in this direction. 
Aware of her status as a side not affected by or concerned with the 
E gryptian- Israeli Peace Treaty, Saudi Arabia, when ratifying the Law of the Sea 
Convention, took the opportunity to declare that: 
... the rati cation oj' the 
Convention by the Kingdom does not W 
include any kind of recognition as to the maritime claims of any 
State which signs or ratifies it, when such claims are opposed to 
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the provisions ql'the Law ýfthe Sea Convention, and violate the 
soverei(rim, and jurisdiction qf the Kingdom it? its maritime 
lol-) (11VUS 
In a clear reference to the relevant provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty. Saudi Arabia, further, declared that: 
The Govcrninent oj'the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia i's not committed 1, 
to an. v international treaýv or agyreeinclit, which contains provision 
opposcd to the Law ofthc Sea Convention, and includes violations 
0, the sovereignti, andjurisdiction ,, his of the Kingdom in its 
-10 177aritillic areas 
ýVith regard to the question of straits linking one part of the high seas or an 
EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ. the Kingdom, through another Z: ) 
declaration, has dernonstrated its understanding of the transit passage regime. as to I- 
islands connected to these straits or located in their vicinity. The Declaration states 
that: 
The Government oj* the Kingdom qI'Saudi Arabia considers that 
the provisions qftheCOnVentiOn concerning the application oj'the 
regime of transit passage in the straits used jbr international 
navigati . on, and which connect one part qj'the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and another part qf the high seas or an 
exclusive economic _7 one, appýv also to navigation 
in between the 
1. slands in vicinity of these straits or connected to them, especially, 
when the waterways, used to enter into or to go out of the strait, 
and which are designated by the competent international 
organi, zation, are located in the vicinitv of these islands 211 . 
In so doing, the Kingdom, clearly, has in mind the Straits of Bab El- 
Mandeb and Honnuz which represent vital channels for the Saudi seabom trade, 
and where there is a number of islands within them and at their entrances 
')II 
. 
3.3 The Question of Sovereignly over Tiran and Sanafir Islands and the 
1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Trea! y 
The two uninhabited islands of Tiran and Sanafir are located at the entrance 
of the Gulf of Aqaba (see Map 2). The geographical location of these two islands 
in the context of the Gulf, has been described as follows: 
Tiran Island, in the approach, is separated ftom the Egyptian 
coast bY the Strait of Tiran, about 3 miles wide; it lies about 4ýV2 
miles south oj'Ras Fartak; Sanafir Island lies about I ý12miles east 
of Tiran, with a reef in between. The north-west, north and east 
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coasts of these islands are fronted by drying coral reefs. About 
midiva v between the ivest side of Tiran Island and the Sinai coast, 
westward, a line of drving coral reefs lies diagonally across the 
strait, forming on the west, the Enterprise Passage and, on the 
east, the Grafton Passage. Theformer has a minimum breadth of 
1,300 
- 
vards, and the latter a minimum breadth of 950 yards 
between the central ree/s and those extending from the coasts. 
Both these passages are deep. East and north of Sanafir and 
Tiran islands, there would appear to be a tortuous channel 
between the coral reetý in to the Guýf with a least depth of 9 
213 Jýthoms and a width oj'less than haýf a mile 
These islands have been put under the Egyptian sovereignty since 1950 
with the acceptance of Saudi Arabia, as a reaction to the occupation of Israel of 
what used to be Umm Rashrash (known today as Eilat) in 1949. This "oral" 
accord between Saudi Arabia and Egypt was aimed at enabling the Egyptian side to 
control the entrance of the Straits of Tiran and close it in the face of Israeli 
shipping when necessary. The content of this accord was infon-ned by the Egyptian 
Government to the Governments of the UK and US respectively on 30 January and 
23 February 1950, through two separate memorandums, as it was stated that: 
1. Taking into consideration velleities which have manifested 
themselves recentýy on the part of Israel authorities on behatf 
of the islands oj' Tit-an and Sanafir in the Red Sea at the 
entrance of the Guýf of Aqaba, the Government of Egypt acting 
in full accord with the Government of Saudi Arabia has given 
orders to occupy effiectively these two islands. This occu ation 
is now an accomplishedfact. 
2. In doing, this, Egipt wanted simply to confirm its right (as well 
as evei-v possible right of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) in 
regard to the mentioned islands which by their geographical 
position are at least 3 marine miles of the Egyptian side of 
Sinai and 4 iniles approximately off the opposite side of Saudi 
Arabia, all this in order to forestall any attempt on or possible 
violation of its riah tS214. 't5 
As to the sovereignty over the two Islands, this wording is not without 
ambiguity, and some phrases may indeed raise questions about the real intentions 
of Egypt. From the references to the Egyptian rights and the "possible" Saudi 
rights over the said islands, and to the fact that the Islands are at 3 n. m. off the 
Egyptian coast and 4 n. m. off the Saudi coast, it may be inferred that Egypt did not 
want, at least, to establish any "self-barriers" when deciding to claim the title over 
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the Islands. However, it was not long before the E, (:, ),, yptian position on the question 
becarne very clear. On 15 February 19-54, the E, (-, ), -yptian representative declared 
before the UN Security Council that: 
the recordý qf'the Second Uorld lVar contain official evidence that 
Egyptian units had been usi . no, these two islands as part of the 
Egyyptian defensive sv, stem duriny that ivar-thev (the Islands) were 
occilpied ... in 
1906. At that thne, it hUd bcen, lbund necessan, to 
delimit the. 11-017tiers hetiveen Eý(, ), ipt and the Ottinan Empire.... and 
I. t is an established, laci that. 1roin that time on the-1, have been 
undcr ýqvptian administration. 
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.... thev 
(the Islands)Jbi-in an intcgralpart ofthe territorv 
SaUdi Arabia, for its part, has maintained its sovereignty rights over the 
Islands. On 
-31 
March 1957, the Saudi Government addressed a circular note to 
the ii-iissions of "friendly Governments" in Jeddah. in which it was emphasized that 
the Islands "are Saudi Arabian property ýý` 16 . As mentioned earlier, the 
Saudis have 
also repeated their claim through a memorandum attached to a letter dated 12 April 
1957, from the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom to the United Nations, 
addressed to the Secretary General, as it was stated that these two islands are 
Saudi Arabian -17 
In recent years, the question has not been raised by either side. 
Nevertheless, Saudi ownership of the Islands is not in question. First of all, the 
Saudi title over the Islands before the Egyptian occupation was never disputed, as 
no side, including Egypt, claimed sovereignty thereover. Egypt itself recognized 
this fact, since in its memorandum to the UK and US Governments, the Egyptian 
Government, as mentioned earlier, expressly stated that the Egyptian occupation of 
the Islands was "in full accord with the Government of Saudi Arabia". There 
would have been no need for any justification, if such was not the case. Moreover, 
in the memorandum, Egypt did not totally reject the Saudi title over the Islands, as 
it stated that by the occupation action, it wanted, inter alia, to confirm - every 
possible right of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to the mentioned islands". 
Second, there is no evidence that Saudi Arabia ceded its title in the Islands 
in 1950 or even abandoned its claim in the years that followed. The Saudi interim 
cession was through an oral accord and in order to provide the Egyptian army with 
wider strategic geographical positions In the face of what was described in the said 
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memorandum as "certain velleities which have manifested themselves recently on 
the part of Israel authorities on behalf of the Islands of Tiran and Sanafir". In other 
words, it is illogical to suppose that it was the intention of the then Saudi 
Government to cede the Islands, since it is not expected that such territorial 
concessions between states would occur without a written agreement, or in return 
for nothing. 
Third, the Saudi title over the Islands at least until 1949 is recognized in the 
Egyptian literature. That Is what was pointed out by Abdulaziz Fodah, one of the 
Egyptian commentators who participated in the meeting of the Egyptian Society of 
International Law, which was held in 1967 with the aim of discussing the legal 
aspects of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran 21 8. Writing in 1983, Salah 
Addien Amer also stated that in the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba there are some 
31 30 islands, all of which, including Tiran and Sanafir islands "were" under the Saudi 
sovereIgnty219. Other Egyptian writers go further to assert the Saudi ownership of 
the two Islands. Of these, there are, for example, Amr Khaleel220 and Mohammed 
Saleim 221 . 
It is to be noted that in the Egyptian 1990 straight baseline Clairn222, no 
reference was made to the Islands. But it is not clear whether this means that 
Egypt has abandoned its claim over the Islands, or whether the legislation was 
carefully formulated so as to avoid provoking any of the parties concerned, 
particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, something which may have been intended by 
the Egyptian side to help in making the Middle East peace process a success. 
However, Saudi Arabia has not abandoned its claim concerning the Islands, and 
this can be inferred from its declaration when ratifying the LOSC, as the Kingdom 
rightly rejected the legal implications of any treaty apart from the LOSC itself. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis, it is obvious that Saudi Arabia applies two 
methods of drawing baselines for the measurement of her maritime zones, i. e. the 
low-water mark and the straight baseline, both of which are justifiable under 
international law. In its application of the latter system, the Saudi legislation 
followed international custom, but preceded the conventional rules. Before the 
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adoption of the LOSC, there were some doubts with regard to some aspects of the 
Saudi claims on baselines and internal waters. However, the accession of Saudi 
Arabia to the Convention which contains significant developments of direct effect 
to the questions of the baselines and internal waters, has removed many of these 
doubts. Nevertheless, the broad definition given to the term "island" to include 
"artificial islands"" should be reviewed by the Saudi legislator. In addition, Saudi 
Arabia has to show clearly the legal justifications with regard to the use of closing 
lines for the bays along her coasts, the claim which seems to have been made on 
"historic basis". The Saudi baseline claim does not refer to coral reefs and 
roadsteads, nor does it meet the requirement of ". adequate publicity", something 
which should be considered by the Saudi legislator. 
As to the question of navigation through straits, it is to be noted that the 
regime of '. non-suspendable innocent passage" applicable to the Straits of Tiran, 
and "'transit passage" applicable to the Straits of Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb, have 
now both become part of international law. Most relevant states have ratified the 
LOSC; thus they are under obligation to observe its provisionS223 . 
Other parties, 
which have not yet acceded to the Convention, have to observe the said provisions, 
since the general acceptance of the Convention, as a whole 224 , by the international 
community suggests that these provisions have passed now into international 
customary law. This matter could also explain why Saudi Arabia shifted her 
position to accept the provision of Article 16(4) of the TSC (Article 45(l) of the 
LOSC). However, with regard to the question of navigation in the Straits of Tiran 
and the Gulf of Aqaba, it seems that it will be finally decided in the light of the 
political negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, which commenced in the 
225 Madrid Conference of 1992 
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Chapter III 
Territorial Sea and Contif! uous Zone 
Introduction 
Having discussed in the past chapter the two regimes of baselines and 
internal waters, we now i-nove seaward to examine the two regimes of the 
territorial sea and the zone adjacent to it, i. e. the contiguous zone. Part I will 
discuss all legal aspects related to the territorial sea, its evaluation, legal status, 
breadth, the right of innocent passage within it, and its delimitation. This will be 
followed by an examination of the Saudi practice with respect to the aforesaid 
aspects. Part 11, in the same way, will examine the regime of the contiguous zone, 
in terms of the development of the concept and its legal status. The discussion ýVlll 
be based on analysis of international practice, teachings of jurists, judicial decisions 
and the provisions of relevant international conventions. The discussion of each 
part will be followed by analysis of the Saudi Arabian practice in the said two areas 
of the sea, with the aim of recognizing the Saudi contribution in these two fields 
and further, ascertaining the extent to which Saudi practice is consistent with the 
law of the sea. 
Part 1: The Territorial Sea 
1. The Judicial Nature of the Regime 
The term "territorial sea", otherwise known as the maritime belt, marginal 
sea, or territorial waters, is employed to indicate that part of the sea extending for 
an uncertain number of miles, beyond the land territory and internal waters of the 
coastal state. The development of the regime is a good case study of customary 
conventional and consensual law'. Despite the fact that the concept of the 
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territorial sea dates back to the Middle Ages. its Jundical nature has been a matter 
of controversv throu-(Thout the aLyes, whether amonL,, writers or in state practi 1ý ice. 
The extent of the state's rights over the waters adjacent to its coasts has been tD 
Subject to a number of theories, stich as the thý2ories of "property' soverein-ty", 
"Ser'VIUICIC and '6competence"-. 
HoNvever, by the beginning of the tNventieth century, the trend in doctrine 1171 ýt 
was steadily towards recognition of a coastal state's soverei itorial I-) ignty over its terri n 
sea. This view was taken by a number of authorities amongst whom was Faucille, 
who found that a state is so\, crelgn where It can impose its authorities, and the 
territorial scLi is a place where a state can impose such authoritieS3 . The state 
pi-actice has , ilso sliown a marked tendency towards the sovereignty doctrine. The 
Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (1919)', for example, 
stated in its first article that: 
every Poit'er has complete and c-, ývchisiVC SOt, erei . gnty over the air 
space aboi, c its territory, which includes the national territory, 
and the territorial waters adjacent thereto. 
This text goes further since it affirms the sovereignty doctrine not only over the 
territorial sea, but also over its superjacent air space. 
In the domestic sphere, the same principle has been also established. The 
expression is found in some municipal laws, such as the British Postal Regulations 
of 1908 5 and the UK Air Navigation Act of 1920'. There were also some implied 
and indirect references to the doctrine in case law, namely by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in the Grisbadarna case (1909) over the maritime boundaries 
between Nor-way and Sweden' and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration 
(1910)8. Thus, support for the principle of coastal state sovereignty over the 
territorial sea was growing and started to crystallize during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. As noted by O'Connell: 
after 1900 the controversy about the juridical nature of the 
territorial sea waned, and scarcely any author took issue with the 
notion that the territorial sea is subject to sovereignty9. 
Under the League of Nations, the "territorial waters" question was among 
the subjects considered for discussion by the Committee of Experts appointed in 
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1924 by the League itself, and one of the three topics'O the preparations of which 
were entrusted to a Preparatory Committee m the Hague Codification Conference 
of 1930. The first point of the Bases of Discussions prepared by the Committee 
says that: 
... it would seem possible to take as the point of departure the 
proposition that the state possesses sovereignty over a belt of sea 
around its coast ... I. t 
has legislative authoriiy over all persons, 
power to make and appýv regulations, judicial authority, power to 
grant concessions andsoforth' 1. 
The doctrine of sovereignty over the territorial sea including its bed subsoil and air 111) 1 
space gained considerable support by the states in the Conference, as was clear 1ý 
from the replies of governments to the Schedule of Points passed through before 
the Conference 12 . However, the final text included this meaning, as it stipulates in 
its first article that: 
the territog oJ' a state includes a belt of sea described in this 
Convention as the territorial sea. Sovereignty over this belt is 
exercised subject to the conditions prescribed by the present 
Convention and the other rules of international law 13 . 
Article 2 enlarged the extent of sovereignty to include the air space above the 
territorial sea, as well as the bed of the sea, and the subsoil] 4. In the Report of 
the Second Committee, the task of which was to study the Bases of Discussions, it 
was stated that the view that the territorial sea forms part of the territory of the 
state stems from to the fact that the power exercised by the state over this belt is in 
its nature in no way different from the power which the state exercises over its 
domain on land 15 . On the preference to employ the term 
"territorial sea" rather 
than "territorial waters" in the text, it was stated that the latter is more general and 
confusing, and could also be used to indicate inland waters 16 . However, the text 
was not adopted and the Conference itself met no success, mainly because of the 
difference on the question of the breadth of the territorial sea. Nevertheless, what 
was achieved was an important step towards establishing the doctrine of the 
coastal state's sovereignty over its territorial sea, throughout the ILC debates and 
the circles of the law of the sea conferences and their productions. 
In his first report of 4 April 1952 submitted to the ILC, the Special 
Rapporteur, Francois indicated that: 
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t. 10110w. y. fi-oin the sovereignti, over the territorial sea, stated in 
Article 2 (oj' the 1930 drq1i) that the territon, oj'the coastal state 
i. ncludes ... the soil covered by the territorial sea, as well as the 
subsoll. Although therc are some contrarv views among writers, 
the PI-CICt1CC- of a certain number Qf states accepts this 17 
Indeed, the nUmber of states SUpporting the theory of "sovereignty"" considerably 
increased in the 1950s. These tendencies of states were reflected in their 
participation in the Law of the Sea Conferences. The matter of sovereignty was 
USUýIllv d[SCLISSCd in the context of the right of innocent passage. In similar 
ýý, ordingr, Articl,,. - I of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone. and Article 2 of the 198-1 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea provide that: 
thc soi, ci-cigrnw of a state exten(ls, he. i, ona' its land tei-ritoty and 
internal watei-s and, On the case of an ai-chipelagic state, its 
ai-chipelagic watei-s, the LOSC adds), to an adjacei7t belt of sea, 
desci-lbed as the tetriton'al sea. 
Moreover, the sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well 
as to its bed and subsoil (TSC Article 1(2), LOSC Article 2(3)). Thus, these two 
important global conventions have fixed only the term "territorial sea" and 
dismissed the other terms, and further, established the sovereignty notion not only 
over the territorial sea but also over the air space above the territorial sea, the bed 
and subsoil. 
Apart from the Law of the Sea Conventions, the notion of sovereignty was 
established by other international instruments, such as the Convention on 
18 International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 (Articles I and 2) . It may be 
added that most twentieth century writers, such as Oppenheim", ColomboS20, 
O'Connell2 ', HaI122 , and Westlake 
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assert the coastal state's sovereignty over 
coastal waters. 
The view that the coastal state has sovereignty over its territorial sea came 
to prevail 'in state practice in the twentieth century, but nevertheless, the lack of 
agreement on a precise meaning of the term is evident in the national legislations of 
states. The territorial sea has been classified, for example, as the public domain by 
Peru and Ecuador in 1969 and 1970 respectiVely24 , and 
before that by Dominican 
1-14 
Republic in 1947 25 , or as national property as 
Spain claimed in its Article 1(3) of 
Coasts Act of 196926. In other cases, the right of "sovereignty'927 or "complete and 
exclusive sovereignty" -)S , 
has been affirmed, but without reference to the essence of 
such concepts, while others claimed "sovereignty", but subject to the provisions of 
interriational rules, as Saudi Arabia, for example, did m 1958 (Article 2 of the 1958 
Royal Decree) 29 
Turning back to the principle of "sovereignty" of the coastal state, adopted 
in the Law of the Sea Conventions, the extent of the concept should be understood 
in connection with the rights and restrictions granted to and imposed upon the 
coastal state, on the one hand, and foreign nationals and vessels, on the other. The 
coastal state has extensive powers to control matters of security, customs, fiscal. ) 
immig-ration and economic interests, and in return, the fundamental restriction upon 
the sovereignty of the coastal states remains the right of other nations to innocent 
30 passage through its territorial sea . 
However, it should be noted finally, that 
although international law concedes that the territorial sea may be included within 
the national boundary, it is solely municipal law which decides the extent of effect 
that the term "sovereignty" has, and some states, even if parties to the TSC or 
LOSC or both, may not wish to benefit from the extent of powers permitted by 
31 intemational law 
2. The Breadth of the Territorial Sea 
2.1 Earlv Trends 
The question of how far a coastal state could extend its territorial sea, has 
been a matter of controversy for centuries. The starting point of this disagreement 
ýN, as in the sixteenth century as a result of the emergence of the two contradictory 
ideas, i. e. Mare Liberum v. Mare Clausum 32 . 
Early practice in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries showed the employment of vague criteria, such as the "range 
of visual horizon", which was referred to in the 1682 Treaty between Great Britain 
and Algers and in the 1691 Treaty between Great Britain and Holland 
33 In the 
eighteenth century, two rules appear to have become prevalent: first, the cannon- 
shot rule, which was recorded and recommended by Bynkershoek 
34 
, and was also 
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adopted in a number of bilateral ageementS3 -5; and secondly, the four-mile 
"leaLyLic". mainly exercised by the Scandinavian stateS36 
However. the uncertainty that accompanied the cannon-shot doctrine 
necessitated having a clearer criterion of a fixed distance. Although there were 
some passing references to a three-mile coastal sea in the late 1600s and early 
1700s-", the Italian Diplomat, Galiani, is widely regarded as the first author to Z: ) 
eqUate cannon range with three miles in 1782. when he was writing of the 
American War of Independence. The idea was based on the fact that the average 
cannon range at the time was three miles. It was not long before until the rule 
received (_ieneral acceptance in state practice and in case law. By issuing the 
Neutrality Act of 5 June 1794 38 , the United States became the 
first state to adopt 
the rule in its i-nLI11ICipal law. In English jurisprudence, the three-mile standard was 
introduced by Lord Stowell in his decisions on the cases of Twee Gebroeders 
(Alberts, Master) (1800) 39 , and 
The Ann (1805) 40 concerning the capture of certain 
ships by British vessels. In treaty law, the rule was first established in the 1818 
Convention Respecting Fisheries, Boundary, and the Restoration of Slaves, 
between Great Britain and the United States 41 . 
This practice of Great Britain and 
42 43 
the United States was followed by other countries, such as Argentina , 
CIffle , 
Ecuador 4' and El Salvador 45 . Among the important multi-party conventions 
that 
affin-ned the application of the three-mile limit were the Hague Convention for the 
Regulation of the Police of Fishenes in the North Sea Outside the Territorial 
Waters of 1882 (Article 11)46 , and the 
Constantinople Convention Respecting the 
Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal of 1888 (Article 4)47 . 
Thus, the rule 
began to gain considerable acceptance as a customary rule. 
2.2 Under Conventional Rules 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the positions of certain nations 
towards the three-mile rule started to shift, especially following World War 1, in 
favour of enforcing a claim to more than three miles of territorial sea. The 
disputing views on the matter were reflected in the debates of the Hague 
Conference of 1930, which led eventually to the failure of the Conference 
48 
. 
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The diversity of international practice went on during the decades that 
preceded UNCLOS 1. In 1958, for instance, the claims of some states were noted 
as follows: Australia 3 miles, Finland 4, Cambodia 5, India 6, Mexico 9, Albania 
10, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia 12, Chffle 50 (kilometres), and El Salvador 200 
miles 49 . This, in turn, was reflected in the debates of the ILC during the 1950s and 
its provisional proposalS50. The replies of governments to the provisional articles 
presented by the ILC to the General Assembly undoubtedly indicated the lack of 
enthusiasm among states to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea in 
the UNCLOS 1. Thus, the Conference failed to decide the question. 
At UNCLOS 11, the conflict over the issue went on, between two camps, 
one led by the United States favouring a six-Mile limit and the second, led by the 
former Soviet Union, favouring 12 miles. These conflicts caused the Conference to 
close without deciding the problem". 
The 1960s marked the trend of states towards broader claims. By the 
beginning of UNCLOS III works, 56 states claimed 12 n. m. territorial sea, one, 18 
n. m.; three, 30 n. m.; one, 50 n. m.; one, 100 n. m. and one, 150 n. m. 5'. This new 
accomplished fact imposed itself on UNCLOS III debates. Ecuador, for instance, 
proposed 200 n. m. 
53 
, Nigeria proposed 
50 n. m. 
54 
. 
However, the general tendency, 
55 
especially among the great maritime powers, such as the United States , the 
United KingdoM56 and former European block states including the Soviet Union 57, 
was in favour of a twelve mile limit to the territorial sea. In May 1975, the latter 
approach received a general consensus in the circles of the Conference 58 , and was 
finally codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Putting an end to a long history of controversy over the territorial sea breadth 
question, and reflecting the clearly dominant trend in state practice the LOSC 
(Article 3), as a first global convention provides that: 
every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles. 
In view of the overwhelming majority of states adopting this rule, it can be 
considered an international customary one. In 1989, for example, 107 states 
claimed a 12 mile territorial sea, while only 13 states, mostly Latin American, 
claimed 200 miles, 4 states claimed 6,2 states claimed 4 and II states claimed 3 
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nules 59. However, such claims will not be accepted, except between states making 
similar claims. Furthermore, states claiming narrower territorial seas would not be 
bound by the 12 mile limit", although it is generally regarded as customary law. 
3. Innocent Passage within the Territorial Sea: A Classical Exceptional 
Right to the Coastal States Sovereignly 
Under Article 19(l) of the LOSC (TSC Article 14(4)), the passage of 
foreign ships within the territorial sea of another state is innocent so long as it is 
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. It 
includes travelling of ships through the territorial sea to or from internal waters 
(LOSC Article 18(l); TSC Article 14(3)). It has been stated that it is difficult to 
define precisely the terms "passage" and "Innocent", both of which were kept 
somewhat vague in order to reconcile the legitimate security and other interests of 
the coastal state with the inclusive right of other states to "pass" through territorial 
waterS61 . 
However, in order to recognize the exact meaning of "innocent passage", 
the definition given in Article 19(2) of the LOSC ought to be read in connection 
with Paragraph 2 of the same article, which enumerates a number of situations 
where passage is not regarded as innocent62. 
As a legitimate right, firmly established in international law, the right of 
innocent passage, in general, has its origins in international custom supported by 
the writings of famous publicists, such as Gentili and Vattel in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centurieS63 , and, more recently, the 
twentieth century commentators, 
such as Jessup, Gidel, and Lauterpacht64 . 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
several proposals of the learned societies and bodies of experts affirmed the 
existence of this right as part of international CUStOM65' which made it ripe to be 
codified in the Hague Codification Conference of 1930. Indeed, despite the failure 
of the Conference, its Draft Convention (Articles 3 and 4)66 reaffirmed the right. 
The doctrine was elaborated in Article 14 of the TSC which prohibits the 
hampering of innocent passage or levying charges from foreign ships when 
exercising such a right (Articles 15 and 18(l)) and, on the other hand, obliges the 
coastal state to publicise any dangers to navigation in the territorial sea of which it 
is aware (Article 15(2)). At UNCLOS 111, the subject was of particular interest, as 
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there were two disputing views. i. e. the expanding claims to territorial sea by the 
de%, elopinu- countries. and that of maritime nations who were concerned to provide 
firnier OLItHrICS for the ri(-)-ht. Howcvcr. the Law of the Sea Convention contains C) 
more detailed provisions than those of the TSC. especially in terms of the rights 
and cluties of the coastal state coiicemingy innocent passag-e (Articles 21-25). 
The right has been expressly recogmized by case law. In the Compania De 
Na%-e(-Taclon \, icional (Panania) %,. Uilted States Arbitration of 1933), Van 
Heeckereii. Prcýýidin_(Y Commissioner. and Root. Commissioner, indicated that: 
... this qw-ililication [thc right of innocent passage], forbids the 
SOVCIVI', ý, 1'17 CICtIM111, to Prohibit thc 1*1717OCC17t passage of' alien 
111CI. C. /Itill, L5 thl. 011( Th jj, ý, tc,,. J. I -to,. IIII, (, /C J. ... 
67 
In the Corfu Cliannel case of 1949. althom-Th the ICJ did not discuss the question of 
passage in the territorial sea, except in intmational straits and in particular of 
warships, it affirmed the existence of this riglit it'ithout the pi-evious authoi-Lation 
6 
ý/'a coavalstate, PI-Ovidea' that Passage I'S 1,1117OCCIlt C, 
However, although the passage of merchant ships is consensually accepted 
as a customary rule, the case is different with warships, a subject which has been a 
matter of controversy for a long time. Some authors, such as Hall'9 and Ro ot70 
deny such a right, while others, such as Oppenheim 71 and Colombos 72 recognize it 
in time of peace when passage in the territorial waters is necessary for international 
traffic. The Final Text of the Hague Codification Conference (Article 12) adopted 
this right without a previous authorization or notification to be required by the 
coastal state 73 . 
The debates of the International Law Commission preceding UNCLOS I 
centred on the question of whether passage should be subject to prior authorization 
or notification, the principle which was secured to the coastal state in the 
formulation adopted by the Commission in its eighth session 
74 
. 
At the Conference 
itself, the gap between those states demanding previous authorization or 
notification (the Communist and Third World states) and those rejecting it (mainly 
75 the Western states), was so wide , that the 
TSC contains no express provision on 
the subject. Under the heading, "Rules Applicable to All Ships", Article 14(l) of 
the Territorial Sea Convention provides, with somewhat vague wording, that: 
1-19 
subject to the provisions of those articles, ships of all states, 
whether coastal 01- 170t, shall enjqv the right oj'innocent passage 
through the territorial sea. 
From this formula, it is clear that the Convention emphasizes the nght of "all states 
whether coastal or not" to innocent passage, but on the means whereby a state 
exercises such a right, i. e. vessels, the Convention, seemingly deliberately, was 
satisfied to mention "all ships" without specifying whether warships are meant by 
this provision! This ambiguity of the rule led to a number of contradictory 
76 77 opinions among commentators. Some of them, such as Jessup and Fitzmaurice , 
hcld that warships by implication have a right to innocent passage. Others, such as 
Tunkin 7S , 
deny such a right. I-) 
However, due to the considerable growth in their naval capacity, the 
attitudes of the former Soviet bloc countries on the passage of warships in the 
territorial sea shifted in the debates of UNCLOS 111". Moreover, the former 
Soviet Union has expressly recognized since 1984 the right of foreign ships to 
innocent passage 80 and reaffirmed its new position by issuing, with the United 
States, a joint "Unifon-n Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Goveming 
Innocent Passage"81, which entitles warships to innocent passage. On the other 
hand, a number of Third World nations maintained their demands concerning 
previous authorization or notification requirements 82 . As a result, the question was 
left, under the 1982 United Nations Convention, without a clear answer, as it was 
in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, except for a statement in Article 30 (of the 
former) that a warship is under obligation to leave the territorial sea "immediately", 
if it does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state. In any 
case, the disagreement on the question does not concern the passage per se, it only 
concerns the way such passage is conducted, therefore, as O'Connell concluded: 
while minesweeping would not be allowed, the passage of ships 
clearedfor action, but with armament in a stowage position, would 
b 83 e 
4. Delimitation of the Territorial Sea 
Most disputes that arise within the field of the Law of the Sea concern 
maritime boundaries. Nevertheless, the problems resulting from the delimitation of 
the territorial sea, whether between adjacent or opposite states, remain by and 
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large limitod. if compared vvith those concernirig, other mantime areas. This is due 
to the fact that the territorial sea is limited in surface, and accordingly. the 
conflicting interests are correspond in gy ly limited in nature 84 There is more than 
one method for delimitation. and the choice of method has been significantly 
inilLienced by the geou)-raphical relationship of the coasts abutting the ocean areas at 
isstic, charactcrized in terms of opposimicss or adjacency, or mixed oppositeness 
and adjacency 1 0; 
4.1 Between Opposite States 
It is well k-nown that all maritime zonesl including the territorial sea. are 
measured from baselines". As is the case \vitli identifying these lines, decidin(, Y the 
otiter limit of the territorial sea is not without difficulties in the case of opposite 
states, especially where the distance between the two coasts of such states are 
within less than double their territorial sea claims. In such a situation, there exist 
three methods, a common median zone, the "thalweg", and the median line. 
The first method is based on the idea that each of the opposite states is 
entitled to sovereignty to the complete extent of its territorial sea, and the 
overlapping- zone is common to both of them". In practice, this method was 4= 
implemented in the division of the Bay of Figueroa between France and Spain"' 
The "thalweg", on the other hand, means the middle line of the deepest or Z: ) 
most navigable channel passing between the two shores89. The idea behind the use 
of this method is to take account of the depth and navigability of waters. This 
solution, which finds its origins in nver law, was employed in a number of treaties 
such as the 1928 Agreement between Great Britain and the Sultan of Johore 
concerning the Johore Strait", the 1913 Agreement between Great Britain and 
Germany9l, and the 1891 Agreement between Zaire and Angola concerning the 
River Cong092. 
As to the median line theory, i. e. equidistance from the nearest points of the 
coasts of the opposite states, it traces back to Pufendorf who found it inappropriate 
for states bordering a bay or a strait to extend their national boundaries to the 
centre 93 . This rule of 
demarcating the territorial sea, which is more common in use 
than the two previous ones, was put forward by the Preparatory Committee of the 
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1)4 Hague Codification Conference 
. It was resorted to in treaty practice, to 
determine the water boundaries of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland on Lake 
Constance9ý for instance, and more recently in 1976 between Colombia and 
96 Panama . Many states have incorporated this technique in their national 
legislations following its adoption in Article 12 of the TSC9' 
4.2 Between Adjacent States 
La Predelle identified two methods to delimit the territorial sea of adjacent 
states. The first was the projection of the land boundary seawards on a great circle 
continuing the landward boundary, wIffle the second was to draw a line 
perpendicular to the general tendency of the coast". The second technique was 
favoured by the Pen-nanent Court of Arbitration in the Grisbadarna case of 1909 
between Norway and Sweden", as the Tribunal was asked to decide whether the 
boundary line between the two countries had been fixed by the Boundary Treaty of 
1661 . and if it had not, to fix it taking into account the circumstances of the fact 
and the principles of international law. Recent treaty practice has also adopted this 
method, such as the Delimitation Protocol of 1958 between Poland and the Soviet 
Union'O', and the 1972 Brazil-Uruguay Agreement on the Chuy River Bank and 
the Lateral Sea Limit'O'. 
In justifying his rejection of both methods, Boggs indicated that in relation 
to the first one, the land boundary is usually accidental in direction and has no 
relation to the necessities of delimiting the sea boundary, while, as to the second, in 
102 
most cases it is hard to deten-nine the general direction of the coast . 
Instead, he 
suggested that a point at five miles distance (i. e. the supposed extent of the 
territorial sea of both nations) is to be taken and connected to the land boundary. 
Where a straight line does not serve, he proposed that the boundary should 
probably constitute a series of straight lines, the last of which should end at the 
normal high sea terminus 103 . 
Boggs's method is embodied in the principle of 
equidistance adopted in Article 12 of the TSC with the qualification that 
equidistance is related to the baseline constituted by the possibility of the use of 
104 straight baseline doctrine 
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4.3. Delimitation of the Territorial Sea under Conventional Rules 
In the ILC, the delimitatioi-i of the territorial sea question was introduced by 
the special RapporteLir Francois. in 195-1'"ý and 195-3)'0'. in the case of straits of 
LineqUal width"". However, the formLila for territorial sea boundary in straits and 
between opposite and adjacent states were merged and submitted to the 
(Y-overi-imems in UNCLOS I for reply"". The formula adopted finally in the 
Confererice. reflected this form. Article 12( 1) of the Territorial Sea Convention 
reads: 
11,77crc thc cousts ofthc two states arc opposite or a4jacent to each 
other, licithcr 0/ thC tlVO StUICS I'S ClIlill(ld, jaill'170' ae(, Yl-eClll(-'l7t 
thCIII to the ('01INWIT, to c. vtcnd its Ierritorial sea beyond 
the inedian line civi-v point (ýfwhich is cquidistant 
, 
11-om the nearest 
POI)IIS 017 IIIC baSCII17CS JI-0/11 Which the breadth oj'the territorial 
scas o/ cach ofthe two states is n7casured. The provisions oj*this 
paragraph shall not app4v, howevcr, where it is necessarl, b-I" 
1-casoll QfhIsloric title Or otherspecial circumstances to delinn .t the 
territorial seas Qfthe two statcs in a way which is at variance with 
this provision. 
It is clear frorn this wording, that the Convention favours, as an initial choice, 
agreement on the question between the states concerned. But since such a solution 
is not always possible, the boundary line the Convention adopts the "median line" 
rule. However the lack of a "decisive" pnnciple for deciding the question is 
obvious in the last clause of the text which excludes the evidence of "histonc title" 
and "special circumstances" from the application of this criterion. The general and 
imprecise reference to these two concepts creates more difficulties and 
controversies in interpretation and application. Commenting on the median line 
approach adopted in the above text, O'Connell correctly describes the impression 
that this solution will resolve the question of the criterion for the delimitation of the 
territorial sea as "deceptive", since: 
this solution is not to apply where it is necessmy, by reason of 
historic title or other special circumstance, to delimit the 
territorial seas of two states in a way which is at variance with the 
provisions of Article 12. If "Special circumstances " is to have in 
this context the enlarged meaning which it has acquired in the 
comparable provision relating to the delimitation of the 
continental she4f..., then other possible solutions are available to 
some extent or other in almost every situation of controversy"'. 
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In the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, it was not difficult for the 
N, egotiating Group 7, which was charged with the arrival of a consensus for the 
delimitation questions, to reach an agreement on the territorial sea delimitation 
criteria in the light of the widespread support for the retention of the TSC 
formulation''O. Indeed, the previous provisions were repeated almost verbatim in 
Article 15 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ) with the 
same degree of generality and flexibility. 
5. Saudi Arabia's Position on the Territorial Sea 
From the previous analysis it is clear that each state is entitled, in 
accordance with established international rules, to claim, subject to the "innocent 
passage" right of foreign ships, "full sovereignty" over a twelve nautical mile 
"territorial sea", measured from the "baselines" seaward, and the delimitation of 
which between adjacent and opposite states is to be decided by the "median line" 
rule, failing agreement, taking into account the "historic title" and "special 
circumstances". Saudi Arabia, as a maritime nation, was one of the first countries 
in the region to lay down her own rules governing almost all legal aspects of the 
territorial sea regime. In what follows, we will examine these rules in connection 
with those of international law. 
5.1 The Juridical Nature of the Saudi Territorial Sea 
The initial claim of the Kingdom over the waters ad acent to its coasts was j 
declared more than five decades ago through the Regulations of Mussels and 
Fishing within the Coasts of the Red Sea"'. The claim was confined to fishery 
rights, rather than the territorial sea in its wider framework. The fishery limit was Zý 
defined to 4 n. m. from the coasts of the Red Sea (Article 4) and 'in this area, fishing 
was prohibited, except by virtue of licence (Articles 5 and 10). 
However, following the offshore concession of 10 October 1948, between 
Saudi Arabia and Aramco 112 , according to which the 
latter was entitled to extract 
oil from the eastern region of the Kingdom, the Saudi Government was initially 
interested in establishing its claim over the submerged areas off the eastern coasts 
for the purpose of oil exploitation. On legal advice from Hudson and Young, the 
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international law experts who were required to lay down the rules governing the tý ZI) 
Saudi Arabian jurisdiction over those submerged lands' 13 , the Kingdom, for the 
first time. defined its territorial waters by ISS1.111123' the Royal Decree No. 6"4/5', 3711 
of 28 May 1949'". The Decree defined the Saudi Arabian territorial sea as 
ernbracimy hoth ihe 1171ancl ivaters and thc coastal . ýea ofthe Kinudoin These 
waters, as wc1l as the air space above and the soil and subsoil beneath thern were 
claii-ned to be: 
under //I ., I 
. 
(), , c . ý01'cl ( ý3170 /he 
Kill, 171dom, subiect to the provisions ol 
i'lic"nalional law as to the i. 'I'locc, 71 Passage of vessels of other 
nations 117rou,,, h the coastalsca 
The exan-iiiiatioi-i of these texts reveals a mimber of observations: 
(a) To describe the territorial sea, the King-dom used the term "coastal sea", 
wl-iich. besides the internal waters, form the Saudi "territorial waters". 
(b) By adopting sovereiOnty riohts over the territorial waters, air space above, I-D t) 117ý 
and the soil and subsoil beneath them, the Kingdom clearly adopted the 
sovereignty theory. Z: ) 
(c) Through this claim, Saudi Arabia recog-nised, without discrimination, the t) 
right of innocent passage in her coastal sea, and on the limits of this right, 
she asserted the 'provisions of international law' as the criterion. The 
legislation avoided making a direct reference to the question of the passage 
of warships. However, it is not expected that a state of great security 
concerns, such as Saudi Arabia, would expressly impose on itself such legal 
obligations in an area of law, which has long been one of the most 
controversial issues in the law of the sea'". 
On 16 February 1958, the Kingdom repealed the 1949 Decree and 
redefined its claims to offshore authority by virtue of the Royal Decree No. 33"8. 
In contrast to the Decree of 1949, the making of which was mainly based on 
economic considerations (specifically oil exploitation) in the Arabian Gulf on the 
east, the secunty factor concerning specifically the Israeli presence at the head of 
the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea to the west, was the major motivation behind the 
issue of the new Decree and the timing of its issue. Article 2 of the Decree 
provides that: 
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The territorial waters ql'the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as 
the air space above and the territorial sea-bed and the subsoil 
beneath them are under the sovereignty of the Kingdom, subject to 
the established provisions of international law. 
Article 4 provides that: 
The territorial sea qfthe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lies outside the 
inland ivaters oj'the Kingdom ... 
The 1958 Decree then contains the following amendments: 
(a) The ten-n "coastal sea" was omitted and replaced with the more commonly 
Used tenn, "territorial sea". 
(b) The 1958 Decree repeats the 1949 claim to the concept of "sovereignty" over 
the territorial sea, but it is noted that the reference to the right of innocent 
passage of other nations therein is omitted, and instead, the Saudi legislator 
was satisfied with the phrase subject to the established provisions of 
119 
hiteriiational law 
By these amendments, it is clear that Saudi Arabia desired to bring her 
policies on the juridical nature of the territorial sea into line with the generally 
accepted international standards. First, as to terminology, the ILC preferred the 
term "territorial sea" to "territorial waters" and used it in Article I of its final draft 
120 
SUbmitted to the General Assembly In its commentary on this question the 
Commission stated that: 
The Commission preferred the term "territorial sea " to 
"territorial waters ". It was of the opinion that the term 
it territorial waters" might lead to confusion, since it is used to 
describe both internal waters only, and internal waters and the 
territorial sea combined. For the same reason, the Codification 
Conftrence also expressed a preference for the term "territorial 
,, 121 sea 
The term was finally used in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and also, later on, 
in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Secondly, the 1958 Decree repeated the 
formulation of 1949 as to the claim of "sovereignty" and its extent which includes 
the air space above and the soil and subsoil beneath the territorial sea. In so doing, 
Saudi Arabia followed the preference of the ILC, which incorporated this provision 
into its draft of 1956 to the GA 122 The same provision, as seen earlier, was 
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included in the TSC and LOSC. Thirdly, %%-ith regard to limitations of sovereignty, 
it can be said that the omission by the 1958 Decree of the reference to -innocent 
passage". included in the Decree of 1949 does not mean that it was the intention of 
the Saudi legislator to reject the principle of innocent passage in the Saudi 
territorial sca in as much as it was his desire to model the claim on the more 
coinnion formulation tendinL), to subjugate the exercise of the coastal state's 
so,, 'ci-cignty in its territorial sea to the -provisions of international law", the 
approach which was followed in the 19-30 Hague Codification Conference and 
supportcd In the ILC debates before the 1958 Geneva Conference and was finally 
adol)ted In Article 1 (21) of the TSC 
These Saudi national policies. which were approved only eight days before 
the corni-nencenient of the 1958 Geneva Confercnce on the Law of the Sea, were 
enthusiastically defended by the Saudi delegation to the Conference which 
witnessed an active Saudi participation. At the Thirteenth Meeting of the 
Conference First Committee, the Saudi representative, Shukairi, welcomed the ILC 
choice of the term "territorial sea" and referred to the adoption of this terrn by the 
Saudi Decree of 1958' 24 . He also: 
applauded the Commission's wisdom in dýfining the juridical 
status of the territorial sea as ývell as in asserting the coastal 
state's soverei . gnty over the airspace abovc it and over the seabed 
and subsoil beneath it, in a manner consonant with existing 
international law, as formulated in the text adopted at the Hague 
25 Conftrence of'1930 and numerous international conventions' . 
The question of innocent passage in the territorial sea, beacuse of its 
relevance to the presence of Israeli warships in the Gulf of Aqaba and Strait of 
Tiran, was of particular importance to Saudi Arabia at the Conference. Being 
more concerned with her security, Saudi Arabia was, unlike certain maritime 
powers (specifically the US and UK), not interested in the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea or straits connecting one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of another state. In his 
126 comment on the statement of the UK representative on this question Shukairi 
said: 
In regard to the right of' innocent passage, he agreed with the 
United Kingdom representative that it was analogous to a right of 
way but disagreed with that representative's conclusion since, 
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under everv s- vstem oJ'law the exercise of a right of wqv must be 
subject to law. Thus, an aggressor had no right of way through the 
properti, qJ'his victim, and a state found guilq, of a breach of the 
peace, a violation oq'international law or defiance of the United 
Nations Charter, was not entitled to a right of way through the 
territorial sea of a state directly affected by its actions. The right 
qj'innocent passage inust be subject to the securio, of the state, 
since that was the basis (? I'international law 127 . 
In this statement, the Saudi representative's position was that Israel, as an 
aL, (; ressor. should not be allowed to enjoy the right of innocent passage m the 
Saudi Arabian territorial waters in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran on the 
(TrOUnds that the Israeli presence in the Gulf of Aqaba was illegal 128 . To this end, 
Saudi Arabia proposed an amendment to the US proposal which included that: 
passage i's innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the securit LI) V 
qfthe coastal state. Such passage shall take place in conformitJ, 29 
with thepresent rules' . 
The Saudi amendment to the US proposal included the following: 
Passage is innocent ýfit is not prejudicial to the security of the 
coastal state. Such passage is not innocent when it is contrary to 
30 he present rules or to other rules of international law' . 
Jointly with Buri-na, the Saudi delegation also reproposed another 
amendment, the wording of which differed only slightly: 
Passage is innocent unless it is prejudicial to the security of the 
coastal state or contrai-v to the present rules or to other rules of 
international law' 31 
. 
From the wording of the said proposals, it is clear that the US proposal was 
satisfied with the subjugation of the innocent passage regime to the " present rules", 
i. e. the rules which would have been included into the TSC, while the Saudi 
proposals added "or to other rules of international law". In that, the Saudi side 
appeared to have in mind what was established as a customary rule in the Corfu 
Channel case, according to which such a right is only allowed through the straits 
linking two parts of the high seas, an interpretation, which would entitle the Saudi 
authorities to suspend the passage of Israeli warships threatening the Kingdom's 
security in the Strait of Tiran connecting the Saudi territorial sea *in the Gulf of 
Aqaba with the high seas in the Red Sea. At the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the 
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Committee. Shukairi defended the inclusion of the phrase "or to other rules of 
international law" to Article 15 of the draft articles. saying that: 
Freedom ofnavicration Was 170t C117 absolute ri, ýu: 
ht; sovereign 
-, 
itse4, 
It) ti 
was not absolute. Both had to he (-ývcrcised in accordance with 
1. nternational law, and the 117ternatl*017al Law Commission hadjelt 
I. t necessan, to make that. lact clear 1'17 the fundamental articles 
C 
ICa lil 7 (-l 
,, iviih sovereigi7tv over the tcrritorlal sea and with the 
mcanin, -, ofthe right 0111717OCCIlt INISSCIO-C 
Saudi Arabla has also connected the exercising of the right with the breadth 
of the territorial -, ca. fn this regard, Shukairi said at the Twenty-Second Meeting 
of tile Comillittee: 
Thc qucsil'on (ýfimzocent passage ... could on4v 
he decided in the 
li-ht (ý/ the breadth o/ the territorial sca. The conditions to which 
a statc would sublect the right Qf innownt passage would naturalli, 
133 depend on whether the territorialsea was wide or narrow 
The extreme sensitivity of Saudi Arabia towards the question of innocent 
passage in the territorial sea was clearly reflected in the strong Saudi objection to 
the tl-tree-power amendment to Paragraph 4 of the Draft Article 17, which provided 
that: 
There shall be no suspension of'the innocent passage of foreign 
ships through straits or other sealanes which are used for 
international navigation between a part of the high seas and 
another part of the high seas or the territorial waters of a foreign 
state' 34 , 
In his response to this proposal, Shukairi said: 
... 
Paragraph 4 was a most important provision; accordingly the 
amendments to it should be veo) carefully considered before they, 
were put to the vote ... . 
The right of innocent passage could be 
exercised only in recognized international seaways. ... 
The three- 
power amendment ... should 
be rejected, as it was in direct conflict 
with the accepted principles of international law ... 
His 
government's participation in the final act of the Conference 
would be conditional, among other things, on the rejection of the 
135 amendments to Article 17... 
The Saudi representative strongly expressed his protest to the said 
amendment by further saying: 
... the amendment text no 
longer dealt with general principles of 
international law, but had been carefulli, tailored to promote the 
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claims of one state. His delegation would be unable to support a 
text that covered onli, one specific case"'. 
As to the innocent passage of warships in the terntorial sea, Saudi Arabia 
rejected the complete freedom of such passage and connected it with the obtaining 
of prior pen-nission. The Saudi representative, Shukain, thus said at the 
Committee's Forty-Second Meeting: 
. Authorities as respected as Oppenheim and Colombos were agreed 
that the waters oj'territorial straits were on the same footing as 
national waters, and it was clear that the presence of a foreign 
warship in an , i, such strait could constitute 
the gravest of threats. 
In those circumstances, it would be unthinkable to permit warships 
to traversesuch arcas without authorisation' 37 . 
Citing Jessup on this question, Shukairi further argued that: 4=) 
The arguinent that warships should not enj*o. i,, completefteedom of 
passage was fidli, supported ky Jessup, who compared the transit 
oj'such vessels throuUh the territorial sea with the movement of I,!, 
any armv across ajbreign State's land territorv 
However, the final result of the long debates on these questions was that 
the three-power amendment, which became Article 16(4) of the TSC was finally 
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adopted by 31 votes to -30 with ten abstentions , while the reference to the 
"right 
of innocent passage for warships" was omitted. 
Having seen that the provisions of Article 16(4) of the TSC do not protect 
the Saudi security interests in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, the 
Kingdom refused to sign the Convention. The content of Paragraph 4 was 
described by the Saudi representatives as: 
mutilation o international law, 140 
principles of international law 
containing ideas foreign to the 
The legal developments at UNCLOS I represented, on the one hand, by the 
adoption of Article 16(4) of the TSC and, on the other, by the failure to reach a 
resolution over the question of the territorial sea's breadth , influenced the 
Saudi 
Arabian position in UNCLOS 11. The Saudi delegation strongly supported a 12 
n. m. limit. Such an action was apparently seen by Saudi Arabia as very related to 
141 
the question of innocent passage in the territorial sea 
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, Nt UNCLOS 111, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia did not abandon its 
prcvlous claims over the territorial sea regnriie, it is noted that the Saudi position 
was less enthusiastic, particularly on the question of the breadth, perhaps because 
of the general acceptance that the 12 ri. m. linilt had started to gain in the circles of 
the Conference. Nevertheless, the Kingdom's worries as to the Israeli presence at 
the head of the Gulf of Aqaba were apparent in the Saudi position on the question 
of passage through straits. The point of view of Saudi Arabia was, as indicated in 
Chapter I I' that straits should not all be treated alike and that there should be a 
distii-ictiori bem-ccii straits connecting two parts of the high seas, and those 
corinecting one part of the hig)-h seas and another part of the territorial sea of a 
forcign state. 
The Outcome of UNCLOS 111, in any case, was a compromise as to the 
Saudi claims. The LOSC, while re-adopting the non-suspendable innocent passage 
in straits connectino, one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the 
territorial sea of a foreian state (the case of the Strait of Tiran), adopted the re'-)-ime 
of transit passage in straits connecting two parts of the high seas (the case of the 
Straits of Bab EI-Mandeb and Hormuz), and further, the Convention allows the 
coastal state to extent its territorial sea up to 12 n. m. from the baselines. 
These conclusions, although not fully satisfying Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, :n 
seemingly have been considered as to some extent "reasonable" by the Saudi side. 
Therefore, the Kingdom has recently ratified the LOSC, which means the Z7ý 
acceptance without discrimination of all its provisions. The Kingdom, when 
ratifying the Convention, however, made two general declarations with regard to 
the question of innocent passage in its territorial sea. First, the Kingdom declared Z: ) 
that: 
the Government of Saudi Arabia considers that the regime of 
innocent passage does not appýv to the territorial sea of the 
Kingdom if there exists, seaward a route through the high seas or 
through an exclusive economic --one of similar convenience with 143 
respect to navigational and kydrographical characteristics 
At first sight, it may appear from this declaration that the Kingdom sought 
to escape its commitments towards innocent passage in its territorial sea. 
However, that is not the case, since first, the Saudi authorities, when ratifying the 
141 
Convention, must have been aware of the content of its Article 309 which prohibits 
any reservations or exceptions being made to its provisions. Secondly, the 
Kingdom, elsewhere, has expressly declared its full commitment to the Convention, 
but rather she rejected any claims of any side which are in contradiction with the 
144 Convention's provisions Thirdly, this declaration reflects the Saudi 
understanding of the purpose for which the principle of innocent passage in the 
coastal state's territorial sea has been accepted. That purpose is logically 
su gested to be to facilitate international navigation rather than merely to create a 91, 
right for foreign states in a state's territory. Clearly, this declaration reflects the 
continuing attention paid by the Kingdom to its security interests, whether m the 
Red Sea or in the Arabian Gulf. 
This factor, together with environmental considerations, lay behind the 
issue of another declaration on the innocent passage of foreign nuclear-powered 
ships and ships carrying nuclear or other dangerous or noxious substances. Having 
referred to Articles 22(2) 145 and 23 146 of the LOSC, Saudi Arabia declared that: 
... the 
Kingdom of* Saudi Arabia obliges the ships referred to, to 
obtain prior pet-mission before entering to the territorial sea of the 
Kingdom until the international agreements, referred to in Article 
23 are concluded, and the Kingdom accedes to them. In all cases, 
theflag state is liable. /br all losses or damages resultingfrom the 
innocent passage oj' these ships in the territorial sea of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 147 . 
The provisions of this declaration can be viewed as a sort of regulation 
allowable under the LOSC. Article 21 of the Convention entitles the coastal state 
to adopt regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, with 
regard to, inter alia. ): 
the safei), of "aVigation and the regulation of maritime tra c; Of, 
the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other 
facilities or installations; 
the protection of cables and pipelines; 
the conservation of the living resources of the sea; and 
the preservation of the environment of the coastal state and the 
preservation, reduction and control ofpollution thereof. 
According to Article 25(3) of the LOSC: 
The coastal state mav, without discrimination in form or in fact 
amongforeign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its 
142 
lerritorial sea the innocent passaý, )-c q -ei n ships ij' such fjol Ig 
SlISPellsioll is essential. 10" Ihe Prolecc-tion ofits security. ... 
Such 
suspci7sionshall take clh-ct onýv (ý/tcr having been didi, published. 
It is clear. then, from the foregoing- discussion, that the Saudi practice as to I= - 
the juridical nature of the territorial sea has been based on international standards. 
First. in relation to tenninolozg), y, the KI -II used the ten-n "territorial sea the 
teriii ývhlch was preferred by the ILC and adopted finally by the TSC and LOSC. 
Secoricily, the Kingdom clainied -sovereluim, " over her territorial sea, air space 
above. and soil and subsoll beiieath them. a theory which was, as indicated above. 
accepted as Li customary one and codified in the Law of the Sea Conventiolls. 
Thirdly, the Kingdom recognized the right of imiocent passage of foreign vessels in 
her territorial sea. In that regard. the Kingdom at the start connected such 
recognition with what was acknowledged as a customary rule respecting 
specifically free navl(ption throu h straits linkin(T two parts of the high seas or 9 
EEZs, rather than those linking one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another 
part of the territorial sea of a foreiLm state. However, when the law of the sea. as 
crystallized m the LOSC, became more balanced to take account of the interests of 
the international community as a whole, including the coastal states, the Saudi 
position, in the ratification of the LOSC, shifted to reflect the standards, although 
these standards, specifically on the question of straits, represent a departure from 
international custom. 
5.2 The Extent of the Saudi Territorial Sea 
As indicated earlier, the breadth of the territorial sea has been throughout 
the development of the law of the sea, one of the most controversial questions. It 
was the main reason for the failure of the 1930 Codification Conference. The First 
and Second UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea tried to agree upon a limit, but 
without success. That was mainly due to the instability of international state 
practice, since in many cases the practice of an individual state changed from time 
to time in accordance with the change of circumstances and interests. That is the 
case with Saudi Arabia. In her first claim over offshore areas, the Kingdom defined 
a fishery limit of 4 n. m. from the coasts of the Red Sea 
148 
, but this claim was 
confined to fishery rights rather than the territorial sea in its wider conception. 
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1) However, on 28 May 1949, the Kingdom expressly defined her "coastal sea'. as it 
was then called., as extending six nautical Miles beyond its internal waters 
149, 
In 
1958, and as mentioned above, for security considerations related, in the first place, 
to the Israeli presence at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, Saudi Arabia changed her 
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previous position and extended the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles . 
The twelve mile limit for the territorial sea was strongly supported by the 
Saudi delegation to the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. The 
Saudi delegate criticised the positions of the UK and US, who were against a 12 
Mi le liMiti5l , and 
described the position of the latter as an insult to the intelligence 
of those who knew United States jurisprudence 152 The Saudi representative 
submitted his amendment to Article 3, forinulated by the ILC on the breadth of the 
territorial sea, as he sought to insert the phrase "save in historic waters" 153 in any 
proposal for Article 33 which the ILC might eventually adopt. Clearly, the Saudi 
representative, by this amendment, had in mind the Gulf of Aqaba, considered then 
by Saudi Arabia as a historic one' 54 . The Saudi contention in this 
field was based 
on the fact that if the twelve mile limit was adopted in the Conference, this would 
mean that the Gulf of Aqaba waters (about 15 miles wide) would be Arab 
territorial seas. The adoption of such an approach, along with that rejecting 
international navigation through straits connecting one part of the high seas with 
another of the territorial sea of a foreign state, a view which was unsuccessfully 
supported by the Kingdom, would legally entitle the Saudi authorities to suspend 
the passage of Israeli warships through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, 
since Israel was in a state of war with the Kingdom, and the passage of its warships 
undoubtedly would prejudice the peace, good order and security of the Kingdom. 
In case agreement was not reached on a twelve mile extent, the Saudi delegation 
put forward an alternative resolution 155 , 
by virtue of which, it was to be 
recognized, inter alia, that: 
1. international law does not permit an extension of the territorial 
sea bevond twe/vc miles; as well as, 
the extension h, va state of its territorial sea to a twelve mile 
limit is not a breach of international law. 
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However, as known, neither ao-reernent was reached on the territorial sea 11: ý 
breadth question. Nevertheless, the Saudi Arabia arguments over the twelve mile 
limit and her proposal that such an extent "is not a breach of international law". 
seem to haý, e been taken into account bv the fLC %,,, I-iose draft Article 3 provided 
th'it: 
the (-'()1llllliSSiOI7 C017Sl*dCI' that international lall, does 'lot p(--'I-tllit an 
C-VtCl7S1017 Ofth(l lel*1'i10rj'Cjj. s, ccj /)Cl, oll(-/ c 
At UN'CLOS 11, xvhich was mainily concemed with the question of the 
breadth of the territorial sea. Saudi Arabia upheld her previous stance in 
challeng)-ing the position of certain maritime powers, namely the US and UK. which 
were ao-ainst a 12 ri. m. limit for the territorial sea. The importance of this question 
to the Saudis was apparent througlh the intensive participation of the Saudi 
delegation to the Conference. Shukairi, who headed the Kingdom's delgation, 
expressed the Saudi viewpoint at the First Meeting of the Committee of the Whole 
(21 March 1960) by saying: 
... the 
breadth q1' the territorial sea was the k-ev to the entire 
question Qfthe law oj'the sea, in times ql'peace as in times of war 157 
He elaborated on the issue and to support the 12 n. m. limit, he cited a 
158 
number of western precedents and the works of western jurists . Among those 
whom he cited was Lauterpacht, who concluded that: 
With regard to the breadth oj'the maritime belt, various opinions 
have in former times been held and quite exorbitant claims have 
been advanced by difftrent states, such as a range of sixty or a 
hundred miles... ' -)9 . 
Having cited at length, the American Jefferson, who enumerated the extent 
of the territorial sea to be three miles, nine miles and twenty miles 160 , Shukain 
stated that: 
Thomas Jefferson seems to live, to argue, to advocate with us in 
this Conference, pleadingfor all draft resolutions based on twelve 
miles. The position he explained in 1793 is the same position that 
prevails in the Conference now in 1960. Thomas Jefferson spoke 
of a ftiendly conference. We are now in a Conference - ftiendly 
we wish it to be. He spoke of the law being unsettled, and that is 
ivh -v we met 
in the past at the Hague, why we meet at present now 
in Geneva, and why we might perhaps meet in thefuture 161 . 
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Together with seventeen other states, Saudi Arabia introduced the so- 
called "The eighteen-power proposal", which provides in its Article I that: 
Evet-v state is entitled to. fix the breadth of its territorial sea tip to a 
limit of' twelve 17autical miles measured ftom the applicable 62 baseline' . 
This proposal was rejected by 39 votes to 36, with 13 abstentions. On the 
other hand the US, through a joint proposal with Canada, resubmitted the six-rrule 
f6mula 163 . In his comment on this proposal, the Saudi representative said: 
Th e' joint PrOposal was designed to override the interests of other 
states, and primm 'I ý1' to defeat the effOrtSof those which advocated 
a twelve mile limit. The siX mile Jbrmula had been conceived as 
part of the cold war between the major powers, and the 7-est of'the 
world had no choice in the matter 
164 
. 
The Saudi position, then, was that political considerations should be kept 
away from legal matters and due regard paid to the security considerations of all 
parties, without discrimmation. To this end, Shukairi concluded that: 
The concern of the United States Government, and of any other 
Government, f6r its country's security was laudable and 
legitimate; what he objected to was the attempt to harness the 
entire Confýrence to the interests andfears of a certain group of 
states without the slightest regard for the equally legitimate 
interests and apprehensions of other states 165 . 
However, the result of the Second Conference was the same as that of the 
first, as all proposals submitted to the Conference were defeated, and no 
aggreement on the question of the territorial sea breadth was reached. 
At UNCLOS 111, the position dramatically shifted since by the closing 
stages of the Conference, the great majority of states claimed, as mentioned 
earlier 166 territorial seas of 12 n. m. or even more. Thus, the trend towards the 
adoption of the 12 n. m. limit seemed irresistible. These considerations 
overshadowed the activeness of the Saudi delegation in the Conference. The 
Saudi representataive, Al-Shuhail, was satisfied, on this question, with the 
indication that: 
Saudi Arabia had set a 12 mile limitfor its territorial waters' 67 
From the above analysis, it is obvious that the Saudi practice on the 
territorial sea linut was greatly influenced by its security interests. She adopted a 
146 
12 n. m. limit for her territorial sea Just days before the opening of UNCLOS L In 
so doing, Saudi -Arabia probably wanted to make quite clear her position on what 
she considered as a vital questioi-i for her Security. i. e. the breadth of the territonal 
sea, %\'hich was still, then, a Nghly controversial area of law. Moreover, the Saudi 
Gover-nment seemingly wanted to strengthen its negotiating position at the 
Conference. especialb,, ' since as was pointed Out in Chapter 11, all indications 
suggested that there would be strong- opposition to the approach of a 12 n. 111. limit 
for the territorial sea. as indeed proved to be the case. Saudi Arabia defended her 
pollcv at both t-'NCLOS I and UN'CLOS 11, and in that, she invoked western 
sources and lcual precedents. The Saudi practice on the territorial sea limit has 
Undoubtedl-ý, ' coi-itribUted to the development of international law on this question 
which has, Lintil recentIv, been a major obstacle in the development of the law of 
the sea. 
5.3 The General Principles in Delimiting the Saudi Territorial Sea 
The delimitation of the maritime zones, whether between adjacent or 
opposite states, because of the potential problems to which it could lead, received, 
as indicated above, a great deal of discussion in the Law of the Sea Conferences. 
As to the territorial sea, this matter gains serious importance when two states make I 
claims to waters which overlap. That is the case between Saudi Arabia and certain 
opposite states. In the Arabian Gulf, the distance between the two coasts of the 
168 Kingdom and Bahrain ranges between nine and fifteen miles With Qatar, the 
distance diminishes the more we head towards the southern maritime boundary 
point. where the two states (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) become adjacent rather than 
opposite. On the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aqaba, situated between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, is about fifteen miles in width 169. Hence, there is, inevitably, overlapping 
between the territorial seas of the Kingdom and these three states, i. e with Qatar 
and Bahrain, in the GuIP70 , and Egypt 
in the Red Sea, which in 1958 17 ' has 
redefined her territorial sea as 12 n. m. 
This situation has been taken into account by the Saudi legislator. 
Repeating what was previously adopted under Article 8 of the 1949 Decree, 
Article 7 of the 1958 Decree states that: 
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if the territorial sea ... 
be overlapped by the waters of another 
state, boundaries will be determined by Our Government in 
agreement with that state in accordance with equitable principles. 
Thus, the Saudi legislation considers "reaching an agreement" as the first choice 'in 
deciding an overlapping territorial sea case. However, international law goes 
further by mentioning expressly the "median line" rule as an alternative, resorted to 
in the absence of agreement between the states concerned, which becomes 
inapplicable in the existence of historic title or other special circumstances 172 . The 
Saudi approach, on the other hand, goes further than conventional rules, by 
referr-ing explicitly to the ground on which a maritime boundary agreement should It) ltý 
be based, i. e. "equitable principles". In so doing, the Saudi claim leaves the door 
open for any acceptable political solution, including the "median line". 
Nevertheless, the latter method , in any case, was expressly stipulated 
in the 1965 
Agreement between the Kingdom and Qatar (Article 3) 173 and more recently the 
Saudi Foreign Ministry Declaration of 1974 concerning the Limits of the Exclusive 
Fishing Zones of Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf174 . However, 
the application of the median line rule itself would have to be a subject of 
agreement, M the light of the problems likely to arise from the baseline methods 
applied by either states concerned 175 The Kingdom has concluded several 
mantime boundary agreements with certain states in the region, such as Iran, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE. These agreements will be discussed in 
Chapter IV 176. With Yemen, both parties are currently involved in serious 
negotiations in order to settle their land-maritime boundaries"'. The Kingdom, 
however, still has to negotiate agreements with Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt. With 
the latter, the Kingdom, as mentioned in Chapter 11, has to negotiate further 
agreement to settle the problem of Tiran and Sinafir islands, located in the Saudi 
territorial sea in the Gulf of Aqaba, both owned by Saudi Arabia, but still 
controlled by Egypt 178 . 
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that despite the fact that the Saudi 
practice is in general agreement with the international standards concerning the 
various legal aspects of the territorial sea, including its delimitation, it is noticeable 
that the Kingdom still needs to enact supplementary bills to her regulations. Such 
bills should comprise precise definitions of the rights and duties of the Kingdom 
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over her territorial seas and the vessels passing- through them in the Gulf and the 
Red Sea, a precise defirýtion of the innocent passage concept, the conditions which 
foreign ships (especially warships) should ftilfil to enjoy it, and sea lanes and traffic 
separation schemes in the territorial sea of the Kingdom, taking into account the 
provisions of international law. 
Part ll: The Contiguous Zone 
The C011till-LIOUS zone is an area of sea contiguous to the territorial sea. in Zý - 
which the coastal state exercises certain linilted and defined competence, mainly 
administrative and police functions neces. sary to prevent and Punish the 
infi-ing-cment of its fiscal, sanitary, customs and immigration regulations""'. The 
zone is now firmly established in the law of the sea, but like many other legal 
reginies, it was not until 1958 that the contiguous zone took its form as an 
international legal concept. In what follows, there will be an attempt to examine 
the development of this concept and its legal status. 
1. The Development of the Concýpt 
1.1 Early-Trends 
The modem contiguous zone, argues Lowe, is the result of the coming, 
together of distinct kinds of claims of maritime jurisdiction identifiable in state 
practice 180 . 
The concept finds its origins in the series of so-called "Hovenng Acts", 
enacted by Great Britain throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries's'. 
Under these Acts, which were mainly made for the purpose of facing the problem 
of smuggling to and from the British shores, the extent of seaward jurisdiction was 
82 83 
not uniform, since it ranged between two leagues' , three 
leagues' , 
four 
leagues 184 and one hundred leagues' t) 
Similar "Hovering Acts" were adopted elsewhere, but the US practice in 
this respect was the most prominent. In order to prevent smuggling to her coasts, 
the US passed her first act on 2 March 1799186, In which a four-league (twelve- 
mile) limit was enforced. This approach was supported by the US Supreme Court 
in certain cases which were brought before it, such as the 1804 Church v. Hubbart 
187 
case: ' and the 18 10 Hudson v. Guestier case'88. Through the Tariff Act of 
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1922"9, the US gave further thrust to the enforcement of the said Hmit"'. Around 
the same time, other states claimed a zone beyond the territorial sea in which they 
exercised the right of policing for customs and security purposes. Such was the 
case with Chile in 1855"', Ecuador in 1857' 
92 
, El Salvador in 1860 
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, Argentina in 
1869 194, Cuba in 1901195 and Honduras in 1906 
196 
. However, on the question of 
jurisdiction beyond the three mile limit, state practice in the period that preceded 
the Hague Codification Conference was not unifon-n. But a wider extent of 
territorial jurisdiction found support from some jurists, such as Fiore'9' and 
Oppenheim, who found that coastal states had a right, under customary law, to 
protect their revenue and sanitary laws by imposing certain duties on vessels bound 
for their ports, although not yet within the maritime belt'9. 
1.2 In the Law of the Sea Conferences 
By 1930, state practice tended to agree upon certain aspects; thus, Basis 
No. 5 of the Basis of Discussion, prepared before the 1930 Codification 
Conference contained a provision giving the coastal state the right to prevent 
infringements of customs, sanitary or security laws in a zone adjacent to its 
territorial sea'99. At the Conference itself, some maritime powers, such as the US, 
UK, and Japan opposed this idea200. The disagreements on the question included 
the nature of the rights exercised in the proposed zone 201 . Thus, no agreement was 
reached on the question in the Conference. 
The years that followed the 1930 Conference witnessed more tendency in 
state practice towards the adoption of the contiguous zone as a regime 
distinguished from the territorial sea, and for various purposes. In 193 1, Colombia 
claimed an extended customs zone of 20 kilometreS202 . Ecuador claimed 
in 1934 a 
fishery zone of 6 miles 203 and 15 miles concerning the Colony Archipelago in 
19 8204. In 1934, France claimed jurisdiction over a zone of 6 miles for defence 
purposeS205 , and of 20 kilometres in 
Indo-China in 1936 206 .A twelve mile zone was 
established by Argentina in 1943 
207, Chile in 194 1208 , and 
Cuba in 1942 209 .A six 
n-ffle zone was claimed by other states, such as Saudi Arabia in 19492 
10, and Egypt 
in 195 1211. In 1958, Iraq claimed an indeterminate contiguous zone 
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The evident increasing desire on the part of states to adopt the concept of 
the conti(-YLIOLIS zone made the atmosphere conducive to accepting the regime at 
UNCLOS 1. Thus, the preparatory works and deliberations of the Conference on 
the subject of the contiguous zone focused upon the limits of interests that could 
be protected within the zone, rather than the very adoption of the regime itself. In 
its Commentary on Article 66 of the final draft text adopted in 1956 which 
pro%'ided for the establishment of the zone, the ILC stated that: 
Alany States have adopted thC pl'117Ci1)lC that in the contiguous 
.: onc, thc coastal 
State maY exercisc customs control in order to 
prevent attempted infi-ingement of ils customs and fiscal 
re'(4, ulwions within its territom, oi- territorial sea, and to punish 
l. n1rin(rements qf*those regaulations committed within its territorv oi- 
tcri-itorial sea. The Commission considered that it would be 
O'ý, ýil /C to C-/,, 
213 
c 7Y to States the exercise Osuch rights. 
Article 66 of the final draft text of the Commission provided for the 
establishment of a 12 mile zone to prevent and punish infringements of customs, 
fiscal and sanitary regulations of the coastal state. ) 
but no fishing, security or 
immigration rights were recognized as being protected within the zone , ". 
However, later on, a proposal submitted by Ceylon, envisaging control of 
immigration was adopted 2 15 . 
As a first treaty law, the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea stipulates in its Article 24 that: 
1. In a zone qf the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, 
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigraton or sanitary regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringment of the above regulations 
committed within its territoty or territorial sea. 
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles 
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured. 
The regime, however, was preserved in the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 33), but with certain changes. First, the 
status of the zone is no longer a part of the high seas in the light of the creation of Z-7) 
the new regime of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is superimposed on 
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it. Second, the farthest permissible extent of the zone has been doubled from 12 to 
24 miles. This alteration appears to have come as a result of the accepted twelve 
miles temtorial sea limit. Thirdly, the provision governing the delimitation of 
zones between the states of opposite or adjacent coasts which was included in 
Article 24 of the TSC, was omitted from the corresponding article of LOSC (i. e. 
Article -33). 
2. The Let! al Status of the Zone 
The language used in both Article 24 of TSC and 33 LOSC shows that the 
ri(, )rht of the coastal state to claim a contiguous zone is of a permissive, rather than 
an obligatory nature. Accordingly, no state is under obligation to claim the zone, 
and countries which do so, are not obliged to claim the maximum extent 
pen-nissible. However, for the legal regime of the zone, there has been some 
difference between the approaches of the two Conventions. Under the TSC, the 
contiguous zone is regarded as an area of the high seas adjacent to a state's 
territorial sea, and over which the riparian state may exercise particular rights, 
specially to enforce certain territorial sea laws. Such rights in the contiguous zone 
do not amount to sovereigntY2 ". The status of the zone as being part of the high 
seas has serious implications, as the rights permitted to be exercised by the state 
are non-exclusive and non-proprietary, but only limited to control and policing 
rights derived from international law rather than its national IaW21 '. Therefore, it 
has been said that exclusive fisheries rights in the high seas cannot derive from or 
218 constitute any general international principle Z: ) 
However, under the 1982 United Nations Convention, the legal status of 
the contiguous zone has changed, by the creation of the exclusive economic zone 
reaime, although the list of purposes has been preserved. Article 33 of the LOSC 
does not describe the zone as an area of the high seas, but solely as an area 
contiguous to the territorial sea. If we read this provision in connection with 
Article 55 which describes the EEZ as an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea, we find that where an EEZ is claimed, the contiguous zone (if 
claimed) falls within it and not the high seas. As a result, any presumption against 
the coastal state jurisdiction is removed and where a dispute arises concerning a 
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claim by a coastal state to jurisdictional rights not expressly granted under the 
LOSC, the question is to be decided, argue Churchill and Lowe: 
on the hasis oJ' equi'(1, ... taking into account the respecti . ve 
1. inpoi-tance ql'the intei-ests involved to the pai-ties as well as to the 
intei-national C-01771711117itl' cis a whole" ' ". 
However, in the absence of a claim to an EEZ. the areas concerned are to be 
considered, in the light of the provisions of Article 24 of TSC and 86 of LOSC. as 
part of the high seas. 
To this, it is to be added finally that from within the contiguous zone. the 
coastal state is entitled to undertake hot pursuit of a foreign ship which violates its 
la%\, s regLilating) the rights for the protection of which the zone was established, and 
such pursuit may be continued providing it has not been interrupted -)10 I- 
3. Saudi Arabia's Position on the Contiguous Zone 
In 1949, Saudi Arabia, for the first time clairned a contiguous zone separate 
from the existing breadth of the territorial sea and extending for a distance of six 
nautical rniles from the outer limit of her respective six m-ile "coastal sea". It was 
stated under Article 9 of the 1949 Royal Decreelý' that the purpose of establishing 
this "surveillance" zone was: 
to assure compliance with the laws qf the Kingdom relating to 
securiti% navigation, andfiscal matters. 
From examination of these provisions, the following remarks can be made: t: ) 
(a) The Decree did not refer to the zone as part of the high seas, but as a zone 
"outside the coastal sea", and this is what has been stipulated, as indicated 
earlier, in the LOSC. 
(b) The rights stipulated to be included by supervision in the zone were secunty, 
navigation and fiscal rights. Comparing this list with that adopted under 
Articles 24 and 333 on the TSC and LOSC respectively, it appears that the 
Saudi legislation put aside the customs and sanitary matters from such 
supervision, but on the other hand, it included navigation and security interests 
as subject to the Kingdom's jurisdiction; 
(c) The Saudi Decree claimed a six miles contiguous zone, to be added to a six 
miles territorial sea. In so doing, it appears that the Saudi legislation is in line 
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with the provisions of Article 24 of TSC, but it does not amount to that limit 
permitted by the LOSC, which stipulated in its 33 Article a maximum extent of 
twenty-four miles for both the territorial sea and contiguous zone, measured 
from the baselines. 
222 In 1958 by virtue of the Royal Decree No. 33 , the Kingdom extended her 
territorial sea to twelve miles, but the six miles contiguous zone claim was left 
unchanged. Article 8 provides that: 
With a view to assuring compliance with the laws of the Kingdom 
relating to securi . ty, navigation, fiscal and health matters, maritime 
surveillance ma 
'v 
he exercised in a contiguous Zone outside the 
territorial sea, extendinggjbr a distance of six nautical miles ... 
Examining these provisions, it is to be observed that: 
(a) On the question of breadth, the Saudi legislation does not grant the Kingdom 
the legitimate limit recognized by the LOSC, since, as mentioned above, under 
the latter, the breadth of the territorial sea and contiguous zone altogether 
could amount to twenty-four miles, and consequently, when a state claims a 
three mile limit territorial sea, it may legitimately claim a contiguous zone of up 
to twenty-one miles. In the Saudi legislation, this distance has been fixed at six 
miles. 
(b) As to the nature of functions exercised within the zone, the right of supervision 
over security, navigation and fiscal matters has been retained. Further, the 
right to supervise "health matters" has been added to the said list. But, on the 
other hand, there is no reference to the jurisdiction over immigration and 
customs matters, referred to in the Law of the Sea Conventions. 
Thus, these provisions which confirm the supervision right of the Kingdom 
over both the fiscal and health matters, are in agreement with international rules, 
but the Saudi legislator, unjustifiably, put aside, where he should not do so, the two 
issues of customs and immigration from the right of national jurisdiction. In return, 
he restated the jurisdiction claim over the two issues of navigation and security. 
On the question of security in particular, Saudi Arabia followed the 1930 
Codification Conference, where the right of the coastal state to "prevent 
interference with its security by foreign ships" was proposed in the Bases of 
Discussions, along with the right of control over customs and sanitary issueS223 . At 
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UNCLOS 111. this position changed. as the security function was omItted. Jointly 
witli a number of states, the Kingdom proposed that: 
in an area within the e('01'701771C' Zone ... the coastal state may 
exercise the control necessarv to. - 
(a) Prevent inji-ingement of' i ts customs fiscal, 
immigration or sanitan, regulations within its territon, or 
224 territorial sea ... 
the formulation, which was adopted previously in the TSC and subsequently in the 
LOSC. However, in practice, the Kýingdom, which has just recently ratified the Z: ) 
LOSC, has to reflect her tendency as marked at UNCLOS 111. In other words, the 
clairn to jurisdictional rights in her contiguous zone should be omitted as to 
security and navigation and included with re. ()-ard to customs and immigration 
matters. The Kingdom is also invited to take advantage of the relevant LOSC 
provisions allowing the coastal state to enlarge her contiguous zone six nules 
further, something which will guarantee her full enjoyment of all rights permitted to 
be exercised in the zone 225 . 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis of the international rules concerning the two 
regimes of the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, and the Saudi Arabian 
practice as expressed both in the Saudi national legislation and through the Saudi 
participations to the Law of the Sea Conferences, it is clear that the Kingdom's 
claims are generally established to cope with the international standards as reflected 
first in the majority of state practices and as formulated later, M international 
conventions. The Kingdom, in her practice, appears to be aiming at full agreement 
with the internationally accepted criteria, although she is not a party to any of the 
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Seas, and has ratified the LOSC only 
very recently. In this respect, the Kingdom has made some amendments to her 
claims in conformity with the international preference. In 1958, for instance, the 
terms "territorial waters" and "coastal sea" were replaced by "territorial sea". Also 
the territorial sea has been extended from six miles (in 1949) to the internationally 
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accepted breadth of twelve miles. Further, the Kingdom at UNCLOS III joined in 
submitting a proposal by virtue of which it appears that she abandoned her claim to 
mclude"security" and "navigation"' within the list of rights permitted to be 
supervised in the contiguous zone. In fact, the Saudi claim in some cases is less 
than that permissible by international standards. That is the case with the 
contiguous zone, claimed to be six miles in the Saudi regulations, although it is 
permitted, together with the territorial sea, to reach up to twenty-four miles. Thus, 
it is time for the Saudi legislation to be reviewed in such a way as to enable the 
Kingdom on the one hand to enjoy all rights granted by international law, and on 
the other, to express explicitly, through its national legislation, the conformity 
between her own regulations and the international practice as reflected Law of the 
Sea Convention. 
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Cha ter IV 
Continental Shelf 
Introduction 
As has becii seen in Chapters 11 and 111, M the carly part of this centurv the 
rights of the coastal ,.,, tate in adjacent waters WCrC Subsumed under three concepts: 
internal waters, in which the coastal state enjoyed full sovereignty, the territorial 
sea, in which the coastal state enjoyed soN/erei(-)-nty Subject to the right of innocent 
passage, and the contioIUOLIS zone, in which the coastal state enjoyed certain limited 
jurisdictional rights'. However, there was a clear tendency among states to extend 
their jurisdiction seaward, which resulted in the adoption, inter alia, of the 
continental shelf concept. The creation of this concept was nothing more than a 
reflection of the international community's desire to assert rights over offshore 
mineral resources, particularly oil, in the light of the gradual depletion of its land- 
based reserves on the one hand, and that engineering progress had made possible 
the extraction of oil below the waters of the continental shelf on the other. The 
regime of the continental shelf, especially in the Arabian Gulf, received great 
attention from Saudi Arabia , in view of the great quantities of oil contained 
therein 
on which the country's economy largely depends. The present chapter, therefore, 
discusses this concept in terms of its development, definition, legal regime, and its 
delimitation between ad acent and opposite states. Afterwards, Saudi Arabia's 
position on the continental shelf and its policy regarding the shelf s oil resources 
will be examined, with the airn of determining the degree of conformity between 
Saudi Arabia's practice, whether through its national legislation or through its 
bilateral agreements with neighbouring states, and the standards and practices of 
international community, and also of examining the Kingdom's contribution to this 
relatively newly established regime. 
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Part 1: Continental Shelf in International Perspectiv 
1. Genesis of the Concept in the Legal Sense 
In a legal context, the first reference to the concept, though not to the term 
44continental shelf' itself, may have been made by Vattel in his book, The Law of 
Nations (1834 )2. 
In treaty law, it was the 1942 Treaty between the UK and Venezuela 3, in 
which a mention was first made of the concept in a legal sense, although there was 
no specific reference to the term itself. In this treaty, the submarine areas of the 
GLilf of Paria were defined as: 
the sea-bed and subsoil outside of the territorial waters of the High 
Contracting Parties to one or the other side of certain lines drawn 
as provided in the Treao,. 
This formula reflects the concern of the Parties with delimiting the continental 
shelf, even before the legal concept was established. t-- 
Three years later (i. e. In 1945), the concept was reflected in what is known 
as the "Truman Proclamation', 4 . 
This instrument made by President Truman of the 
US was described by the International Court of Justice as the starting point of the 
positive law on the subject5 . 
The Proclamation declared, inter alia, that: 
... the 
Government of the United States regards the natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental sheýf 
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United 
States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its 
Jurisdiction and control. 
As is clear, the act used, for the first time, the term "continental shelf' in a legal 
sense and for the purpose of asserting sovereign rights over the natural resources 
of the said areas. No definition of the concept was given in the Proclamation, but a 
White House press release issued on the same day indicated that the term referred 
to submerged lands contiguous to the coasts which are covered by no more than zn 
6 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water . 
In the Proclamation itself, it was manifested that 
the claim was legally based on the principles of contiguity, reasonableness and 
justice 7, rather than on international legal principles. The US was followed by 
certain other states, mainly in Latin America and the Arabian Gute. Nevertheless, 
the status of the continental shelf doctrine was not fim-dy established in customary 
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international law. at least until the earl I 950s. a view confirmed by certain 'u yj nsts. 
9 
such as Lauterpacht , and Gidel'o, and by the Arbitrator. Lord Asquith , in the Abu 
Dhabi Arbitration of 195 11 1. However. the increasing claims of states in the late 
1950s and earlv 1960s. asserting sovereignty over the natural resources of their 
shelves confirni the legal status of the continental shelf as a customary principle. 
Writin(ý in 196-33. Brierly says: 
... I. t is I)ossihlc even to(1a. v. 16r nciv custoins to clevelop and to Ivin 
acccj)tance as law whm the necd is sqýficientýv cleat- ana' 
II17t"I 
-) 
. 
Indeed, this approach clearly applies, to the continental shelf and its resources. 
The concept of the continental shelf \ý, 'as considered extensively by the 
International Law Coi-rimission (ILC) between 1950 and 1956. In July 1950, the 
Commission indicated the right of the coastal state to: 
exet-cise coim-ol andjui-isdiction oi, cr the sca-bed and subsoil qf 
the submai-me ai-eas situatecl outside its tci-ritoi-ial ivatel-s with a 
O-cw to &-ýYploilnu and exploitino, the natm-al resout-ces 13 
While this wording of the Commission indicates the rights of the coastal state to 
exercise "control" and "jurisdiction" over the natural sources of the submarine 
areas, there is no other reference to any fixed depth. However, these issues were 
subject to the discussions of the ILC, the efforts of which in the years 1951-56 14 
led eventually to the adoption of an independent convention on the subject at 
UNCLOS 1, i. e. the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 
(C S C), whose first three articles, as observed by the ICJ: 
were then regarded as reflecting, or as crystallising, received or at 
least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the 
16 
continental sheýf... 
The continental shelf also received great attention by the ILC through its 
preparatory works to UNCLOS III and through the negotiations of the Conference 
itself. Its legal regime was laid down in a separate section in the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (i. e. part VI (Articles 76-85)). 
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2. Definition of the Continental Shelf 
It is thought that the term "continental shelf' was first used in 1887 by 
im 11,17 The concept is of purely geological, geographical and oceanographical 
on, gins". Geographically, going from the shore towards the sea, the sea-bed 
slopes gently away from the coast to a certain extent (around 200 metres in most 
cases) before it plunges steeply down to the great ocean depths. The isobath of the 
said figure forms an edge. The sloping part covered by shallow water and located 
between the shore and this edge is called the continental shelf'9. 
The emergence in law of this concept, which was derived originally from 
other sciences, raises a delicate question of definition. This matter was of major 
concern in the debates of the ILC that preceded the 1958 Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. 
Article I of the CSC defines the shelf as: 
(a) the sea-bed and subsoil of'the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of* the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of'the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
said areas, - (b) to the sea-bed and subsoil of similar submarine 
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
With the exception of the reference to islands, this formula is exactly the same as 
that of Article 67 of the 1956 ILC's draft Articles, submitted to the General 
Assembly of the United NationS20. Clearly, in this definition, the Convention put 
aside geographical considerations, and relied upon the two criteria of adjacency 
and exploitabilltY2 1, for the continental shelf to be considered as such in a legal 
sense. Thisl in any event, created considerable ambiguity since it was, even by that 
time, technically possible to exploit resources at depths greater than 200 metres 
and yet, the outer limits of the shelf subject to the coastal state jurisdiction 
remained uncertain. As to the criterion of exploitability, one commentator put it as 
follows: 
Was it to be read literalýy, or did it include considerations of 
econoinicfeasibiliti,? Did it refer to the potential of the particular 
coastal state claiming the sheýf area, or was there an objective test 
of exploitabilitv? ... 
22 
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The ICJ emphasised in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 the 
physical criterion of "natural prolongation- as a basis for the identification of th I-e 
continental shelf and for the legal foundation of the entitlement of coastal states to 
sovereign rights over their continental shelves. In this respect, the Court stated 
that: 
... the submarine areas concerned ma v he deemed to be actualli, 
part qf die territon, over which the coastal state alreadv, has 
dol"i'lioll ill the sense that althoug-li covered with water, thev are a 
prolow, ation or continuation ol'tll(lt tel*, *i, tot*i an extension o it 
wider the sca 
The Court was also careful to stress the relationship between the legal reagime of 
the shelf and the physical criterion by declaring- that: 
the institution of the continental shelf has arisen out oj I the 
recognition ofa ph 
, 
vsical., Oct, - and the link between this Jýct and 
thC lall', without which that institution would never have existed, 
remains an important elen7(--, 17t 
. 
10r the application of its legal 
,. (-, gi - /lie 
24 
. 
In the 1979 Anglo-French Continental Shelf arbitration, the Tribunal 
endorsed the ICJ's conclusion in the 1969 Judgment that the continental shelf of 
any state must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not t) 
encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the territory of another state 25 
The 1982 United Nations Convention for its part, retained the shelf despite 
the overlapping EEZ and provided a distinct legal definition for it. The two criteria 
of the 200 metres depth and exploitability were set aside. According to Article 
76(l) of the Convention: 
The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines ... where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
In cases where the continental margin 2' extends beyond 200 miles, 
geographical factors are to be considered, but in any event, the outer limit shall not 
exceed either -350 miles 
from the baselines or 100 miles from the 2500 metre 
27 
isobath . In establishing this 
definition, obviously, the Convention was Influenced 4=0 
by the then newly created regime of the exclusive economic zone, the claim to 
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which would create two legal bases for the entitlement of the sea-bed rights, i. e. 
the doctrine of the continental shelf and the concept of the EEZ28. 
The shelf definition as formulated in Article 76(l) of the LOSC was 
considered by the Arbitration Tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case of 1985 29 
The Tribunal noted that there is neither priority nor precedence between the two 
rules of deten-nining the shelf, contained in the said defin=itIon (i. e. natural 
prolongation and distance rules )30 . Nonetheless, in the Tribunal's view, the latter 
rule reduced the fon-ner's scope by substituting it in certain circumstances 
envisaged in the said Article 31. The 200 mile distance criterion was supported by 
the ICJ in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case of 1985 32 The concepts of 
natural prolongation and distance were not, as observed by the Court, as opposed, 
but complementary and essential in thejuridical concept oj'the continental sheu, 3. 
However, despite this fact, it is to be noted that the recent developments on the 
subject, whether in treaty law or in case law, have shown increasing tendency to 
attach the concept of the continental shelf to legal principles and to detach it fTom 
its physical origins. 
3. The Rights of the Coastal State over the Shelf 
The nature and extent of the coastal state's rights over its continental shelf 
were subject to long debate in the discussion of the ILC and in the Fourth 
Committee of UNCLOS 134 . 
The discussions of the delegations at the Conference 
which were reflections of their practices, showed considerable divergency of views 
on the question of the nature and extent of the coastal state's rights over the shelf. 
One group of states including Argentina 35, Uruguay 
36 
, 
PerU37 , 
Mexic038 
, and 
Chile 39 claimed complete so,,,, ereignty for the coastal state, while the other group 
which was in the majority, was in favour of limited sovereignty. 
In its first draft of 1951 on the subject, the ILC followed the Truman 
Proclamation's wording as it referred to the continental shelf as: 
subject to the exercise by the coastal state of control and 
jurisdiction for the purposes of exploring and exploiting its natural 
40 
resources 
In its fmal draft of 1956, the ILC omitted the expression "control and 
jurisdiction' 41 and replaced it with "sovereign rights", an approach incorporated in 
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Article 22(1) of the CSC. The CSC went further to assert that the said nights are 
-exclusive", in the sense that no state is entitled to enjoy them without the express 
consent of the coastal state and moreover, they do not depend on occupation, 
effective or national, or on any express proclamation 42 . 
Thus, by adopting the ipso 
J. urc principle as a basis for exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of 
the shelf, the Convention departed from the Truman Proclamation, which appears 
to have been based on the concept of occupation. By the use of the term 
66sovereigii rights" instead of either -sovereigyriv, "' or "jurisdiction and control" it 
seems that the I LC wanted to safe(-YLiard the character of the superjacent waters and 
the air-space above them. on the one hand, and to confirm on the other hand, the 
full right of the coastal state to explore and exploit the shelf's natural resources. 
However, the useftilriess of this course of the fLC was doubtful, since the use of 
the term "sovereig-nty" if it was adopted, would not entitle the coastal state to 
interfere unjustifiably with the freedoms of international navigation for the 1-11, -)-h :n It) 
seas in the superjacent sea of the shelf, the principle which was expressly confin-ned 
in the CSC43 ; nor does the use of the term "so,,,, ereign rights", with the description tD 'In 
of the said rights in Article 2(2) of the CSC, as "exclusive", appear to add any legal 
effect to the full right of the coastal states over its shelf s natural resources. 
The ipso jure doctrine was given further impetus by the ICJ M the often 
quoted North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, as the Court stated that: 
The rights oj'the coastal state in respect of the area of continental 
shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territoty 
into and under the sea exist ipsojacto and ab initio, by virtue of its 
sovereigqv over the land and as an extension of it in an exercise 
of'soverel . gn rights jbr the purpose of exploring the seabed and 
exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent 
righ t44. 
As far as the resources' capability of exploitation are concerned, it is to be 
noted that the CSC extends the Truman concept of such resources, which referred 
only to mineral resources, to include organisms belonging to sedentary specieS45. 
In addition, the coastal state may construct and maintain installations and other 
devices necessary for exploration on the shelf and may also establish safety zones 
around such installations to a limit of 500 metres. Within such zones, the state 
46 
concerned is authorised to take necessary measures for their protection 
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The ipsojure theory over the shelf entitlement has been recognised by the 
1982 Convention, which repeats without significant change the wording of Article 
2 of the CSC. But, as to the scope of the coastal state's rights Irl the shelf, the 
LOSC went further, not only in terms of extending the continental shelf up to 350 
miles from the baselines, but also with the emergence of the EEZ regime, whereby 
the coastal state in its EEZ (geographically overlapping with the continental shelf) 
has sovereign rights to exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, 
41 whether living or non-living . Hence, the LOSC, 
in contrast with the CSC, does 
not exclude any living resources whatsoever from being subject to exploration and 
exploitation. Moreover, the LOSC established a system for payments and 
contributions regarding the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles 48 . 
It has been said that such a system is not only beneficial to developing countries 
(including landlocked countries), but also creates a global interest in the legitimacy 
and exercise of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental margin, despite the 
disproportionate benefits conferred on certain large and prosperous coastal 
states 49 . 
It is clear,, then, that the LOSC contains two legal bases for coastal state 
rights in the sea-bed. The first is the classical conce t of the continental shelf as tD p 
forniulated in the CSC and international custom. The second is the newer concept 
of the EEZ50. 
However, it should be added finally that the characterisation of the 
continental shelf rights is a matter of controversy. Expressing his hesitation to 
make a distinction between the interests of a state in the territorial sea and the 
continental shelf, O'Connell stated that: 
it seems to be impossible to distinguish in strict jurisprudence 
between the interest a state has in territorial waters, and that 
I 
which it claims to have in the continental sheU5 . 
4. The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
Maritime delimitation must, inevitably, be a painful process, since it implies 
a reduction of the area which each of the states involved could hope to appropriate 
if it faced the oceans on its own 52. Many international disputes have arisen M 
recent decades over the question of maritime boundaries, and most of them were 
concerned with the continental shelf delimitation in particular. Such 
disputes, 
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which are made more complicated by the existence of certain political, economic 
and geographical circumstances 53 are, however, the price coastal states have to pay 
for the extension of their zones of national iurlsdlctioný'. The occurrence of such 
disputes is more likely in marine areas, such as the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, 
where several adjacent and opposite states share boundanes, potential sources of 
conflict are available, unless there is a high level of co-operation. 
As to the continental shelf, the delimitation may arise as noted by the Arbitration 
Tribunal, in the An(do-French Continental Shelf case: 
1. n situations where the territories ol'tivo or more states abut on a 
sill'alc C017tillZIOUS continental shcl. 11' [which] inav be said 
creographicalli, to constitute a natural prolongation of the territon, 
ofeach ofthe states concerned' 
4.1 Sources of Delimitation Law 
Since the regime of the continental shelf, as a whole, in the legal sense, is of 
relatively recent origins, the rules governing its delimitation are also of the same 
character. As is the case with other aspects of the law of the sea, the rules 
governing the delimitation of the continental shelf are found in international 
custom , international conventions and case law. 
4.1.1 Customarv Law 
The customary firm rule in delimiting the continental shelves between states 
is that such a process is the ob . ect of an agreement based on "equitable principles". 9 
This was confinned by the ICJ, which concluded in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases that such principles: 
haveftom the beginning reflected the opinlojuris in the matter of 
delimitation 56 . 
This approach was first followed in the 1942 Treaty between the UK and 
Venezuela, as to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria 5 ', and later on m the 
Truman Proclamation of 1945, in which it was stated that: 
in cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of 
another state, or is shared with an adjacent state, the boundaty 
shall be determined by the United States, and the states concerned 
in accordance with equitable principlesý'. 
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In a survey on published state practice completed by Brown in 1982, it was 
noted that the great majority of legislation enacted after the Truman Proclamation 
until the conclusion of the CSC in 1958 made no provision at all for delimitation, 
but where specific provision was made, the formula usually included reference to 
64 -) ý5 9 equitable principles . During the period in which the law of the sea was under 
consideration, the majority practice ignored the issue", while the 1960s witnessed 
the influence of Article 6 of the CSC giving some role to the "equidistance 
principle"61 . Brown's survey shows also that the period 1969-1982 (i. e. the period 
between the ruling of the ICJ in the Continental Shelf cases and the conclusion of 
the LOSC) witnessed more extensive national legislation on the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the EEZ, and more influence for the formula of Article 6 of 
the CSC62 .A recent survey completed by Brown shows that the behaviour of 
states in the period after 1982, reflects an apparent preference to rely on agreement 
and equidistance as the principal elements of delimitation provisions, while the 
influence of the LOSC formulation remained limited 63 . 
On the other hand, analysis of bilaterial delimitation agreements reveals a 
major role for the equidistance principle. Since 1946, over 130 maritime 
boundaries have been settled by bilateral agreementS64. It was found that of a total 
of 134 boundary delimitation instances, the equidistance method (whether strict, 
simplified or modified) was followed in 103 boundaries, while methods other than 
equidistance were used in some 42 caseS65 . Despite the predominance of 
equidistance" in state practice, judicial and arbitral determinations tended to 
disregard the implications of such practice. Commenting on the arguments of 
Denmark and the Netherlands, seeking to consider the application of the principle 
of "equidistance", the ICJ in the Continental Shelf cases said: 
It simply considers that they are inconclusive, and insufficient to 
bear the weight sought to be put upon them as evidence of such a 
settled practice, manifested in such circumstances, as wouldjustify 
the inference that delimitation according to the principle of 
equidistance amounts to a mandatory rule of customary 
66 international law... 
The Court reiterated this position in the Libva/Malta case, when it expressly stated 
that: 
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Yet that practice .... 
falls short ol'providing the existence of a rule, 
prescribin, (), the use oj'equidistance, or indeed of anY method, as 
obligatorv"'. 
This divergence between the evidence of state practice and the international 
tribunals' decisions, could be attributed to the following reasons: 
(1) negotiated agreement is not necessarily of legal obligation, but it could 
result frorn other factors, such as political and economic considerations, 
In many delimitation agreements. the rules and methods applicable are not 
proclaimed, or not explicitly stated in the text of the agreement, or the 
reason behind the adjustment of the equidistance list is not explained; 
(3) State practice has a restricting effect since, as seen above, the ICJ has relied Z: ) 
upon the pnnciple of equity. In doing so however, the Court appears to :n 
tend to preserve a virtually unfettered discretion in identifying the relevant 
factors that would satisfy its sense Of Justice. Thus, the Court would not 
wish to recognize any substantive rule of delimitation, even if it was 
deriving its legal force from state practice". 
4.1.2 Conventional Law 
4.1.2.1 The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention 
Article 6 of the CSC (Article 72 of the final draft of the International Law 
Commission)'9 declared that In the absence of agreement and unless another 
boundary line was justified by special circumstances, the boundary should be 
detennined by the: 
application of the principle of equidistance ftom the nearest points 
of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of 
each state is measured. 
Through this fonnula, the Convention obviously prefers, in the first place, that 
boundary questions be decided by agreement. Failing agreement and in cases 
where special circumstances exist, it proposes a boundary justified by those special 
circumstances. As a last resort, the Convention adopts the median line principle 
(i. e. the principle of equidistance). However, these provisions are not without 
ambiguity. First of all, although reference has been made to "reaching agreement" 
as a first choice, which means that the parties concerned are under obligation to 
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enter into negotiations as between them, the content and framework of such a 
negotiation have not been clarified. Secondly, although the Convention referred to 
"special circumstances" which should be considered, it did not clarify the meaning 
of such circumstances, or even provide exemplification. In other words, there is no 
guidance about when the median line should be waived in favour of equitable 
principles. Thirdly, the Convention does not include any specific provision about 
the influence of the presence of islands on the delimitation process". 
4.1.2.2 The 1982 United Nations Convention 
At UNCLOS 111, the delimitation of mantime boundaries was one of the 
most complicated issues that faced the Conference, and was entrusted for 
settlement to Negotiating Group 7. As to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
(and the exclusive economic zone), there were two main interest groups, i. e. the 
71 -)i, 72 "Median Line Group" , and the "Equitable Principles Group The conflict 
between the two groups was such that the Conference appeared likely to fail in 
adopting any rule on the subject73 . However, in the final stages of the Conference, 
and under increased pressure to find a solution, an uneasy agreement was reached, 
as the President of the Conference introduced his proposal which was incorporated 
into the text of the LOSC (Articles 74(l), 83(l)) with a reference to Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice 74 . Article 83(l) of the LOSC reads 
as follows: 
The delimitation of the continental shelf between states with 
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the 
basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. 
The Convention then maintained the process of "agreement" to achieve the 
goal of "equitable solution", but it has expressly omitted the reference to the 
principle of "equidistance" included in Article 6 of the CSC and invented the 
phrase "on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 38 of ... " for 
reaching an equitable solution. This vague instruction to adjudicators to achieve an 
equitable settlement was subject to criticism by a number of commentators. 
Oxman described the said text as: 
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introducing unnecessary language and avoiding recognised 
terminology associated with the jurisprudence and scholarship on 
the subject". 
In a separate opin-ion. m the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf case (1985) the LOSC 
formula of "equitable solution" was described as uninstructive as it is all- 
16 
embracing . Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion in the Tunisia-Libya Continental 
Shelf case (1982), described the "equitable principle" as the "principle of 
, )77 nonprinciple' . In his dissent M the Gulf of Maine case (1984), Judge Ginos 
expressed his doubts whether international justice could long survive an equity 
78 
measured by the judge's eye , in other words, to an excessive degree of judicial 
discretion based upon a conception of equity which: 
lacks all general doctrine and varies ftom case to case ... in 
accordance with whatever the judge may choose to dub an 
equitable resUlt79. 
There is undoubtedly some validity to these observations. The law as 
stated in the recent decisions of the ICJ and other international tribunals lacks 
precision and suffers from an excess of equitable discretion8o. Indeed, the major 
disadvantage in the concept of "equitable principles" is the absence of any precise 
criterion, in accordance with which the term can be defined, since what is equitable 
to one state may not be equitable to another. Thus, this provision of the LOSC, 
which was expected to find a solution to the question of continental shelf 
delimitation, could result in more complications. However, despite the omission of 
the term "median line" which was described once as the best solution for 
delineating water areas between sovereignties", the principle of equidistance is 
likely to be utilised in many cases as the basic principle, with consideration given to 
the special circumstances of each case. As mentioned earlier, it was, on the one 
hand, adopted in the CSC, which is still valid even with the recent entrance into 
effect of the LOSC, and on the other hand it was taken into account by the World 
Court in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case (1985)82 , and 
in the Gulf of Maine 
case (1984)83 , 
both of which were decided following the adoption of the LOSC In 
1982. 
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4.1.3 Case Law: The Primacy of "Eguitable Principles" 
International adjUdications represent a significant addition to the body of 
law relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf. On the one hand, the%, 
contribute to the interpretation of the rele%ýant rules as established in customary and 
treaty law, and on the other, they create specific criteria that give the law at least 
sorne degi-ce Of Substantive content and predictability. 
In a nU1-nbC1' of judgments, the ICJ did not accept the rules contained M 
Article 6(2) of tile CSC, as iinIII 1: ', P V"' somc role to the p inciple of "equidistance". as 
part of international custom. The Court insisted on reliance on "equitable 
principles" as a custornary rule. Therefore, the Court found in the Continental 
She-if cases that Article 6(2) of the CSC was not binding on the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), which had not ratified the said convention ý4 . 
The same approach 
was followed by the Court in the Tunisia-Libya case of 1982 85 , as neither state was 
partv to the CSC. In this case, the Court declared that: 
... the 
Court considers that it is bound to decide the case on the 
basis Qfequitable principles ... . 
The equitableness of a principle 
must he assessed in the light Qfits us, ýIldness for the putpose Q1 
arriving tit an equitable result 86 It> 
The Court stated further that: 
... equidistance is not, in the view ofthe 
Court, either a mandatory 
legal principle, or a method having some privileged status 1.77 
I-elation to other methods'ý'. 
The same position was taken by the ICJ in the 1985 Guinea/Guinea Bissau 
arbitration" and the 1992 Canada/France Maritime Boundary case'9. 
However , in spite of the 
"toning down" of the significance attached to the 
equidistance principle at the hands of the World Court, the principle was not quite 
dead, notwithstanding its disappearance from the LOSC90. In the Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf case of 1977, the Tribunal regarded the equidistance-special 
circumstances rule contained in Article 6 of the CSC, as expressing a general norm 
based on equitable pnnciples9'. In the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case of 
1985 92 a great reliance was also placed upon the equldistance-speclal 
circumstances rule by the ICJ this time. In order to achieve an equitable result, the 
Court's approach in that case (which provided the first substantive judicial 
18 
discussion of the implications of the new 200 n. m. zone regime), was to apply the 
median line rule9'. In the most recent case concerning Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Maven (Denmark v. Norway) (1993), the ICJ, 
having approved the said Tribunal's dictum, equated Article 6 of the CSC 
completely with international customary law. In this respect, the Court stated that: 
If the equidistaHce-special circumstances rule of the 1958 
Convention is, in the light of [the] 1977 Decision, to be regarded 
as expressing a creneral norm based on equitable principles, it 
must be difficult to find an 'v material 
difference - at an -v rate 
in 
reggard to delimitation between opposite coasts - between the effect 
Ql' Article 6 and the effect of the customaty rule which also 
requires a delimitation based on equitable principles 94 . 
However, the circumstances which are to be taken into account in a 
delimitation case remain wide and might be variously named and grouped as the 
case demands. As Evans PLIt It: 
Naturally, the vveight assigned to such circumstances will vaq 
between the stages: a circumstance of great relevanWo one aspect 
of*a delimitation miaht be of a comparatively minor influence on 
another". 
SLicl-i circumstances were identified by the ICJ in the Libya/Malta case as: 
the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, their 
oppositeness, and their relationship to each other within the 
general geographical context; 
2. the disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the Parties 
and the distance between them; 
the need to avoid in delimitation any excessive disproportion 
between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining 
to the coastal state and the length of the relevant part of its 
coast, measured in the general direction of the coastlines. 
96 
Similar circumstances were enumerated by the Court in the North Sea 
cases 97 . The geographical configuration was expressly recognized 
by the ICJ in the 
Tunisia/Libya. case 98 and the Gulf of Maine case as a special circurnstance", while 
geographical features were considered by the Arbitrial Tribunal in the 
Canada/France case, to be at the heart of the delimitation processlOO. 
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The factor of socio-economic interests in drawing a maritime boundarý, line 
recen, 'ed no support in case la%v. The ICJ described these factors in the 
TLinisia/'Libva case as: 
virtualli, extraneous factors since ihc_v are variables which an 
unpredictable national. fortitne or calainiti, ... might at anY time 
cause to tilt the scale one wav or the wher"''. 
The same position was taken by the Court, for example, in the Libya/Malta case'"', 
and. more recently, in the Greetiland-Jan Ma-ven case of 1993, although in the latter 
case. the 1CJ recognised the relevance of the need to ensiti-e equitable access to the 
capc1in fishci-i, resom-ces Jbi- the i, idnei-ahle fishing cominunities concei-ned' 03 . 
The Linity of deposits, lying on both sides of the line dividing a continental shelf 
between t%vo states, has been given special regard, however. In localities where 
there is an overlapping of deposits, the ICJ recommended in the North Sea cases 
that Such a problem may be resolved: 
either h'v agreement, orjailing that, by an equal division oj'the 
overlapping areas, or b-v agreeinents Jbi, Joint exploitation, the 
latter solution appearing parti . cularlv appropri . ate when it is a 
question ofpreserving the unity of a deposit 104 (emphasis added). 
Pic Court recognized in the Tunisia/Liby case the existence of oil-wells in an area 
to be delimited as an element to be taken into account in the process of weighing I 
all relevant factors, but such recognition was connected with the facts of the 
105 
case 
106 As far as the factor of proportionality is concerned , it was referred to in a 
number of awards. It was, as mentioned above, listed as a "special circumstance" 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. In the AngloAFrench award, the notion of 
proportionality was employed as a test: 
1. n appreciating the effects of geographical features on the 
equitable or inequitable character of delimitation, and in 
particular of a delimitation by application of the equidistance 
method'O'. 
The notion was considered by the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya case as a fundamental 
principle of ensuring an equitable delimitation between the states concerned'08. It 
was also applied m the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case 109 , the Libya/Malta case' 
10, and 
the Greenland-Jan Maygn case. In the latter case, the ICJ held that: 
184 
There are, however, situations - and the present case is one such - in which the relationship between the length of' the relevant coasts, 
and the maritime areas generated by them by application of the 
equidistance method, is so disproportionate that it has been found 
necessary to take this circumstance into account in order to ensure 
an equitable solution '' 1. 
The role of islands in the delimitation of the shelf has been one of the most 
questionable issues, giving rise to debate as to whether or not they are to be treated 
as mainland, and the elements, which are to be considered, such as distance from 
the mainland, size, population and isolation. In the Anglo-French case, the 
delimitation process was mainly affected by the location of the Channel Islands, 
12 
while the median line method, proposed by the UK was rejected' . In the same 
case, the Scilly Islands, located on the UK side (some 21 miles distant from the 
mainland) were taken into account, as part of the coastline of the UK, but they 
were given only "half-effect"' 
13 
. The same approach was also applied by the ICJ in 
the Tunisia/Liby case, as the Kerkennah Islands (lying some II miles from the 
Tunisian town of Sfax. ) and their size is some 180 square 
kilometres) were given t: ý 
"half-effect"' 14 . 
Security and defence considerations were taken into account, but they 
received less support. In the 1977 Anglo-French case, the Tribunal concluded that 
these factors may support and strengthen"', but it did not consider them as 
exercising a decisive influence and emphasized that: 
... they cannot negatNe, any conclusions that already 
indicated by 
the geographical, political and legal circumstances of the region 
16 
which the Court has identified' . 
The Court, in the Libya/Malta case recognised the fact that security interests were 
relevant circumstances, but the Court noted that: 
the delimitation which will result from the application of the 
presentjudgment is ... not so near to the coast of either party as 
to 
make questions of' security a particular consideration in the 
present case' 17 . 
In the Greenland-Jan Maye case, the ICJ recognised, in principle, that secunty 
considerations were relevant to the delimitation of all maritime zones, and with 
regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf in particular, the Court held that 
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the application of security considerations is a pai-ticulat- application ... oj'a genei-al 
obsei-vation concenfing all inantiinespacc, ý II ýý . 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that case law has contributed 
considerably in the development of the continental shelf delimitation rules. This 
contribution may be summarized in the following: 
(1) the assertion of the principle of "settlement by agreement" as a primary rule 
of international law; 
(2) givin-o' a strong impet-us to the -equitable" solution in any delimitation, 
%viiether agreed or determined by a third party: 
(3) lesseninu) the importance of the "equidistance" principle and subjecting its 
role in many situations, to what leads to an "equitable" result; 
(4) giving a great si&mificance to the "circumstances"' surrounding each t) C) _týl 
individual delimitation case, in achieving an "equitable" solution. The 
circumstances which have come to predominate are geographical factors, 
proportionality and the presence of islands in the delimitation area, while 
other factors, such as economic, security and defence factors have been 
given less weight. 
Part 11: Saudi Arabia and the Continental Shelf 
As pointed out above, the Truman Proclamation was followed by similar 
claims on the part of many other states, among which was Saudi Arabia. The t) 
Saudi initial claim m this respect was in the form of a Royal Pronouncement on 28 
May 1949 (cited hereafter as the Royal Pronouncement of 1949)119. The claim, 
which was the first of its kind in the region, was designed for the respective areas 
in the Arabian Gulf only, and there was no mention at all of the Red Sea. The 
reason for the confinement of the Pronouncement's provisions to the Arabian Gulf 
was exclusively economic. Petroleum having been discovered in the Gulf area, the 
Saudi Arabian Government granted in the 1930s and 1940s a number of 
concessions to certain international companies, with the aim of exploration of 
petroleum in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom, which is known to contain the 
world's largest petroleum reserves. On 29 May 1933, for example, Saudi Arabia 
signed a 60-year concession with the Standard Oil Company of California 120 . 
The 
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area covered by this concession included islands and territorial waters121. In the 
Supplemental Agreement signed on 31 May 1939 
122 
, the Company's concession 
area was enlarged to cover, inter alia, exploration and exploitation rights in the 
Saudi Government's half of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone, including 
12' 
islands and territorial waters '. On 10 October 1948, an agreement (known as the 
Offshore Areas Agreement) was signed between Aramco (Arabian American Oil 
Company) and the Saudi Government 124 - Following this concession, the Kingdom 
found itself compelled to define her jurisdiction over the said areas, a matter which 
was translated to reality on 28 May 1949. However, despite the reasonableness of 
the Saudi move that led to the issue of the 1949 Royal Pronouncement (being the 
discovery of oil in the submerged areas contiguous to the Saudi coasts in great 
commercial quantities), the confinement of the claim to the Arabian Gulf without 
the Red Sea was unjustifiable, especially M view of the certain existence of non- 
living resources in the Red Sea. The Saudi continental shelf in the Red Sea 
remained undefined until 7 September 1968, when Royal Decree No. M/27 was 
issued, endorsing the Regulations relating to the Ownership of the Red Sea 
Resources (cited hereafter as Royal Decree of 1968 125 . These two instruments will 
be separately examined in the context of considering the concept of the Saudi 
continental shelf in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. 
1. The Saudi Continental Shelf in the Arabian Gulf 
1.1 The Concept of the Shelf in the Gulf 
The Arabian Gulf is, as mentioned earlier, a relatively shallow basin with a 
maximum depth of about 100 metres 126 . The shallowness of the waters 
has led 
certain authors to deny the existence of a continental shelf in the Arabian Gulf in 
the technical or geological sense. Of this view is Young who stated that: 
as a factual matter, no continental sheýf exists in the Persian 
Guýf 
which is merely a basin much less than 100 fathoms on the 
Asian 
continental mass' 27 - 
In a similar opinion, Lauterpacht said: 
... in the 
Persian Guýf there is nowhere either a rapid drop or a 
depth of 600 feet. To these areas the geographical concept, even 
in its general connotation, of the continental sheýf does not seem t6` 128 
be applicable at all 
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In support of this argument, Lauterpacht cited the non-existence of any reference 
to the continental shelf in the proclamations issued by the Rulers of the 
Sheikhdoms in the GLI IfI29 . However. the minimum depth of 200 metres is not a 
precondition for considering certain submarine areas as part of the continental 
shelf. The whole Gulf could be considered as a continental shelf, not only in the 
legal sense, but in the technical meaning of the term. In the UNESCO Secretariat 
Meniorandum on "Scientific Considerations relating to the Continental Shelf' 13 0, a 
Committee of experts indicated that sliallow seas, such as the Gulf of Paria. the 
Arabian Gulf and the North Sea incontcstahýv jorm parts qf the continental 
S/70, -; '. The sarne conclusion was reached by the M in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, as to the North Sea, the depth of which does not exceed 200 metres, 
except in a small area, known as the Norwegian Trough 132 . The Baltic Sea, a 
shallow sea with an avera()-e depth of 55 metres, was stipulated to be aC017017110US 
contineiacil shCýf Linder Article I of the joint Declaration of 23 October 1968 
issued by the former German Democratic Republic, Poland and USSR 133 . 
As to 
the absence of any reference to the term "continental shelf' in the proclamations of 
the Gulfs Shelkhdoms., this should not be taken as evidence of the non-existence 
of a continental shelf in the Gulf, for these Sheikhdoms were at the time under UK 
protection, and the practice of the latter was in favour of employing the term 
41 submarine areas" rather than "continental shelf'. That is apparent in the 1942 
Treaty between UK and Venezuela, relating to the division of sovereignty over "the 
submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria" 134 . 
Moreover, Iran 135 and Oman 136, two 
littoral states in the Gulf, have specifically adopted the continental shelf theory in 
their claims over the submarine areas of the Gulf. The question which may anse 
here is that, assuming that other Gulf states redefine their claims using the terrn 
cc continental shelf', would this M itself constitute evidence of the existence of the 
continental shelf in the Gulf, in a geological sense? 
It is noted that this matter was present in the debates of the International 
Law Commission. For the continental shelf, as a legal concept, the exploitability 
test, rather than that of a strict physical configuration, was adopted in the 
Commission's proposal of July 195 0137 The indication of the Commission 
asserting the criterion of exploitability, was clear in Article I of the Continental 
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Shelf Convention of 1958 138 . Furthermore, the new definition of the continental 
shelf, adopted in Article 76 of the LOSC, removes any doubts that may arise 
around the description of the submarine areas in the Arabian Gulf as continental 
shelves in the legal sense. First, the LOSC had adopted the criterion of (. 6natural 
prolongation of the land territory"', which applies to the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas of the Gulf. Secondly, reference to the 200-metre depth of waters 
was omitted. Besides, under the LOSC, coastal states are entitled to exercise 
sovereignty over the natural resources of the said areas, not only by virtue of the 
continental shelf regime, but also in accordance with the newly established regime 
of the EEZ (LOSC, Article 56). 
It can be concluded, therefore, from the analysis above, that the 
characteristics of the submarine areas of the Gulf do not affect the legitimacy of 
the claims of the recrion's states (including Saudi Arabia) in relation to the 
resources of the said areas, even before the adoption of the LOSC. However, the 
adoption in the latter of a new definition for the continental shelf, in addition to the 
creation of the 200 n. m. EEZ. ) have added new legal dimensions to this issue. 
According to Article 76 of the LOSC, Saudi Arabia could, regardless of the 
controversial physical features of the sea floor of the Arabian Gulf, claim a 200- 
mile continental shelf concurrently with the right to claim a 200-mile EEZ (Article 
57 of the LOSQ, subject, of course, to claims by other adjacent and opposite 
states, including rights over the living and non-living resources of the sea floor and 
sea-bed. 
1.2 The Saudi Arabian Claim in the Gulf - Royal Pronouncement of 1949 
The Kingdom was the first state in the region to proclaim its jurisdiction 
and control over the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil lying under the seas 
contiguous to its territorial sea in the Gulf by the Royal Pronouncement of 28 May 
1949"9. By examining this Pronouncement, the following observations may be 
made: 
(1) The Pronouncement, in its formulation, is apparently influenced by the 
Truman Proclamation. Nevertheless, while the latter used the term 
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-continental shelf', the Saudi claim avoided that. Instead, the Kingdom 
declared: 
The utb, ýoll cind sea-hed ()/' tho. w areas Qf the Per. 0an 
[Arcibiun. 
11 
Guý, f scawcird 
. 
1roin the coastal . ýeq Qf Saudi 
Ar(ibla but contiguoits to it, ý co(ists ... apperml In to the Kinadoin qf' Smich Arcihia und [arej suýject to it, ý 
jurls(liction and control (emphasis added). 140 
(2) 
ThLIS. the SaLidi claim was based on the imprecisely-defined. concept of 
"contwLIItV-, a concept which fOLind its way finally to Article I of the CSC: 
In justification of the claim, emphasis was placed on: 
(a) the need for the greater UtIlisation of the world's natural resources 
and the desirability of encouraýyin(, ) efforts to discover and make Cý - 
available such resources; 
(3) 
(b) the technological capability to utilise these resources; 4n 
(c) the reasonableness and Justice of exercising jurisdiction over the t) I 
resources with the knowledge of iiewylibouring nations; and 
(d) the adjacency of the said areas and the concern for the urgency of 
conserving and prudently utilising their natural resources. Those 
justifications are similar to those of the Truman Proclamation, but 
rather in certain circumstances, more precise wording was used"'. 
The outer limits of the areas concerned were not specified. Instead it was 
provided that: 
the boundaries of such areas will be determined in 
accordance with equitable principles ... in agreements with 
other states havingjurisdiction and control over the subsoil 
of sea-bed of adjoining areas; and finally, 
(4) The Saudi Pronouncement, while designed to validate the legitimacy of the 
national jurisdiction over the resources of the submarine areas of the Gulf, 
recognised Saudi Arabia's duties towards the international community and 
neighbouring states by declaring that: t: ý 
the character as high seas of the waters of such areas, the 
right to the ftee and unimpeded navigation of such waters 
and the air space above those waters, fishing rights in such 
waters and the traditional freedom of pearling by the 
peoples of the Guýf are in no way affected. 
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It is to be noted that, as to the character of the waters of the said areas and 
the right of free navigation therein, the Pronouncement used the same wording as 
the Truman Proclamation. However, the express recognition of such rights refutes 
the allegations that the Saudi claim contains a broader assertion, and is not limited, 
as was the Truman Proclamation, to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea- 
42 bed' . 
2. The Saudi Continental Shelf in the Red Sea - Royal Decree of 1968 
Physiographically, the Red Sea was described as follows: 
The bed oj'the Red Sea is an inner shelf because it is a fault 
depression in the Arabian-Nubian shield. The length of the 
depression at sea level is about 1,875 km from the Sinai Peninsula 
to the Strait o 'Bab-el-Mandeb. The width of the depression at sea 
level variesfi-oin about 200 km in the north to about 360 km in the 
south. The width of the Red Sea is substantially the same as the 
width of the depression, except at the extreme southern end where 
the sea begins tojunnel into the Strait143. 
Unlike the Arabian Gulf, in the Red Sea, the existence of the continental shelf 
concept in the geological sense, therefore, has not been a matter of controversy. 
As to the Saudi policy in the Red Sea, on 7 September 1968,19 years after 
144 
the issue of the 1949 Pronouncement, the Royal Decree No. M/27 was issued 
This Saudi Decree was apparently enacted in order to face the increasing activities 
carried out by a number of research vessels in the Red Sea during the period 1963- 
1966. These scientific exploration voyages proved the existence of mineral-rich 
brines in the Red Sea 145 . As a result, an 
Amencan marine resources firm applied on 
15 February 1968 to the United Nations for a 38.5 square-mile exclusive mineral 
exploration lease to survey thermal sea floor springs in the middle of the Red Sea. 
In justification of this application, the firm stated that no national claimed 
sovereignty over the area, and the firm wished to have the United Nations' 
approval to sample and map mineral deposits over a three-year period, to 
determine their economic significance 146 . 
However, the United Nations replied that 
it had no authority to grant nuneral rights in the Red Sea floor 
147 
. 
Thus, Saudi 
Arabia found it necessary to forestall outside commercial companies' attempts to 
reach the Red Sea deposits, by issuing the Royal Decree of 7 September 1968 
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endorsing the Regulations Relating to the Ownership of the Red Sea Resources 148 . 
Oil Minister I In this regard, the then Saudi III declared in an interview with the Middle 
East Economic Sui-vey (MEES), just before the publication of the Decree, that: 
There are vast mineral resources in the Red Sea area west of 
Jeddah, between Saudi Arabia and the Sudan. This area is not 
considered as Jýlling within the continental shelf of the Kingdom 
of'Saudi .4 rabia and 
has attracted several companies from distant 
countries who are laying claun to the ownership of these 
141) ITSOUFCCS 
Injustification of this claim, the Saudi Minister stated that: 
This development is analogous to what happened in the US under 
President Truman's Administration, wlicii the US declared title to 
the hydrocarbon resources in its offýhore areas. Several nations 
Jbllovt., c(/ the &wample qf' the US and it has now become an 
established international rule that even, nation has the right to 
exercise sovereignty over the subsoll resources of the Continental 
S17 e If. This time it is Saudi Arabia that IS taking the lead in 
establishing anotherfair and equitable rule in international law' 50 . 
Further justification was given in an "Explanatory Note 1-)15 
1 
accompanied to the rn 
Regulations. In this Note, it was emphasised that initial studies proved the 
existence of great amounts of mineral resources on the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
Red Sea in the areas located between the Kingdom and the Sudan, which are not 
included in the continental shelf of any of the two countries, and those resources 
attracted the attention of foreign states. The Kingdom, therefore found it 
necessary, as a precautionary measure in the face of these attempts, to issue the 
said regulations asserting the Saudi title to the natural resources of the Red Sea bed 
contiguous to the Saudi continental shelf and extending seaward. 
By examining these regulations, the following insights may be derived: 
(1) Unlike the Royal Pronouncement of 1949, the present Decree uses the term 
"continental shelf'. Nevertheless, the Saudi jurisdiction over its continental 
shelf in the Red Sea, was affirmed only by implication. What has been 
expressly asserted is the Saudi jurisdiction over the area extending below 
the high sea and contiguous to the Saudi continental shelf In this respect, 
Article I stipulates that: 
the Saudi Arabia Kingdom owns all the hydrocarbon 
materials and minerals existing in the strata of the sea-bed, 
and this is in respect to thezone extending in the Red Sea 
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bed ad Yacent to the Saudi continenta (emphasis 
added). 
(2) The present instrument referred to the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia over 
"the hydrocarbon materials and minerals", and did not use the confusing 
expression used in the Royal Pronouncement of 1949, which referred to the 
Saudi jurisdiction over "areas ... of the Arabian Gulf'. 
(3) Unlike the 1949 Royal Pronouncement, this Decree contains no clear 
criterion for the outer limits of the areas concerned, whether for the 
continental shelf or the areas extending beyond it. However, in what 
appears to be an acceptance of "equitable principles", Article 3 is satisfied 
with providing that: 
... the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may 
exercise its rights in exploring or mining these "resources " 
and exploiting them by way of sharing with the 
neýghbouring governments, which have similar ri-ahts 
recognised by the Government of the Saudi Arabia 
Kingdom i. n common zones (emphasis added). 
The claim asserted the exclusive right of the Kingdom over the "resources" 
concerned (Article 3). In reference to the non-legitimacy of the 
intemational compames' activities III the Red Sea, Article 4 of the Decree 
reads: 
These "resources" shall not be owned by possession or 
prescription and the rules of limitation by lapse of time 
shall not apply to the ownership of the state thereto. 
(5) The Decree explicitly provides in Article 6 that the implementation of its 
provisions shall not affect the status of the high seas and the right of 
navigation therein, within the limits prescribed by the established rules of 
public intemational law. 
Appraisal 
In the Saudi Arabian claims to continental shelf, whether in the Arabian 
Gulf or in the Red Sea, two matters may call for immediate attention. First, the 
Saudi claim of 1949 in the Gulf was based on the concept of "contiguity" rather 
than the continental shelf theory. Secondly, the Saudi claim of 1968 in the Red 
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Sea was based on the continental shelf concept, and also on the concept of 
-con ti (guilty" in the forrn of "adjacent to the SaUdi I ion 1, cont nental shelf'. The quest' 
which arises here is whether these claims are justifiable under international law'. 
In relation to the Saudi clairn in the Gulf. it is true, there is no reference to 
the term "continental shelf', bUt this does not. however. mean the non-existence of 
I , shelf' therein. 
In the light of the le-(-Tal evideiice. mentioned earlier'ý_, it can be 
concludcd that the Arabian Gulf has a continental shelf. However, even if the fact 
is not so, from the lc-(Yal pei-spective. one reasoii 1`61- the existence of the continental 
shelf i-ights is that the shelf represents a national pi-olongation of the coastal state's 
land territot-y. This conclusion was set out b%, the ICJ in the North Sea cases'ý-'. In 
the Libva/\Iilta case, the ICJ i-egarded the distance criterion, alongside with the C17 11: ý 
natUi-al prolon-gation as cornplementary and C. ýNCIM*al CleMC17tS 117 the judicial 
concelm ol the continciacil shcll'ý'. The emphasis on the natural prolongation 
concept is found in Article 76 of the 1982 Uliilted Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea'ý, which is expressly stated to prevail over the 1958 Geneva 
conventions 
Another legal reason for en . oying the continental shelf rights, is the : 71 3 11= 
capability of the coastal state to explore and exploit the shelf's natural resources. 
This position was taken by the ILC 15 ', and was reaffin-ned in Article I of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf'ý8. It is clear, then, that the 
development of the law of the sea in this regard has witnessed a tendency to attach 
the continental shelf concept to legal considerations at the expense of physical 
cons iderations, whether geological or geomorphological. Therefore, given these Z--) ZD 
dealino-s. it can be concluded that the sea-bed of the Arabian Gulf falls within the t) 
legal definition of the continental shelf as adopted in treaty and case laws. 
As regards the use of the "contiguity" concept by Saudi Arabia, it is to be t) I 
noted, first of all. ) that, 
in doing so, the Kingdom followed the precedent of the 
Truman Proclamation, which asserted the jurisdiction and control of the United 
States over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf 
beneath the high seas, but contiguous to the coasts of the US159. Moreover, this t 
concept was also adopted in Article I (a) of the CSC, which provides that: 
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the con tin entalshelf'is used as referring to the sea-bed and subsoil 
oj'the subinarine areas ad the area jacent to the coast but outside- 
of the territorialsea ... (emphasis added). 
However, apart from this, it can be said that in the absence of any protests, 
the Saudi practice, along with the practices of the other Gulf states, have already 
now passed into customary law, which means that the Saudi claim over its 
continental shelf in the Arabian Gulf is legitimate not only under conventional law 
or case law, but also as a matter of international Custom 160. 
With regard to the Saudi claim in the Red Sea, obviously, it was influenced 
by claims made elsewhere much earlier. This was confin-ned in the Explanatory 
Note accompanying the 1968 Decree. Of these, specific mention was made of the 
1858 UK Cornwall Submarine Mines Act 161 , where it was stated that: 
All mines and minerals ýving below low-water mark under the open 
sea a4jacent to, but not being part of the Couqv of Cornwall ... 
are vested in Her Mqjestv the queen in right of her Crown as part 
qj'the soil and territorial possessions of*the Crown. 162 
The Note also cited Colombos who found that: 
... the subsoil under the 
bed of the sea may be considered capable 
of occupation, as the same reasons, based on the principle that no 
obstacles should be made to the freedom of communication and 
trade on the high seas, do not appýv. It would therefore be 
unreasonable to withhold recognition of the right of a littoral state 
to drive inines or build tunnels in the subsoil, even when they 
extend considerablv beyond the three-mile limit of territorial 
waters, provided that they do not affect or endanger the surface of 
the sea. 113 
Despite that, it should be said that in this claim, Saudi Arabia undoubtedly 
went beyond the continental shelf regime as established in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf This fact was recognised by Saudi Arabia 
herself in the said Explanatory Note, but Saudi Arabia did not sign the Convention. 
However, the inclusion into the LOSC of a new legal definition for the continental 
shelf norm removes any doubts about the Saudi claim. By the adoption of the 200 
n. m. distance criterion, it is clear that the sea-bed and subsoil of the Red Sea, the 
average breadth of which is only about 170 Miles 
164 
, 
fall within the legal definition 
of the continental shelves of littoral states. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia may 
legitimize her claim in the Red Sea, not only relying upon the continental shelf 
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regime as established in the LOSC. but also In accordance with the newly 
established regnme of the EEZ. 
Through both claims, SaUdi Arabia, however. has expressly bound itself ltý 
not to affect the legal status of the supe ' Z-- rjacent waters as high seas and not to 
obstruct navigation therein, as well as. not to affect the air space above the said 
waters"'5. These provisions fulfil the requirements contained in Article -33 of the 
CSC and Article 78 of the LOSC""'. Thus, it i-nay be concluded, therefore, that the 
SaLICII Arabian practice on the continental shelf, whether as to the de(-)-ree of 
authority oxci-cised. or the duties towards the international community, is now in 
general agreement with international standards of the regime. Nevertheless, the 
Saudi legislation is, in the present author's view. in need of reformulation, to be M 
full a(-)rcernent with the conventional texts. not only in content but also in form. 
4. The Delimitation of the Saudi Arabian Continental Shelf 
The existence of offshore oil deposits in the Arabian Gulf makes the 
question of maritime boundaries one of extreme importance to Saudi Arabia. The 
Kingdom, as mentioned earlier, shares its 2320 ki-n mantime boundanes with nine 
countries: Yemen, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Iran"'. In what follows, the Saudi policy relating to the offshore boundaries will 
be examined, first, through the principles laid down in the Saudi national 
legislation, and second, through the practical applications of such prmciples M the 
bilateral delimitation agreements, concluded between the Kingdom and some 
neighbouring states. 
4.1 The Rules of Delimitation in the Saudi National Leizislation 
The geographical characteristics of the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea made 
the overlapping of claims inevitable"'. The Saudi legislator was apparently aware 
of this fact at the time of formulating the Kingdom's claims over her continental 
shelf. Therefore, no specific seaward limits for the continental shelf were 
identified. Instead, the Royal Pronouncement of 1949, having asserted the 
jurisdiction of the Kingdom over the sea-bed and subsoil areas contiguous to her 
coasts in the Gulf, provides that: 
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The boundaries of such areas will be determined in accordance 
ýv, ith equitable principles by Our Government in agreements with 
other states having. jurisdiction and control over the subsoil of sea- 
bed o a4joining areas"9 (emphasis added . 
The Decree of 1968 does not deal expressly with the delimitation question. 
Nevertheless, by inference, it can be said that the Decree has adopted the 
"equitable principles" rule. In this respect. Article 3 provides for the possibility to 
explore, mine and exploit the stated "natural resources": 
by way ! 2fsharing with the neighbouring governments which have 
similar rIghts recognised by the government of'the Saudi Arabia 1ý> I Kingdom in CO 1? 1117 017 zones (emphasis added). 
Turning back to the provisions adopted in the 1949 Royal Pronouncement, 
it is to be noted that Saudi Arabia followed the Truman Proclamation which 
provided for boundaries to be determined on the basis of "equitable principles", 
without indicating a specific method of delimitation that could lead to the sought 
equity. The Saudi claim, however, adds the phrase "in agreement with other states 
but it is silent as to the situation of failure to reach agreement. The adoption 
of "equitable principles by agreement" to detennine the continental shelf 
boundaries with adjacent or opposite states reflects the flexible position of the 
Kingdom, tending to leave doors open for settlement by negotiation. Thus, due to 
the fact that "equitable principles" represent general principles of law that might be 
applied in a number of different ways, Saudi Arabia could seek to rely on various 
factors, e. o,. natural confiauration of the coast economic considerations, unity of t: ) tD I 
boundary deposits, and any other relevant circumstances, in order to produce an 
equitable solution. In practice, Saudi Arabia, as will be seen, was confronted with 
the problems associated with the "equitable principles" concept 170 . 
In adopting the framework of "agreement in accordance with equitable 
principles"', Saudi Arabia has followed the approach of international courts. In the 
North Sea cases, for example, the ICJ said: 
These two concepts, of delimitation by mutual agreement and 
delimitation in accordance with equitable principles, have 
underlain all the subsequent history of the subject. They were 
reflected in various other state proclamations of the period, and 
after, and in the latter work of the subject"'. 
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I The same position was also taken by the Court in the Tunisia/Libya case 17 -, 
and bv the tribunals in the An(-, Io, French, Guinea/Guinea Bissau, and 
Canada/France Maritime Boundary arbitrations' On the other hand, the Saud' 
le(, Yislation appears to be in partial accord w"th the approach of the fLC'-' and the 
CSC-ý as to preference for reacl-iing "agreenicrit", but it departs frorn them, in that 
the former contains no reference to the more specific concept of "equidistance" 
ancl the use of a "i-nedian line". the concept which was emphasised by the ILC and 
adoptcd in the CSC-6. The Saudi approach is. however, closer to that adopted in 
the LOSC whicli provides that the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
shall be ýýkctcd by Clgl'Cel7ICI7t 017 t1lC haSI'S QfilItCOlational law, as 
rc1cl-rcd to in Ai-ticlc 38 Oftl7C StatLltC ofthe International Court oj 
Ji i. s, tl*(, (, In order to achiciv an equitable soluil*011' 
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Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the provisions of the LOSC, unlike the 
SUICII procedure, contain a reference to "international law as referred to in Article 
38 of the ICJ's statute"' 7 '. The LOSC goes further to oblige the states concerned, 
while negotiating agreement, to enter into pi-ovi . '0 . onal ai-rangenient, ý of a pi-actical 
179 natia-c If no agreement can be reached within a "reasonable period of time", 
the LOSC adds that the states concerned are obliged to resort to the dispute 
settlement procedures provided for in Part XV of the Convention'so. It should be 
noted, finally, that although there is no mention of the "equidistance" principle in 
the respective Saudi claims, this principle was adopted elsewhere m the Saudi 
legislation, but in relation to the delimitation of the exclusive fishing zones of the 
Kingdom "'. 
4.2 Agreements on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf with 
Neitahbouring States 
Usually, the provisions of delimitation agreements represent a practical 
application of those contained in national legislation. Settlement of Saudi Arabia's 
maritime problems with neighbouring states was attained by agreements reached at 
different times and never by judicial or arbitral procedures. The discovery of oil 
and gas in the Gulf in great commercial amounts caused the region's states to enter 
promptly into bilateral boundary agreements with the aim of avoiding the probable 
disputes over these resources. Thus, although the Kýingdom overlooks the Red 
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Sea and the Arabian Gulf, most maritime boundary agreements were concluded 
with the neighbouring states in the Gulf rather than the Red Sea. These I 
aureements will be exam] II ion. In ned in the following secti 
4.2.1 Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement of 1958 
The Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement of 22 
February 1958' 82 was the first offshore boundary agreement to be concluded in the 
Arabian Gulf region. It aimed to define the boundary line extending for 98V2 
n. m. between Saudi Arabia and the opposite island state of Bahrain. 
Reference having been made, in the preamble, to the relevant 
pronouncements of the Kingdom and Bahrain' 84 of 28 May 1949 and 5 June 1949, 
respectively, concerning the exploitation of the sea-bed, Article I of the 
Agreement states that the boLindary line between the two countries is delimited on 
the qfthe n7edian line. This line consists of straight lines connecting 14 
points on the boundary, the locations of which are based on either "predetermined 
landmarks" on both the Saudi and Bahraini land territory, or on specific longitudes 
and latitudes (see Map 3). It beorins at point I situated at the midpoint of the line 
connecting the southmost extremity of Bahrain(A) and Ras Abu Maharah(B) on 
the Saudi coast. From point I the line proceeds northwards, linking all 14 points. 
It lias been indicated that points 1-4 and 7 represent midpoints between landmarks 
and their location was determined independent from small islands in the vicinity, 
while points 5,65 10, and II represent true midpoints between the coasts, as there 
are no small islands that could be utilised to alter the location of the points 
involved' 85 
. The Agreement provided a solution to the dispute over the two 
islands of Lubainah al-Sagirah and Lubainah al-Kabirah, which represented points 
8 and 9, respectively, on the boundary line. Neither island, however, generates a 
territorial sea. All areas lying to the left of the line belong to the Kingdom, while 
those to the right belong to Bahrain' 86. Points 12-14 are determined by reference 
solely to geographical co-ordinates apparently to include the Fasht Bu Saafa 
199 
C 
k. 
71 
f^ 
c7 bcn 
27 0 00'"', 
Gu/f 
210 
7 0% -. 0 
BAHRAIN 
26000' 
QATAR 
50 00, M cl ha r- ch 131000, E BI 
Administered by Saudi Arabic Fasht bu- Sa'fah Hexagon oit revenue shared with Bahrain 
Continentat Shetf boundary 
Map 3: Saudi Arabia - Bahrain Continental Shelf Boundary. Modified from J. 1. Charney and L. M. Alexander, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 11 , (1993), at p. 1489. 
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Hexagon (an area of proven oil resources) under the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia. 
From point 14, the boundary line extends north-eastwards into the Gulf, to the 
extent consistent with the Saudi and Bahraini claims of 1949. The northern 
ten-ninus was not deten-nined, due to the junsdictional disputes then prevailing 
between Bahrain and Iran'". However, the boundary lines between the continental 
shelves of Saudi Arabia-Iran and Bahrain-Iran have now been delimited and the 
point where they meet is 12 V4 n. m. from point 14 of the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain 
boundary line"'. 
In a unique solution, the Agreement recognised the right of jurisdiction and 
administration of Saudi Arabia in the Fasht Bu Saafa Hexagon, located to the left 
of points 12-14 of the boundary line, and demarcated according to Article 2, but 
re%, enue from the oil resources therein is to be divided equally between the two 
89 
countries' 
From the previous review of the Agreement's provisions, a number of 
observations may be drawn. 
I. The two states' claims of 1949 make no mention of the "equidistance" 
principle as to the delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries'" while 
Article I of the accord expressly provides for drawing the boundary line 
between the parties on the basis of "median line" and "midpoints". It could 
be said, therefore, that this represents a departure fTorn the relevant 
provisions contained in the national legislations of both states, where the 
more general framework of "agreement In accordance with equitable 
principles" was adopted. However, this is not the case, since neither state 
sets aside , in its national claims, the "equidistance" method. 
Secondly, the 
1949 claims of both parties provided for "agreement leading to equitable 
principles" to decide the outer limits of their sea-bed and submarine areas. 
Thusl the "median line" accordingly is one method available, among others, 
that could be agreed upon in order to achieve an equitable solution. In the 
Anglo/French case of 1977, the Tribunal stated that: 
the combined "equidistance-special circumstances rule ", 
in effect gives particular expression to a general norm that, 
failing agreement the boundary between states abutting on 
the same continental sheýf is to be determined on equitable 
principles'9'. 
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In the case of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, however, not only were the 
continental shelf boundaries agreed upon between the two sides, but also. it 
was emphasised that the said agreement was concluded m the light of the 
. ýpirit (ýfqllý, ction and inlitual. frien(Iship between the two countries '92 . 
The present Agreement was ratified before the adoption of the Geneva 
Corivention on the Continental Shelf. Neither country subsequently 
acceded to the latter. Nevertheless. both parties have, undoubtedly, been 
aware of the debates relatirig to the process of mantime boundary 
delli-nitatiori that took place in the ILC. Hence, the boundary carne, to a 
lai-L)v extent. on the basis of the median line, the principle which was 
adopted in Article 6 of the CSC. 
AlthOLI(Ih the Agreement provided for the median p nI in practice, 
there exist certain legal deviations from this method. First, some small 
islands near the coasts were not given wenflit in the process. Such was the 
case with points 1-4 and 7, the locations of which were determined, 
irrespective of the small islands in the vicinity. This approach, however, 
was recognised by the ICJ in the North Sea cases of 1969. The Court Z: ) 
indicated that ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal 
projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be 
eliminated by other means, a median line must effect an equal division of 
the particular area involved' 93 ,a view which was supported 
by certain 
authorities, such as Lauterpacht 194 , 
Gutteridge' 95 
, 
McDougal and Burke'9' 
and Mouton'9'. Secondly, at points 8 and 9, located respectively on the 
westernmost tip of the Lubainah al-Sagirah island, and easteriamost tip of 
the Lubainah al-Kabirah island, the median line was adjusted in such a way 
that Bahraini sovereignty was recognised over the former and Saudi 
sovereignty over the latter. In doing so, the two sides managed to resolve 
the long-standing dispute over the two islands. Thirdly, in determining 
points 12-14, the median line was obviously abandoned in favour of agreed 
geographical co-ordinates. This joint desire of both parties was M order to 
preserve the unity of Fasht Bu Saafa oil field, the division of which would 
have been inevitable if the median line principle had been applied'98. 
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In accepting this solution, the parties were very likely influenced by the 
views of some delegates to UNCLOS 1, who preferred the unity of oil 
deposits'". Emphasising that the existence of a common deposit would 
scarcely seem to constitute a "special circumstance", entitling a coastal 
state to demand a deviation from the median line, El-Hakim finds that there 
seems to be no reason why points 12-14 of the boundary line between 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia should not be located on the basis of the median 
line. He further ar(, Tues that the parties could have agreed a joint 
exploitation or profit-sharing in the Fasht Bu Saafa oil field 200 . However. 
the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement over the Fasht is justified under 
international law. Having regarded the unity of deposit as a factual element 
which it is reasonable to take into account m the course of negotiations for 
a continental shelf delimitation 201 , the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, stated that where the continental shelf areas of certain states 
overlap, such a problem may be resolved: 
either b'1,, agreement, orfailing that, by an equal division of 
the overlapping areas, or by agreements for joint 
exploitation, the latter solutlon, the Court continues, 
appearing particularly appropriate when it is a question of 
PoSit202. preserving the unity of a de 
Not only does this rule of the Court confirm the legitimacy of the Saudi- 
Bahrain Agreement concerning the Fasht Bu Saafa Hexagon, but, indeed, it is very 
likely that this Agreement was one of the precedents that was taken into account 
by the Court before expressing its previous view. Thus, the Saudi Arabia-Bahrain 
continental shelf boundaries were determined in accordance with "agreement". 
This Agreement, in light of the existence of some "special circumstances", was 
based on a modified rather than a strict equidistant line, which led one author to 
say that the said Agreement does not apply the principle of "equidistance', 203 . 
The 
Agreement was, further, based on sharing of the Fasht Bu Saafa oil revenues. 
These grounds reflected the perspective of both sides in order to achieve 
equitable settlement" of the question of the continental shelf delimitation between 
them. 
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4.2.2 Saudi-Arabia-Kuwait Partition Agreement of 1965 
The Neutral Zone, a land area of about 2,000 square miles between Saudi 
Arabia and KLIwait. was established as a result of the 1922 Conference held at the 
port ot I AI-Uqair"'4. tn the Conference, the Boundary Agreement between Kuwait 
and N,, Ijd was adopted. The A(greement provided that: 
the Governments QI'Nqýd and Kinval't willshare equal rights until, 
thl-0111"17 ilic good Qfli(, c, s, ol'tlzc Government Qf Great Britain, a 
ll'irthcr agreement IS arrived at bctiveen A'(Y*d and Kuwait ... 
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Indeed. another aggreement relatin(-), to the partition of the Zone was 
SUbseqLICntIV signed by Kuwait and SaLidi Arabia 01 qJ I 
including N 'd), on 7 July 1965 
According to this convention, officially known as the 1965 Agreement between the 
Sate of KLiwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relating to the Partition of the 
Neutral Zone the zone in question was equally divided between the two parties, 
as the northern half of the mainland was annexed to Kuwait and the southern to 
Saudi Arabia-"'-'7. Nevertheless, provision was rnade for joint exploitation of natural 
resources of the Partitioned Zone as a wholeý"', and a permanent committee for 
that purpose was established 209 . 
As to the legal implications of this agreement, it 
was pointed out that the Neutral Zone, established under the Al-Uqair Agreement 
of 1922, ceased to exist as a result of its division into two parts under the 1965 
Aureement '110 
. According to another view, which seems to 
be closer to truth, the 
partition of the Zone under the latter agreement is of no more than administrative 
nature, and by no means incorporates either part into the exclusive sovereignty of 
the respective country, 21 1. 
Although the 1965 Agreement is mainly a land boundary one, the division 
decision had also its legal effects on the opposite maritime zones of the Arabian 
Gulf Both parties agreed that the territorial waters which adjoin that part of the 
Partitioned Zone of the respective state are to be annexed to its territory, and 
therein the state has full right to exercise the same rights as exercised over the part 
annexed to its mainland 212 . 
No outer limits for the territorial waters were 
specified. It was further stipulated that for the purpose of exploiting the natural 
resources in the Partitioned Zone, not more than 6 n. m. of the sea-bed and subsoil 
adjoirUng the Zone are to be annexed to the mainland of the Zone 
213 
. 
Beyond that 
6 n. m. limit, presumably within the shelf appertaining to the Zone, the parties 
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agreed to enjoy equal rights by means of joint exploitation 214, but again, no outer 
limits for this area were specified. That is because, at the time, the maritime 
boundary between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Iran, the 
opposite state on the Gulf, on the other, had not been determined 215 . 
The 1965 Agreement did not also provide for the territorial sea boundary 
between the two sides, although such action was stipulated in Article VII of the 
Agreement. This may have been because there were no practical difficulties ansing 
out of the exercise of equal rights, as was the case within the Neutral Zone 216 . 
In implementation of Article I of the 1965 Agreement, the land boundary 
line was subsequently precisely defined by virtue of the Supplemental Agreement 
approving the Demarcation of the Median Line of the Saudi Kuwait Neutral 
Zone 21 but the boundaries of the offshore areas remain undefined, and yet, the 
provision for joint exploitation for the natural resources of the Zone is still valid. 
Nonetheless, it has been pointed out that despite the fact that the southern offshore 
boundary of the Neutral Zone, between the Zone and Saudi Arabia, has not yet 
been formally determined throughout its length, the segment nearer the shore, 
which runs through the Safaniya and KhafiJ1 offshore oil-fields, has been established 
dejýcto for a number of yearS218. 
In any case, the offshore boundaries between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
have not yet been settled, due to a dispute over the two islands of Qaru and Umm. 
Al-Maradim, which lie off the shore of the Partitioned Zone. These islands are 
claimed by Kuwait, but are regarded by Saudi Arabia as having the same legal 
status as the Neutral Zone before its division in 1965, i. e. joint sovereigntY219. This 
question is one of the outstanding problems with regard to offshore boundaries in 
the region. 
It is interesting to note that through the Partition Agreement of 1965, the 
Kingdom agreed to be entitled to exploit the natural resources of submerged areas 
adjoining the Zone for a distance no more than 6 n. m. even though the Royal 
Decree of 1958, as indicated before, had stipulated a 12 n. m. territorial sea, In 
which the Kingdom has the right to exercise its sovereignty over its waters, as well 
as the air space above and the territonal. sea-bed and the subsoil beneath theM220. 
The territorial sea of Kuwait, the other party of the Agreement, was never 
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officially detined Lintil 17 December 19672". Thus, the rights of the Kingdom imn 
the Lmen areas appeared to have fallen short of the Saudi claim. However. the 
acceptance of this provision accords with the Saudi Arabian tendency, preferring tý 
always to resolve offshore boundary problems in accordance with the principle of 
- agreement". 
It is clear, therefore, that the 1965 Agreement between Saudi Arabia and 
KLmalt adopted the "equidistance" principle as to the partition of the land area of 
the NCLItral Zone. It further provided for "equitable" principles regarding the joint 
exploitation of the SUbmerged areas bevond the 6 n. m. limit of the Zone. 
Ho%vever. the offshore boundary line, as mentioned earlier was not identified, and 
morem'er, the question of Qaru and Urni-n al-Maradim islands has not yet been 
settled. In this respect the governments of both countries, however, have recently 
entered into various negotiations, and officials of both sides have expressed their 
satisfaction \vith these negotiations. The Saudi Minister of Interior stated in 
intcrvilew that contacts on this subject are on their proper track and there are no 
obstacles" '2. The Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs has been reported to have 
declared that the demarcation of the Saudi-Kuivait maritime boundaries is going 
to be achici, ed shortlý, 223 . 
Given the warm relationships between the two 
countries , it seems to 
be only a matter of time before the maritime boundary line 
between them is demarcated. 
4.2.3 Saudi-Arabia-Jordan Agreement of 1965 
The Boundary Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was reached at Amman on 9 August 1965 
224. -rhiS 
agreement was concluded mainly with the aim of defining the land boundary line 
between the two countries. According to the Agreement. ) 
both sides exchanged 
land, as Saudi Arabia ceded around 4,375 square miles of its territory to Jordan, 
while the latter ceded around 3,750 square miles to Saudi Arabia 
225 
. 
On the coast 
of the Gulf of Aqaba, the land boundary between the two sides meets at a point the 
geographical location of which is latitude 29' 21'05 north and longitude 34' 57'08 
east2 "6. Thýis situation gave advantage to the Jordanian side, since Jordan managed 
to gain sorne 10 n. m. of the Gulf s coast to be added to 
its original 3.5 n. m. 
coast2 "7 (see Map 4). However, the Agreement does not provide 
for the 
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demarcation of the maritime boundary line. nor for the principles according to 
, xiiich such a line might be defined, a matter which necessitates that the 
governments of both countries enter into serious negotiations in order to settle 
their maritime boundaries alon(, )- the lines of their land boundaries. 
4.2.4 Saudi Arabia-Qatar Agreement of 196-5 
On 4 December 1965, the SaLldl-Qatar Boundary Agreement was signed in 
Riyadh""" The Agreement aimed to determine both onshore and offshore 
boundaries. Between the coasts of the two Countries, there exists the Bav of 
SaMa (Dohat Sal%ý, a). This waterbody, Surrounded by the mainlands of both sides, 
satisties the tests for closing lines, and could be described as deeply cut into or 
indented The Agreement provided for the division of the Gulf in half between 
the parties, in accordance with the principle of equidistance, and where there exist 
zigzaas in the coastline, the median line is to be used, but this line should be zn 11 -. ) 
straight as far as possible 23 0. This provision, which is the only one in the 
Agreement to deal with the maritime boundaries between the two countries, is 
Ili-nited in scope, since it has no reference to the closing line at the Gulf s mouth, 
and moreover, it does not cover other maritime areas than the Gulf of Salwa. In 
addition, it is to be noted that the Agreement provides for the "equidistance" 
principle for drawing the boundary line in the Bay of Salwa, although neither party 
has acceded to the 1958 CSC. This apparently reflects the par-ties' view of this 
principle as a customary one. 
However , in reality, the 
Agreement has not been implemented. Indeed, Its 
implementation seemed to be in question in late 1992, following friction between 
the boundary safeguard forces of the two countries. In the wake of those events, 
Saudi Arabia, for its part, confirmed its commitment to the Agreement's provisions 
and advocated a prompt application of Article 3 which, inter alia, provides for 
surveying and specification of the boundary points on land and boundary lines from 
these points, referred to in Article 2, by a specialist world company 
231 
. 
In the Saudi-Qatari Joint Statement , issued at 
Al-Madinah Al-Monawarah 
on 20 December 1992 following a meeting envolved the Heads of both countries, 
the following points were emphasized: C 
'? 08 
* the implementation of the 1965 Agreement and the drawing of a boundary map 
to be siped by both sides; 
* for the implementation of the Agreement, the statement provided for the 
establishment of a joint Committee, which may in accordance with Article 3 of 
the Agreement, seek the assistance of a specialist surveying company; and 
* the Committee should accomplish its task within one year of the signing of this 
statement232. 
However, unfortunately, it took both sides more than three years to give 
the green light to the establishment of the said Committee. Not until 8 Apnl 1996, 
ývas it reported that the two countries have agreed to take practical measures to 
demarcate their boundary line in accordance with the 1965 Agreernent233. 
It should be said that the sensitive circumstances of the Gulf region, which 
suffered two disastrous wars in the 1980s and early 1990s, are such that the area 
cannot afford further conflicts. Therefore , it is necessary 
for Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar to reach a final settlement to their land and maritime boundaries. This will 
contribute to the stability in the region as a whole and within the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, to which both countries belong. 
4.2.5 Saudi Arabia-Iran Aueement of 1968 
The Agreement concerning the Sovereignty over Al- Arabiyah and Farsi 
Islands and Delimitation of Boundary Line Separating Areas between the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and Iran was signed on 24 October 1968 following years of 
difficult negotiations, and entered into force on 29 January 1969234. The 
continental shelf boundary dispute between the two countries started as early as I 
April 196-3, following the publication of an announcement by the National Iranian 
Oil Company (NIOC), in which the Company declared that certain offshore areas 
would be opened for international bidding 235 . 
Saudi Arabia, for its part, issued a 
statement on 15 June 1963 protesting at the NIOC announcement, on the grounds 
that it constituted an infringement of legitimate Saudi rights in the area opposite 
Saudi Arabia's territorial waters or the territorial waters of the Saudi-Kuwait 
neutral zone, and that the concession previously granted by Iran to Pan-American 
Petroleum Corporation overlapped the concession of 1948 granted by Saudi 
209 
Arabia to Aramc 0236 - This development forced the two countries to enter serious 
negotiations. On 13) December 1965, they, indeed, initiated a median line 
agreement. but the Iranian side reffised to ratify it. following the discovery by the 
Iranian concessionaire of a petroleurn structure in the Marian-Feyerdoon region, 
situated largely on the Saudi side of the boundary delimited by the said agreement. 
After further negotiations, the two states i-naiiaged. three years later. to reach 
Ligreeiiient on the offshore boundary question between them. The 1968 Aggreement 
(ya\, c Iran a sliglit net gain in sea-bed area, but presurnably a substantial increase in 
its share of estimated oil reserves In an intcrview with MEES, the then Saudi 
Oil . 1dinister commented on the 1968 Agreemei-it by , avin-(y that: 
thiS 11US (III eXalýjple Of 17011,10171,, -standinc), disputes betiveen 
17Ci, (, ThhOlll-i171(, '- and ftictid1v states could he solved, and he hoped 
that it wouhl provide a good start. 1br the scttlenient qj'all similar 
houndarl, disputes in the Gu 
The boundary between the two countries is the longest single continental 
231) 
shelf boundary in the Arabian Gulf, extending approximately 139 n. M. 
According to the 1968 Agreement.. the boundary line is divided into three distinct 
sectors, involving some 16 points (see Map 5). The southern segment runs from 
point 1, the intersection point of the shelf boundary between Saudi -Arab ia- Iran, 
Saudi Arabia-Bahrain, and Iran-Bahrain, and ends at point A at the vicMity of Al- 
Arabiyah island. Here, according to the points specified in Article 3(a), the 
boundary is essentially a median line between the opposite mainland coasts. 
In the central sector , involving the islands of 
AI-Arabiyah and Farsi, the 
former was placed under Saudi sovereignty, and the latter under Iranian 
sovereignty '740 . 
The Agreement recognised a 12-mile territorial sea for both, and 
where these two belts of waters overlap, something which cannot be avoided, an 
equidistant boundary line is to be drawn from the lowest low water lines on each 
island. This solution led the boundary line to constitute an S shape, as it deviates 
sharply towards the Saudi coast before returning eastwards to reach a point 
241 approximately equidistant form the mainlands of the two states 
The delimitation of the northern segment, extending beyond the area 
surrounding the said islands, was the most difficult, and the source of the most 
disagreement between the two countries, in ten-ns of oil deposits and the presence 
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of Iran's island of Kharg (referred to sometimes as K-hark). some 17 n. m. offshore 
and 3 by 4 n. m. in area '42 . Dunng the neo"otiations. Iran insisted that the island of 
Kharg should have ftill effect, i. e. be treated as part of the Iranian mainland. It Is 
noteworthy that this Iranian negotiational position was in contradiction with the 
position of the Iranian delegate to UNCLOS 1. At the Conference, the Iranian 
representative. Mr. Rouhani, stated that: 
... 
The question that arosc, howei, cr, is how to trace the mediall 
/Inc in relation to islancis. It was c1car that, ý/' thev werc to be 
takcn mto account, serious complications would arise and the 
hcnc., 1it (? / having adopted the inedian line rule would be lost bY the 
difficultv ol'applving It. It I's becauscsitch tlýjficulties were alwavs 
encounterc(l that the Delegation believc(I that the inost conveni . ent 
aml inost equitable solution was ... not to verinit islands situated 
inuch-, Lurthýr out than the territorial sea to have am, influence oil 
the houndan !4 ') (emphasis added). 
However, the boundary line which was eventually agreed upon gave "half 
effect" to the Island 244 . and adopted at the same time, equitable apportionment of 
the petroleum structure in the vicinity of the boundary. The result is a series of 
straight line segments that zigzag back and forth across the half-effect line. These 
conclusions are in harmony with international law. The Scilly Isles, located some 
21 n. m. from the UK mainland, were, as mentioned earlier, given "half-effect" in 
the subsequent *udgement of the Anglo/French Arbitration of 1977 245 . The same 
approach was followed by the ICJ in the Tunisia/Liby case of 1982, as to 
Kerkennah Island, situated some IIn. m. from the Tunisian mainland 246 
In addition, the choice of "reaching agreement for joint exploitation in 
order to preserve the unity of a deposit" was recommended by the International 
Court of Justice in the Continental Shelf cases 247 . 
In the Tunisialiby case the 
Court considered that the presence of oil-wells in an area to be delimited, could: 
depending on the facts, be an element to be taken into account in 
the process of weighing all relevan t factors to achieve an equitable 
res Ult248. 
It should be noted that the existence of Kharg island and the oil deposits in 
the northern sector, plus the existence of Al-Arablyah and Farsi islands in the 
central section of the boundary which, altogether, gave rise to the deviation of the 
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boundary line from the median line towards the Saudi coast, are what is meant by 
the "particular circumstances" referred to in the preamble of the Agreement. 
It is interesting also to note that the Agreement prohibits oil drilling 
operations within 500 metres of the boundary249. In an accompanying exchange of 
notes dated the same day as the Agreement, this provision was interpreted by both 
parties to apply to exploitation not only from installations withi but also in the zone 
from those outside it, with the exception of wells for conservation of observation 
purposes jointly agreed upon2 
From the above consideration of the Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement, it is 
clear, that the delimitation was essentially based on the pnnciple of "equidistance", 
especially in the south, where the boundary line was a reflection of the opposite 
relationship of the parties' mainland coasts. In the central segment, the median line 
was adjusted to take account of the sovereignty of both countries over the islands 
of Farsi and Al-Arabiyah and their 12 n. m. territorial sea limits. Further 
adjustment to the median line took place in the northern segment, where the 
boundary was delimited in a way representing a broad application of "equitable 
principles" m dividing oil resources therein. The behaviour of both parties when 
dealing with the islands of Al-Arabiyah and Farsi, located many miles from their 
mainland coasts, and the Iranian island of Kharg situated not far from the 
mainland, plus the employment of a modified median line to draw the boundary 
line, altogether represent a valuable contribution of this bilateral agreement to the 
international law of mantime boundaries. Such precedents, as noted earlier, were 
further supported m international decisions and in the Law of the Sea Convention 
of 1982. 
4.2.6 Saudi Arabia-UAE Ap-reement of 1974 
The Boundary Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates was signed at Jeddah City on 21 August 1974, and entered 
into force on the same day 251 . The Agreement, which 
has not been published until 
recently, provides not only for definition of the maritime boundary, but also for the 
settlement of the long standing land boundary dispute between the two countries 
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over Wahat Al-Buraimi. The general features of the Agreement over the maritime 
boundaries can be summarised as follows (see Map 6): 
(1) The Agreement provides for land-maritime territorial exchanges2 The 
Kingdom's concessions were in land. in return for maritime concessions on the 
part of the UAE. This situation also enabled the Kingdom to gain access to the 
Gulf s water at the east of Qatar, which had not been available before; 
(2) HU%Vysat island and the other two Dowhat Duwayhin islands were put under 
Saudi sovereignty, while another seven 25 3, including the islands of 
Umi-nal-Ghumaghim, Ghaghah. Khardal. AI-Qaffay and Makasib. were agreed 
to be Put under the sovereianty of the UAE. However, on the two UAE 
islands of AI-Qaffay and Makasib, the Kindom has the right to establish any 
mstallations 254 1 
(3) The hUg-e oil field of Shaybah-Zerarah. located to the north of the boundary 
line was expressly stated to be under the sovereignty of Saud, Arabia-, ý 
However, when a hydrocarbon material field is located on both sides of the 
boundary line, the Agreement provides that such a field is to be owned by the 
country which embraces the greatest part of the field 256; 
(4) As to defining the boundary line, provision was made for the application of the 
"equitable principles"257 , which entitles the 
Kingdom, according to the 
Agreement, to enjoy joint jurisdiction with the UAE, only in terms of 
navigation in the latter's territorial waters leading to the high seaS258 . 
It is clear, then, from this 1974 Agreement that the maritime boundary 
problem between Saudi Arabia and the UAE was settled in accordance with 
"agreement", based on "equitable principles", an approach which, as seen earlier, 
was established both in the Saudi national legislation and in the international law of 
the sea. The Agreement is unique in granting the Saudi side certain rights on the 
UAE side of the boundary, such as the right to establish installations on the islands 
at Al-Qaffey and Makasib, and the right of access to the high seas through the 
UAE territorial sea. The Agreement also adopts the principle of "unity of 
deposits' which was pointed out by the International Court of Justice as one of 
the circumstances that may be taken into account in the delimitation process 
259 
. 
However, the most distinguished aspect of the Agreement is that in defining the 
21-4 
Map 6- Saudi Arabia - United Arab Emirates Maritime Boundary, Modified from F. M. AI-Muwaled, Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :A Case Study in Political Geograýjh)ý, 
an Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (University of Durham), 1993, (Index of Maps). 
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maritime boundary line, it took into account one factor which has nothing at all to 
do with maritime boundanes, that is. the dispute of the two countries over land 
boundaries, as Linder the 1974 Agreement. the Kin-adom gave up her terr to 'al 
claims over Wahat Al-Buraimi (which is %\, 'idely known to be rich in oil), in return 
for some gains in the sea. Thus, the Agreement established a valuable precedent 
for the delimitation of other offshore boundarics in the region. In 
4.2.7 Saudi Arabia-Sudan Aareement of 1974 
The discovery of brine deposits of great economic value in the sea-bed 
areas lying along the axial trough of the Red Sea between the coastlines of Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan persuaded the Governments of both countries to negotiate the 
possibility of joint exploitation of those deposits between the two sides"'O. Indeed, 
the Agreement between Sudan and Saudi Arabia relating to the Joint Exploitation 
of the Natural Resources of the Sea-Bed and Subsoil of the Red Sea in the 
Common Zone was signed at KhartOLIM on 16 May 1974, and took effect on 26 
211 August 1974 On the part of Saudi Arabia, the Agreement came as a practical 
translation of the Royal Decree of 1968 relating to the Ownership of the Red Sea 
Resources, which provided, inter alia, for joint enjoyment to the Red Sea 
4'resources" with the neighbouring governments ivhich have similar rights 
reeognised by the government Qf the Saudi Arabia Kingdom in common_7ones 262 . 
Sudan, on the other hand, had not enacted any law on the Red Sea resources, 
although as stated in the Agreement, the Sudanese Government has given on 15 
May 197-33, exploration licences to Sudanese Minerals Limited and the West 
German Company of Preussag263. 
However, the Agreement is not a delimitation accord as such. It is merely, 
1 in . 
The as its title suggests, an "agreement on joint exploitation in a com on zone" 
Agreement can also be viewed as a "joint measure" promoted by the attempts of 
foreign commercial companies to claim the Red Sea deposits. In this accord, 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia, the two opposite countries on the Red Sea, agreed to 
specify their respective sovereign rights in the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas lying between their coasts. In this respect, the said areas were divided into 
three parts (see Map 7): 
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1. The area of the sea-bed adjacent to the Sudanese coast and extending 
eastwards to a line where the depth of the superjacent waters is uninterruptedly 
one thousand metres. In this area, Sudan has exclusive sovereign rights' 64 Z: ) 
) The area of the sea-bed adjacent to the Saudi coast and extending westwards 
to a line where the depth of the superjacent waters is uninterruptedly one 
thousand metres. In this area. Saudi Arabia has exclusive sovereign rights-l'ý. 
The area of the sea-bed lying between the two areas defined above is common 
to both state,,. and referred to as the Common Zone, where the two parties 
ha,,,, e equal sovereign rights to exploit all the natural resources therein"'. The 
Common Zone, which is approximately 2,100 metres depth, includes the main 
Red Sea brine deposi tS267. 
The Ag-reement provided that its appliccation should not, to the extent 
prescribed by the established rules of international law, affect the status of the high 
2 
seas or obstruct navigation therein 
The parties agreed to provide for the establishment of a Joint Commission 
the seat of which is in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), in order to ensure "prompt and 
efficieiit" exploitation of the Common Zone's natural resourceS269. In 
implementation of this provision, a Saudi-Sudanese Joint Commission for the 
Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Common Zone was established, and 
met for the first time on 10 May 1975 in 
KhartoUM270. 
This Saudi-Sudanese Agreement is the -first of its kind in the Red Sea 
region. It provided for the division of the submanne areas between the two states 
171 
in a unique manner- . The principles adopted in this 
division are clearly inspired 
by international law. In the North Sea cases, the ICJ stated that: 
If ..., the delimitation 
leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, 
these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions or, 
failing agreement, equally, unless they decide on a regime ofjoint 
jurisdiction, user, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any 
-72 part of them" . 
In practice, it is noted that research and exploitation activities commenced 
in the Common Zone soon after the conclusion of the Agreement. However, these 
activities and generally the concerns of both parties started to wane in the nud 
1980s. The Agreement is still in operation, but a question arises about the 
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effectiveness of this agreement especially after the adoption in the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention of a new legal definition for the continental shelf This significant 
legal development undoubtedly removes any fears of "foreign exploitation" In the 
region, since the submarine areas between the two countries fall according to the 
LOSC (Article 76) under the regime of the continental shelf where the coastal state 
has "inherent" rights to explore and exploit its natural resources. Indeed, the 
LOSC has weakened the Agreement and brough its importance and effectiveness 
into question. 
It should be noted, however, that in addition to Sudan, Saudi Arabia shares 
maritime boundaries in the Red Sea with four other countries (Yemen, Jordan, 
Egypt and Eritrea). The Kingdom has not yet delimited her offshore boundaries 
with any of these states. The 1974 Agreement with Sudan is not on delimitation 
accord as such in as much as it is a special accord providing for joint exploitation 
of the natural resources in a common zone. Thus, the Kingdom still has to 
negotiate maritime boundary delimitation agreements with the said states. 
With Yemen, however, serious efforts in this direction have indeed been 
initiated as both parties signed on 26 February 1995 a Joint Understanding 
MemorandUM273 , which was concerned with 
both land and offshore boundaries. 
In order to conduct negotiations over defending the maritime boundary 
line, which starts where the land boundaries meet on the coast of the Red Sea, the 
Memorandum provided for the establishment of joint commissions 274 . In the 
Memorandum, no specific principles as to the delimitation process were laid down, 
but it was stated in general, that the offshore boundaries should be decided "in 
accordance with international law'5275 . 
It was recently reported that the boundary 
negotiations between the two countries have entered a "crucial stage"276, but in 
view of the secrecy surrounding the negotiations, it is not possible to assess the 
extent to which these negotiations have progressed. However, compared with the 
land boundaries, it is expected that the offshore boundaries do not represent a 
significant obstacle, though the known desire of both sides to achieve a final and 
lasting settlement of the boundary problem, both on land and at sea may, to some 
extent, delay this goal. 
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Conclusion 
From the foregoing analysis of the continental shelf regime, it is clear that 
this regime has mainly crystallised through the Truman Proclamation and the 
similar state claims that followed, the 1958 Gene,,,, a Convention on the Continental 
shelf, international adjudications, and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. 
The initial Saudi Arabian claim of 1949 to the resources of the sea-bed and 
subsoil of the areas contiguous to the coast in the Arabian Gulf came four years 
after the Truman Proclamation, which is regarded as the real starting point on the 
continental shelf regirne, and it was formulated similarly to the latter. The Saudi 
claim, howeN-er, contained no mention of the term "continental shelf', although, as 
concluded earlier, it could do so. Instead, it emphasised the principle of 
"conti(yUltv", referred to the Truman Proclamation. The setting aside of strict t) I It) 
physical configuration of the submerged areas, lying beyond the territonal sea was 
subsequently supported by the ILC as it proposed in July 1950 the cnterion of 
exploitability' and by most of the Gulf states, the practices of which on the 
continental shelf are considered as significant in forming international custom on 
the subject. Further support was received for the criteria on which the Saudi claim 
was based, in the CSC and LOSC. The Saudi claim of 1968 M the Red Sea was 
based on the principle of continuity, but it was concerned with the areas "adjacent" 
to the continental shelf Therefore, it was beyond the CSC, to which Saudi Arabia 
has not been a party. However, the legitimacy of this claim is not in doubt, now in 
the light of the new criteria of the regime found in the LOSC, since Saudi Arabia is 
party to the Convention. 
As one of the foremost states to declare its authority over offshore 
resources, Saudi Arabia, can be said without reservationý to have contributed 
significantly to the development of the continental shelf concept. However, Saudi 
Arabia's contribution to the legal regime of continental shelf is most manifest In her 
practice concerning the delimitation of the shelf, whether through her national 
legislation or through bilateral agreements with opposite and adjacent states in the 
Gulf In this respect Saudi Arabia, despite the complicated geographical structure 
of the Gulf and the Red Sea has adopted a systematic approach to the negotiation 
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of her continental shelf boundaries. To this end, the Saudi continental shelf 
boundaries so far deten-nined were generally based on a mixture of: agreement, 
equitable principles, equidistance and special circumstances, particularly the 
presence of islands and oil deposits around the boundary lines. The practices of 
Saudi Arabia and her neighbours set significant international precedents that were 
subsequently supported and followed by international multilateral conventions and 
the judgements of international courts and tribunals. Indeed, in case of 
disagreement over the delimitation process, as was the case with Iran, the Kingdom 
has rendered some concessions to ease access to peaceful settlement of matters in 
dispute, an approach called upon in Article 279 of the LOSC. In brief, not only 
does the practice of Saudi Arabia on the continental shelf, which was motivated by 
her respective economic interests, correspond with international standards, but it 
has contributed considerably to the development of the concept's international 
rules, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia has only very recently ratified the LOSC. 
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Chapter V 
Exclusive Economic/Fisherv Zones 
Introduction 
The creation of the EEZ regime comes as one of the most important leoral Z: ) --7 
developments in the law of the sea. with re(jard to the distribution of the ocean 
reSOUrces. Officially the regime is considered as one of the most i important 
innovations of the 1982 Convention. This concept was onginally proposed and 
endorsed by the Third World Countries, but opposed by the developed countries, 
such as the US, the former Soviet Union and Japan. Since the late 1970s, It has 
received universal approval and many states have declared their own EEZs. Saudi 
Arabia is one of the littoral states which have not yet established an EEZ, although 
she set tip her own fishery zone in 1974. In this Chapter, there will be an attempt, 
first to trace the evolution of the EEZ concept, to examine its legal framework, 
particularly with regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state in the zone, and 
then to discuss its delimitation rules, whether through the 1982 Convention, or 
case law. In the second part of the Chapter, an attempt will be made to discuss the 
Kingdom's position on the EEZ concept, the expected reasons behind the 
reluctance to proclaim an EEZ, and Saudi's marine fisheries policy, Including her 
perspective on the delimitation of her fishery zone. 
Part 1: Exclusive Economic Zone in International Perspective 
The introduction of a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is one of 
the i-nost significant contributions of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. Indeed, it has been described as the most significant development 
in the law of the sea since Grotius wrote his celebrated work, Mare Liberum'. 
The creation of the EEZ concept has had a tremendous impact on mankind's uses 
of the ocean. With 200-mile maritime zones M effect, approximately 28.5 million 
square miles (out of 105.3 million square miles) of ocean space has come under 
coastal states I jurisdiction. The total size would increase to about 31.9 million 
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square miles if all coastal states were to claim the zoneS2 . This means that 90 per 
cent of the living resources would be under single nation jurisdiction 3. 
The Definition and Development of the EEZ 
Under the LOSC, the EEZ is the marine area (including the water-column 
and the subjacent sea-bed and subsoil), beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines, used for measuring the 
breadth of the territorial sea, and within this area, the coastal state has sovereign 
rights to explore and exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources; also to 
exercise jurisdiction respecting artificial islands, installations and structures, marine 
scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
subject to the rights of other states4. 
The zone itself is a relatively recent concept and has its origins in the 
concept of the exclusive fishing zone and the doctrine of the continental shelf, as it 
combines and develops the two regimeS5 . 
The emergence of the EEZ can be traced 
to the Truman Proclamation of 28th September 1945, in which the US 
Government expressly declared its right to: 
establish conservation _7ones in those areas of the 
high seas 
contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fishing 
activities have been or in the future may be developed and 
maintained on a substantial scale 6 
This Proclamation was followed by similar claims by a number of Latin American 
states such as Argentina 7 and Panamas in 1946, Chile 
9, and Perulo in 1947, and 
Honduras'' and El Salvador 12 in 1950, all of which made claims to the natural 
resources of their epicontinental seas. At a tripartite conference in August 
1952 at 
Santiago, Chile, Ecuador and Peru sought to enforce their sovereignty rights to 
3 
200 miles by an international declaration' . 
The failure of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and 
Contiguous Zone to reach agreement on the creation of fishing zones, or even to 
give exclusive fishing rights M the contiguous zone 
(Article 24), prompted a 
number of states to claim fishing zones of widely varying widths. 
By 1972 the 
concept of the EEZ crystallised in a pragmatic 
form as a "patrimonial sea" 
extending up to 200 n. m., by the Caribbean countries through 
the Declaration of 
14 Santo Domingo 
237 
The first occasion the term -EEZ" was specifically introduced was M 
January 1971, by Njenda, Kenya's representative to the Asian-African LeEial 
Consultative Committee, which in turn, supported this suggestion 1ý . 
In 1972, at 
the Geneva Session of the UN Seabed Committee. the idea was brought up by 
Kenya in the form of "Draft Articles on an Exclusive Economic Zone beyond the 
10 Ten-itorial Sea" . At the Third United nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
there was widespread support for the concept of a 200-mile economic zone, 
especially by the developing Countries in . -Ua. Latin America, and Africa, clearly 
because the creation of such a regrime would help them obtain greater control over 
the economic reSOL11-CCS of their coasts and narrow the gap between the poorer and 
richer countries 17. 
The concept was considered by the ICJ in the Fishenes Jurisdiction case 
(United-Kingdorn of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland) of 1974", in 
the context of the coastal state's fishery rights. In this case, although the Court 
avoided taking a position on the validity of Iceland's extension of its fishery limits 
up to 50 miles Linder international law'9, it asserted the validity of the coastal 
state's fishery rights over the waters adjacent to its coast. It declared that: 
Two concepts have crý, stallised as customan,, lait, in recent years 
arising out of the general consensus revealed at that Conference 
[Geneva Conference of 1960]. The first is the concept of the 
fisheiý, . -one, the area in which a state ma -v 
claim exclusive fishery 
jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea; the extension of 
thatfishery zone up to a 12-mile limitfrom the baselines appears 
now to be generally accepted. The second is the concept of 
preferential rights of fishing in adjacent waters in favour of the 
20 coastal state ... 
Thus, by describing the exclusive fishing zone as an "area in which a state 
may claim exclusive fishing jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea", the ICJ 
confirmed the tendency of the international community to depart from the relevant 
provisions of the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea designating the area 
beyond the territorial sea, as high seas, in which all states enjoy equal rights, with 
respect to, among other things, the right to exploit the fishery resourceS21 . The 
Court 
, in doing so, 
developed and prompted the concept of fishing rights, which 
led to the adoption of the relevant provisions in the LOSC. 
However, In the light of the increasing tendency among states at UNCLOS 
111, the Conference succeeded in producing a comprehensive 200-mile exclusive 
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economic zone regime. Although the LOSC provides a legal basis for the 
establishment of an EEZ by coastal states, state practice, nevertheless. 
demonstrates that the establishment of the zone does not necessarily depend on the 
LOSC, which has just recently entered into force 22 . This was confin-ned by the ICJ 
in the Tunisia/Liby case of 1982, as it pointed out that: 
the concept of the exclusive economic zone ... may 
be regarded as 
part of'modern international law 23 . 
That the EEZ is part of international custom was confirmed by the ICJ in the 
Libya/Malta case of 1985, as the Court declared that: 
It is in the Court's view incontestable that ... the institution of the 
exclusive economic : one, with its rule on entitlement by reason of 
distance, is shown b, v the practice of'states to have become a part 
oj'customary law 24 I 
Despite the fact that the EEZ has passed now into customary law, few 
states have enacted detailed legislation claiming all the rights and recognising all 
the duties included in Parts V and XI of the LOSC. The result, therefore, has been 
as described by Freestone as: 
a "pick and mix " selective approach to the 1982 UNCLOS regime, 
in which certain powers and duties have been specifically claimed 
but others ignored 25 - 
However, both in customary law and under the LOSC, the zone is optional and Its 
existence depends upon an actual claim. 
2. The Exclusive Economic Zone in the LOSC 
The 1982 Convention has devoted Part V (Articles 55-75) to the new 
concept of the EEZ. These 21 Articles lay down the legal framework governing -t) 
the zone. In what follows, the legal aspects of the zone will be discussed, to a 
degree, however, commensurate with the purposes of this research. 
2.1 The Rights and Duties of the Coastal State in the EEZ 
As it evolved in the LOSC, the EEZ is a zone sui generis, situated between 
the territorial sea and the high seas, and being part of neither of them. In terms of 
the degree of authority granted to the coastal state in its EEZ, Article 56 of the 
LOSC, in broad terms, distinguishes three categories of rights. 
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First, for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and 
nianaging the natural resources, living and non-11-ving, of the waters superjacent to 
the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, the coastal state has "sovereign 
, 126 rights . 
It is to be noted that with the exception of the provisions concerning- 
-conservation and management", which apparently refer to the "living resources", 
the rights of the coastal state in the sea-bed area are the same as those provided for 
under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf" and customary 
international law-'. Similar sovereign rights are also granted to the coastal state 
with reg-ard to other economic activities for the exploitation and exploration of the 
zone, such as the production of energy from water, currents, or winds2'. 
Second, the coastal state has "jurisdiction" over three identified matters: the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine 
scientific research, and protection and preservation of the marine environment3O. ft 
is noteworthy that for exercising the first category of rights, the LOSC in Article 
56 rants the coastal state "sovereign rights" rather than "sovereignty", the 9 Z: ) 
approach used in Article 2(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. In so doing, the LOSC tends to confirm the legal nature of the EEZ as a sui 
generis institution, different ftorn either the territorial sea, in which the coastal 
state's sovereignty is recognised subject to the right of innocent passage3', and the 
high seas, where all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy on the same 
footing, various freedomS32. On the other hand, the change in terminology by 
using the formulation of "jurisdiction" in the case of the second category of rights, 
reflects the tendency of the LOSC to give the coastal state less authority in the 
zone with regard to the respective rights. 
Thirdly, in addition to those rights mentioned above, states can enjoy other 
rights that may arise from other provisions of the Convention 
33 
. 
However, it is 
evident that the rights referred to here, mainly contain those exercisable in the 
contiguous zone34 , and the right to 
hot pursuit as provided for in the LO SC35. 
In return for exercising its EEZ rights, the coastal state has some duties to 
perform. Under the LOSC, 
the coastal state shall have due regard to the rights and duties of 
other states and shall act in a manner compatible with the 36 
provisions of this Convention 
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The Convention, through this clause, does not clarify the intended duties, perhaps 
due to the complex structure of the Convention itself. However, no doubt, the 
rights of the other states in the coastal state's EEZ can be viewed as duties 
imposed upon the coastal state. Thus, the latter should, M its EEZ, allow other 
states to enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight and of laying of submarine 
cables and pipelineS37. Other states are also granted the right to participate in the 
zone's surplus stocks of living resources, but within the allowable catch, 
deten-nined by the coastal state 3 8, a measure which was intended to prevent 
overexploitation of the living resources of the zone 3 9. The coastal state should "in 
normal circumstances" grant its consent to foreign states and competent 
international organizations to conduct marine scientific research in its EEZ and 
such consent is not to be delayed or denied unreasonably40 . Furthermore, the 
coastal state , in exploiting its natural resources, has a duty to protect and preserve 
the marine environment4 I. These provisions, however, are not without ambiguity. 
The absence of precise criteria, for example, for the granting of permission to 
conduct marine scientific research in the zone, created various views on the real 
nature of this regime, ranging from the position that it provides the coastal state 
with complete discretion to deny access to the foreign researcher as it pleases, to 
the view that the Convention provides a reasonable assurance that a bona fide 
researcher will get permission without unnecessary difficUlty42 . 
2.2 The Content of the Fisheries Regime in the EEZ 
2.2.1 General 
Until recently, the principle of free and open access to fisheries beyond the 
territorial sea was widely accepted among nations. The failure of the two United 
Nations Conferences of 1958 and 1960 on the question of fishing limits, on the one 
hand, and the improvement in the technology of finding, catching, storing and 
marketing fish, together made the world's harvest of fish continue to expand until 
the 1960S43 . 
This was undoubtedly at the expense of developing states suffering 
technological backwardness. The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which was described as a "dead letter"44 I 
did not address the problem. Instead, it was satisfied with requiring states parties 
to adopt, or to co-operate in adopting measures for the conservation of the 
living 
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resources of the high seaS45 , and in 
limited circumstances, the Convention gave the 
coastal state the right unilaterally to adopt conservation measures for areas of the 
higli seas adjacent to its territorial seas 40 . 
Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, coastal state control of fishenes beyond the territorial sea 
was limited to sedentary species of the continental shelf4'. However, practice in 
the 1960s- I 970s developed towards the acceptance of the coastal state's right to a 
12-mile fishing zone, a rule which was confirmed by the International Court of 
justice in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, as a customary one 48 . 
2.2.2 UNCLOS III: More Discretionary Powers for the Coastal State 
The strong pressure exercised at UNCLOS 111, mostly by all de-veloping 
states, succeeded finally in providing wider exclusive national fishery zones and In 
terminating the traditional freedom to fish in nearshore waters, and preventing Z: ý 
overfishing 49 . 
The 1982 Convention is a great departure from the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea, in giving singular rights and responsibilities for 
the coastal state in relation to the management and conservation of the living 
resources In the EEZ, without, however, forgetting the fisheries interests of other 
states. 
As mentioned earlier, the coastal state, under the LOSC has sovereign 
rights for the exploitation conservation and management of the livin resources of Z: ) 9 
the EEZ50. In exercising these sovereign rights, the coastal state is to "promote the 
objective of optimum utilisation" of those resources 5 1, and to this end, it is to 
determine the allowable catch 52 , and to 
determine also its own harvesting capacity 
in the EEZ 53 . 
As the coastal state may not have the capacity to exploit all the 
allowable catch, it is to give other states through agreements or other arrangements 
access to surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard in this respect to 
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged stateS54. If the surplus is to be 
allocated to foreign states, the coastal state shall take into account all relevant 
factors which, include, inter alia: 
the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy 
of the coastal state concerned and its other national interests, the 
provisions of Articles 69 and 70 [earrnarked for landlocked and 
disadvantaged states], the requirements of developing states in the 
subregion or region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need 
to minimise economic dislocation in states whose nationals have 
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habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial 
S55. efforts in research and identification of stock 
The conservation and management of anadromous and catadromous stocks 
56 are also recognised for the coastal state 
This regime of fisheries in the EEZ which, as seen, gives the coastal state a 
preeminent role in the conservation of the living resources is not, however , in 
practice without difficulties and the Convention is ambiguous on many subjects. In 
the first place, no mention is made of subjective cntena for the conservation, 
utilisation and management of the living resources, entrusted to the coastal state. 
In other words, the Convention fails to provide specific limits for the powers and 
responsibilities as between the coastal state and other states in the EEZ. Under the 
Convention, it is the coastal state, for example, which determines the allowable 
catch, but even if one assumes good faith in the state concerned, the scientific and 
technical criteria that could be resorted to in the estimation process, tend to be 
complex to handle. The Convention, once again confirms the 'objective' critenon, 
for the coastal state solely to determine its capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch of the EEZ living resources. 
In the light of this dealing, it is difficult to imagine how any coastal state 
will declare its incapacity to harvest the allowable catch in its EEZ, an assumption 
which was pointed to in Article 62(2) of the Convention. That is due to the fact 
that even though the coastal state might not wish to use the catch for the local 
consumption, it is free, if it is, for example, short of scientific, technical and 
economic means, to introduce such means from foreign nations or foreign 
enterprises it chooses to engage in fishing activities through agreements, and to 
secure the maximum of the total allowable catch for itsele'. Yet it is hard 
(although not impossible) to imagine the other states' access to the living resources 
of one coastal state. This wide discretionary power of the coastal state regarding 
its EEZ fisheries, which culminates in the dispute settlement system established by 
the LOSC58 (Article 297), led one commentator, Burke, to conclude that under the 
Convention the coastal state is given absolute discretion to determine whether or 
not to allow foreigners to fish in its EEZ59. Furthermore, while the Convention 
enumerates a number of considerations that should be taken into account by the 
coastal state once it allows foreign state fishing in its EEZ, such an enumeration is 
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not exhaustive and does not constitute a list of clear priorities to which states with 
a fishery surplus must strictly adhere"'. In addition, it is difficult to appreciate the 
real weight of the said factors, in the absence of any specific criterion. Thus, as 
Oda observed, one cannot but wonder: 
hoiv can the coastal state take these relevantjýctors into account, 
and with what "other states ", and what "agreements or other 
arrangements " is the coastal state going to have? " 
He rightly conclUdes: 
It issureh, hard to imagine that a coastal state that "does not have 
the capaci . tv to harvest the entire allowable catch " will be readi, 
and able to engage in so complex an (-ýYercise 62 . 
2.3 The Delimitation of the EEZ between Opposite or Adjacent States 
According to the LOSC. ) the identification of the inner 
linUt of the EEZ 
does not represent a problem, and it is the baseline from which the territorial sea's 
breadth is measured 03 , with the 
knowledge that the EEZ regime is only applicable 
beyond the territorial sea 64 . For the outer 
limits of the zone, it is the coastal state 
which decides its EEZ breadth, on the understanding that, as provided for in the 
LOSC, it "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles"65 . 
However, the issue of 
delimitation does not arise in the case of nations facing the open ocean, where the 
EEZ may extend to the full limit of 200 miles, but it is to be raised as between 
opposite states, such as those bordering on the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea or the 
Mediterranean, which at no point is 400 miles across, as well as between adjacent 
states. Thus, in such cases, the overlapping of states' claims to EEZs is inevitable. 
The 1982 Convention addressed the subject by adopting the same approach 
adopted for the delimitation of the continental shelf Article 74 of the Convention, 
which follows exactly, mutatis mutandis the wording of Article 83, provides that 
the delimitation of the EEZ between opposite and ad acent states shall be effected 1i 
by agreement based on international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ's 
66 
statute, in order to achieve an "equitable solution" . If such an agreement 
is not 
possible "within a reasonable period of time", the Convention provides for 
referring the matter to the dispute settlement mechanism set out in Part XV of the 
Convention 67 
, unless a special accord covering 
the matter is in force between the 
states concerned 68 , which 
in turn, are obliged to make every effort to enter into 
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provisional arrangements of a practical nature 69 . The Convention, then, reaffirms 
the common principle of delimitation, that such an action is in no way un-ilateral, 
but, to be valid under international law, it should be decided by the consent of the 
states concerned. 
However, as is the case with the continental shelf boundary delimitation, 
already discussed in Chapter IVO, the Convention provisions on the EEZ boundary 
delimitation are also ambiguous. Article 74 stipulates that the delimitation must 
produce an "equitable solution", but it does not clarify what constitutes such a 
solution, and what methods can lead to it. Instead, the Convention refers, in 
general terms, to international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
10, on the approach, which is practically unhelpful, in practice, and could result in 
different views and various interpretations. 
It should be noted that despite the identical wordings of Articles 74 and 8-3, 
concerned respectively with the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf 
between adjacent and opposite states, and despite also the intimate relationship 
between the two regimes resulting from their overlapping, their outer limits do not 
always coincide, although this could occur, as stated by Jimenez de Arechaga, in 
his separate opinion in the 1982 Tunisia/Liby case, at least in the large majority 
of normal cases ". The ICJ observed, in the 1985 Libya/Malta Continental Shelf 
judgement that despite the intimate link between the two institutions of the 
continental shelf and the EEZ , in modem 
law, this does not mean that the former 
has been absorbed by the latter, but rather, the Court adds: 
it does ... signify that greater importance must 
be attributed to 
elements, such as distancefrom the coast, which are common to 
both conceptS72. 
By and large, as Brownlie pertinently noted, when the coasts involved are 
less than 400 miles apart, it may be assumed that the principles of delimitation are 
similar, although there will be some differences in the balancing up of equitable 
elements, particularly when the EEZ areas in question are significant in terms of 
fisheries rather than oil and gas 73 . 
But as mentioned earlier, the coastal state may, 
under the LOSC, extend its shelf beyond 200 n. m. throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin 
74 
. 
Thus, *in such a situation, there will be no room to talk about an EEZ/continental 
shelf common boundary. 
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In case law, however, there have been, so far, no international tribunal 
decisions concerned solely with EFZ or EEZ boundafieS75. In the 
-Gulf of 
Maine 
case, the Chamber of the ICJ was faced with having to delimit a single boundary 71 
between the continental shelves and EFZs of the USA and Canada in the Gulf of 
Maine. In this case, the Chamber described the symmetry of the wording of 
Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC relating to the delimitation of the EEZ and the 
shelf as "most interesting" in the case where a single boundary line is to be 
drawn 77 , which may mean that the Chamber was in favour of this approach, but it 
emphasized the difference of relevant factors in each case by saying: 
the jact that the criteria ... were ... Jbund equitable and 
appropriate jbr the delimitation of the continental shelf does not 
impýv that they must automaticalli., possess the same properties in 
relation to the simultaneous delimitation of the continental sheýf 
and the supeijacentfishety Zone 78 . 
The Chamber, having reviewed the rules of international law on maritime 
delimitation, asserted that: 
delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable 
criteria and by the case ofpractical methods capable of ensuring, 
with regard to the geographical configuration of the area and of 
other relevant circumstances, an equitable result'9. 
In weighing the "relevant factors", the Court, to achieve equity of delimitation for 
the seaward limits of the zones in question, relied upon the geography of the 
coastso. In return., the Chamber rejected the parties' arguments" with regard to the 
fisheries of Goerges Bank, where each party claimed the relevancy of its historical 
fishery rights therein before EEZs were claimed 
82. In the 1985 Quinea/Guinea- 
Bissau arbitration, where the Tribunal was requested to trace a single line of 
delimitation for the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the EEZ of the 
83 
parties , the above principles were reflected, as the 
Tribunal stressed the principle 
84 
of equitable solution, having regard to the relevant circumstances . 
In this respect, 
the Tribunal considered the configuration and direction of the parties' coastlines as 
an important factor, and disregarded natural prolongation, economic and security 
factors 85 
. 
Fisheries factors then were paid no attention when determining a single 
continental shelf and EFZ/EEZ boundary. 
But in the Greenland-Jan Maye case, where the ICJ was concerned with 
drawing boundaries for each of the fishery zones and continental shelves of 
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Greenland and Jan Mayen, "access" to the fisheries was given prominence. In the 
southern part of the delimitation, the area between the median line and the 200 mile 
limit was equally divided in such a way as to allow both parties (Denmark and 
Norway) equitable access to thefishery resources of this zone 86 . 
In any case, in practice, the application of a single maritime solution is 
logical and more easily administered, especially where no continental shelf 
boundary was traced. Nevertheless, in the light of the differences between the two 
regimes of the continental shelf and the EEZ, the equitable factors are accordingly 
different in each case. It follows, in my view, that the mere correspondence 'in the 
language of the relevant provisions of the LOSC has no significance, respecting the 
"equitable criteria" principle, fin-nly established in international law, whether for a 
single or separate boundary line. Despite the fact that the coincidence of shelf and 
EEZ boundaries are very practical and more easily administered, the reality is as 
Bowett put it, if the drafters at UNCLOS III had intended the EEZ and the Sheýf 
boundaries to be identical, it would have been a simple drafting matter to sav 
87 so 
2.4 The Basis of Title to the EEZ Rip-hts 
Unlike the continental shelf, over which the rights of the coastal state, 
88 
obviously, do not depend either on occupation or any express proclamation , the 
language used in the 1982 Convention may raise inquiry regarding the legal basis of 
the coastal state's rights in the EEZ. The relevant provisions in the LOSC make no 
mention of this issue. Article 56(l) is satisfied for the coastal state to have certain 
rights in the EEZ, but it does not contain any reference to the coastal state's right 
in establishing an EEZ. The question could therefore arise as to whether this 
formulation may be interpreted to mean that the EEZ rights exist ipso facto and ab 
initio, without having to make an express claim to the areas concerned, in a manner 
similar to the continental shelf In other words, do the EEZ rights have the same 
innate nature as shelf rights, even if they are not in reality exercised? However, the 
judgement does not seem to be positively in favour of such an argument. First, it 
does not appear that the LOSC drafters intended the inherency of the coastal state 
rights in the EEZ, otherwise it would have been a simple drafting matter for them 
to make this clear, as was the case with the shelf Second, in the 1982 
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Tunisia/Libya case, the ICJ by implication asserted this approach. In its dealing 
with the question of historic fishing rights, raised by Tunisia, the Court, noting that 
Tunisia's historic rights and titles are more nearly related to the concept of the 
exclusive economic zone", expressly stated that: 
the notion qj*hivoi-ic 1-igahts or waters and that of the continental 
she4' arc o-overned bi, distinct legal reghne, ý in custoinai-l' 
intcl-national /aw 90 
The Court added that: 
thc. 1irst rcgjine is based on acquisition and occupation, while the 
sccond is based on the &mstencc oj' rights "ipso facto and ab 
1 17 11 10 
Third and last, an examination of the relevant state practice in the 1970s shows. as 
noted by Attard, that the large majority of EEZ claimants consider an express 
92 
proclamation necessary in order to enjoy EEZ right S 
There has been rapid evolution in state practice, accepting, or rather, 
establishing the 200 mile EEZ. This was clear in the circles of UNCLOS 111, where 
the concept gained a considerable support. In practice, many states claimed EEZs, 
and the claimants come from all the major geographical regions of the world, 
though the great majority of the claimants were developing states. An official 
publication reveals that between 1974 and the date of adoption of the 1982 
Convention, 51 states established a 200 mile EEZ93 . 
The number had increased to 
69 states by November 1986, while 20 states had claimed an EFZ of the same 
breadth 94 
. 
As of 15 January 1993,87 states had proclaimed an EEZ, a further 15 
states claimed a fishery zoneof 200 miles, and 4 states a fishery zone between 12 
and 15 rmles 95 . 
Taking into account that there are more than 55 landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged states in the world 96 , these 
indications obviously 
reveal that the widespread assertions of 200-mile jurisdiction by states, have 
considerably contributed to the acceptance of the EEZ as an international legal 
regime not only as a conventional concept, but as part of customary international 
law. In 1982, the same year the LOSC was opened for signature, the ICJ stated 
that: 
... xclusive economic zone ... may 
be regarded as part of th e e. 
modern international laii'9' (emphasis added). 
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Three years later, the same Court found no difficulty in declaring expressly and 
without any hesitation that: 
It is in the Court's view incontestable that ... the institution of the 
exclusive economic zone, with its rule on entitlement by reason of 
distance, is shown kv the practice of states to have become a part 
of customan, law 98 . 
From the above indications, it can be concluded that the rights exercised In 
the EEZ do not exist ipsofacto and ab initio, but the EEZ concept has passed now 
into international customary law". Yet, the right of a coastal state to establish an 
EEZ is not necessarily dependent upon the LOSC. Therefore, any state, even if 
not party to the Convention, is entitled to claim an EEZ. Saudi Arabia, then, could 
have claimed an EEZ, even before her recent ratification of the LOSC. 
Part 11: Saudi Arabia's EEZ[EFZ 
1. The Saudi Position on the EEZ Regime 
Although it has not yet declared a 200-miles exclusive economic zone, 
Saudi Arabia at UNCLOS 111, like many other developing states, was one of the 
supporters of the EEZ concept. Drawing a connection between the Saudi 
perspective on the legal status of the area beyond the national jurisdiction and the 
EEZ regime (both of which were in process of debate at the time), Al-Shuhall, the 
Saudi representative to the Conference stated that: 
his countty supported the declaration in General Assembly 
resolution 2749(XAV) that the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the 
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction, as well as 
the resources of the area, were the common heritage of mankind, 
provided that the Conference adopted the concept of an exclusive 
economic zone of 200 miles' 00 . 
The Saudi delegate subsequently added that: 
It [Saudi Arabia] had ... believed that every coastal state was 
entitled to extend its exclusive economic zone up to 200 miles on 
the basis of the freedom of navigation and overflight in that 
101 area 
From these two statements, the only official statements of the Saudi 
delegate on the EEZ, the Kingdom's position on the concept can be summansed. as 4: ý 
follows: Firstly, while Saudi Arabia believes in each coastal state's right to establish 
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a 200 mile EEZ, the Saudi representative to UNCLOS III linked such a move with 
the necessity of regarding the area beyond the limits of ("national jurisdiction" as a 
66common heritage of mankind" area, as lie considered the adoption of the former 
as a precondition for the acceptance of the latter. In so doing, Saudi Arabia 
seemingly wants to make a balance between its own economic interests as an 
independent entity, and the interests of the de%, eloping countries, to which it 
belongs. In other words, the adoption of a 2200-i-nile EEZ would, on the one hand, 
confinn the legitimacy of the previous Saudi claims, the last of which was the 
establishment of an EFZ, made Just over two months before the above statements 
were produced' 02 , and, on the other hand, would place what used to be part of the 
high seas in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. under the "national jurisdiction" of 
the coastal states concerned, including, Of Course, Saudi Arabia itself Thus, in the 
said two seas, there would be no room for the implementation of the regime of 
"common heritage of mankind", a regime from which the Kingdom, as a country, 
suffering lack in "self-technology" and with no distant-water fishing fleets, is 
undoubtedly one of the greatest beneficiaries. 
Secondly, as far as the width of the EEZ is concerned. ) 
Saudi Arabia 
maintains that a coastal state's outer limit of the zone may not, in maximum, 
exceed 200 miles from the baseline of the territorial sea' 03 . 
Saudi Arabia, 
therefore, supported the aspirations of the states able to exercise jurisdiction up to 
200 nautical miles, although it is itself unable to enjoy an EEZ up to this extent, 
owing to the lack of sufficient space both in the Gulf and the Red Sea, each of 
which at no point is as much as 400 miles across 104 . 
There is no reference to the 
minimurn extent of the zone, and this implies that the coastal state, based on its 
geographical and geological conditions, its natural resources, and its needs of 
national economic development, has the right to define its own EEZ. 
Thirdly, by recognising the right of the coastal state to have up to 200 n. m. 
EEZ, Saudi Arabia supported the view that the EEZ is a concept sui genel-is. 
Nevertheless, the Saudi Arabian delegate did not elaborate on the legal implications 
of the regime. In other words, no mention was made of the possible rights and 
duties of the coastal states or the other states M such a zone, with the exception of 
a passing reference to the foreign state's right to "navigation and overflight" 
therein 105 In practice, the Kingdom, as discussed in Chapter IV proclaimed its 
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jurisdictional rights over the subsoil and sea-bed of those areas of the Gulf 
contiguous to its coasts 106 , as well as over the natural resources of the Saudi 
continental shelf and the area adjacent to it in the Red Sea'O'. Saudi Arabia, 
moreover, declared its fishery rights in both seas'O'. In return, the Kingdom - in 
general terms - obliged itself to respect the rules of international law, especially as 
regards navigation and overflight'09. However, the rights and duties contained in 
the Saudi local legislation fall short of those exercisable in the EEZ as stipulated in 
the LOSC. In relation to rights, the Saudi legislation is only concerned with 
natural resources, living and non-living, while the EEZ regime grants the coastal 
state rights not only with living and non-living resources, but also with regard to 
artificial islands , installations and structures, marine scientific research and the 
marine environment. As to duties, the Saudi legislation refers always to the "rules 
of international law", but specific mention is only made of navigation, overflight 
and fishing merely in the Gulf, while under the EEZ regime, the coastal state, as 
mentioned earlier, is obliged to respect the freedoms of navigation, overflight, 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea related to these freedoms. 
2. Reluctance to Claim an EEZ 
Of the 13 countries bordering the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, nearly half 
of them have established EEZs of their own. The initiative, in this respect, was 
taken by Qatar in 1974''0, and was followed by Yemen in 19771", Djibouti in 
19791 12 
, 
United Arab Emirates in 1980113ý Oman in 1981 114 , 
Egypt In 1983' 15 , and 
Iran in 19931 16 . 
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, despite the fact that it was the 
first country in the region to make a claim to its Gulf continental shelf resources 
through the Royal Pronouncement of 1949, followed by the Royal Decree of 1968 
concerning the resources of the Red Sea, and the 1974 Declaration of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs concerning fishery nghts beyond the limits of the territorial sea 
in the Red Sea and the Gulf, and despite the Saudi Arabian position supporting the 
right of the coastal states to establish a 200-mile zone at UNCLOS III, and finally 
despite the recent accession of Saudi Arabia to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, she has not yet declared an EEZ of her own. 
Saudi Arabia's support for the EEZ legal regime of 200 miles has not changed; 
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thus, the question arises, why is there this disiiiclination to create an EEZ? There 
has been no official statement on the matter. but it is thought that the reason is 
related to one or more of the following considerations. 
First of all, it is well known, as i-nentioned earlier'" that the EEZ finds its 
roots in the concept of the exclusive fishing zone and the doctrine of the 
continental shelf. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has defined its coastal rights 
concerning its continental shelf and Set LIP a fishery zone beyond the limit of the 
territorial sea. Thus, these already existimy claims could have been viewed by the 
planners of the Saudi marine policy as equivalents of the EEZ, something that may 
lead to a conclusion that having an EEZ Would add little if anything to the 
Kingdom's existing powers. I'D 
Another consideration which may contribute to an explanation of the non- 
establishment of an EEZ by the Kingdorn may be represented in the geographic 
position of Saudi Arabia as a state bordering two semi-enclosed seas, i. e. the Red 
Sea and the Arabian Gulf and in what follows that concerning the demarcation of 
the EEZ boundaries as between the states concerned. As is known, Article 122 of 
the LOSC defines an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea as: 
a guýf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more states and 
connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow-outlet or 
consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic 7ones of two or more coastal states. 
, 
Jve a more precise definition, Alexander stated that the term In an attempt to o 
refers to: 
an area of at least 50,000 square nautical miles and [be] a 
'ýprhnaiy" sea, rather than an area of a larger semi-enclosed 
water body. At least 50 per cent of its circumference should be 
occupied by land and the width of the connector between the sea 
and the open ocean must not represent more than 20 per cent of 
the sea's total circumference" 8. 
The Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, according to their geographical and 
hydrographical characteristics, are designated within the above category of seas. 
Consequently, In these two bodies of waters, neither of which in breadth exceeds 
200 miles at any point' 19, no state may claim an EEZ extending seaward from its 
120 
baselines without encroaching upon the potential claims of other states In such 
a case, delimitation necessitates agreement with the adjacent and opposite 
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countries, a matter which will create more problems, especially for Saudi Arabia, 
which has not yet agreed on EFZ boundaries with any of her neighbours. The 
dispute over the ownership of certain islands (such as the islands of Qarue and 
Umm Al-Maradin with Kuwait, and Tiran and Sanafir with Egypt) Will not ease 
settlement of the maritime boundaries in the region. Moreover, the inter- 
relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf will undoubtedly make the 
EEZ delimitation more complicated, since relevant circumstances which should be 
taken into account to reach an equitable solution in continental shelf boundaries are 
different from those applicable to EEZ boundaries. For instance, Evans, citing 
various decisions of the ICJ, which touch on the issue of economic dependence of 
a coastal population, suggests: 
This is more like4v to arise in the context offishing and thus could 
have greater signi/icance for a 'ýpure " EEZ delimitation, where 
greater emphasis inight be placed upon suchfactors. 121 
Associated with these difficulties, is the case where the continental shelf has 
already been delimited as is the case with Bahrain and Iran. The difficulty here is 
for the states concerned to decide whether the factors considered as relevance 
when the old continental shelf boundary was determined are still relevant with 
regard to their new EEZ boundaries. Given these difficulties, the declaration of an 
EEZ, could be viewed by the Saudi marine policy makers as raising maritime 
boundary problems to be added to those of seas and land, existing as between the 
states of the region. Accordingly, they may have considered that it would be 
preferable to leave things as they are, than to raise boundary problems, the like of 
which have already caused suffering to the countries of the region. This approach, 
is not, however, the ideal one, since, if correct, it may lead, by the changing of 
circumstances in the future, to more complex problems. 
A further reason for the Saudi Arabian failure to declare an EEZ could be 
attributed to the viewpoint of Saudi Arabia towards some provisions of the 1982 
Convention, especially in what concerns Article 45, which prevents the coastal 
state from suspending innocent passage of foreign ships through straits connecting 
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a part of the hi(, )-h seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of that 
state 
12' 
. 
In any event, neither of the above mentioned considerations seems to be 
justifiable. First of all, the rights to be exercised in the EEZ are not confined to the 
living and non-living resources of the area, but as indicated earlier they exceed that 
to cover other economic resources. such as the production of energy from the 
water, construction of artificial islands and installations, marine scientific reserach 
and marine Pollution 123. Secondly, the Issue of delimitation will one day be raised 
and, whether it takes a short or a long time, a solution will, at the end of the day, 
be reached. Undertaking to negotiate maritirne boundaries with neighbouring states 
is the proper approach to achieve a final settlement. Postponement will not help 
stabilise the relationships between the Kin(.. Yldoi-n and her neighbounng states. 
Thirdly. if the last consideration relating to the disagreement of the Kingdom's 
view with some provisions of the LOSC is correct, such a reasoning seems to be 
unjustifiable. since regardless of the recent ratification of the 1982 Convention, 
Saudi Arabia has been a signatory party to the Convention since 1984. Moreover, 
however, the assumed dissatisfaction of Saudi Arabia with some provisions of the 
LOSC does not justify the non-declaration of an EEZ, as these two factors appear 
to be irrelevant. In this respect, there exist certain maritime powers, such as the 
United States 124 and the former Soviet Union (succeeded by the Russian 
12 5 Federation) , which 
have declared EEZs, although they had not acceded to the 
LOSC, as a result of their dissatisfaction with the LOSC's newly created regime 
for the deep sea-bed. Thus, the proclamation of an EEZ would not be "costly" for 
the Saudi authorities. Taking such an action cannot, then, be excluded in the 
future, and yet it seems to be just a matter of time before the Kingdom declares an 
EEL 
3. Saudi Arabia and Fisheries 
It is estimated that the fishing resources in the Red Sea and the Arabian 
Gulf are the most important resources after the hydrocarbon materials and minerals 
in the former and oil and gas in the latter. The marine life of these two seas are 
remarkably rich, and many of the fish are able to tolerate wide extremes of 
temperature and salinity. The richness of the marine life is reflected in the large 
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number of species seen in Saudi Arabian fish markets, as over 180 different species 
in the Red Sea coast markets and over 110 in the Gulf coast markets were 
recorded 126 However, these represent only a small proportion of the actual 
species, since there are many more fish in the Saudi territorial waters which never 
appear in the markets either because they are inedible, too small, or not yet 
127 exploited by Saudi fishermen 
The real concern of Saudi Arabia over the fishing industry started from the 
mid 1970s by the establishment in 1976 of the Saudi Arabia Fishenes Development 
Programme in co-operation with the British White Fish Authonty. The year 1980 
witnessed an important event in this context, by the establishment of the Saudi 
28 Fisheries Company' 
. 
In addition to fishing, processing and local marketing, the 
Company conducts the activities of exporting, importing and making local 
purchases. In 1991 and with the aim of meeting local shortages and giving the 
consumer adequate variety, the Company's imports of fish and shrimp were 12,830 
tonnes, the exports were 635 tonnes, while the local purchases from local 
129 fishen-nen in the auction markets totalled 2046 tonnes 
Fish is a popular food in Saudi Arabia, and it was estimated to be 13% of 
the total consumption of animal protein 130 , while the potential 
harvest was 
estimated at 32,000 tonnes a year 131 . 
The Kingdom's catches of fish have 
increasingly risen. The statistics published by FAO reveal that the Saudi total catch 
beyond the inland waters was estimated to be 33,000 and 45,523 metric tonnes M 
the years 1982 and 1986 respectively. The number went up to 53,391 metric 
tonnes in 1989132. As a result of what is widely known as the Gulf Crisis, caused 
by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the total Saudi Arabian catch of fish descended 
to 46,427 metric tonnes in 1990, and 43,251 in 199 1133. The internal waters' catch 
was estimated to be 11427 metric tonnes in 1990, rising to 1,982 metric tonnes in 
iggi 134 
, while the catch of all marine 
fishing areas was estimated to be 45,517 
metric tonnes in 1986 and 52,190 in 1989, descending to 45,000 and 41,269 metric 
tonnes in 1990 and 1991 respectively 135 . 
However, despite the noticable growth in 
the Saudi fishing industry, the amount of catch satisfied only less than one half of 
total local demand 136 , which means 
that the industry is in need of more 
and efforts to provide a better contribution to the gross domestic development 
137 
product 
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3.1 Saudi Arabia's Policv on Marine Fisherv 
The features of Saudi Arabia's fishery policy can be recognised through her 
national legislation and her participation at the Law of the Sea Conferences, 
especially the first and second ones. In order to protect its fishery resources, Saudi 
Arabia issued, very soon after her establishment, i. e. in 1932 (1351 AH), the initial 
regulations on fishery catch within the coasts of the Red Sea (Regulations of 
"I -) ) 138 193- 
. 
The very early constitution of a fishery zone title (some 17 years before 
the Kingdom in 1949 defined its territorial %vaters and its sovereignty rights over 
the Gulf continental shelf resources), apparently reflects the Kingdom's concern to 
protect her fishery interests. Article 4 of the 1932 Regulations defined the outer 
limits of the area concerned to be 4 miles from the Saudi coasts (with the exception 
of bays), plus the areas where the Government used to permit fishing outside the 
said zone. The Regulations, however, did not even contain any reference to the 
term "territorial sea" or "territorial waters", which was not claimed by the Saudi 
139 authorities until 1949 Instead, the terin "coasts of the Red Sea" was employed. 
Moreover, the effects of the Regulations were confined to the Saudi coasts in the 
Red Sea, and there was no reference to the Arabian Gulf This, however, could be 
attributed to the fact that the 1930s witnessed the discovery of oil, In the eastern 
province of the Kingdom and her coasts in the Arabian Gulf, in commercial 
quantities. This position considerably increased the activities of search and drilling 
in the area at the expense of the activities relating to fisheries. Nevertheless, it 
would not have been costly for the coasts of the Arabian Gulf to be included. The 
main goal of these Regulations, however, was to protect the Saudi fishery interests 
within 4 miles from the Red Sea Saudi coasts, and for that, fishing therein was 
prohibited unless a catch licence was obtained from the competent authorities, 
represented in the Coasts Safeguards 140. The Regulations allowed foreigners to 
fish within the area but such an action had to be permitted in advance. The licence 
was to be obtained from the Saudi representative in the foreigner's country, and if 
there was no representative, it was to be obtained from the nearest Saudi Coasts 
141 Safeguards Office 
The 1932 Regulations were abolished in 1988 by virtue of Royal Decree 
No. M/9, which endorsed, instead, the Regulations of Fishing, Investment, and 
Protection of Living Resources in the Territorial Waters of the Kingdom of 
Saudi 
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Arabia (referred to hereafter as Regulations of 1988) 142 . According to the latter 
Regulations, the Ministry of Agnculture and Waters was allocated as a central 
governmental body, in charge of the Kingdom's fishing matters within her 
territorial waters regarding organization, development, investment and protection, 
in co-ordination with the National Commission for Wildlife, Conservation and 
Development 143 Article 2 of the Regulations prevents fishing In the Saudi 
territorial waters without permission, to be obtained from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Waters. As to foreign fishermen, they are not allowed to fish 
therein unless they obtain a licence from the said Ministry, approved by the Head 
of the Council of Ministers 144 . 
The Kingdom's title to living resource of her territorial sea, was obviously 
declared, for the first time in 1949 through the Royal Decree No. 6/4/5/3711 of 28 
May 1949 145 . Article 2 of that Decree provides that: 
The territorial waters of'Saudi Arabia, as well as the air space 
above and the soil and subsoil beneath them, are under the 
sovereign4, of the Kingdom... . 
In the same Decree, the territorial sea of the Kingdom was defmed to be 6 n. m. 
seaward from the baselines 
146 
. No direct reference was made in this Decree to 
Saudi fishing rights. However, the language, used in Article 2, mentioned above, 
read in conjunction with the last clause of Article 9, which stipulates that nothing in 
this Article shall be deemed to apply to the rights of the Kingdom with respect to 
fishing, and also with Article 4 of the 1932 Regulations, according to which, the 
fishery zone scope was limited to 4 miles from the Saudi coasts, all indicates the 
intention of the Saudi legislator to establish exclusive access to the fish stocks in 
the 6 n. m. territorial sea of the Kingdom. In 1958, Saudi Arabia redefined its 
territorial sea 
147 
, extending 
it to 12 n. m Thus, the Saudi Arabian fishery zone 
automatically extended from 6 to 12 n. m. 
At UNCLOS 1, Saudi Arabia's position on the coastal state jurisdictional 
fishery rights was expressed in the context of her position supporting a 12-rmle 
territorial sea limit. The Saudi representative to the Conference, Shukain, 
emphasised the sovereignty of the coastal states over their coasts and fisheries. In 
this respect, Shukairi said: 
The crucial change that had occurred since the Conference for the 
Codification of International Law held at The Hague in 1930, 
which had been attended byforty-two as opposed to the eighty- 
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seven delegates participatingr in the present conference, was that 
the number qfsoverei, (!! ), rnstates had almost doubled and that incient 
peoples which had noiv acquired statehood had become masters 148 
over their coasts andfisheries 
In his reply to the UK representative that a twelve-mile limit would 
adversely affect the food supply available for the population and his country's 
balance of payments, Shukairi described this argument as a "weighty one", tD 
SLIPPOrting the proposal for a výveh,, e-rnile I im I t14" ,S ince, according to Shukairi: 1: 1 
o ther coastal states emergh 7, ufi-oni a condition of poverti, in 
Asia, A, Irica and Latin A inerica also had to fted man 
,v 
millions and 
to balance their economics; the 
,v 
surelv had prior rights to 
cývclusivcfishing off their coasts 150 . 
At UNCLOS 11, the same positions were repeated. The great mantime 
powers, particularly the US and the UK were against a twelve-mile limit for the 
coastal state's territorial sea. In his reply to the UK representative's argument that 
distant water fishing was of serious importance, and that the loss of the fish it 
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produced would be a cruel blow to the UK economy , the Saudi representative 
emphasised the needs of the coastal peoples, particularly those of under-developed 
countries, for the: 
food that the fish of their coastal waters would give them, and they 
needed to catch and process their own fish, and build up their own 
fishing industry, so that they would not have to reimport fish at 
great expense 152 . 
Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its perspective over the coastal state's fishery rights in a 
joint proposal 153 , submitted to the Conference on 
6 April, 1960, with 15 other 
states 154 . Having asserted in its Article I the coastal state's right to 
fix the breadth 
of its territorial sea up to a maximum of 12 miles measured from the baselines, the 
proposal in Article 2 stated that the coastal state claiming a territorial sea of less 
than 12 n. m. in breadth: 
has the right to establish afishing zone contiguous to its territorial 
sea extending to a maximum of 12 miles measured from the 
applicable baseline. 
Under Article 3 of the said proposal, it was stipulated that the coastal state has in 
the prescribed zone: 
the same rights of fishing and of exploitation of the living 
resources of the sea as it has in its territorial sea. 
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On II April, 1960, Mexico and Venezuela joined Saudi Arabia and the 
other previous group of states in submitting to the Conference a proposal'ýý 
containing the same provisions as mentioned above as to the limits of the coastal 
state fishery jurisdictional rights. As is well known, the Conference failed to reach 
an agreement on the two questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and the 
limits of the fishery zones. As a result, Saudi Arabia with nine other states'ý' 
produced shortly before the end of the Conference, a draft resolution 157 in which 
they requested all states participating in the Conference to abstain from extending 
the breadth of their territorial sea, pending consideration of the question by the UN 
General Assembly. However, regarding the fishery question, the said countries 
maintained their position, calling for a coastal state's right of up to a 12 n. m. limit 
fishery zone, where such a state may exercise the same rights in respect offishing 
and the exploitation oj'the living resources of the sea as it has in its territorial 
sea " 8. Obviously, the Saudi Arabian fishery debates at the Law of the Sea 
Conferences of 1958 and 1960 were in support of its pre-existing claim of 16 
February 1958, according to which the Kingdom extended the outer limit of its 
territorial sea to 12 miles, measured from the baselines, and therein the Saudi 
sovereignty was declared. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the focal point of the Saudi 
marine fishery policy was that the coastal state is entitled to exercise its fishery 
jurisdictional rights in its territorial sea, which should, from the Saudi perspective, 
be extended up to 12 n. m. from the baseline. In other words, the Kingdom at that 
time was not in favour of the extension of the fishing zone beyond a 12 mile outer 
limit. This situation continued until 1974. By then, however, Saudi Arabia realised 
that the 12 n. m. limit territorial sea was inadequate for the protection of its 
fishery 
interests. Having noticed the international practice, tending to create wider 
fishery 
zones beyond the limits of the territorial sea, Saudi Arabia established 
its own EFZ 
159 
in 1974 through a declaration issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs . In 
justification of this measure, the preamble of the declaration mentioned the 
following considerations: 
(a) The importance of the fish resources as a principle diet for the people of 
Saudi Arabia, and a vital factor for its social and economic progress; 
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(b) The significance of jurisdiction over those fish resources for their protection 
and prudent exploitation; 
(c) The affirmation of jurisdiction by other states, over the fish resources in the 
areas adjacent to their territorial seas. 
By its reference to "other states", the Kingdom apparently wanted to confirm the 
legal basis of its claim, represented in international custom. On the other hand, the 
timing of the claim suggests that the competent authorities in the Kingdom may 
have been aNvare of the debates in the ICJ over the Fisheries Jurisdiction case 
(1974). In this case, as discussed earlier, the Court declared that: 
the concept ofthefishei-v zone, the area in it, hich a state may clahn 
cyclush, e fishery 'urisdiction independently of its territorial sea J 
160 [has] ciý'stallised as customarý, law 
At the regional level, it seems that Saudi Arabia, in declaring an EFZ, was 
influenced by Oman 
16 1 
and Iran' 
62 
, which unilaterally proclaimed in 1972 and 19733 
respectively an exclusive fishing zone of 50 n. m. (in 1977 Oman extended its 
163 
exclusive fishing zone to 200 n. m. ) 
By the Declaration of 1974, which applies to the Saudi Arabian coasts in 
the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, the Kingdom asserted exclusive fishing 
jurisdiction in: 
those areas contiguous to the coasts of the Kingdom and the coasts 
of its island, from the coastal sea of the Kingdom towards the high 
164 
seas 
The outer limits of the zone were not, however, stipulated, but it was stated that: 
if thefishing zones, measuredfrom the baselines ... 
be overlapped 
with those of another coastal state, the boundary shall be the 
median line every point of which is equidistant from the baselines 165 
fi-om which the territorial sea is measured 
Thus, the EFZ outer limits coincide with the median line. The silence of the 
Saudi legislator on the issue of specifying the EFZ outer limits does not represent 
ambiguity in the text, in as much as, it reflects, on the one hand, his intention to 
extend the Kingdom"s fishing authority areas seaward as far as possible, bearing in 
mind the debates at UNCLOS Ill, which were in favour of accepting 200 n. m. 
EEZ, and on the other hand, the geographical characteristics of the Red Sea and 
the Arabian Gulf, which at no point exceed 200 n. m. in breadth. Besides, the 1974 
Declaration provided that no fishing or any related activities were to be exercised 
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by non-Saudis In the said zone, unless prior permission was obtained from the 
Saudi Government 166 
. In addition, however, the Declaration asserted the 
Kingdom's duty towards the international community, by recognising the legal 
status of the fishing zones as part of the high seas subject to the "established 
principles of international law" 167 . Thus, although no mention was made of specific 
duties within the zone, the general language used in the Declaration reflects the 
Kingdom's readiness to respect "all" duties, on the understanding that they are 
within international law. 
This examination of the wording of the 1974 Declaration reveals that the 
Saudi claim, whether as to its justifications or its other legal aspects, is mainly 
based on international precedents and standards. The justifications given for the 
Truman Proclamation of 28 September 1945, by virtue of which, the US asserted 
its authority over fisheries in "areas of the high seas contiguous to its coasts", were 
that: 
fisheiýv resources have a special importance to coastal 
communities as a source of livelihood and to the nation as a food 
and industrial resource, ..., the progressive 
development of new 
methods and techniques contributes to intensifiedfishing over wide 
sea areas and in certain cases seriously threatens fisheries with 
depletion, 
... 
[and that] there is an urgent need to protect coastal 
168 fishery resourcesfrom destructive exploitation, ... 
169 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case of 1951 , the ICJ, which was 
considering the use of straight baselines in the delimitation of the territorial sea, 
declared, on the occasion of discussing the question of whether certain sea areas 
lying within the chosen baselines are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain 
to be subject to the regime of internal waters, that: 
... there is one consideration not to 
be overlooked, the scope of 
which extends beyond purely geographical factors: that o certain )f 
economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance 
of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage 
170 
. 
In the 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of Living 
Resources of the High Seas, it was provided that: 
... any coastal state may, with a view 
to the maintenance of the 
productivity of the living resources of the sea, adopt unilateral 
measures of conservation appropriate to any stock offish or other 
marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its 
territorial seas ... 
"I 
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In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case of 1974, the ICJ asserted two concepts: 
the customary legal status of the EFZ's establishment and the coastal state's 
preferential rights of fishing in "adjacent waters" 
172 
Finally, the 1982 United Nations Convention established a 200 n. m. 
exclusive economic zone adjacent to the territorial sea. In this zone, the coastal 
state's sovereign rights, were recognized, as seen earlier, among other things: 
for the purpose of exploring, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living... 1 73 
Compared with these significant developments M the legal history of 
fisheries, it is quite clear that the Saudi Arabian fishery policy has been, since the 
issue of the initial relevant regulations in 1932, in general conformity with the 
principles set forth in the international law of the sea. Saudi Arabia, as has been 
seen, has declared an exclusive fishery zone, the concept which was established in 
the 1982 Convention. In doing so, the Kingdom based its claim on the 
"contiguity" norm, i. e. the special relationship between her offshore areas and the 
mainland recognized both under conventional rules and case law. Further, while 
the Kingdom's claim was justified in terms of economic interests, the Saudi 
national legislations have confirmed the need for the conservation and prudent 
utilisation of fishery resources. However, since the protection of fish resources 
from depletion and exploitation has been set forth, as indicated in the Saudi 
legislation, as a main goal of the Saudi policy, it appears that the Kingdom, which 
has not yet concluded any accord with any of her neighbouring states, is in need to 
negotiate such agreements with the aim of organising this matter, especially since, 
as will be seen in the following section, the Kingdom recognises, in principle, the 
right of foreign fishermen to fish in her fishing zones. 
3.2 Saudi Arabia's Regulations on Foreign Fishigg 
Through her national legislations, Saudi Arabia has recognised foreign 
fishing not only in her exclusive fishery zone, but in her territorial waters. This 
ii right was first recognised in the Regulations of 1932, which provided for obtaining 
a licence as a precondition for fishing in the Red Sea Saudi Arabian "coastal 
waters" 174 . According to 
Article 20 of the said Regulations: 
each foreign comer has to obtain the said licence from the Saudi 
representative in that comer's country if there is any, otherwise he 
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should get the licencefirom the nearest competent authority in the 
nearest Hijazi port. 
The Kingdom reiterated her obligation in 1949 through the Royal Pronouncement 
concerning the Saudi Policy as to the Subsoil and Sea-Bed of the Gulf Areas 
Contiguous to her Coasts"'. After asserting the Saudi Arabian jurisdiction over 
the said areas , it emphasised that: 
the character as high seas of the waters of such areas, the right to 
the fi-ee and unimpeded navigation of such waters and the air 
space above those waters, - 
fishing rights in such waters, and the 
traditional fteedom of pearling by the peoples of I the Gulf are in 
no way affected' 76 (emphasis added). 
It is noteworthy here that Saudi Arabia expressly recognizes the right of the 
"region's peoples" to free pearling and fishing in the waters superjacent to its Gulf 
continental shelf (known as the exclusive fishery zone in the contemporary sense), 
though such recognition by Saudi Arabia came nearly a quarter of a century before 
she established her own exclusive fishery zone in 1974. 
In the Foreign Affairs Ministry Declaration of 1974, a provision was made 
for fishing and all related activities by non-Saudis in the Saudi EFZ, but prior 
permission from the Saudi Govenunent is a precondition for exercising such 
177 
activities 
In the Regulations of 1988, Saudi Arabia maintined, in principle, the right 
of foreign fishing in her territorial sea, but after obtaining permission from the 
Minister of Agriculture and Waters, approved by the Head of the Council of 
Ministers"8. There is no indication of the qualifications and conditions required to 
get such permission; therefore, it is left to the competent authorities to decide. The 
confinement of the permission authorization to the highest level in the country's 
executive authority suggests that foreign fishing in the Saudi territorial waters win 
be very limited. Nevertheless, the mere acceptance of this practice, even if in 
principle, is unjustifiable, since under these regulations, Saudi Arabia allows the 
exercise in her temtorial sea of foreign fishing rights which are not recognised even 
by international law itself! 
With regard to enforcement measures, Saudi Arabia applies a system of 
fines and imprisonment to enforce her fishery zone. Under Article 69 of the 1932 
Regulations, anyone who exercises fishing in the Saudi coastal waters without 
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being licensed was to be punislied by expropriation of the entire catch or a fine of 
between a quarter of a Riyal and 10 Riyals. Under Article 9 of the 1988 
Regulations, which replaced those of 19332, whoever violates any of the provisions 
contained in the Regulations (including of, course. fishing, without permission) is to I" Z: ) 
be sentenced to jail terms of no more than 6 months, a fine of no more than 10,000 
Riyals. or both punish-ments. The said penalty, however, is to be applied for each 
offence. 
UInder the LOSC, access of foreign states to a state's EEZ fishery is 
recognised. bUt the coastal state has been given a very broad discreti ion to regulate 
this access. -, Adthough access of the fishermen of other states to the surplus of the 
allowable catch in a state's EEZ is permitted (In principle), when the coastal state 
does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it is the coastal 
state which determines this allowable catch (Article 61(l)). Moreover, it is the 
coastal state which decides its own capacity to harvest the EEZ living resources 
(Article 62(2)). This broad discretion is asserted in Paragraph . 3' of 
Article 62, 
which provides that , in giving access, the coastal state: 
shall take into account all relevant. /actors including, inter alia, the 
signýficance of the living resources of the area to the economy of 
the coastal state concerned and its other national interests, the 
provisions of Articles 69 and 70, the requirement of developing 
states in the subregion qf region in harvesting part of the surplus 
and the need to minimize economic dislocation in states whose 
nationals have habitualli) fished in the zone or which have made 
substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. 
In practice, this, plus the fact that the coastal state is excluded from the 
Convention procedures (contained in Article 287) regarding compulsory settlement 
of disputes, including those ansing from failure to determine total allowable catch 
and harvesting capacity, as well as the fact that the coastal state can prescribe and 
enforce conditions to govern the access, when allowed, makes the access of other 
states (with the exception of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states) 
to a coastal state's EEZ fisheries very difficult, if not impossible. 
On the other hand, under the 1982 Convention enforcement system, the 
competent authorities of such a state may board, inspect, arrest, and proceed, but 
arrested vessels and crews are to be released promptly when reasonable bond is 
posted. Violation of fishery laws in the EEZ entitles the coastal state to impose a 
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financial penalty only rather than imprisonment or any other form Of corporal 
punishment, in the absence of agreement to the contrary 179 However, in the 
absence of any international criteria for such financial penalties, the degree of these 
penalties would fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the coastal state concerned, 
unless otherwise provided for in international law'80. 
It should be noted that Saudi Arabia's above-mentioned system of penalties 
is designated only for foreign fishing in the territorial sea. The 1974 Declaration, 
although it makes obtaining prior authonsation a precondition to fish in the Saudi 
EFZ , is unjustifiably silent on the violation of such condition by 
foreign fishermen. 
Therefore, there is no scope for comparing the EEZ enforcement provisions, 
contained in the LOSC, with those included in the Saudi legislation, since the 
latter, represented in the 1988 Regulations, speak only of fishing M the territorial 
sea, the area where the coastal state has full sovereignty 181 , and yet it is entitled to 
impose penalties consistent with the conception of this sovereignty, including the 
imprisonment punishment. 
The LOSC makes a special mention of landlocked and disadvantaged 
states. Under the Convention, these two categories of states have the right to: 
participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an 
appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of coastal states of the same subregion 
or region, taking into account the relevant economic and 
geographical circumstances of all the states concerned and in 
conformity with the provisions of [these aiticles] and of Articles 61 
and 62' 82 . 
The terms and modalities of this participation are to be established by the states 
concerned through bilateral, subregional, or regional agreements, taking into 
account inter alia: 
(a) the necessity to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or the fishing 
industry of the coastal state; 
(b) the extent to which disadvantaged and landlocked states are participating or are 
entitled to participate under existing bilateral, subregional. or regional 
agreements in the exploitation of living resources of the EEZ of other coastal 
states; 
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(c) the cxtent to which other landlocked states and geographically disadvantaged 
states are participating in the exploitation of the living resources of the coastal 
state's EEZ and the consequent need to avoid a particular burden for any single 
coastal state or a part of it. 
(d) the IlUtritional needs of the POPUlations of the states concerned 83 . 
The larigua(ge of the said provisions leads to various interpretations bV the 
respecti\ c statos and leave many questions Without answers. For example, who 
decides the equity of the participation basis" And who decides that a part of the 
Surplus is appropriate? Who decides to take account of relevant economic and 
geographical circumstances? And what is meant by economic and geographical 
cirCUM stances" What is the definition of regional and subregional agreements? 
Who decides the extent to which the geographically disadvantaged and landlocked 
states are participating in the exploitation of living resources of the EEZ of other 11-D It) 
coastal states" And likewise, who will decide the extent to which other landlocked 
and geographically disadvantaged states are participating in the exploitation of the Z: ) 417) Z: ) 
living resources of the coastal state's EEZ? And finally, who will estimate the 
nutitional needs of the population of the respective states? Indeed, all these 
questions, which have been left without answers, throw doubts upon the 
effectiveness of the said provisions. 
As to Saudi Arabia, the Saudi legislation, as seen earlier, does not provide 
for preferential rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, nor 
for the exclusion of these rights, in the Saudi EFZ. At UNCLOS 111, apart from 
recognition of their right to transit access 184 , no specific statement was made 
by the 
Saudi delegation with regard to the said states. However, the numerous 
qualifications imposed on the fishery rights of these two categories of states give 
opportunity to the coastal states, including Saudi Arabia, to minimize greatly the 
fishery participation in their EEZs/EFZs. 
3.3 The Delimitation of Saudi Arabia's EFZ 
Owing to the particular geographical characteristics of the Red Sea and the 
Arabian Gulf will undoubtedly lead to an overlapping of the EEZ/EFZ boundaries 
between the region's states whether opposite or adjacent. As mentioned 
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previously, a number of these two seas' states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Iran, Egypt, Yemen and Djibouti, have established either an 
EEZ or EFT It is to be observed that if similar actions are to be taken by the other 
coastal states, the entire waters of the Red Sea and the Gulf will be closed off, 
covered by the exclusive jurisdictions of the coastal states. Hence, all these states, 
including Saudi Arabia, should reach an agTeement among themselves, otherwise 
the validity of the outer limits of their EEZs/EFZs will be challenged, as the 
Chamber of the ICJ M the Gulf of Maine case of 1984 asserted the general 
principle in this regard by indicating that: 
No maritime delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent 
costs ma 'v 
be ejjýcted unilaterally by one of those states. Such 
delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an 
agreement, JbIlowing negotiations conducted in good faith and 
with the genuine intention of achieving a positive result' 85 . 
Saudi Arabia has not yet delimited its EFZ with any of its neighbours, 
although, as discussed in Chapter IV, it has defined its continental shelf boundaries 
with Iran and Bahrain. However, Saudi Arabia has laid down the general rule for 
delimiting its EFZ. Article 2 of the 1974 Declaration provides that: 
-ones, measuredfrom the baselines referred to in ... if the fishing . Article 5 oj'the Ro ' val 
Decree concerning the territorial waters 
be overlapped with those of another coastal state, the boundary 
shall be the median line evety point of which is equidistant from 
the baselinesfrom which the territorial sea is measured. 
Thus, the Kingdom adopts, for its EFZ delimitation, the same criterion, 
used in the bilateral agreements of the continental shelf boundary delimitation with 
each of Bahrain, Qatar, and Iran' 86 , 
i. e. the median line rule. Compared with the 
other opposite or adjacent states which established EEZs or EFZs, it is to be noted 
that Qatar, in its Declaration of 1974 187 asserted the outer limits of the Qatari 
continental prolongation, or the median line as a "determining fact" in defining the 
outer limits of its EEZ, unless a particular agreement provides to the contrary'88. 
With slight differences, Iran, in its Proclamation of 1973189 established two criteria 
for the determination of its EFZ In the Arabian Gulf First, in the area where Iran 
had delimited its continental shelf with the states concerned, here the outer limit of 
Iran's EFZ is that of its continental shelf Second, where no agreement had been 
achieved, the median line was provided for, to be the outer limit of the EFZ190. In 
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its Act of 1993, Iran, however adopted the si for the boundary concept 
continental shelf and the EEZ, unless otherwise determined in accordance with 
bilateral agreements'9'. In the Declaration of 1983, made on ratifying the 1982 
Convention, Egypt, a bordering state of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea, accepted, 
for its part: 
to estahli. ýh the outer limits q1' irý cxclu, ýive economic zone in 
accordance with the riile. ý, criteria and modalities laid dovt, 17 in the 
C017VC170 - 017 
192 
. 
In other words. Egypt applies the criterion laid down in Article 74 of the 
Convention, the core of which is reaching: 
agi, eement on the basis qf international /aiv, as refei-i-ed to an 
Article 38 of the Statute ofthe [wei-national Coui-t of Justice, in 
oi-der to achieve an equitable solution. 
Saudi Arabia has not yet delimited its EFZ boundaries any of the re(g)-ion's, 
states, and apart from Bahrain and Iran, the continental shelf boundaries as 
between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours have not been defined either' 93 . 
Thus, the 
boundaries need to be determined by means of agreement following negotiations, 
since the claims of the region's states to EFZs or EEZs will not be valid, according 
to the International Court of Justice, in the absence of an agreement' 94 . As to the 
boundary with Bahrain and Qatar, no problem is likely to arise, since the 
agreements concluded with these two states have provided not only for delimiting 
the submerged areas, but also for the delimitation of the superjacent waters of such 
areas. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Saudi boundary with Bahrain has been 
delimited since 1958 195 , and with 
Qatar, as is well known, the 1965 Agreement has 
not yet taken effect, but the reasons for that concern the land boundary, and have 
nothing to do with the maritime boundaries, as both sides agreed, under the said 
Agreement, upon the utilisation of the median line rule for the division of the Bay 
of Salwa lying between the coasts of the two countries 196 . 
Thus, in light of the 
above-mentioned criteria adopted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the boundary may be 
assumed to correspond. 
The case with Iran and Sudan, however, is different. As seen in Chapter 
IV, with Iran, the continental shelf boundary was settled by virtue of the 1968 
Agreement, while with Sudan, agreement was reached in 1974 on the division of 
the natural resources of the sea-bed area located between the Saudi-Sudanese 
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coasts in the Red Sea 197 . Iran, as mentioned earlier, supports a single maritime 
boundary for the EEZ and the continental shelf. Thus, according to the Iranian 
approach, the outer limit of the Saudi-Iranian EFZs or EEZs will be the outer limit 
of their continental shelves, as provided for in the 1968 Agreement. It should be 
noted, however, that the said Agreement was based on a "modified" median line, as 
the boundary line witnessed some deviations towards the Saudi side in the northern 
sector of the delimited areas. The Kingdom's acceptance of Iran's boundary claim, 
therefore, will mean some concessions on the part of Saudi Arabia in her 
superjacent fishery zone, similar to those of the continental shelf Saudi Arabia, 
however, is silent on this Iranian approach. 
From an international legal perspective, the coincidence of the EEZ and 
continental shelf boundary could occur; rather, it may occur, as stated by Judge 
Jimenez de Arechaga in his separate opinion in the 1982 Tunisia/Libva case at least 
I. n the large majority of normal cases 198 . The Chamber of the ICJ, in the Gulf of 
Maine case of 1984 validated the possibility of drawing a single boundary for 
different jurisdiction, and affirmed that: 
there is certainly no rule of international law to the contrary, and 
in the present case, there is no material impossiblity in drawing a 
boundary of this kind'99. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ's decisions appear to support the autonomy of the two 
regimes of the EEZ and the continental shelf 00. 
The 1982 Convention, for its part, appears, as pointed out earlier, to 
support this tendencY201 , 
but the relevant provisions relating to the role of the pre- 
existing continental shelf boundary In the EEZ boundary delimitation is unhelpful. 
Article 74(4) of the 1982 Convention reads: 
where there is an agreement in force between the states concerned, 
questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic 
zone shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that 
agreement. 
The ambiguity of the text lies in the phrase "where there is an agreement in force 
between the states concerned')". The question here is what is intended by such an 
agreement? Does the clause refer to an old continental shelf boundary agreement, 
if there is any? Or does it imply the case where there are differences over an 
existing EEZ boundary agreement between the parties concerned? In all cases, it 
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seems that the Convention establishes a legal basis for the use of an old shelf 
boundary line as a relevant factor in delimiting the exclusive economic or fishery 
zones of two adjacent or opposite states. 
As far as Saudi Arabia and Iran are concerned, despite the fact that the 
Iranian Act of 1993 adopting a single boundary both for the EEZ and the 
continental shelf is of a unilateral nature, reflects only the standpoint of Iran on the 
issue and does not. by the nature of thin(-), s, oblige Saudi Arabia, it seems that the C, 
adoption bv the latter of the median line method, touether with its silence and its 
non-coi-nment on the Iranian claim, SL12-0"CSt that the Kingdom, at least, does not 
object to the approach of a single continental shelf/EFZ boundary with Iran. 
Hovv, ever. the acceptance of the "modified inedian line" criterion, previously 
UtIlised in delimiting the continental shelf between the two countries, although it 
will slightly lessen the Saudi fisheries share, especially in the northern sector of the 
boundary, will, on the other hand, avoid the difficulties of implementim,; two 
separate boundaries. Negotiation of a single mantime boundary, which may not 
escape the influence of political factors, is more feasible than that of separate 
boundaries. Further, assuming two separate boundanes may lead to a clash of 
jurisdiction within the same maritime area, but the application of a single boundary 
for both the shelf and the superjacent waters will result in the avoidance of such 
jurisdictional problemS202. 
With Sudan on the Red Sea, the Kingdom, as mentioned above, concluded 
an agreement in 1974 203 for the purpose of exploiting the natural resources of the 
sea-bed and subsoil areas located between their coasts in the Red Sea, though the 
Agreement was merely confined to "natural resources" which comprise according 
to its Article 1(2): 
the non-living substances including the hydrocarbon and the mineral 
resources. 
In other words, the accord has nothing to do with the living resources of the 
prescribed areas. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Sudan has not yet declared an EFZ- Thus, 
until such an action is taken, it still remains to be seen how matters will be solved. 
However, due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has not yet determined its EFZ 
with any of its neighbours, whether in the Arabian Gulf or in the Red Sea, and in 
view of the expected hardship for many Saudi fishermen and those who belong to 
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the other states, if their usual fishing waters are placed in foreign territory and thus 
off-limits, it would be in the interest of all states concerned to enter into fisheries 
arrangements and agreements In which they take into account their jurisdictional 
limits and allow the continuation of the traditional fishing patterns 'in these two 
seas. Although such an approach has been provided for since 1960204 by a number 
of the region's states, it has not yet seen the light of day. 
3.4 Saudi Arabia's EFZ and the Concept of the EEZ 
As seen previously, Saudi Arabia has not yet declared an EEZ, but 
established an EFZ, in 1974. The economic considerations rooted in the special 
dependence of coastal inhabitants upon the resources of the coast are central to the 
basic purpose of Saudi Arabia's claim relating to the EFZ. The question arises 
here, however, as to the extent to which Saudi Arabia's EFZ claim reflects the 
regime of fishery as part of the more comprehensive concept of the EEZ. 1. 
An examination of the 1974 Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
shows the existence of certain legal elements, similar to those in the concept of the 
EEZ, which indicates that the EFZ of Saudi Arabia serves as a functional 
equivalent to the EEZ concept. First of all, amongst the justifications given to the 
issue of the Declaration was the importance of the fish resources as a principal 
component of the diet of the Saudi Arabian people, and as a vital factor for its 
social and economic progress, and further, the need for the protection and prudent 
exploitation of these resources. These considerations are included in the 1982 
United Nations Convention. Article 61(2) of the Convention, which is devoted to 
the "conservation of the living resources"', reads: 
the coastal state ... shall ensure through proper conservation and 
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources 
in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over- 
exploitation. 
In addition, Paragraph 3 of the same Article stipulates that the said 
measures shall aim to: 
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels 
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors, including th 
economic needs of coastal _fishing 
communities and the special 
requirements of'developing states (emphasis added). 
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Thus, both the LOSC and the Saudi Declaration of 1974 emphasise the role of the 
coastal state in conserving and mal III intaining the living resources of the EEZ or the 
EFZ from over-exploitation, and further, both instruments recognise the 
importance of the fish resources for the economic progress of the coastal fishing 
coini-nunities. Secondly, Saudi Arabia, via the 1974 Declaration, maintains her 
sovercign rights over fishing as it provides that: 
lishint! an(l all related activities hi, non-Saudis in the exclusive 
fishing zoiie ai-e prohibited unless pi-ior pet-inission is obtained 205 
. 
1roin the Governinent q1"the Kingdoin qf'Satidi Ai-abia 
Although the Declaration does not include terms, such as exploring, conservation, 
and management, nevertheless, it seems that its adoption of the phrase 6 'all related 
activities", which are subject to Saudi Arabia's exclusive sovereign rights, might 
include sorne or all activities, such as exploring, exploiting, management and 
conservation of living resources in the Saudi EFZ. These provisions are similar to 
those contained in the LOSC, under which, the coastal state in its EEZ is entitled 
to have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting, exploring, managing and 
conserving the living natural resources 206 . 
Thirdly, according to the previous text, 
it is clear that Saudi Arabia recognises, in principle at least, foreign fishing in her 
EFZ, but she makes obtaining permission from the Saudi government a pre- 
condition. These provisions could be viewed as being in line with those included M 
the LOSC, which entitle the coastal state to determine the allowable catch of its 
EEZ living resources 107 . 
Finally, the Declaration provides for non-prejudice of the 
fishing zone status as high seas in accordance with the established principles oJ' 
208 international law . Thus, the 
Declaration does not mention the requirements of 
such status, but the inclusion of the ph-rase "in accordance with the established 
principles of international law" could be interpreted as containing the various 
freedoms referred to in Article 87 of the LOSC, which include the freedom of 
navigation, freedom of overflight, freedom of laying submarine cables and 
pipelines, freedom of the establishment of artificial islands, installations and 
structures, freedom of fishing and the freedom of scientific research. 
Commenting in 1978 on the claims of Iran (1973), Saudi Arabia (1974), 
and Qatar (1974), MacDonald said: 
such actions represent, in effect, the establishment of exclusive 
economic zones in the Persian Guýf andparallel the developments 209 
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
'172 
Of this view also is El-Hakim, who rightly stated that: 
the said states are actually asserting claims which fall into line 
with the exclusive economic . -one concept ... 
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In the light of the above discussion, it may be concluded, therefore, that 
although Saudi Arabia has not declared an EEZ, and instead an EFZ was 
established, she, in practice, and for fishing purposes, exercises a form of EEZ 
jurisdiction,, as provided for under the LOSC exclusive economic regime, without 
formal establishment of an EEZ. 
3.5 The Significance of the EEZ for the Kingdom 
As seen previously, Article 56 of the 1982 Convention gives the coastal 
state sovereignty over living and non-living resources in the EEZ. The coastal 
state also has jurisdiction over the construction of artificial islands and installations, 
marine scientific research, and pollution control. It also has other rights, which 
principally are concurrent with those of the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the 
right of hot pursuit (Article I 11). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, as discussed 
earlier, proclaimed her sovereignty rights over the resources of submarine areas, M 
1949 as to the Arabian Gulf, and in 1968 as to the Red Sea 21 1. The Kingdom also 
established, as mentioned, an EFZ since 1974. The question arises, then, as to the 
significance of establishing an EEZ for Saudi Arabia, a country which, although 
supporting the EEZ concept and having supported, in terms of distance, what was 
to become an irreversible trend, has not as yet made any formal extensive claims to 
one herself. In other words, Will the establishment of an EEZ add anything to the 
already existing Saudi rights relating to the continental shelf and the fishery zones? 
The answer to that question is: yes. As has been concluded earlier, 
although the EEZ concept has passed now into international customary law, the 
rights exercised in the EEZ do not exist ipsofacto and ab initi0212. This means 
that by estbalisl-iing an EEZ, Saudi Arabia, within the limits of this zone, will, first, 
have sovereign rights with regard to all activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents 
and wind. She will also have jurisdictional rights with regard to the establishment 
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research 
and over the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
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Second, in declaring an EEZ, Saudi Arabia will create another legal basis 
for her previous claims concerning 1Ping, and non-living resources, and yet all 
doubts about those claims, especially with regard to her claim over the natural 
resources of the Red Sea, will be removed. 
Third, such an action would place the country on the same footing as its 
maritime neighbours, Qatar, Egypt, Yemen and Iran all of which have declared 
EEZs, and moreover, it would make the nation in confon-nity with the current 
gener, al state practice. 
Fourth, it is expected that such an action may prompt the other states in the 
region, which have not yet declared EEZs to take similar actions, which hopeftilly 
would accelerate the negotiation for delimitation of boundanes between these 
neighbOUring states. Such an action would not only be concerned with the 
delimitation of the fishenes zones, as is the case under the present claim of 1974, 
but it would also provide for the limits of the other jurisdictional areas, such as 
those concerning marine pollution and marine scientific research. 
Fifth, the creation of an EEZ would be a suitable chance for the Kingdom 
to correct the legal status of its EFZ which is considered, under Article 3 of the 
1974 Declaration as part of the "high seas", while under the 1982 Convention, the 
EEZ is regarded as a separate functional zone of a sui generis legal character, 
situated between the territorial sea and the high seaS213 . Finally, 
declaring an EEZ 
would accelerate enactment of regulations which show, in detail, the rights and 
duties of the Kingdom, as well as the rights and duties of the other states in the 
area. In any case, the establishment of an EEZ, even if not beneficial, will not be 
han-nful. Therefore, it seems to be, just a matter of time before the Kingdom 
declares an EEZ. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that as to fishing, Saudi 
Arabia, in her mantime zones, recognises certain rights for others, which are not 
even stipulated by international law itself. Such is the case with foreign fishing in 
the Saudi territonal sea, where, according to international law, Saudi Arabia as a 
coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights including sovereignty over fishery 
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resources. In establisl-iing an EFZ, Saudi Arabia recognises the vital economic 
importance of the area for the coastal state. The Saudi EFZ regulations confonn to 
almost all the fishery provisions of the EEZ laid down in the LOSC. The 
justifications of the Saudi claim of 1974 are similar to those included in the LOSC. 
The Saudi claim confirrns the sovereignty rights of the Kingdom not only over 
fisheries, but also over "related activities" which may include, by implication: 
exploring, exploiting, management and conservation, the activities expressly 
stipulated in the LOSC. Moreover, Saudi Arabia conforms to the LOSC in 
recogising foreign fishing in her EFZ. Indeed, she goes further by recognising 
that even in her territorial sea. Finally, in her EEZ, Saudi Arabia (in a general 
formulation) recognises all the rights of the international community (according to 
international law), something which means recognition of all freedoms of the high 
seas contained in Article 87 of the LOSC. 
On the delimitation question, without any doubt, the geographical 
characteristics of the Red Sea and the Gulf Will inevitably lead to overlapping of 
claims. The inter-relationship between the continental shelf and the EEZ will lead 
to more complexity if Saudi Arabia chooses to declare an EEZ. However, to avoid 
such difficulties , it 
is advisable for the Kingdom and its neighbouring states to 
follow the single mantime boundary concept for the shelf and the EEZ/EFZ. The 
same approach is advisable to be followed even when an old continental shelf 
boundary exists, as is the case with Bahrain and Iran. 
The Kingdom's support for the EEZ concept suggests that she is on her 
way to declaring her own. However, when doing so, Saudi Arabia will have to re- 
examine the adequacy of her regulations on fishing. In particular, the permission of 
fishing in the Saudi territorial sea would have to be confined to local fishing. It 
should take into account the needs of the fishing industry and should maximise 
economic benefits in favour of the Saudi people. Proper management of the EEZ 
would also require the monitoring of all activities in the zone, such as entry, 
commencement of fishing, cessation and departure. In brief, Saudi Arabia should 
lay down detailed rules, which show its rights and duties, as well as the rights and 
duties of the others in its EEZ, taking into account the provisions of the 1982 
Convention. All these considerations are relevant when negotiating such bilateral 
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or international fishing agreements as will become necessary in the event of a Saudi 
proclamation of an EEZ. 
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Chapter VI 
Marine Scientific Research 
Introduction 
The increasing importance of the ocean to man renders marine scientific 
research (referred to hereafter as MSR) as a factor of vital significance since it is 
the means whereby the hidden resources of the sea have been discovered. 
Adequate and effective scientific research is a basic precondition for the rational 
exploitation of the sea's resources. It serves a wide variety of purposes. For 
example, exploitation of offshore oil is possible only where the necessary 
geological research has been carried out to locate oil fields. The harvesting of a 
particular stock of fish at levels which do not lead to overfishing can be achieved 
only if there is constant monitoring of the size of and recruitment to the stock. The 
study of waves, currents, the seabed and weather helps to make navigation safer. 
Also, the study of climatic changes, which is perhaps the most "international" issue 
of our time, represents a great help in avoiding the potentially catastrophic impact 
on the wealth of species and ecosystems in general2. MSR is the key to the 
preservation of the marine environment as a whole. It also helps to tell us more 
about the earth generally. Furthermore, it may also be more or less directly tinked 
to nulitary uses of the sea, by trying, for example, to improve the ability to detect 
submanneS3 . However, despite these 
facts, MSR has only relatively recently 
become an area of concern to students and practitioners of ocean law and politics, 
and until relatively recently, no international legal regulations governed its conduct. 
Like many other states, Saudi Arabia has not demonstrated any concern 
with this aspect of the law of the sea until very recently, perhaps because of the 
lack of her own capability, as a developing nation, for MSR. 
This Chapter is divided into two parts. Part I examines the legal 
development of the MSR concept, with particular reference to the scope of the 
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competence to conduct it under the 1982 United Nations Convention. Part 11 
begins by considering the institutional setting of MSR in Saudi Arabia. It then 
goes on to examine the Saudi Arabian policies regarding MSR, with the aim of 
finding out the extent of confon-nity between the Saudi practice and the current 
international lecral regime. n Z=ý 
Part 1: Marine Scientific Research in International Perspective 
1. Definition and Types of MSR 
Before examining the legal development of MSR, it is logical to shed light n 
upon the rneaning of the term. The 1982 United Nations Convention does not 
contain a definition of manne scientific research. In a general concept, the term 
46man*ne scientific research" is used to refer to scientific investigation, however and 
wherever conducted, having the marine environment as object4. Characterized in 
terms of its immediate objective, oceanic research has been classified into three 
broad cate(TorieS5 : First: pure research (known also as basic or fundamental). This 
type was defined by Schaefer in his capacity as an expert at the 1958 First United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, as: scientific study intended to add to 
the sum of human knowledge about the world, regardless of its application'. 
Schaefer defined oceanography as the scientific study of ocean basins, the ocean 
and its contents. He further subdivided it into four parts: (a) physical 
oceanography, which deals with waves, tides, currents, magnetism, heat exchange, 
etc.; (b) chemical oceanography, which involves the study of the chemistry of the 
complex mixture of substances in the sea's waters; (c) marine biology, which 
involves the study of plant and animal organisms in the sea; (d) submarine geology, 
which includes the geology of the sea bottom, the study of sedimentation 
processes, etc. Oceanography also includes the study of phenomena outside the 
oceans, such as meteorology'. 
The second type is referred to as applied research, which refers to research 
undertaken primarily for specific practical purposesg, motivated by 
hopes of 
financial gain9. 
The third type is nulitary research, the objective of which is strategic. This 
kind of research will have incidental social and economic 
implications, if not 
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immediately, at least in the long term". However, it should be noted that activities 
such as military intelligence, testing of new weapons or military instruments, or the 
gathering in the marine environment of any other data not related to the marine 
environment are not considered to be marine scientific research". 
2. Legal Development of MSR 
The origins of the age of ocean discovery can be traced back to the second 
half of the last century, to the famous voyages of the Challenger exploration 
expedition in the Atlantic between 1872-1876 12 . The nineteenth-century freedom 
of the seas eased the marine scientists' task *in collecting their data and samples 
beyond the narrow territorial waters of the coastal state; rather, within the maritime 
belt and even the internal waters of a foreign state, permission was readily 
obtained. In many cases the scientists involved reported on their task to their 
counterparts in the state concerned, rather than to the government of that state 13. 
This situation, however, has changed greatly in the present century, particularly 
since the end of World War 11. Thus, freedom to conduct marine scientific 
research around the world, characterized by the Wilkes expedition, the Challenger 
expedition, the voyages of the Albatross, the Carnegie, or the Meteor has been 
inexorably reduced as part of the contemporary political and legal phenomenon of 
coastal states asserting claims to jurisdiction over wide areas of world oceans and 
the seabed 14 . 
Nevertheless, until the middle of the twentieth century, no legal 
controls on the conduct of MSR were perceived to be necessary, nor did the law of 
the sea literature up to that time contain any real mention of it". Within the past 
three decades or so, this situation of "non-regime" has been replaced by 
increasingly complex national and international regulations. This may be ascribed 
to a number of reasons, such as the increased capability of making use of the 
ocean9s economic potential; the growing awareness by developing coastal states of 
the importance of MSR; the expanded scale of research; the new technologies 
available to carry out research; and the increase in use and utilization of the sea M 
general 16 . These 
factors necessitated the inclusion of controls on MSR first in the 
289 
1958 Geneva Conventions, and more extensively later on in the 1982 United 
Nations Convention. 
The focus of discussion on MSR, whether in the International Law 
Commission's debates or at UNCLOS I or UNCLOS 111, was on the scope of the 
competence to conduct the research. Generally speaking, there is on the one hand, 
the group of developed countries, which, with advanced research capabilities, have 
advocated unrestricted freedom of oceanic research in areas under coastal state 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the coastal developing countries. while 
recognizing their interests in, and importance of marine scientific research, have 
insisted that it should be subjected to reaulation, a view prompted by their 
suspicions of the underlying motives of developed states' 7. 
The question was first explicitly dealt with in the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf (CSC), but the relevant provi II isions therein are limited to 
conducting MSR on the continental shelf of the coastal state. Demands for 
international regulation of MSR voiced chiefly by the developing nations, 
culminated at UNCLOS 111. As a result of the demands of these countries, which 
were concerned about their security and the impact of research by developed 
countries in their fishing zones, a comprehensive legal regime of MSR was 
introduced as Part XIII (Articles 238-265) of the LOSC covering all portions of 
the ocean , including internal waters, territorial sea, 
EEZ, archipelagic waters, 
straits used for international navigation, the continental shelf beyond 200 miles, the 
"Area", and the high seas 18 . 
3. Scope of the Competence to Conduct MSR under the Current Lggal 
Rep-ime 
Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, the high seas are 
defined as: 
all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in 
the internal waters of a state'9. 
Marine research has generally been considered as one of the high seas freedoms, 
although it is not mentioned as such under the Convention 
20 
. The said 
freedoms, 
however, are stated not to be exhaustive. It has been argued that scientific 
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research is one of the "other freedoms" mentioned in the LOSC, and should be 
equally recognized and safeguarded, like the other freedoms of the high seas. 
Furthermore, scientists need maximurn access to all parts of the oceans, otherwise, 
in view of the physical, chemical and biological interactions in the marine 
environment, scientific research would be incomplete and superficial2 1. In its 
commentary on what became eventually Article 2 of the High Seas Convention, the 
ILC mentioned MSR as an example of a freedom not referred to in the Article 22 
Under the LOSC, the high seas were redefined to include: 
all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in 
the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state 23 . 
According to this definition, wide areas of the seas regarded as part of the high 
seas under the HSC, came under the jurisdiction of the coastal state under the 
LOSC which, as expressly stated: 
shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea ... 
24 
. 
Marine research has been explicitly recognized in the new regime as an unrestricted 
high-sea freedoM25. 
Within the other maritime zones, the coastal state authority over marine 
research varies. MSR is restricted or prohibited in the zones closer to the coast, 
i. e. international waters and territorial sea, and regulated or controlled in the zones 
receding from the coast, i. e. the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. 
3.1 Internal Waters 
The internal waters comprise those waters which lie within the baselines of 
the territorial sea". To many scientists, particularly biologists, the coastal areas are 
the most interesting part of the ocean 27 . However, the 
Law of the Sea 
Conventions make no mention of marine research in the internal waters. But, as 
previously discussed in Chapter 1128, over these waters, the coastal state has M 
territorial sovereignty. Only one exception has been imposed, that is with regard to 
the right of innocent passage, where the use of straight baselines would enclose as 
internal waters areas which had not been regarded as such previously. Therefore, 
apart from this exception, access to the internal waters of a coastal state, for 
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whatever reason, includina carrying Out marine research, subject to the consent 
Of SLIch a state. 
3.2 Territorial Sea 
As is vvell known, except for the ri(, )-lit of innocent passage of third states, 
the coastal state has full sovereignity on its territorial sea 19 . The TSC makes no 
reference to research in the territorial sea, but, as a result of the said rule, it is not 
SUI-PrISIM-1 that marine research within the territorial sea is totally at the discretion 
of the coastal state as an expression of its ftill sovereignty. This principle. 
howc%, cr. has been expressly Stipulated under the LOSC, which grants the coastal 
state an exclusive right to regulate, authorize and conduct marine research in its 
territorial sea The question, however, arises whether the exercise of the rigrht of 
innocent passa(-), e includes the right to carry Out certain research activities during 
the passage. The TSC says nothing about the subject, but the wording of Article 17) 11 I- 4-: ) 
14 of the Convention on the definition of innocent passage, suggests that such Z: ) 
passage does not include the right to conduct research". The LOSC, for its part, 
has expressly confin-ned the coastal state's authority to conduct research in its 
territorial sea. Under Article 245, the state is free to authorize, to prohibit, or to 
impose conditions on any MSR activity, whether by its own nationals or by other 
states. Unlike the TSC, the LOSC has affin-ned the fact that the carrying out of 
research or survey activities while exercising the right of innocent passage Will 
render such passage as non-innocent3 2. In this respect, Churchill and Lowe 
correctly argue that: 
... whatever the 
form of research it would always take the vessel 
outside the concept of "passage , 33 . 
3.3 Continental Shelf and the EEZ 
The continental shelf, together with the EEZ are most important for marine 
research and are subject to a complex regime 34 . On the 
basis of the reported 
geological and geographical locations, research on and above the shelf is estimated 
35 
to constitute 50 per cent of all oceanic research 
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Customary international law is rooted in the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, which contains two specific direct provisions on MSR. The 
Convention, in Article 5, (1) provides in general terms that: 
The exploration ofthe continental shelf and the exploitation of its 
natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable intelference 
with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources 
oj' the sea, nor result in any interftrence with fundamental 
oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the 
intention oj'open publication. 
Qualifying the previous words, Paragraph 8 of the same Article reads: 
The consent oJ'the coastal state shall be obtained in respect of an: y 
research concerning the continental she4f and undertaken there. 
Nevertheless, the coastal state shall not normally withhold its 
consent ýf'the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a 
view to pureh, scientific research into the phýysical or biological 
ch a racteris tics qf'the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that 
the coastal state shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate 
or to be represented in the research, and that in anýv event the 
results shall be published. 
The examination of the said provisions reveals the existence of a number of 
problems. First, there is no consistency between the wording of the two 
Paragraphs: I and 8 of Article 5. VVhile Paragraph I provides for non-interference 
with research on the continental shelf, Paragraph 8 emphasises the requirement of 
the coastal stateýs consent. As noted by Soons, this formulation, it appears, was an 
attempt at compromise among the different positions and proposals at UNCLOS 
136 , otherwise, how can it be explained that on the one 
hand, any interference with 
research is prohibited, wIffle on the other hand, the coastal state's consent is 
stipulated as a precondition for research on the continental shelf? 
Secondly, it is to be noted that, although the coastal state's consent was put 
as a precondition for conducting the research, the "physical" scope of such 
research is not clear. Two interpretations are possible for the phrase "research 
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there"'). One is that the consent is 
only required where the research both concerns the shelf and is physically 
undertaken on it, i. e. on the seabed 37 . 
Another interpretation is that the said phrase 
embraces, and hence, the coastal state consent is required for, all research 
concerning the shelf, whether conducted on the seabed or in the water volume 
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above the continental shelf. As noted by Soons, the practice of states parties to the 
CSC, although not conclusive. seems to be in line with the second interpretation 38 . 
Thirdly, the inclusion of the ten-n "non-nally" in the text is misleading, since 
no criterion or criteria were adopted, for a request to be considered by the coastal 
state as normal or otherwise. 
Fourth, reference was made to a "qualified institution", but no guidelines 
for an institution to be regarded as qualified were (given. 
Fifth, a reference was made to "pure" research, but the meaning of such 
research %vas left v, a(. )-Lie. 
Sixth, the text indicates the coastal state's right to participate or to be 
represented in the research, but the nature and limitations of such activities have 
not been clarified, nor is it clear what kind Of results must be published. 
However, apart from these ambi(Y-Llities included in the said provisions. It) 
there is an even greater difficulty with regard to the definition given to the term t) t: ) I 
-continental shelf' in the Convention itself. The Convention, as discussed in 
Chapter IV39, left the limit seaward of the continental shelf in serious doubt. While 
it specified the seaward limit of the shelf to a depth of 200 metres of water, it 
added: 
or beyond that limit to vvhere the depth of the superjacent water 
adinits of' the exploitation qf the natural resources of the said 
40 
areas 
Thus, the extent of a state's continental shelf depends - to a great extent - on its 
technological capability and the restrictions on the freedom of research on the shelf 
vary in consequence. 
Under the LOSC, more concern has been given to the authority over MSR 
in the EEZ and on the continental shelf, than in other maritime zones, and there are 
more detailed provisions in respect of these two zones. The general framework of 
the LOSC "consent regime" is contained in Article 246. The Convention maintains 
the consent regime with respect to the conduct of scientific research on the 
continental shelf and in the EEZ, and such consent can be express or implied 
4 
Moreover, on the continental shelf and in the EEZ, the coastal state 
has the right to 
regulate, authorize and conduct research, but in accordance with the relevant 
42.3 
provisions of the Convention Paragraph 3 of Article 246 provides that: 
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coastal states shall, in normal circumstances, grant their consent 
Jbr marine scienti/ic research projects by other states or competent 
i. nternational organl'7ations in their exclusive economic zone or on 
their continental sheýf to he carried out in accordance with this 
Convention exclusively for peaceful putposes and in order to 
increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the 
benefit of all mankind. To this end, coastal states shall establish 
rules and procedures ensuring that such consent will not be 
delayed or denied unreasonably. 
This Paragraph, however 
, is a source of potential disputes. Several phrases 
in this context could be subject to different interpretations by the countries 
concerned. It is not clear, for example, which circumstances are "normal" and 
which are "abnormal", and yet what may be regarded as normal in the viewpoint of 
a researching state, may be treated as abnormal on the part of some coastal state. 
Thus, the coastal state may deny or delay a foreign country's request to carry out 
research on the basis of "special circumstances", such as national securitv 
considerations. It has been argued that the coastal state, for the validity of its 
refusal to grant consent, must demonstrate the non-existence of such 
circumstances 43 . However, the language of the LOSC 
does not provide a great 
deal of help to the researching state. Article 297(2) of the Convention allows the 
coastal state to refuse to submit such a dispute to dispute settlement; rather, the 
coastal state, pending settlement of a dispute, has full right to prevent the state or 
competent international organization, authorized to conduct the MSR project from 
commencing or continuing such a project44. Even Paragraph 4 of Article 246, 
which is seemingly intended to be interpretative of Paragraph 3, is not without 
ambiguity. It provides that normal circumstances may exist, despite the absence of 
diplomatic relations between the coastal state and the researching state. It has been 
correctly argued that: 
the absence of diplomatic relations should be a reflection of the 
existence between the two states involved of political relations of 
such a nature that the coastal state could not reasonably be 
expected to grant consent. An obvious example would be a 
situation of'imminent danger of armed conflicý'. 
Moreover, the phrase "exclusively for peaceful purposes" could be a 
disputed area of interpretation by the countries concerned. It is not easy to draw a 
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clear line between research for "exclusively peaceful purposes" and other research. 
Therefore, it was stated that: 
when the pi-qje(-, t mereýv has potential militarv application 
however, the determinatio n becomes prohlematic 
, because tile 
sweepingy language q1' the [wicl] provision qfftrs no dec-I'Sional 
()-itidelines. Morcovel-, - (ý5 Inclusion o. 1' the "peacoid purposes lanItyziage in Article [-146(3)] is pcrplcxin, (, - in light ofthe general 
[LOSCI principle prohibitim)-scientific activities ol'a non-peacq1111 
These terms are indeed open to dispute. especially in light of the fact that 
ktioNviedge in many cases may be used both for peaceful and non-peaceful 
PLII-POSeS. 
Another difficulty of interpretation concerns the phrase "for the benefit of 
all mankind" [emphasis added]. In the absence of clear guidance as to how to 
determine whether the research is beneficial to all mankind, the coastal state may, if I 
unwilling to have a research project conducted In its EEZ or on its continental 
shelf, argue that such a project is not to the benefit of its people as part of 
ý4 mankind". According to Yusuf: 
ýI'ihe criterion tbr ascertaining pure research is the language oj' 
Article [246(3)], that is that the activitv, seeks to contribute to 
man's knowledge ol'the maritime environment for the benefit of 
all, then such an ascertainment inevitably becomes high4v 
subjective and imprecise". 
A further problem concerning another interpretation question falls in the 
provision requiring the coastal state to establish rules and procedures which ensure 
that its consent is not to be "delayed or denied unreasonably". The question which 
arises here is, what is the criterion that makes a procedure reasonable or not? In 
other words, for how long, or for what reason, is it "reasonable" for a research 
demand to be delayed or rejected? 
On the other hand, the 1982 Convention has specifically limited the 
circumstances under which consent may be withheld to cases where the research is 
of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources 
within 200 miles from shore; where the research involves artificial islands, shelf 
drilling, or use of environmentally harmful substances; or the researcher submits 
inaccurate information 
48 
. It appears that it is the coastal state which 
decides the 
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existence of such circumstances. This position, together with the absence of any 
guidance, could lead to abuse on the part of the coastal state. For example, there is 
no criterion upon which it is to be decided which project is of "direct significance 
for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources", or which substances are 
hannful and which are not. Similarly, who is to judge, and on what basis, the 
accuracy or otherwise of the information submitted by the researching state? 
However, despite the imprecision of the above provisions, state practice 
supports the conclusion that the LOSC consent regime for research in the EEZ and 
on the continental shelf is now part of customary international law'9. Most marine 
scientists believe that their research would be facilitated under the LOSC 
provisions'O. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the whole scientific research 
regime, including the consent regime as laid down in Part XIII of the LOSC, 
consists merely of general principles, which leave various issues subject to different 
interpretations, and do not, unfortunately, resolve many problems that may arise 
over conducting scientific research in the oceans. Therefore, the international 
community is in need of a special convention on this subject, seeking guidance 
from the 1982 United Nations Convention. 
Part 11: Saudi Arabia and Marine Scientific Research 
As a developing nation, Saudi Arabia does not have a significant capability 
for marine scientific research. Nonetheless, the importance of marine research for 
Saudi Arabia is growing steadily, not only because Saudi Arabia is surrounded by 
the ocean in two directions, but also because of its great marine resources, 
particularly oil and gas, and special environmental concerns. The fact that Saudi 
Arabia has limited facilities for conducting MSR in its own right has meant that 
foreign nations have featured in researching Saudi waters. In the Arabian Gulf, the 
scientific activities are associated with the discovery of oil and gas, which began in 
the early decades of this century. In the Red Sea, these activities are associated 
with the discovery of the metallifereous sediments, which came following the 
discovery M 1948 by the Swedish vessel, Albati-oss, of abnormally high- 
temperatures and salinities in near-bottom water. 
51 Saudi statistics show, however, 
that a few foreign applications were submitted to the competent authonties. In the 
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last ten years or so, MSR permission was given to seven foreign research cruises. 
while five other requests were denied". The areas of research in these applications 
have ranged from fisheries and marine biology to oceanography, geolou)-y. and 
hydrography. Before examining the Saudi Arabian legal position toward MSR. it is 
instructive first to throw light upon the scientific policies and institutional 
structures in Saudi Arabi I a with regard to MSR. 
I. Scientific Policies and Institutional Settin 
In Saudi Arabia, scientific investigation and research are always associated 
with iiationil economic and social policies and state plans. In the statement of the 
Planning, N/Imistryý 3 released following the annOLIncement of the recent Si 1ý 1 1. 
ixth 5- 
Year Development Plan 1415-1420 AH [ 1995-2000], it was stated that one of the 
Plan's goals, is: 
The inotivating oj*scientýfic activl(v ancl cultia-al and infbi-mation 
17101'07107t tO the level qj'the Kingdoin c1civIopinent. 
Elsewhere in the Statement, one of the fundamental goals of higher education was zn 
said to be: 
Pla 
- 
ving a positive role in the scientyiC research arena which 
dh-CCI`ýI' contributes in thefields oj'science, technology and arts, 
and 
' 
finds suitable solutionsfor the requirements of economic and 
social Iýtý and its technological directions 
54 
. 
Thus, it is clear that progress in science and technology in Saudi Arabia has been 
linked with economic and social policies, and it has been highlighted by successive 
state plans. 
In Saudi Arabia, the responsibility for marine investigation is shared among 
a variety of goverm-nental institutions, agencies, research units, and university 
laboratories. The most important of these bodies, however, are the Faculty of 
Marine Sciences (affiliated to King Abdulaziz Umversity)55, the Research Institute 
(affiliated to King Fahd University of Petroleum and MineraIS)56, the Ministry of 
Defence and Aviation, represented in the Meteorological and Environmental 
Protection Administration (MEPA)57, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
represented in the Ministry Agency for FisherY5 8, the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Minerals, and King Abdulaziz Centre for Science and Technology". 
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Since the founding of Saudi Arabia in 1932, marine scientific research and 
investigation have been conducted with emphasis, in the early years, on the 
exploration of oil, gas and minerals, along with fisheries and the protection of the 
maritime environment in recent years. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saudi 
Arabia's marine scientific research activities have expanded further to include 
Antarctica and the North Pole. In the period between September 1989 and April 
1990, certain Saudi scholars joined others from France, US, the former Soviet 
Union, UK and China in their journey of exploration to Antarctica6O. Between 30 
July 1990 and 17 August 1990, a Saudi mission joined other missions from 
Germany, Australia, Canada, the fon-ner Soviet Union, Switzerland, France, 
Finland and US in an exploratory expedition to the North Pole". In another 
instance of international marine scientific co-operation, some Saudi environmental 
experts have been engaged in the conduct of a number of marine research 
expeditions, jointly with their counterparts from Japan and the GCC States in the 
Arabian Gulf following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These activities were aimed 
at finding out the effects of the oil spill, resulting fTom the warfare, over marine 
species 12 . Nevertheless, the great significance of the sea, particularly with regard 
to the considerations of economy and secunty, makes it necessary for Saudi Arabia 
to develop considerably its manne scientific research capabilities and to engage 
increasingly in co-operative manne scientific research, both at the regional and 
global levels. 
The importance of MSR has increased in Saudi Arabia, and more 
infon-nation regarding various uses of the ocean is required by a variety of 
c, overnmental bodies. For instance the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals needs 
more information about the Saudi maritime zones in order to conduct offshore oil, 
gas, and minerals exploration and exploitation activities. In order to help increase 
fisheries production, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water needs information 
about fishery resources and fishing grounds. For safer navigation of its ships, the 
Ministry of Defence needs information about the hydrological conditions of the 
ocean. In order to help protect the maritime environment in the Arabian Gulf and 
the Red Sea, MEPA is in need of systematic data and basic information about the 
sources of marine pollution and the degrees of damage in polluted areas, and so on. 
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Therefore, Saudi Arabia needs to consider the possibility of acceding to 
international organizations, directly concerned with manne science, such as the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, International 
Association of the Physical Sciences of the Ocean, International Hydrographic 
Organization. and World Data Centre (Oceanography). 
2. Saudi Arabia's Let! al Position 
The Saudi attitude toward the legal reuprne of marine scientific research was 
shaped chiefly by the concepts of sovereignty and security. At UNCLOS 111, Saud' I: ) ýI 
Arabia did not take an individual position, but her views were collectively 
expressed through the Group of 77, which was in favour of the requirement of 
coastal state consent for all marine scientific research conducted m the econoi-nic 
zone and on the continental shelf, and ftill control to be exercised by the 
International Seabed Authority over marine scientific research in the international 
seabed area" 
Within the national context, the Saudi legal position on marine scientific 
research has only recently been expressed through her own regulations. On 2 
February 1993, Saudi Arabia issued, in a relatively late step, the Marine Scientific 
Research Regulations In the Marine Territories of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(referred to hereafter as RMSR), as the latest in the series of legislations related to 
the law of the sea 64 . 
As is clear, the Regulations which took effect since the date 
of issue, have been passed eleven years after the LOSC was opened for signature, 
but clearly, they were passed in order to give effect to the relevant provisions of 
the Convention. 
2.1 Research Jurisdictional Zones in the Saudi Legislation 
Article I of RMSR, which speaks of the scope of application, makes no 
specific mention of the different maritime areas where the Regulations should take 
effect. Instead, the Article, in general terms, stipulates that the Regulations are to 
apply to the "maritime zones", which have been defined to include: 
all marine territories under the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia or 
under its regional jurisdiction in the Red Sea and Arabian guýf in 
accordance with the regulations applicable in the Kingdom ... 
" 
300 
However, the employment of the terrn "sovereignty") is understood to refer 
inclusively to the areas over which Saudi Arabia claims sovereignty, i. e. the 
territorial sea", while the term "jurisdiction" refers to the areas of the continental 
shelf and the exclusive fishery zones, where Saudi Arabia has declared its 
jurisdictional rightS67 . Although the Kingdom, as discussed earlier in Chapter V, 
has not declared an EEZ of its own, it is to be noted that the Saudi MSR municipal 
legislation was drafted in terms similar to those of the LOSC concerning the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf This seems to reflect the desire 
of the Saudi legislator to give effect to the LOSC's marine scientific research 
provisions in the continental shelf and exclusive fishery zones, and further, it may 
suggest the Kingdom is in the process of declaring an EEZ. 
2.2 Notification Regime 
The R-MSR stresses the consent regime when it states that : 
1. Marine scientific research regulations, licensing, processing 
and controlling it in marine territories are the sole right of the 
Kingdom; 
2. No marine scientific reserach shall be conducted in marine 
territories except by an explicit licence issued in accordance 
with the provisions of these regulations ... 
68 
Three conditions were laid down for granting such a licence: 
a. It is intendedfor peaceful purposes only. 
b. No harm is caused to other legal users ofseas. 
C. Marine scientific research activities in the marine territories 
shall notform a legal or actual basis of claim for any party of 
the marine environment or resourceS69. 
Thus, as In the case of some other nations 
70 
, 
by the adoption of the 
&4 qualified" consent regime, Saudi Arabia follows the spirit of the 1958 regime as 
constituting customary international law, as well as the updated and more 
detailed 
MSR regime in the LOSC 71 , except 
in that the RMSR emphasises the expressness 
of the permission obtained, without making any reference to the so-called', implied 
consent" stipulated in Article 252 of the LOSC. 
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Moreover, the Saudi legislation tallies nearly verbatim with the provisions 
of Article 246(5), (7) and (8) as to the situations where the coastal state has the 
right to refrain from granting consent. In this respect, Article 4 of the RMSR 
requires the Department of Military Survey not to grant its consent for conductina 
MSR if- 
it is proved that the would-he lic-cl7sce has submitted jalse 
iqýbnnation or ij'such research ma. i, cinall, for example, ani, o f the 
a. Direct effict on the exploration and utilization o live or other 
natural resources. 
1). Dccp drilling over the COIW17071(11 shc4. ' 
c. USc ofexplosives that mav aftýct live or other resources. 
d. Introduction ofiteins harii? fid to the marine environment. 
e. C017StrUC'tiO1I oj'artýficial islands or pcrmanent installations or 
fticiliticS. 
f Prýjudice to the rights of the Kingdom over its marine 
territories. 
Clearly, when forinulating the above provisions, the Saudi legislator 
considered as guidance the provisions laid down in the LOSC. However, the Saudi 
legislator has gone beyond the LOSC's provisions by listing the previous cases 
only as examples. The phrase "for example" included in Article 4(l) of the RMSR 
is redundant, since the same Article mentions the "breach of the Kingdom's rights 
over her maritime zones 11 as one reason for refusal to grant consent. This general 
wording enables the competent authority to refrain from giving its consent for the 
conduct of MSR on the grounds that such research would infringe any of the 
Kingdom's rights in any of her maritime zones 
inclusion of the phrase "for example" in the text. 
2.2.1 Process of Application 
Thus, there is no need for the 
The mechanics of processing applications in Saudi Arabia is very 
sophisticated. The governmental body in charge of organizing MSR activities has 
recently started using a standardised application form of its own devising, which 
leave no scope for the state making the request to get away with supplying 
inadequate information. The form contains forty questions to be answered by the 
applicant. It requires infon-nation on all aspects of the research, including the 
research itself and the body standing behind it, the research area and the Saudi 
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ports to which access may be needed, the research equipment, the research vessel, 
the persons participating in the research, the Kingdom's participation in the 
research activities, and her rights if she wishes to participate. It also makes clear 
that the Kingdom is to be provided with preliminary reports and with a report on 
the final results of the research. However, the said application form, is no more 
than a practical translation of all conditions and requirements laid down 'in the 
Saudi legislation and the LOSC. 
2.2.2 Channels of Communication 
As far as the official channels for processing and considering research 
applications are concerned, it has been stipulated in the RMSR that: 
I. Upon application oJ'the provisions of these regulations on a 
marine scienti/ic reserach project carried out by foreign 
governmental vessels or international organizations vessels, all 
communications shall be made and all applications shall be 
submitted and notifications shall be served through diplomatic 
72 channels 
In practice, however, the system now is that all applications go initially to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thence, they are sent to the competent governmental 
body, i. e. the Department of Military Survey (DMS) 73 , which sends them, in turn, 
to the interested Government departments, such as the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Minerals, Ministry of Agriculture and Water, MEPA, and so on. All these 
interested departments and bodies may make observations on an application to the 
Department of Military Survey, which has the right to make its decision on the 
matter. The Department informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of its decision and 
the Ministry then sends official notification to the applicant. 
As to the body which is authorized to receive research applications, there 
seem to be contradictions here, since Article 14, on the one hand, requires, as 
mentioned earlier, that all applications should be submitted through diplomatic 
channels, which means that the first contact must be through the departments of 
foreign affairs in both the Kingdom and the applicant's state; while, according to 
Article 5, on the other hand, the application is to be submitted to the competent 
authority intended to be DMS. One possible interpretation of this contradiction is 
that the "competent authority" mentioned in Article 5 refers to the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs, but in Article 2(5), the "competent authority" has been defined as 
the Department of Military Survey. Another possible interpretation is that the 
66competent authority" referred to in Article 5 is still the DMS, and yet, the 
requirement of the period of time, between the research application date. and its 
expected starting date74 presumably refers to the time between receipt of the 
application by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the actual starting date of the 
research. 
However, the stipulation in the RMSR that applications should go "through 
diplornatic channels" complies with Article 250 of the LOSC, which says that: 
connimnications concerning marine scientýfic projects shall he 
inade through appropriate channels, unless otherwise agreed. 
Nevertheless, there is some confusion in the RMSR formula, a matter which has to 
be taken into account by the Ministry of Defence, the Governmental body 
75 
authorized to issue interpretations of the RMSR 
On the other hand,, the Saudi legislation assumes the possibility of granting 
consent to conduct MSR in the Kingdom's maritime zones to states which have no 
diplornatic relations with her. This can be inferred from Article 14(2), of the 
RMSR, which provides that: 
States which have no diplomatic missions in the Kingdom shall be 
contacted through the channels that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs may determine proper. 
This goes in line with Article 246(4) of the LOSC, which assumes the existence of 
"non-nal circumstances" where the coastal state's consent is granted even in the 
absence of diplomatic relations between such a state and the applicant state. 
2.3 Particular Saudi Reguirements for MSR Cruises 
In essence, the Saudi Arabian legislation requirements follow very closely 
the LOSCs provisions for the most part as to the following aspects. 
2.3.1 A Time Limit for Application 
On this point the Saudi regulations have laid down more details than are 
contained in the LOSC. According to the latter, for research in the EEZ and on 
the continental shelf, applications of a coastal state are required to be submitted: 
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not less than six months in advance of the expected starting date of 
the marine scientific research project". 
The RMSR, on the other hand, distinguish between four cases: the first is when the 
applicant is a Saudi national, the second is when the applicant is non-Saudi, the 
third is when the applicant is non-Saudi, but entering into a contract with a Saudi 
goverm-nentat body or a Saudi national, and finally when the research project is 
intended to be conducted jointly between Saudi nationals and others of a different 
nationality". The minimum time has been set under the RMSR as follows: 
1. The licence application shall be submitted to the pertinent authority at least 
sixty days prior to the date specified for the commencement of marine scientific 
research activities if the applicant is holding a Saudi nationality and at least six 
months if the applicant is a non-Saudi. 
2. Non-Saudi persons under contracts with a governmental agency in the 
Kingdom or with a Saudi person shall submit the licence application through 
the said goverm-nental agency or Saudi person at least ninety days prior to the 
date specified for the commencement of research activities. 
3. The licence application shall be submitted at least six months prior to the date 
of commencement of research activities if the proposed marine scientific 
research is a joint venture between Saudi and non-Saudi personS78. 
Thus, while the RMSR tally exactly with the initial wording of Article 248 of the 
LOSC as to the category of non-Saudi applicants, the Saudi municipal legislation, 
by creating three further categories, has incorporated certain elements which do 
not exist in the LOSC. The more restrictive Saudi position with regard to 
foreign 
applicants reflects the great concern of the Saudi Government over the security 
factor, since the Saudi legislator seemingly has presumed less security 
dangers 
where there is a national element. However, in that, the Saudi practice 
does not 
raise a discrimination issue. The "six months rule" is, as seen above, 
fully 
respected in the Saudi legislation. The preferential rights granted 
by Saudi Arabia 
to certain categories concerning the application time limit fall within 
its sovereignty 
as there is no rule of international law that prevents any state 
from granting 
preferential nghts to whomsoever it desires, as long as such practice 
does not 
breach international law. 
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2.3.2 Saudi Participation in the Research Activities 
Article 249(l)(a) of the LOSC provides for the coastal state's participation 
in the research project on board the vessel or the research installations "when 
practicable". Benefiting, seemingly, from this position, the Saudi RMSR confirms 
the nomination of scientists, experts, and technicians to join the research activities 
in co-ordination with the relevant governmental bodies. It is the responsibility of 
the participators to submit a report to the DMS about their participation'9. 
Elsewhere, it was stipulated, that among the obligations imposed on the applicant 
for a licence is that such applicant should: 
provide suitable places in the marine scientific research vessel or 
vessels to receive the person that the pertinent authority may elect 
to escort the research teamso. 
The latter Saudi requirement, it could be argued, goes beyond what is set out in the 
LOSC. According to the latter, the coastal state has full right to: 
participate or be represented in the marine scientific research 
project, especially on board research vessels and other craft or 
scientific research installations, when practicable8'. 
From this wording, it is clear that the said coastal state right is not absolute. 
In addition, the word "practicable" is misleading, since what may be viewed as 
practicable by the researching state, could be ruled otherwise by the coastal state. 
However, despite the omission of this phrase, the Saudi legislation is still within the 
spirit of the LOSC's provisions which grant the coastal state full right to organise 
MSR in its maritime zones (see Articles 245 and 246). 
2.3.3 The Research Project Detaffs 
The LOSC requires the research applicant to provide in advance, 
information on the nature and objectives of the project, the method and means to 
be used, including the name, tonnage, type and class of vessel, a description of 
scientific equipment, the precise geographical area, the expected 
date of first 
appearance and final. departure, and sponsoring institute and the person 
in charge 
of the project, and the extent of the coastal state's participation 
8'. All these 
matters were included in the Draft Articles and the Revised 
Draft Articles 
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submitted by Colombia and Iraq respectively to UNCLOS III on behalf of the 
Group of 77, to which Saudi Arabia belongs 83 - The Saudi legislation has dealt with 
these issues in further detail. Article 6 of the RMSR reads: 
The marine scientific research licence a lication shall include Pp 
copies of the research projects intended to be carried out, 
containing theJbIlowing information: 
1. An introduction to the person who will cariy out the research 
along with his previous activities, places of work andforeign 
parties with which he worked in similar projects. 
2. Stating qf'the agency responsiblefor the project and sources of 
JUnds. 
3. Stating names of the research team members and names of 
assistant technicians along with their specialities, experiences 
and nationalities. 
4. Research project nature, programme, objective and completion 
period. 
5. An accurate geographical demarcation of the marine 
territories where the research will take place. 
6. Scientific and technical methods and means intended to be 
used in the research activities including accurate descriptions 
oJ'the vessel or vessels intended to be used including its name, 
type, nationality, payload, model and class, in addition to full 
description ofscientific research equipment and its nature. 
7. Date expected J6r the first arrival and last departure of the 
research team and used vessels or for the installation and 
removal of equipment as the case may be. 
8. The extent to which the applicant determines that the Kingdom 
may participate to be represented in the research. 
9. A scientific study of the impacts expected to result from the 84 
marine scienti/ic study in the marine territories 
It is clear, then, that the RMSR go further in requiring further information about 
the person who will conduct the research, his previous activities and the places 
where he exercised them and the foreign parties that he dealt with in similar 
projects. The RMSR further require the research application to contain the names 
of the research team members and the technicians, their specializations, experience 
and nationalities. Moreover, the applicant must not only indicate the project's 
nature and goal, but also its programme and the proposed duration. Finally, Saudi 
Arabia demands that the applicant submit with his application a scientific study on 
the expected effects, resulting from the MSR 'in the Saudi maritime zones. All the 
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above requirements have been laid down in the special application form which has 
to be filled in by the applicant. fn containing these details. i is noted that the Saudi t 
leuislation goes beyond the LOSC provisions. What can be inferred from the 
elaboration of the Saudi legislator on these matters in any case, is the areat concern Z) 
of Saudi . -'ýrabia about the security consideration, and the safety of the maritime 
environment. 
2.3.4 Data and Research Reports 
In their proposals, submitted to the Third Committee and Second 
Committee of UNCLOS 111, Colombia and Iraq, who reflected the views of the 
Group of 77 (including Saudi Arabia), requested researching persons and bodies 
seeking the coastal state's consent to conduct MSR, intei- alia, to: 
Suppli, on t1ine all raw and processed data, including thefinal 
evaluations and conclusions and samples to the coastal state, - 
Assist the coastal state in assessm(,, the implications o' the said Iq data and samples and the results thereofin such a manner as that 
state may request; 
Undertake that results of scientýfic research shall not be published 
Without the explicit consent of the coastal state". 
The relevant final text of the Conference was incorporated in Article 249 of 
the LOSC. It requires the researching state to provide preliminary reports "as soon 
as practicable" to the coastal state, as well as "final results and conclusions after 
the completion of the research", "access to all data and samples" derived from the 
research project, and "data which may be copied and samples which may be 
diN,, ided without detriment to their scientific value". The LOSC requires, further, 
that the coastal state be provided , if requested, with an assessment of such 
data, 
samples and results, or assistance in assessing or interpreting them. These 
requirements, which give the coastal state considerable control over divulgence and 
ownership of the research data, are now reflected in Article 7 of the Saudi RMSR. 
Article 249(l) of the Convention contains a general wording which says that the 
MSR applicant should: 
inform the coastal state immediately of any major change in the 
research programme. 
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The Saudi RMSR in turn includes a similar text. Paragraph 3 of Article 7, for 
obtaining research pennission obligates the research state to: 
immediately notqý the pertinent authority of aiq change in the 
research programme. 
Compared with the LOSC corresponding text, the latter describes the change in the 
research programme that should be reported as "major"86 , while the Saudi 
legislation omits this word. In so doing, the Saudi legislator perhaps wanted to 
avoid the possible difficulty in interpreting the ten-n "major", which may occur in 
the absence of specific criteria for what may be considered as major change and 
what is not. 
2.3.5 Monitorint!, Suspension and Cessation of the Research Activities 
The RMSR has adopted the principle of a "monitoring system" as to the 
MSR in the Saudi maritime zones. Article 12 provides that: 
The scientitic research and related activities shall be under 
the supervi . si . on of inspectors elected by the pertinent 
authoritv, ... 
3. Inspectors shall submit regular reports to the pertinent 
authoriti, on the methods used in research and other 
research related activities. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 12 provides that: 
when the research licence is given to non-Saudi persons or 
agencies, supervision shall commence with the arrival of the vessel 
to the research area and continues until the completion of field- 
research activities and departure of the vessel from the marine 
territories and submission of the results. 
Again, this exclusion reflects the great concern for security issues. The 
Saudi legislator apparently assumes greater security danger from foreign 
researchers. Nevertheless, these provisions are not devoid of ambiguity. WIfile the 
Saudi researchers have not been excluded from the "monitoring system", the time 
limits of such a system are left open, seemingly at the discretion of the monitors 
themselves. As far as the LOSC is concerned, it does not include provisions on the 
monitoring aspect, but at the same time it does not provide for the prevention of 
such procedures by the coastal state. The Convention, as mentioned previously, 
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authorizes the coastal state to org)-anize \, /ISR in and on its territorial sea. EEZ and 
continental shelf" 
The LOSC, on the other hand. provides for the suspension and ten-nination 
of the research activities in different sit-Liations. In its EEZ and on its continental 
shelf, the coastal state has the right to suspend MSR activities in two si 
first, if they are not conducted according to the research project details submitt d 
under Article 248 of the ConN,, 'ention". second. if the researching state or 
or(yanizatioll falls to comply Nvith the duties referred to in Article 249". 
A similar obsen, ation can be made concerning the possibility of cessation 
provided for in the LOSC in case of non-compliance with the information 
communicated. if such deviation amounts to a "major change" in the research 
project, since Article 248 of the LOSC is once more the point of reference. 
Moreover, the coastal state may also terminate research activities if any of the two 
suspension situations, mentioned above, are not rectified within a "reasonable 
period of time"". 
The Saudi municipal legislation, for its part, does not distinguish between 
the situations of suspension and cessation. In general terms, Article 8 of the 
RMSR provides for the suspension and cessation of all research activities 
conducted in the Saudi maritime zones, including its EEZ and continental shelf 
when violating data and obligations, upon which the research permission has been 
granted. Accordingly, the decision whether to suspend or ten-ninate research 
activities , in case of non-compliance with the stipulated 
duties, is left to the 
discretion of the DMS. For the termination of research activities, the Saudi 
legislation, then, provides neither for any violation which may amount to a major 
change in the research project or activities, nor for non-rectification of any of the 
research suspension situation within a reasonable period of time. This might have 
been an attempt by the Saudi legislator to go around the interpretation problems 
arising from certain phrases in the LOSC, such as "major change in the research 
project" and "reasonable period of time". But the general formulation used in the 
Saudi legislation, particularly with regard to non-discrimination between the cases 
of suspension and cessation, creates further interpretation problems. The Saudi 
legislator should have followed the wording of the LOSC, since in the case of any 
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difference on these issues between the applicant and Saudi Arabia as a party to the 
LOSC, which unfortunately do not provide much help in this regard. However, 
with regard to the obligation imposed upon the researcher to suspend or cease the 
research activities when ordered to do so by the coastal state, as well as the lifting 
of such a decision when meeting the conditions mentioned earlier, the Saudi 
legislation followed the LOSC". 
The Saudi regulations, however, go beyond the LOSC in granting the 
researcher the right of appeal against the decision of suspension or cessation. 
According to Article 8(4) of the RMSR, such a right is to be submitted to the 
Boat-d qf Gilevances within sixty days from the date of notification of such 
deciSion. In any case, despite the fact that the 1982 United Nations Convention 
entitles the coastal state in Article 253 to suspend, and, indeed, require cessation of 
MSR activities under certain conditions, there is no evidence that Saudi Arabia has 
yet applied in practice the content of this article. 
2.3.6 Research in the Internal Waters and Territorial Sea 
it is not surprising that under the LOSC, MSR within the territorial sea is 
totally at the discretion of the coastal state as an expression of its full sovereignty92. 
The Convention does not speak about research in the internal waters, but, with 
greater reason, it is within the sovereignty of the coastal state since as mentioned in 
Chapter 11, the internal waters are considered as part of the coastal state's 
mainland 93 . 
Thus, territorial seas and internal waters are - prima facie - 
inaccessible to foreign research vessels. As far as MSR in the territorial sea is 
concerned, the LOSC deals with the matter through one article only (Article 245), 
and in a manner which reflects the possibility of research being conducted therein, 
but the Convention refrains from establishing any rules on this matter. The coastal 
state is free to authorize, to prohibit or to impose conditions on any MSR activity 
in the territorial sea, whether by its own nationals or by other states. The same rule 
must undoubtedly apply to MSR in the internal waters. 
Saudi Arabia adopts the possibility of conducting MSR in her territorial 
sea, and unlike the LOSC the Saudi RMSR go further to allow the possibility to 
conduct the research in the Saudi internal waters 
94 
. However, 
in both situations, 
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this lias been surrounded by a number of conditions, according to which the 
competent authority was granted the right: Cý 
a. To terminate the scientýfic research activities at an v time jbr 
an. v rason cis deemed proper hi, the pertinent author"tV. 
b. To carrv out, at an 
, 
I, ti . 171C, without giving pri . or noti . ce, 
inspecti . Oil of . thescicntýfic research places and equipment. 
c. To control entri, and exit Qfvesscbý and individuals to andfi-om 
thescicntýfic research arca. 
d. To request submission of at least quartcrIv reports by the 
rc-ývcarcher oil the Inctliods ofscientyic research in the internal 
watcrs or tcri-itorialsea and thcfindings')ý. 
In addition. the DMS has the right to a certain percentage of the revenues of the 
research in the said areas or the revenues Of Utilization of findings (Article 9(3)), 
and to prevent the researcher from giving any information, data or results to any 
other party except when the research is approved by the DMS itself (Article 7(l 0)). 
Clearly, Saudi Arabia, while allowing in principle the conduct of MSR in her 
internal waters and territorial sea, imposes more restricted conditions than those 
concerning the other maritime areas, namely the EEZ and the continental shelf In 
doing so, Saudi Arabia, in any case, does no more than exercise her sovereignty as 
a coastal state, confin-ned in Article 2 and also in Article 245 of the LOSC, which 
says that MSR in the territorial sea: 
shall be conducted onýv ivith the express consent of and under the 
conditions setforth ky the coastal state. 
2.3.7 The Reguirements concernint! the Research Installations and 
Eguipment 
Unlike the Saudi legislation, the LOSC deals with installations and 
equipment In further detail. Having provided in Article 249(G) for the removal of 
research installations and equipment on conclusion of the research activities (unless 
otherwise agreed), the Convention has devoted Section 4 of Part XIII to this 
matter. The central provision of the LOSC is Article 258, which reads: 
The deployment and use of any type of scientific research 
installations or equipment in any area of the marine environment 
shall be subject to the same conditions as are prescribed in this 
Convention for the conduct of marine scientific research in any 
such area. 
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If read in conjunction with other respective articles of the Convention (60,80,245 
and 246 for example), the main implications of these rules will be that in the 
territorial sea and internal waters, the deployment and use of the said installations 
and equipment is subject to the express consent of the coastal state. In the EEZ 
and on the continental shelf, the coastal state is to grant consent in normal 
circumstances and it may refuse when the installations and equipment are used for 
96 activities covered by Paragraph 5 of Article 246 . Article 259 provides that 
installations and equipment may not be treated legally as islands. Thus, it repeats 
what has been stipulated in Article 60(8) and 80, as to installations in particular9'. 
The LOSC also entitles, but does not obligate the coastal state to establish 
safety zones of no more than 500 metres in breadth around the research 
6cinstallations"98. The research equipment is not included in this provision. The 
reason for this, as stated by Soons, is that the installations, because of their 
dimensions, may present a danger to navigation or other uses of the sea, and 
moreover, they need protection against damage caused by other users of the sea 
because of the value they represent or to ensure the safety of persons on board 
them". 
The Saudi Arabian municipal regulations are silent on the above mentioned 
issues concerning installations and equipment of MSR. The Saudi legislator has 
dealt with the subject through three aspects: the removal of them following the 
ending of the research activities, the existence of identification markings and 
warning signals on such installations and equipment, and their interference with 
shipping routes. In this respect, Article 7(4) puts as a condition for granting a 
research licence the obligation of the researcher to: 
remove research installations or equipment immediately after 
completion unless otherwise agreed. 
The RMSR then follows exactly Article 249(G) of the LOSC. Article 10(2) of the 
Regulations provides further that the use of the MSR installations and equipment 
shall not obstruct international marine navigation routes. Paragraph I of the 
same Article stipulates that: 
The marine scientific research installations and equipment shall 
carty identity signs showing the country of registration of the 
international proprietor and shall be equipped with suitable 
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international4i, recognised warning signals. lorsa fe marine and air 
navigation. 
These provisions are mentioned nearly verbatim in the LOSC100. The confinement 
of the Saudi regulations to only the said two aspects , in 
dealing with research 
installations and equipment, reflects the concern of Saudi Arabia with her 
commitments toward the international community as to the issue of ensuring 
international naviu-ation, as well as the sig-rnificance of identification markin(-)-s and 
warrilmy signals. which was described by one cornmentator just before the adoption 
of the LOSC, as follows: 
Eýpcciallv 1*17 cases ofunmanned installations and equipment such 
markings will help to locate the OW17CF or operator of a particular 
iltWallcition or oj'equipment which was involved in all accident 
(perhaps 17ecessitating salvage operations or resulting in liabilio, 
lbr damage), or which was 
. 
10und aficr havinu been lost at sea. 
IdentýficatlOn markings may also hell) coastal states to verýlýy 
inarine scientijic i-esearch involvin, (, ), the deplo-vinent of such 
installations and eqUiplnent in areas under their. jurisdiction is 
carried out in accordance with the provisions oj' the Draji 
Convention and of theil- national le(gislation"'. 
The silence of the Saudi legislation on some issues concerning research 
installations and equipment, particularly with regard to their deployment and use, 
their legal status and safety areas around them, should not, it is suggested, ) be 
understood to indicate that the Saudi legislator was not concerned with such 
matters. Saudi Arabia may have been satisfied with what has been mentioned on 
the said aspects under Articles 60 and 80 of the LOSC as to the legal status of 
these installations and equipment, according to which such objects do not have the 
102 
status of islands, nor do they affect the delimitation of maritime zones . It is true 
that the Saudi regulations do not embody these issues directly, but the generality 
used in formulating certain texts in the RMSR suggests that the Saudi legislator has 
not been neglectful of these matters. In this respect, Article 7(7) of the RMSR 
stipulates, in general terms, that for the research permission to be granted, the 
researcher must commit himself to: 
respect applicable marine regulations in accordance with the 
Kingdoni's regulations and international law rules' 03 (emphasis 
added). 
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2.3.8 Other Research Reguirements 
Apart from what has been mentioned previously, the Saudi RMSR laid 
down certain additional conditions for obtaining consent to conduct MSR. First, 
under Article 7(5) of the Regulations, the research applicant is under an obligation 
to: 
take necessary, measures to protect the maritime environment 
against anýy pollution or harm that may result from the research 
activities. 
This provision is included in the LOSC concerning research in the EEZ and on the 
04 
continental shelf' . Moreover, under Article 7(6) of the RMSR, the research 
organ is also under an obligation not to: 
cause anýv harm to the activities related to exploration and 
tili. u zatiot? of live or other resources in marine territories carried 
out by the Kingdom or licensed to be carried out on its behalf 
This repeats verbatim the stipulation of Paragraph 5(a) of Article 246 (the 
"consent" article) of the LOSC. It is provided further under the RMSR for the 
protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and for 
the competent authority (DMS) to be notified of their location"'. Such a provision 
is not, however, included in Part XIII of the LOSC designated for MSR, but it is 
stipulated as a "'general provision" in Article 303(l) of Part XVI. 
It is clear, then, from the above discussion, that Saudi Arabia fully accepts 
the provisions concerning MSR in her maritime zones, as incorporated in the 
LOSC. 
2.4 Responsibili! y and Liabili 
As to the LOSC, the provisions on international responsibility and repair of 
damage are included in Article 263. The Article reads as follows: 
States and competent international organizations shall be 
responsible for ensuring that marine scientific research, 
whether undertaken by them or on their behaýf is conducted in 
accordance with this Convention. 
2. States and competent international organizations shall be 
responsible and liable for the measures they take in 
contravention of this Convention in respect of marine scientific 
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research conducted bY other states, their natural or judicial 
Persons or by competent international organizations, and shall 
provide compensatIO17 Jor damage resulting ftom such 
measures. 
3. States and competent international organ17ations shall be 
responsible and liable pursuant to Article 235 jbr damage 
causcd by pollution qfthe marine environment arising out of' 
marine scientýfic research undertaken bY them or on their 
hchalf 
By examining the above rules, two observations may be made: first, Paragraph I 
stipulates the responsibility to ensure the conduct of MSR, whi ile from a log cal 
point of view. the responsibility should concern the ensuring against damage 
restilting from the conduct of MSR, rather than the conduct of the research itself 
Secondly, according to Paragraph -1, reparation is limited only to compensation, "n 
A and there is no mention of any other relief. such as satisfaction or restitution. 
far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, the provisions of responsibility and liability are 
included in Article 16 of the RMSR. In general terms, the Article confin-ns the ltý 
right of Saudi Arabia to: 
seek international legal liability against anY state or I. nternational 
organi. zation whose acts oj'scientýfic research in marine territories 
are considered a violation of the rules of international lait, and the 
rights oj'the Kino.,, dom and its international obligations. 
Before that, however, the Saudi legislation went beyond the LOSC in laying down 
certain rules in relation to the violation of the RMSR. Paragraph I of Article 15 
provides that: 
without prejudice to any severe penaliy established by the Islamic 
Shari'a qaws) or regulations applicable in the Kingdom and 
without prejudice to the provisions of international law, any 
violation of these regulations shall entail a penalty of 
imprisonmentfor a period not more than two years and a fine not 
less than two hundred thousand Saudi Riyals or eitherpenalty. 
The difficulty in categorizing the violations which may arise when conducting 
MSR , is reflected 
in the formulation of the above provisions. Imprisonment is 
mentioned in terms of its maximum duration (no more than two years). 
The 
financial fine, on the other hand , is stated 
in terms of its minimum (no less than two 
hundred Saudi Riyals). Further, the competent authority is not under obligation to 
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apply both penalties, since it may be satisfied with applying either. Under 
Paragraph 2 of Article 15: 
The research vessels and equipment may be subject to confiscation 
in case of serious violation of the provisions of these regulations. 
This provision is, however, arguable since no criteria have been laid down to clarify 
the meaning of the ten-n "serious" used in the text. 
As far as the reparation of damage concerned, the Saudi legislation, unlike 
the LOSC gives priority to "restitution", rather than "compensation". Paragraph 3 
of Article 15 obliges anyone breaching the RMSR and what has been agreed upon 
with the competent authority, to rectify all damage resulting from such breach 
within thirty days from the date of notification by the DMS. However, 
if he Jýils to do so ivithin thirty days from the date of notification 
bY the pertinent authoritv, the Kingdom shall have the right to 
remove the violation tit the expense of'the violating paqv'O'. 
In other words, Saudi Arabia adopts the principle of reparation for any damages 
resulting from the conduct of marine scientific research activities in the Saudi 
maritime zones , in the 
form of rectification as a first option or compensation as an 
alternative 107 . 
Conclusion 
The importance of, and interest in, marine scientific research is constantly 
being felt. Advances in technology have made research increasingly sophisticated. 
Historically, the legal regime of marine scientific research has been accorded little 
attention at the international level. It was the 1982 United Nations Convention, 
however, which dealt comprehensively with the matter and the provisions 
dealing 
with MSR in the Convention, although merely general principles, form a 
definite 
contribution to the development of the law of the sea and provide a significant 
improvement on the Geneva Conventions. Saudi Arabia is not an exception, since 
it was not until 1993, that she issued her first regulations on 
MSR. The above 
analysis shows that Saudi Arabia is one of those states, which 
have legislated on 
MSR in line with the LOSC, accepting the benefits and the 
burdens. Only on some 
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minor points of these technical and detailed rules can differences be discerned with 
respect to a combined reading of the 1993 RMSR, which constitute the Saudi 
legislation on the question. Even where the Saudi legislation had to lay down 
certain detailed rules, these do not seem to have o-one far beyond the Convention's 
spirit. Clearly, the LOSC consent regime , which grants the coastal state very wide 
poNvers to pen-nit and organize MSR in its maritime zones has gained the approval 
of the Saudi competent authorities, leading to the incorporation of most of its 
provisions into the Saudi national legislation. 
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102. Article 259 of the LOSC reads: The installations or equipment referred to in thi's 
section [section 4 of Part X111] do not possess the status oj, islands. The 
-v 
have no 
territorial sea of their own, and their presence (toes not affect the delimitation of the 
territorialsea, the exclusive economic zone or the continenial she4f. 
103. The following paragraph of the same article (i. e. Paragraph 8) emphasises the "respect of t:: ) L- I 
the Kingdom's internal regulations". However, this addition is without significance. for 
the previous paragraph already includes this idea. 
104. Art. 246(5)(b). 
105. A rt. 7 (9). 
106. Art. 15(3). 
107. For further details as to types of reparation, see Ian Brownlie, op. cit., Chapt. 111, note 
117, p. 457 et seq. 
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Chapter VII 
Control of Marine Pollution 
Introduction 
Environmental problems in general, are today the subject of international 
concern. Protecting the environment is viewed as a human issue, and yet, 
responsibility to future generations in this regard, should be not merely a matter of 
moral duty, but of law'. This idea, however, has already been introduced into 
international law 2 Little or no attention was given to the development of 
international environmental law prior to the Stockholm Conference of 1972; 
indeed, the Conference itself was intended merely to discuss technical and scientific 
aspects rather than legal questions'. As part of the universal environment, the 
protection of the marine environment is a global priority today since, as stated by 
Freestone: 
... the health of marine ecosystems and marine 
lifeforms is at least 
as important to life on the planet as that of terrestrial systems 4. 
Thus, marine pollution comes as a major concern both for states and for concerned 
organizations. 
As a consequence of the geographical location of Saudi Arabia, bordering 
two of the busiest international waterways in the world (the Red Sea and the 
Arabian Gulf), the Saudi coastal areas are among those most subject to pollution, 
especially oil pollution. Recognising this fact, Saudi Arabia has been paying 
increasing attention to the preservation of the marine environment in recent years. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore Saudi Arabia's attitude and policy 
toward the legal regime of marine pollution. The chapter is divided into two parts. 
In the first part, there will be a brief review of the definition and development of 
the legal regime of marine pollution. In the second part, an attempt will be made to 
examine Saudi Arabia's policy regarding the control and prevention of marine 
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pollution at all levels, locally, regionally and internationally, in the light of accepted 
standards of international law. 
Part 1: Marine Pollution in International Perspectiv 
Despite the fact that the sea provides an important source of human food 
and an attractive environment for recreation, sea water contains a wide variety of 
agents, biological as well as organic and inorganic, all of which can be hazardous 
to human health 5. Marine pollution, including pollution from land-based sources'l 
ships', sea-bed activities8, activities in the Area', dumping'o, and pollution from or 
through the atmosphere'', was not an issue in the public eye three decades ago and 
the turning point was during the 1960s when the effects of pollution became 
apparent, and major catastrophic incidents were reported by the world press 12 . 
With the growing awareness of the seriousness of the marine pollution problem and 
the remarkable technological progress concerning the exploration and exploitation 
of the oceans, an international legal regime of pollution began to develop. This 
was further motivated by the occurrence in the 1960s and 1970s of serious 
pollution accidents at sea such as the 1967 Torrey Canyon incident, which was 
described as "the catastrophe of the century" 13. It was followed by similar 
disasters in the late 1970s, such as the 1977 blow-out of the Ekofisk oil field 14 , the 
1978 Antoco Cadiz oil Spills 15 , and the 1979 
Ixtoc I blow-out in the Gulf of 
Mexico 16 . 
The international community's first serious attempt to cope with the 
increasing scale of marine pollution was the conclusion of the 1954 International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by oil 17. Since then, a 
number of multilateral (global and regional) treaties regarding the prevention of 
marine pollution have been concluded. The development of international 
environmental law over the last three decades or so demonstrates that one of its 
most dynamic branches has been the law of marine pollution' 8. Since the adoption 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, global 
environmental problems have become more acute, and global environmental 
awareness more expansive'9. Indeed, today, environmental questions, in general, 
dominate both national and international discussions in a way undreamed of before 
326 
the last decade 20. However, before going further in discussing the evolution of the 
legal regulation of marine pollution, it would be desirable first to try to elucidate 
the meaning of the term. 
1. Definition of Marine Pollution 
The fact is that the term "pollution" is a word whose precise meaning in 
21 law, particularly international law, is not easily discerned . Various descriptions of 
pollution can be found in earlier legal instruments. However, they are descriptions, 
not definitions, and whether they can be said to include defining criteria, and yet be 
useful for purposes of litigation, is a matter of controversY22 . By and large, 
historically, there might be distinguished the period prior to 1972 (no definitions), 
the period between 1972 and 1974 (implied definitions), and the period from 1974 
(express definitions)23 
. However, the most widely used definition of marine 
pollution today is probably that agreed upon in 1970 by the United Nations Group 
of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP)24 . Their 
definition of marine pollution is: 
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting 
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to 
human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, 
impairment of qualiq, or use of sea water, and reduction of 
amenities. 
This definition was employed by the 1972 United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment25. With certain amendments, it was also used by a 
number of multilateral conventions, such as the 1974 Helsinki Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Envirom-nent of the Baltic Sea Area 26 , the 
1974 Paris 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based SourceS27 the 
1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution 28 
. 
The definitions found in other regional conventions, such as the 1978 
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution (hereafter KC)'9, and the 1982 Regional Convention 
for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment (hereafter 
jC)30 contain important amendments since they consider the introduction of 
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substances. which are "likely to result" in deleterious effects to living resources, as 
marine pollution in the legal context. 
A very similar formula to that of the two latter Conventions is found in the 
LOSC: 
pollution of the environment " mcans the introduction bl, inan, 
directli, or indirectIv, of substances or energ"i, into the marine 
C17111 . ronment including estuaries, which results oi- IS likeli, to result 
l. n such deleterious effeCtS CIS harm to living resources and marine 
HIC, ha-zards to hun7an health, hindrance to marine activities, 
I. ncludl'17V, fishino, and other legitimate tiscs of the sea, impairment 
q1'qualltv. 1br use ol'sca water and rcAction of amenities 
31. 
It may be noted that the basic difference between the two definitions of the 
1972 United Nations Conference and the LOSC is that the former is based on an 
established CaLlse-effect relationship, Willie the latter contemplates the 
establishment of such a relationship as well -'-. However , it is clear that neither 
'I 
definition is aimed at preventing all substances being added to the sea - many 
substances being harmless or rapidly rendered so by the sea - but only those which 
have deleterious effects. Therefore, the definitions were subject to criticism for not 
taking sufficient account of the need to prevent changes in the manne environment 
as such, and apart from any immediate deleterious effectS33. 
2. Development of Marine Pollution Regime - An Overview 
International environmental law has today become a major branch of 
international law, and yet, as stated by Freestone, it exists, states make it and they 
follow it, but like most other laws, on some occasions, they break 1t34 . The 
fundamental law making processes for international environmental law, developed 
by the international community are principally twofold: treaties and customary 
international law 35 . As far as marine pollution control 
is concerned, international 
custom does not offer much guidance. International law in this area is 
predominantly treaty law". The discussion that follows consists of two parts. The 
first section will review the development of international customary law applicable 
to marine pollution while the second section will analyse the development of treaty 
law. 
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2.1 International Custom 
In the absence of binding standards either of general or particular 
applicability, the concept of "territorial sovereignty" is the principal starting point 
in the consideration of principles of state responsibility for conduct entailing 
extraterritorial environmental effects upon other states 37 - This principle is derived 
from the Roman maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ". It means: use your 
own property so as not to harm otherS38 . This principle has been embodied in a 
number of international decisions. In the Trail Smelter arbitration (1938-41), 
where a smelter located on Canadian territory caused damage to property in the 
neighbouring USA, the arbitral tribunal stated that: 
... under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of 
the United States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of 
its territoty in such a manner as to cause injury byfumes in or to 
39 the territorv of another or the properties or persons therein ... . 
In the Corfu Channel case ( 1949), in which the ICJ was asked to decide the 
responsibility of Albania for damage suffered by British warships and their crews 
when the ships struck mines while passing through an international strait in the 
Albanian territorial sea, the Court confirmed: 
... every state's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be 40 
usedfor acts contrarv to the rights of other States 
The sic utere tuo principle has been further espoused in the Lake Lanoux 
case between France and Spain. The case concerned a claim by Spain that Spanish 
consent was a precondition for the French who wanted to divert the waters of Lake 
Lanoux, since it would affect the flow at a river originating from the said lake 
running into the Spanish territory. The arbitration tribunal stated that: 
It could have been argued that the works would bring about a 
definitive pollution of the waters of the Canal or that the returned 
waters would have a chemical composition or a temperature or 
some other characteristics which could injure Spanish interests. 
Spain could then have claimed that her rýghts had been impai 
(emphasis added)41. 
The principle finds further support in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas, the provisions of which have been stated to be "as generally declatory 
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of established principles of international law". Article 2 of the Convention 
provides that the freedoms of the high seas: ID 
shall he exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the 
interests of'other states in their (---ývercise Ql* the freedoin of the high 
seas. 
The principle of prohibition of the InjUrious use of territory has been 
amplified by the principle of "good neighbOLirliness", which is, according to 
Kuwabara: 
onc ql'the jUndaincinal principles ql'international environmental 
law [andl implies a morc positive ohlý(, Yationfior co-operati - on 42 . 
It is clear, then, from the foregoing discussion that the customary rule 
which has crýystallised under international custom is that, states are obliged to 
prevent any harrnftil activity within their sovereignty and territory which could 
cause injuries to the interests of other states. This rule is too ,,, ague to provide an 
effective framework for the protection of the marine environment. The deficiency 
of international customary law is apparent , in the outputs of the 1972 Stockholm 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment43 . 
However, it was the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, concluded in 
Rio de Janeiro, which gave a significant thrust to international envirom-nental law 
as a whole. In the Conference, a number of pre-existing principles of soft law, of 
uncertain status, passed into rules of treaty. The repetition of these principles in 
the outputs of the Conference 44 , 
has strengthened the argument that they are, or 
are on the point of becoming, rules of customary law binding on all stateS45 - In any 
case, the current world envirom-nental problems are such that customary 
international law cannot be said to have sufficient strength to cope with them 46 - 
2.2 Trealy Law 
Given the deficiencies of customary international law, along with the need 
for a more comprehensive approach for the protection of the marine environment, 
the international community has looked for other sources through the conclusion of 
numerous conventions at various levels, multilateral, regional and bilateral. Indeed, 
the greatest part of the international marine pollution regime is contained in these 
treaties, the first of which was adopted in 1954 (International Convention for the 
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Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil)47 . 
At UNCLOS 1 (1958), the issue of 
the marine environment was not given much attention. Under Articles 24 and 25 
of the HSC, the only two articles that dealt with the question, states are obliged to 
regulate oil pollution from ships, pipelines and seabed operations, to prevent 
pollution of radioactive waste, and to co-operate in this respect with competent 
international organizations. However, these provisions do not go so far as to deal 
with all sources of marine pollution; moreover, they leave states much discretion as 
to their application. 
Before the beginning of UNCLOS III works, several general multilateral 
conventions had already been concluded to regulate vessel-source pollution 
48, 
civil 
liability for vessel-source pollution 
49, intervention in cases of maritime casualtieS50 
and dumping at sea S1 . Nevertheless the development of the marine pollution 
regime prior to LTNCLOS III can fairly be described as a "patchwork quilt" affair - 
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ad hoc responses to source-specific marine pollution . It was the 1982 United 
Nations Convention, which represented the first attempt to set out a general 
framework for the control and protection of the marine environment through its 
Part XII. 
On the other hand, regional approaches to marine pollution control proved 
to be enormously attractive in the 1970s. The regional concept was applied so 
late 53 According to Recommendation 92 of the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
Action Plan, the states were called upon to: 
adopt effective national measures for the control of all significant 
sources of marine pollution, including land-based sources, and 
concert and co-ordinate their actions regionally and where 
appropriate on a wider international basis. 54 
Indeed 
, it was the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) which 
initiated its Regional Seas Programme in 1974 55 .A number of multilateral regional 
treaties and Action Plans were concluded under the auspices of UNEP and to a 
rather more limited extent the International Maritime Organization (IMO)56 . 
In 
certain cases, bilateral agreements were concluded to deal with more specific or 
local questions of marine pollution 57 . 
It is clear that while marine pollution is a 
global concern, its regime does not necessarily have to be a single global entity and 
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regional approaches can never be dispensed with because, as Schachter and Serwer 
Pitt it: 
... there has come to he a greater recognition of the need r C, fio 
I-Cgl'017al pollution control orIqlans since it is apparent that, 
although pollution 1'S a global problem, it is not uniformly global". 
The intensity of treaty action, whether at international or regional level, was 
reflected in the relevant discussions of UNCLOS III, as marine pollution control 
ývas a minor, but not insig-nificant, negotiation topicý". However, the 1982 United 
Nations Convention represents, as mentioned earlier, the first comprehensive 
approach that establishes on a global, conventional basis the obligations. 
responsibilities and powers of nations regarding marine pollution control. The Z-- ltý 
Convention imposes on coastal states, for the first time, a duty to protect and 
preserve the environment from pollution from all sources'O, a requirement to 
observe this ftindamental obligation when exploiting their natural resourceS6 1, and a 
duty to assume liability for ensuring that these responsibilities are met62 . 
The states 
are also obliged - for the first time - to co-operate globally and regionally in 
formulating rules and standards, giving notification of imminent or actual damage, 
and undertaking research and the exchange of inforination 63 The Convention 
stipulates also obligations to provide technical and scientific assistance to 
64 developing states and to conduct monitoring and environmental assessrnents'ý 
The Convention, further, goes beyond just the obligation of pollution control. 
Article 192 of the Convention recognizes a general obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. Article 194(5) expressly requires that: 
the measures taken in accordance with this Part (Part XII) shall 
include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile 
ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or 
endangered species and otherforms of marine life 
66 
. 
What should be noted, however, is that while the Convention constitutes a 
general framework for the protection of marine environment depending on existing 
standards and organizations, it does not create such organizations and standards, 
not does it specify mechanisms for their implementation. Nor does the Convention 
develop an effective approach concerning the responsibility of states 
for the 
fulfilment of the said obligations, since whereas Paragraph 3 of Article 
235 
3 3-2 
recognises te "failing of international law relating to responsibility and liability". 
we find that Paragraph I emphasises, in general terrns, the liability of states for the 
fulfilment of their respective obligations "in accordance with international laW,. )67 . 
The LOSC, as is known, has come into force. This factor, plus the fact that 
the Convention's provisions relating to the protection of the marine environment 
were adopted by consensus, leaves no doubt that the obligation to prevent marine 
pollution has become now an obligatory general rule of international law. 
Part 11: Saudi Arabia and Marine Pollution Control 
In the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, pollution can result from many 
sources, such as industrial waste, sewage, desalination plants, sea-bed activities, 
etc. However, oil pollution is the most conspicuous of these hazards, made so by 
reason of extensive offshore production operations in the Gulf, on the one hand, 
and the heavy maritime traffic of oil tankers within these two relatively narrow- 
water bodies, on the other. 
Before examining the legal position of Saudi Arabia with regard to the 
protection of the marine environment, it would be beneficial, first, to present a 
general review of the state of the environment of the Red Sea and the Gulf, as well 
as Saudi Arabian environmental policies and institutional setting. 
1. The State of the Marine Environment 
The Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea have been subjected to serious pollution. 
The Gulf, in particular, has suffered massive oil pollution in the last decade and in 
the beginning of the current decade. It is one of the most heavily-travelled tanker 
routes in the world. It has 26 oil terminals served by between 20 and 
100 tankers 
passing via the Strait of Hormuz every day 
68 
. 
It has been indicated that at least 
80% of oil pollution originates from tanker and ship traffic 
(spills and routine 
69 discharges) and offshore production 
The two worst pollution accidents witnessed so far by the 
Gulf were, 
unfortunately, carried out deliberately by man himself The Iraq-Iran war 
(1980- 
88), and the 1991 Gulf War both had disastrous impacts on the 
Gulfs marine 
environment. According to a report prepared by MEPA, more than 
500 tankers 
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and ships were attacked during %vhat is known as the "Tanker War" between Iraq 
and Iran in the period 1984-1988. Oil was released from some 10% of this 
number"'. On 27 January, 198"), a massive release of oil occurred in the Iranian oil 
field of Nowruz. The Nowntz spill was a chronic and long-running spill that 
continued unabated for more than a year, releasing an estimated 1.5 million barrels 
of oil into the Gulf waters 
However, the magnitude of the 1991 Gulf War oil spill exceeded by far all 
earlicr spills 1nc1Lidini, )- the Nowruz. Due to hostilities during that war, inputs of 
ci-Lide oil released into the Gulf waters are estimated to have been between 6 and 8 
million barrels. affecting more than 500 kilometres of coastline in Saudi Arabia". 
This substantial oil release, which is perhaps the largest in human history, polluted 
a sizeable stretch of the Southern Kuwaiti and Saudi coasts, as well as killing large "n 
qLiantities of seabirds 
73 It also had harniftil effects on water, sediments, coral 
74 
reefs. seagrass, algae mats, and other intertidal habitats . The hugeness of the 
Gulf War oil spill compelled the Saudi authorities to mobilise all local expertise, 
and further to seek international assistance to face the threat posed by the oil. 
Indeed, the MEPA was desi(Ynated as a National Oil Spill Co-ordinator. In 
addition, two organizations were established, the National Oil Spill Co-ordinating : 71 
Committee and the Scientific Subgroup, which contained a number of foreign 
states' agencies 75. International assistance was co-ordinated through the IM076. 
However, despite the great success of the Gulf s clean-up efforts, the pollution 
dangers in the Gulf remain as a legacy of the War. It was recently reported that 
more than 26 oil tankers are still sunk in the Gulf, amongst them, the Amarýyah 
which has on board up to 100,000 tons of crude 01177. In recent years, oil pollution 
accidents continued to be the problem affecting the marine environment in the 
Gulf A report prepared by MEPA reveals that in 1993,8 oil pollution accidents 
were reported in the Saudi maiitime zones, I chemical, 3 biological, and 4 oily 
accidents, releasing more than 1600 barrels of oil into the Gulf waterS78. 
However, oil is not the only source of pollution in the Arabian Gulf Apart 
from natural phenomena there exist a number of human activities that affect the 
Gulf s environment. These include: disposal of urban and industrial waste waters, 
development., of coastal areas, manipulation of hydrological cycles, land use 
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practices, disposal of contaminated sediments, mine tailings and industnal wastes, 
disposal of solid matter, exploitation of living and non-living marine resources. 
war-related pollution, and radioactive pollution'9. 
The Red Sea is no less sensitive to pollution than the Arabian Gulf The 
huge movement of oil transporting tankers makes it one of the seas most subjected 
to pollution, and oil pollution in particular. It is estimated that over 100 million 
tons of oil are transported through the Red Sea annuallyso. This high volume of 
transport traffic results in chronic marine pollution as the result of discharges of 
oily ballast water and tank washings from vessels, operational spills from foundered 
vessels, and leaks from vessels in transit8'. In 1993,28 pollution accidents were 
reported to MEPA, 8 biological, 3 running aground and 17 011Y82 However, 
shipping is not the only source of oil pollution in the area. A study conducted in 
1984 indicated that more than 700 tons/year of discharged crude oils are released 
to the coastal waters of the main Saudi seaport on the Red Sea, Jeddah City, as a 
result of Petromin Oil Refinery processes 83. In addition, the Red Sea is exposed to 
other types of pollution. Of land-based pollution, there are municipal waste water 
dischargeS84 and industrial effluents. There is also the possibility of pollution 
resulting from dredging and filling, and inadequately planned construction in the 
coastal zones 85 . 
There is, further, the danger of radioactive pollution, especially 
with the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel, one of the states bordering the 
Red Sea, and the attempts of some of the region's states to use atomic energy for, 
at least, peaceful purposes. 
Thus, from the above review, it is clear that unlike most seas, the Arabian 
Gulf and the Red Sea are more vulnerable to oil pollution than other sources. In 
addition , it 
is expected that the status of the marine environment in the said seas, 
in 
norinal circumstances is worse than what has been mentioned. Full and precise 
information in this respect is not available. That is what has been stated 
by 
ROPME. According to the Report to the 8th Meeting of the ROPME Council, 
held in Kuwait, 27-28 October 1993, the secretariat reported that two attempts to 
prepare proper regional reviews had been made in 1989 and 1990, 
but both failed 
to reflect the regional state of the marine enviroriment86 . 
The position in the Red 
Sea region is worse, however, basically due to lack of 
funds, as only some 
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ecological survey projects have been conducted on the coasts of Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen, in addition to certain workshops, training courses, and the publication of 
the Red Sea Bibliography on Oceanographic and Marine Environment87. In brief a 
more effective information system seems to be an urgent necessity, since without 
that, all efforts and means to combat marine pollution will suffer inadequacy. 
I Environmental Policies and Institutional Settin 
2.1 Policies 
Saudi Arabia has been dealing seriously with the problem of manne 
Pollution since the mid-1970s. Before that. no attention was paid to the issue of 
protecting the environment in general. despite the fact that the Kingdom started its tD 
activities on the exploration and exploitation of oil in the Arabian Gulf area in the 
19330s, %vith concomitant damage to the marine environment! 
Saudi Arabia's concern for environmental issues has coincided with that of 
the international community as a whole. fn 1975, three years after the holding of 
the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, Saudi Arabia 
issued its first major legislation on the marine environment. Part 12 (Articles 311- 
335) of the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations (hereafter referred to as SLR) 
was designed for the protection of the marine environment from oil pollution and 
from the operational discharges of ships". This was followed by the adoption in 
1984 of the National Contingency Plan for Combating Marine Pollution by Oil and 
Other Harmful Substances in Emergency Cases89 (hereafter referred to as NCP) by 
the Environmental Protection Co-ordinating Committee (hereafter referred to as 
EPCQ90, 
At the regional level, Saudi Arabia played an effective role in building up 
and activating regional efforts to face the dangers of marine pollution. 
In this 
respect, the Kingdom took part in formulating the 1978 Kuwait Action 
Plan. 91. She 
is an active party to the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for 
Co-operation on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution 
92 and the three protocols 
supplementary to it: the 1978 Protocol concerning Regional 
Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution by Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Emer, gencY93, the 1989 Protocol concerning Marine Pollution resulting 
from 
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Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental ShelfQ4 , and the 1990 Protocol for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based 
Source S95 . The Kingdom also hosted in Jeddah, between 13-15 February 1982, the 
Plenipotentiary Regional Conference which led to the adoption of the Jeddah 
Action Plan", the Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden(JC)9', and the Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in 
Combating Pollution by Oil and other Harmful Substances M Cases of 
Emergency". 
At the intemational level, Saudi Arabia is a party to a number of 
conventions, such as the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) and its amendments of 1962,1969 and 
1971 99 and the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage and its Protocol of 1976'00. 
In recent years, the Saudi Arabian concern with regard to environmental 
issues has intensified as part of the international community's concern as a whole. 
She was one of the participants to the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in June, 1992. The 
Saudi delegation to the Conference was headed by the then Minister of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources, Mr Nazer. Having given a brief review of the Kingdom's 
efforts in facing environmental problems in general, Mr Nazer, in his address to the 
Conference, called upon the international community to protect the environment, 
rescue marine life from the dangers of armed conflicts, and to develop international 
law in facing armed conflicts and their disastrous effects on the environment. In 
this respect, he said: 
The dimensions of the threats to the environment inherent in armed 
conflicts call for sustained efforts untiring endeavours of the 
international community to protect the environment, rescue marine 
life, reconstruct and rehabilitate the environment. It calls for a 
serious review of the provisions of international law applicable to 
armed conflicts with a view to Preventing the recurrence of the 
international crimes against the environment similar to those 
experienced in the Gulf region'O'. 
Elsewhere in the Address, the Minister emphasised the adverse impacts of nuclear 
energy on the environment by saying: 
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It is important to ensure that conclusions reached 4y this 
Coiýlerencesholtld not he used to promote environmentally unsafe 
technology or energy sources. It is unacceptable to promote 
means that have been proven to gencralise and deepen well- 
established environmentalprobleins such cis nuclear energy.. . 102 
In the National Report, submitted to the Conference, a comprehensive 
review was presented of the state of the environment in the Kingdom, with 
particular reference to the damages caused to the environment by the Gulf War 
hostillties""' 
The Saudi Arabian commitment to protect the environment was reflected at 
the highest levels in the Saudi legislation. Article 332 of the newly issued Basic ZD I 
Regulations of RLIle ( 1992) 
104 
reads: 
The state shall do its utinost to maintain, protect and develop the 
environment and to avoid contamination. 
Moreover, the responsibility for the protection of the environment in Saudi 
Arabia in recent years, has always been associated with national economic and 
social policies and state plans. Concern about the environment is clearly present in 
the statement of the Planning Ministry, released following the announcement of the 
recent Sixth 5-Year Development Plan 1415-1420 AH [1995-2000] 105 . It was 
stated that one of the Plan's goals is: 
the conservation, development, and the protection o the 
06 
environmentfrom pollution' 
Among the achievements, aimed to be carried out, the Plan mentioned, 
inter alia: 
(a) The employment of modem technological instruments, which take 
environmental considerations into account in order to avoid pollution; 
(b) The adoption of national regulations for the assessment of environmental 
impacts. Such regulations are to be implemented by all concerned projects, 
especially industrial, agricultural and urban sectors; 
(c) The adoption of a comprehensive set of environmental standards 
107 
. Pursuant 
to that, the Kingdom indeed issued, in 1993, its Environmental Protection 
Standards for the Control of Disastrous Wastes'08. 
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Furthermore, the Kingdom has just recently (9-12 October, 1995) hosted in 
Jeddah, the Sea to Sea Regional Conference on Sustainable Use of the Marine 
Environment, where a group of experts participated in discussing ways of 
providing better means to protect the environment of the Red Sea and the Arabian 
Gulf'09. 
These, then, are the features of the Saudi policies regarding the protecting 
of marine environment. It Is clear that the Kingdom has been dealing seriously 
with the problem of pollution, including marine pollution. However, whether the 
Saudi policies are effective enough to deal with the marine environmental problems 
rernains to be seen when we discuss the Kingdom's legal attitude towards such a 
problem''O. 
2.2 Institutional Setting 
The crucial step in control of marine pollution was taken by the Saudi 
Government in 1981, with the inclusion of the function of pollution control within 
the responsibilities of what had forinerly been known as the General Directorate of 
Meteorology and was now renamed to become the Meteorology and 
Environmental Protection Administration (MEPA), by virtue of Royal Decree No. 
7/2/8903''1. The establishment of MEPA and granting it the power to enforce 
various regulatory measures, came in a response to increased public concerns over 
pollution. Within MEPA, there is the Environmental Protection General 
Directorate (EPGD), as an entity responsible for environmental protection matters. 
The Marine Environment Unit is one of the units affiliated to EPGD, and 
responsible for all marine environmental matters. Also affiliated to the EPGD are 
M, o Oil Spill Response Centres, one in Jeddah (on the Red Sea), and the other 
based in the Eastern Province of the Kingdom (on the Arabian Gulf). Beside these, 
there is the National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development, 
established on 12 May 1986, amongst whose objectives is to develop and 
implement plans and projects to conserve wildlife and wildlife habitats of the 
12 Kingdom on land and in the sea' . 
Of the governmental bodies which have direct relationship with marine 
pollution, there are The Ministry of Communications and the Saudi Port 
339 
Authorities, both of which have a special section for monitoring and helping in 
combating marine pollution. There is also the Saudi Arabian Royal NavY. 
Howe%'cr, MEPA remains the central governmental body for pollution control. but 
as is known, a marine pollution incident affect many different interests both 
within and outside the Government. Therefore, the Environmental Protection Co- 
ordinating Committee was established in 1981 . wi IIIj 
ith the aim. of co-ordinatin-( the 
activities of government bodies involved in environmental protection 113. The 
President of MEPA is the Secretary General of the Committee, which is headed by 
the Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence and Aviation and 
14 Inspector General' In its membership. the Committee includes the deputy 
ministers (or equivalent), in each of'' 
- Ministry of Interior (Local Authorities, Coast Guard and Civil Defence)-, 
- Ministry of Planning, 
- Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources; 
- Ministry of Agriculture and Water; 
- Ministry of Commerce (Saudi Organization for Standards); 
- Ministry of Health; 
- Ministry of Communications; 
- Ministry of Industry and Electricity; 
- Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs; 
- King Abdulaziz Centre for Science and Technology; 
- National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and 
Development; 
- Port Authorities; and 
- MEPA. 
In addition, there is the Environmental Ministry Committee, which was 
established m 1990. This Committee is viewed as the highest environmental 
organization at the national level. Its objectives are to lay down national 
environmental strategies and policies, as well as to express the Kingdom's points of 
view with regard to environmental matters, whether regionally or 
internationally"'. 
The Committee is headed by the Second Deputy Pnme Minister and Minister for 
Defence and Aviation and Inspector General, and includes in its membership'' 
7: 
- The Minister of Interior; 
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The Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
Deputy Minister of Defence for Civil Aviation; 
The Minister of Planning; 
The Minister of Finance and National Economy; 
The Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources; 
The Minister of Agriculture and Water; 
The Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs; 
The Minister of Health; 
- The Minister of Industry and Electricity; 
- The President of King Abdulaziz Centre for Science and Technology. 
The President of MEPA has been assigned as the Secretary General of the 
Committee' 18. 
Apart from these governmental organizations, there are certain 
organizations which, although not under direct supervision by the Government, are 
greatly involved in pollution control due to the nature of their work. These include 
the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, and the Saudi ARAMCO. The two 
organizations have good capabilities, especially with regard to oil pollution, and 
they participated effectively in combating the Gulf War oil spill "'. 
These, then, are the relevant Saudi national environmental organizations 
currently in existence. At the regional and international levels, however, Saudi 
Arabia is a party to a number of regional and international organizations. She is a 
member of the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment (ROPME) in Kuwait, as well as the Programme for the Environment 
of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Internationally, the Kingdom has also been a 
member of IMO (previously IMCO), since 25 February 1969. She is actively 
involved in the governing bodies of UNEP, the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), and the Advisory Committee on Pollution of the Sea 
(ACOPS) 120 
. 
It is clear from the above review, that in Saudi Arabia, there are many 
organizations involved m preventing and combating pollution. However, the 
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effectiveness of such organizations depends undoubtedly on the degree of 
coordination among them when facing a pollution incident. 
3. The Legal Position of Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi Arabian concern and response to manne pollution problems have 
come as a reflection of the concern of the international community as a whole, 
especially in terms of timing, as the Saudi concern about these issues became 
obvious since the mid-1970s. As with most states, the Kingdom's approach to tn 
protecting and preserving the maritime environment has consisted of three types of 
action: Multilateral conventions and proposals, regional accords, and unilateral 
action. 
3.1 International Approach 
At the intemational level, the Saudi legal position may be assessed through 
the general statements made by the Saudi officials and representatives to relevant Z: ) 
international conferences, especially UNCLOS 111, on the one hand, and through 
the observance of international standards and rules, by the accession or the desire 
to accede to relevant international conventions, on the other. 
3.1.1 The Position at UNCLOS III 
At the 335th meeting of the second session of UNCLOS 111 (10 July 1974), 
the Saudi delegate addressed marine pollution problems in a general statement. Mr 
Al-Shahail said in this respect: 
Since Saudi Arabia had 122 nautical miles of coastline in waters 
subject to extensive marine pollution, it had been an active 
member of the Inter- Governmental Maritime 
Consultative 
Organization since 1969. It was party to the 1954 International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil and 
as the country with the highest output of oil in the world, 
had taken 
fundamental steps in this respect 121 . 
It is to be noted, however, that while this statement reflects the 
Saudi 
concern about marine pollution in general, the Saudi representative 
had In nund oil 
pollution in particular. When he said ... Saudi 
Arabia had 122 nautical miles of 
coastline in waters subject to extensi . ve mari . ne pollution..., 
he was talking about 
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the Arabian Gulf, wherein most operations of oil exploration and extraction 
occurred. This fact was expressly confirmed in the last part of the statement. In 
addition, by referring to the "fundamental steps"', Mr Al-Shuhail meant the 
Seaports and Lighthouse Regulations 122 , which had just been endorsed. However, 
from this statement, the Saudi Arabian legal position towards certain aspects of 
marine pollution was expressed collectively, either as a member at the Arab States 
Group or as a member of the Group of 77. 
The responsibility and liability of states to protect the marine environment 
was a "cornerstone" for the Arab States' representatives at UNCLOS 111. 
According to Article 41 of Part III of the Informal Single Negotiating Text 123 , 
(Article 236 of the Internal Composite Negotiating Text), the state was considered 
as responsible for activities under its jurisdiction or control. This situation, 
however 
, is not in the interest of the Arab States, which are regarded as coastal 
states rather than flag states. Therefore the Arab delegates attempted, from the 
beginning, to improve the forinula of the said text, which was subject to extensive 
discussions before it became Article 235 of the LOSC 124 . Initially, the text adopted 
the responsibility of the state regarding any damage to the marine environment 
resulting from activities under its jurisdiction 125 . Expressing their 
dissatisfaction 
with the situation, two Arab countries i. e. Egypt and Morocco submitted jointly 
two proposals on 23 April and 14 September of 1976 respectively, with the aim of 
amending the said Article 41, which became Article 44 of the Revised Single 
126 Negotiating Text . In these proposals, the state causing a 
damage to the marine 
environment shall be considered as responsible and compensation shall be required. 
As a result, under Article 236 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, the 
responsibility of the state concerning activities under its jurisdiction was omitted, 
but still Article 236 was not without its ambiguity in the view of the Arab Group. 
Thus, the other Arab states (including Saudi Arabia), and also Portugal 
joined Egypt and Morocco in submitting on 2 May 1978, an infonnal suggestion 
that Article 236 be amended 127 . This suggestion was 
based mainly on the 
proposals of Egypt and Morocco. In this collective proposal, it was provided for a 
44 claim for compensation" for any damage to the marine envirom-nent. It was 
suggested that the state's responsibility should be based on the rules of 
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international law in cases where the state causing pollution had carried out an act 
of sovereignty, and in accordance with private international law in other cases. It 
is clear that it was the goal of the suggestion to burden the state causing the 
enviroiunental damage with the responsibility for such an act, whether or not the 
activity causing pollution was regarded as a sovereign act. 
The Arab proposal provided also for the obligation to provide the injured 
party with recourse to national courts or authorities, in order that such party might 
obtain compensation or the repair of the darnage. In addition, it was suggested 
that financial and technical institutions be established at the regional and 
international levels to which compensation or reparation claims may be submitted 
when the party responsible for the damage is unknown or is unable to pay 
compensation or make reparation. Provision was finally made in the said proposal 
for co-operation in the development of international law relating to the protection 
of the marine environment, and to the assessment of damage, the payment of 
compensation and the settlement of related disputes. 
As a result of the pressures exercised by industrial states and certain flag of 
convenience states, the Arab Group submitted on 5 April 1979 another informal 
proposal containing slight amendments to the previous one"'. The latter proposal 
confirmed the liability of the state causing damage to the marine environment, 
whether tinder international law or the private law, and the right of the injured 
party to compensation. 
However, comparing Article 41 of the Informal Single Negotiating Text, 
which was the first formulation to be put forward on responsibility and liability 
concerning the damage to the marine environment, with Article 235 or the LOSC, 
129 devoted to the same purpose , 
it is to be noted that the latter was influenced to 
some extent by the proposal of the Group of Arab states. Under Article 235, the 
obligation of the coastal state as to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment was relieved. Secondly, the recourse to national remedies for 
compensation became available. Thirdly, the idea of developing international law 
related to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for 
damage and the settlement of disputes, was also included. This idea is the 
cornerstone of the Arab proposal, on the ground of the inadequacy of the then 
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international rules for the protection of the marine environment. Fourthly, 
depending on the Arab proposal, Article 235 contains the idea of developing the 
criteria and procedures for payment of adequate compensation, such as compulsory 
insurance or compensation funds. 
The Arab Group and Portugal submitted on 2 May 1978 a similar proposal 
concerning responsibility and liability for damage to the marine environment, 
resulting from marine research activities 130 . This Arab position led to certain 
amendments in the formulation of Article 34 of Part H of the Informal Single 
Negotiating Text 131 . Article 263 of the LOSC, on responsibility of damage 
resulting from the conduct of marine research, contains a reference to Article 235 
related to responsibility in respect of marine pollution in general 132 . This led to the 
uni II ification of the legal basis of responsibility and compensation for damage caused 
to the marine environment , including that caused by marine scientific research 
activities. 
Apart from responsibility and liability, at UNCLOS 111, there were two 
conflicting positions regarding the standards used for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment and allocation of enforcement power. On 
the one hand, there were the developed maritime powers. From the point of view 
of these powers, the establishment of "international standards" or "global 
measures" through competent international organizations, such as IMO, was 
necessary for the protection and preservation of the marine envirom-nent. 
Moreover 
, in the name of 
freedom of navigation and out of fear of awkward 
coastal regulations, the developed countries preferred the enforcement power to be 
133 given mainly to flag states and international organizations . 
On the other hand, 
the Group of 77 (to which Saudi Arabia belongs), strongly opposed these views, 
arguing that the coastal states should have the power to enforce anti-pollution rules 
and standards, not only in their territonal seas, but also in areas adjacent to them. 
They argued that because of such vague concepts as "international standards" and 
46 global measures", the coastal state's jurisdiction in the prevention and control of 
marine pollution was seriously weakened. The Group of 77 also believed that 
uniform international pollution standards would not meet the developing coastal 
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states' needs in terms of protecting their marine environment. In this respect. they 
called for states' co-operation on a global basis or on a regional basis to: 
conclude treaties, and formulate rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures consistent with [the] 
convention for the prevention of' marine pollution, taking into 
account characteristic regionalftatures, the economic capacity of 
developin(o, countries and their needfor economic developmentý34. 
However, in Article 211(4) of the LOSC, stipulation was made regarding 
the coastal state's right in the exercise of its sovereignty within its territorial sea to 
adopt laws and regulations Jbi- the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution. 11-omf6reign vessels, provided that innocent passage of these vessels was 
not hampered. This means that the coastal state may not prevent a foreign vessel 
threatening pollution from exercising innocent passage in its territorial sea. In the 
EEZ, the coastal state was granted lesser rights, as according to Paragraph 5 of the 
same article, it may for the said purpose adopt laws and regulations which should 
be in conformity with generally accepted international rules and standards 
established through the competent international organizations or general 
diplomatic conference. Thus, in its EEZ, the coastal state's right as to the 
protection of the marine environment could be described as "national in shape and 
international in essence", something which serves the interest of the flag state more 
than that of the coastal state. Rather, in conferring upon coastal states the right to 
adopt in certain areas of the EEZ (which are of particular sensitivity to pollution) 
135 
national rules and standards, more restricted than those adopted internationally, it 
was provided that such rules and standards would only be valid subject to certain 
conditions: first, the submission by the coastal state for that area of a 
communication to the competent international organizations, submitting supporting 
scientific and technical evidence and information on necessary reception facilities; 
secondly, the acceptance of the organization that the conditions in the said area 
correspond to the mentioned requirements 136 , and thirdly, 
the publication by the 
coastal state of the limits of the said area 137 . 
Furthermore, the Group of 77, including Saudi Arabia, favoured boarding, 
inspecting, and detaining vessels violating rules and international standards 
concerning the protection of the marine envirOmnent, whether such an action 
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occurs in te territorial sea or the EEZ of a state. The industrial states, on the 
other hand, opposed, in an attempt to maintain the freedom of navigation, the 
granting of such powers to the coastal state in the EEZ; rather, they called for the 
granting to the flag state of all powers related to the violations of vessels. 
However, the relevant texts of the LOSC 138 tried to balance the interests of the 
port state, the flag state and the coastal state. Accordingly, the coastal state has 
the right to carry out a physical inspection of the vessel violating its national laws 
and regulations related to the protection of the environment in the territorial sea: to 
require the violating vessel to give information when the violation occurs in the 
EEZ (however, inspection in this area is permitted for the coastal state only when 
the violation has resulted in a substantial discharge causing or threatening 
significant pollution of the marine environment) and to institute proceedings, 
including detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws, if in its EEZ, the 
vessel committed a violation resulting in a discharge causing major damage or 
threat of major damage to the coastal state's coasts 139 . 
However, in a subsequent 
provision, the Convention appeared to put the interests of the flag state above 
those of the coastal state. According to Article 228(l), proceedings to impose 
penalties in respect of any violation committed beyond the territorial sea are to be 
suspended as soon as the flag state institutes proceedings in respect of the same 
charges or within six months of the date on which proceedings were first instituted, 
unless there is major damage to the coastal state, or the flag state has repeatedly 
disregarded its obligation to enforce international rules and standards concerning 
the violations committed by its own vessels. 
It is clear from the above discussion, that apart from the emphasis on the 
importance of the protection and preservation of the marine envirom-nent, 
Saudi 
Arabia has not taken any individual position on this matter. Three subjects were 
raised by the Saudi delegation to the Conference. These were the responsibility 
and liability concerning the protection of the marine environment, the 
laying down 
of rules and standards, and the right to inspect and detain vessels violating such 
rules and standards. The Saudi position towards these 
issues was collectively 
expressed by Saudi Arabia either as a member to the Arab Group or the 
Group of 
77. As a developing country of very limited industrial capabilities, 
Saudi Arabia, 
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like the other countries belonging to the said two groups, favoured the interest of 
coastal states rather than flag states. As a result of the positions and counter 
positions of these states, the LOSC created a sort of balance in their interests, 
though, in certain areas, the interests of industrial powers were accorded priority 
over those of developing countries. 
3.1.2 The Position toward International Conventions 
Saudi Arabia shares common interest with the international community in 
the protection of the marine environment. The major international conventions to 
which Saudi Arabia is a party are the International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL 1954, as amended) 140 , the 1969 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), and its 
Protocol of 1976 141 . The OILPOL Convention regulates vessel-source pollution 
by imposing limitations upon deliberate, "operational" discharges of oil or oily 
mixtures. The CLC convention seeks to provide compensation to those who 
sustain damage from oil spills caused by accident and casualties, and to determine 
liability for such payments. 
Saudi Arabia is also a party to the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereoý 42 . This Convention prohibits 
the emplacement of such weapons (which could include biological and chemical 
weapons of mass destruction) and of installations specially designed to store, test 
or use them, on the seabed beyond twelve miles from the shore. Every party is 
entitled to verify through observation the compliance of other parties. In addition, 
the Kingdom, as mentioned earlier, is a party to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and was one of the first countries to sign the 
1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 143 , which represents the 
first comprehensive 
and global attempt to establish uniform obligations and standards for the control of 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. Apart from these conventions, 
there are other conventions, regarding which discussion has been initiated 
by the 
Saudi authorities 144 . These 
include the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the 
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sea, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water' 
45 
, the 1969 International Convention relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 
146 
, the 1973 
Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by 
Substances other than 011147 , the 1971 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
(Fund Convention) 
148, 
and the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
149 Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
From the above survey, two remarks may be drawn. First, while Saudi 
Arabia is a party to the CLC and its protocol, she has not yet acceded to the Fund 
Convention, although both conventions are regarded as supplementary to each 
other, in that they attempt to overcome the difficulties which my be faced by the 
victims of oil pollution. The CLC stipulates the liability of the shipowner when oil 
escapes or is discharged from a ship and causes damage on the territory, including 
the territorial sea of a contracting state"O. This is, however, subject to three 
exceptions: (1) damage resulting from war or acts of God; (2) damage caused 
wholly by an act or omission perpetrated by a third party with the aim to cause 
damage; (3) damage caused wholly by the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
government or other authority responsible for maintenance lights or other 
navigational aids"'. The Fund Convention provides that where the shipowner is 
not liable by reason of any of the said CLC exceptions, or in cases where the 
shipowner is financially unable to meet his obligations, or if the damage exceeds 
the limits of his liability, compensation is to be paid from the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund 152 . 
The second observation is that Saudi Arabia is 
not a party to the 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL Convention) 153 as amended by the Protocol of 1978 
154 
although this convention and its annexes would considerably extend the scope of 
protection against pollution of the sea from ships other than from dumping. Annex 
I to the Convention is concerned with oil, Annex 11 with noxious liquid substance 
in bulk, Annex III with hannful substances camed by sea in packaged forms, 
Annex IV with sewage, and Annex V with garbage. Moreover, the MARPOL 
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Convention reintroduces the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf as Special Areas, 
where the discharge of all types of pollutants is completely prohibited' 55 
Saudi Arabia's reservation regarding accession to the MARPOL 
Convention seems to be based on two points: First, the accession to the 
Convention will burden the Kingdom with further financial obligations in order to 
56 provide more effective reception facilities, as prescribed by the Convention' . 
Second. the ratification of the Convention will put the Kingdom under an 
obligation to prevent tankers, which are not committed to the Conventioni s 
provisions, frorn entering and loading from the Saudi ports and ten-ninals, which 
would affect the operations of oil marketing, and impose restrictions over the 
customers, %vho would, in choosinL)- the tankers, be bound by the Convention Is 
requirements. In other words, perhaps it was viewed that the adoption of 
international anti-pollution standards had meant increased costs for the oil industry 
and shipowners. 
However, these two considerations, if correct, do not seem to be 
convincing. The significant importance of protecting and preserving the marine 
environment, especially in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, is worth paying for, 
and sacrificing certain commercial benefits. The examination of the Convention 
shows that it does not put specific qualifications for the reception facilities 
required. In other words, there are various alternatives, some of which will fulfil 
the Convention's requirements without imposing great additional financial burdens. 
Moreover. the Saudi Arabian policy of non-adherence to the MARPOL 
Convention does not take into account the fact that most of such pollution is 
caused by foreign or Saudi vessels engaged in the export of oil. Saudi Arabia 
should subject both national and foreign vessels to the same regime of pollution 
control. It should be noted that the Convention does not discriminate between 
foreign and national vessels, so far as the control of pollution by vessels is 
concerned. 
As to the second consideration, it is noted that the Convention has granted 
enough time for shipowners to adjust to its conditions 157 . 
Hence it can be said that 
most oil tankers at the current time are in conformity with the standards of safety 
and marine environment protection, as prescribed by the Convention. Besides, the 
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tankers carrying Saudi oil are built in accordance to the most recent international 
specifications, otherwise they would not be allowed to enter the ports of countries 
in Europe, Asia and America, most of which are parties to the MARPOL 
Convention. Thus, it would be advisable for the Kingdom to consider her ability to 
accede to the MARPOL Convention, and to encourage the other states of the 
region to do so, since in that they would be entitled to greater powers to extend the 
scope of their marine environment protection against all sources of pollution from 
ships. 
3.2 Redonal Approach 
In what seems to be a response to calls made in the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment" )a number of regional conventions have 
been concluded 15 9. These conventions aimed to create a regional co-operative 
legal framework for the control of marine pollution in the relevant regional seas. 
Because of its geographical location, as a state bordering two seas, the Arabian 
Gulf to the east and the Red Sea to the west, Saudi Arabia is a party to two 
regional conventions, the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, or (KC) Kuwait 
Convention"O, and the 1982 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red 
Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment (JC), or Jeddah Convention 161 . The 
former 
instrument was adopted in 1978, in the Kuwait Regional Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment 
and the Coastal Areas, which was convened under the auspices of UNEP 162 . 
Before the adoption of the KC an Action Plan was first agreed on 163 . Furthermore, 
the Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and 
Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency was also adopted in the 
Conference 164 . The Jeddah Convention was adopted 
in the Jeddah Plenipotentiary 
Regional Conference (13-15 February, 1982), at the invitation of Saudi Arabia, 
and under the auspices of the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific 
Organization 165 . Before that, an 
Action Plan was agreed on 
166 
, and the 
Protocol 
concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency was also adopted in the Conference 167 . 
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The Kuwait Convention was followed by the adoption of two protocols in 1989 
and 1990 respectively. These are the Protocol concerning Marine Pollution 
resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf"8, and the 
Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from 
Laiid-Based Sources"9. 
In the following part of the study, there will be an attempt to analyse the 
general legal framework of these instruments, which lay down the obligations 
imposed LIPOII the parties to control marine POHUtI I ian 'on in the areas of the Arab' 
GLilf. and the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. 
3.2.1 The Conventions 
Four years elapsed between the adoption of two Conventions of Kuwait 
and Jeddah. However, the exarnination of both instruments shows that the latter 
was evidently modelled on the former, and that they were both influenced by other 
regional treaties. It is proposed to examine hereafter the general features of these 
two Conventions. 
3.2.1.1 Participation and Let! al Status 
The Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions are regarded as "closed" conventions, 
since membership of each of them is confined to specific states sharing common 
characteristics, the most important of which is geographical location. The two 
conventions contain no provision which prevents any party from acceding to any 
other regional treaty. Thus, Saudi Arabia, as mentioned earlier, because of her 
geographical setting, is a party to both Conventions. In addition to the Kingdom, 
seven other Gulf states are parties to the Kuwait Convention (KC): Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iraq, and Iran. The Convention was 
open for signature from 24 April to 23 July, and entered into force on I July 
1979 170 
. 
The Jeddah Convention (JC), on the other hand, was opened for signature 
on 14 February 1982 and entered into force on 20 August 1985 171 - The 
membership of the Convention is confined to Arab states bordering the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden' 72 . Thus, the parties to this convention are 
Jordan, Somalia, 
Palestine (represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization), Sudan, the two 
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former parts of Yemen (known today as the Republic of Yemen), Egypt, and the 
Kingdom 173 . 
Both Conventions contain a withdrawal clause. After the expiry of five 
years from the date of entry into force of either Convention, any Contracting Party 
may withdraw from the Convention by giving written notice to the Depository 
State (Saudi Arabia as to JC, and Kuwait as to KC). Withdrawal becomes valid 
twelve months after the date on which notification of withdrawal is received by the 
174 
Depository 
3.2.1.2 The Definition of Marine Pollution 
The JC and KC provide very similar definitions of the term 'Imanne 
pollution". The JC defines the term as: 
Introduction by, man, directýv or indirectly, or any substances or 
form of energy into the marine environment resulting or likely to 
result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources, 
hazzards to human health, hindrance to activities including fishing, 
175 impairment of qualityfor use at sea and reduction of amenities 
Compared with the KC definition, it is to be noted that the JC is more 
restricted and specific. The terms "substance", "energy", and "activities", which 
are included in both Conventions' texts are respectively preceded in the JC by the 
terms "any", "form of', and "marine". However, apart from these slight 
differences, the said definitions contain the same elements as that fon-nulated by the 
United Nations Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution 
(GESAMP)"'. The same formula is also found in a number of regional treaties 177 - 
In addition, it is noted that as is the case with other international and regional 
conventions, two conditions are to be met for marine pollution to be considered as 
such under the two Conventions. First, man must be the cause of the pollution; 
acts of God are not taken into account. Secondly, the introduction of substances 
must result or be likely to result in deleterious effects, referred to in the definition. 
The inclusion in the definition of the phrase "or likely to result in", represents 
precautionary measures for the protection of the marine envirom-nent and reduction 
of pollution. However, the Conventions do not define the period of time in which 
the probable damage may appear. 
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In comparison with the LOSC definition, it is clear that the latter contains 
new elements, such as references to "marine life" and "other legitimate uses of the 
sea". These elements are not found in the KC and JC. However. this does not 
seem to be of great significance, since the generality of the text could be 
interpreted to cover the said absent aspects. 
3.2-1.3 The Scope of Application 
Geographically, the KC applies to the whole maritime zone of the Arabian 
GLIlf, with the exception of the intemal waters of the Parties. Thus, these areas are 
confined to the body of water encompassing the EEZs, contiguous zones, and the 
territorial seas"' The JC, for its part, applies to the sea areas and environmental 
ecosystems of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Suez, Suez Canal up to its 
meeting point with the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Aden"9. As is the case with 
the KC, the JC excludes the internal waters of the Contracting Parties from the 
application of the Conventions, unless otherwise stated in the Conventions or in 
any of their Protocols. This is one of the shortcomings of the Conventions. 
However, the Jeddah Convention contains an additional provision, according to 
which, any Party is entitled to request the Regional Organization for the 
Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden EnvironmentI80, to subject the 
internal waters of those described as applicable, to the Convention and the 
activities resulting therefTom'81. 
In confining the geographical scope to the areas beyond the internal waters, 4:: ý 
the Conventions followed the model of some regional conventions, such as the 
Helsinki Convention' 82 , and the Barcelona Convention'". 
The Jeddah and Kuwait 
Conventions confirm that their provisions do not prejudice or affect the rights or 
claims of any contracting state as to the nature or extent of its jurisdiction 
established 'in accordance with international law' 84 , yet, 
jurisdictional claims of 
wider nature, such as the width of the territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ are 
left to intemational law. 
As far as sovereign irnrnunity is concerned, the Conventions do not apply 
to warships and other ships owned or operated by a state and used only on 
government non-commercial service. A similar provision is found in the MARPOL 
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Convention' 85 , Helsinki Convention' 
86 
, the 1976 Protocol of Dumping, attached to 
the Barcelona Convention' 87 , and the 
LOSC 188 
. 
Nonetheless, the Kuwait and 
Jeddah Conventions, as is the case with the other mentioned Conventions, require 
the Contracting Parties to ensure '(as far as possible"' the compliance of their 
exempted ships with the provisions of the Conventions' 89 . 
3.2.1.4 The Oblit! ations 
Under the Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions, the obligations for the 
protection of the marine environment from pollution are similar and expressed in 
general terms. Much of the detail was laid down in the Protocols which followed. 
Article 3(l) in each of the Conventions provides that the Contracting Parties 
should individually and jointly take all the appropriate measures in accordance with 
the Conventions and the Protocols In force to conserve the marine environment, 
including the prevention, abatement and combating of pollution. The same 
fon-nula is included in the Helsinki Convention'" and Barcelona Convention'9'. 
The Conventions further oblige the Parties to cooperate in the formulation and 
adoption of other protocols prescribing agreed measures, procedures and 
192 
standards for the implementation of the Conventions Moreover, the 
Contracting Parties of both Conventions have to establish national standards, laws 
and regulations as required for the effective discharge of the obligation provided in 
the first Paragraph of Article 3 to take appropriate measures to conserve the 
environment' 93. One fundamental duty imposed upon the state Parties is not to 
transfer any type or form of pollution to each other' 94 . 
This approach is also 
recognised in the two regional Conventions of Helsinki 
195 
and Paris 
196 
, and in 
Article 195 of the LOSC. Hence, through the KC and JC, the state Parties help in 
establishing the customary rule, the content of which is that a state is not allowed 
197 
to use its territory in such a manner as may cause damage to others . 
The two Conventions went further to oblige the Parties to take all the 
appropriate measures in conformity with the Conventions and the applicable rules 
of international law to prevent, abate and combat pollution from ships 
198 
, pollution 
caused by dumping from ships and aircraft'99, pollution from land-based sourceS200' 
pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the bed of the territorial 
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sea, the continental shelf and the subsoi 101, and pollution from other human 
activitieS202. The concern of the Parties to the two Conventions, with regard to oil 
pollution, was reflected in the introduction, at the time the Conventions were 
adopted, of two Protocols for the protection of the marine environment from oil 
pollution and other han-nful substances in cases of emergency. It is to be noted 
that in the Arabian Gulf area. some of the general obligations mentioned above 
ha-,,, e been elaborated, as mentioned earlier, by the subsequent introduction in 1989 
and 1990 of two protocols: the Protocol concerning Manne Pollution resulting 
from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, and the Protocol for 
the Protection of the Manne Environment against Pollution from Land-Based I 
Sources. 
In addition to the previous obligations, the Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions 
impose over the Parties the duty to take, individually and jointly, all the necessary 
measures to deal with pollution emergencies and to reduce or eliminate damage 
resulting therefrom. Any Party aware of an emergency must immediately notify 
the prescribed Regional Organization and the other Parties likely to be affected by 
such pollution 203 . 
This provision is similar to that adopted in the Barcelona 
Convention2O4 and the LO SC205. 
3.2.1.5 Liabili! y and Compensation 
In identical tenns, both the Kuwait Convention and the Jeddah Convention 
embody the principle of liability and compensation for damage resulting from 
pollution of the marine environment or fTom violation of the obligations under the 
Conventions and their Protoco IS206 . However, no specific rules regarding 
liability 
or compensation have been prescribed, although the Action Plans coupled with the 
Conventions recommended the adoption of an additional protocol on this matter. 
Instead, the Contracting Parties, for the determination of liability and 
compensation are to: 
undertake to co-operate in the formulation and adoption of 
appropriate rules andprocedures'07 . 
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In this, the Conventions seem to have followed the formulation adopted under 
Principle 22 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 
which stipulates that: 
states shall cooperate to develop further the international law 
regarding liabiliýv and compensation for the victims of pollution 
and other environmental damage caused by activities within the 
jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction 208 
209 This approach is also found in the Helsinki Convention and Barcelona 
2 Convention '0. But 
, it is noted that, unlike these two Conventions, the KC and JC 
contain a reference to "applicable international rules and procedures". Thus, the 
states Parties to Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions, when applying private law rules 
on the matters of liability and compensation are under obligation to consider 
international rules and non-ns. The "international rules and procedures" mentioned 
here, however, are meant to be those contained in the 1969 Civil Liability 
211 Convention and its Protocol of 1976 . It is to be added, finally, that besides the 
"enforcement reporting system"' adopted by Kuwait and Jeddah ConventionS212 I 
the Parties of both Conventions, for the enforcement of the Conventions and their 
Protocols and determination of violations raising liability and compensation, are 
obliged to lay down appropriate and practicable measures for detection and 
environmental monitoring, including adequate procedures for reporting and 
accumulation of evidence 
213 A similar "monitoring system" is, however, found in 
214 
the Barcelona Convention 
3.2.1.6 Settlement of Disputes 
VA-ffle both the Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions adopt "amicable mutual 
methods , 215 as a means for the settlement of disputes arising from the 
interpretation or application of the Conventions or their Protocols, they follow 
different mechanisms when the dispute cannot be resolved by such a means. Under 
the KC, the matter of the dispute is to be referred directly to the Judicial 
Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, which forms part of the Regional 
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment216. Under the JC, on 
the other hand, if a settlement is not reached through amicable means, the matter 
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shall be submitted first to the Council for consideration 217 . If the Council fails to 
reach a decision to resolve the dispute, then the matter must be referred to the 
Committee for the Settlement of Disputes whose decision is fina, 21 '. However, the 
records of neither Convention show any evidence of any dispute between the 
Parties with regard to the interpretation and appli I Convention's of the 
provisions. 
Commenting on the nature of the Ridicial Commission established under 
the Kuwait Convention, Al-Ashaal wonders whether the Commission is "a regional 
tribunal for the protection of the marine environment by the application of 
,2 19 international rules ... or it is an arbitration tribunal ... . However, the Arabic and 
English texts of the Convention are, it may be suggested, clear enough, since they I'D 11: ) Z: ) 
speak of a "Judicial Commission" rather than an "Arbitral Commission". 
Compared with other regional conventions, it is worth noting that all the 
Conventions are in han-nony, in referring first to peaceful means for the settlement t) 
of disputes arising from the interpretation or application of their provisions. 
However, they differ as to the next step, if a peaceful settlement cannot be 
reached. Under the Pans Convention of 1974, the dispute is to be referred to 
220 
Arbitration, at the request of any of the Parties concerned Thus, the 
Convention does not make the "common agreement" of the Parties concerned, a 
pre-condition for submission of a difference matter to arbitration. The Helsinki 
Convention of 1974 adopts the principle of arbitration, whether by an ad hoc 
tribunal or pen-nanent arbitration tribunal or even the International Court of 
Justice 221 
. 
However. ) the 
latter makes it a pre-condition that such procedures must 
be commonly agreed upon by the Parties concerned 
211 
- 
The Barcelona 
Convention, for its part adopts, as a general rule, the possibility of reference to 
arbitration by the common agreement of the dispute parties 
223 
. 
The Convention 
further adopts the principle of "reciprocity", whereby, according to the 
Convention: 
... the 
Contracting Parties may at any time declare that they 
recognise as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, 
in relation to any other Party accepting the same obligation, the 
application of the arbitration procedure in conformity with the 
provisions ofAnnex A 
224 
. 
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From the above discussion, it may be inferred that it is the desire of the 
Parties to both the Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions to settle their disputes ansing 
from the interpretation or application of the Conventions under the umbrella of the 
Regional Organizations concerned. This is seemingly aimed at lessening the 
importance of possible disputes between the Parties, something which may be 
expected to improve and increase the effectiveness of the Conventions in 
protecting -the marine environment 
in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden. 
3.2.1.7 The Organizational Framework 
The effectiveness of any legal instrument remains undoubtedly subject to 
the implementation of its provisions, a process which usually takes two forms. 
First, the adoption by the states Parties of measures and procedures stipulated in 
the instrument. In this respect the KC and JC, as mentioned earlier, oblige the 
Parties to adopt national laws and regulations. They further provide for co- 
operation of the Parties to prepare effective research, monitoring and assessment 
systems, and to develop environmental standards and technical guidelineS225 . The 
second means , is to follow-up the instrument's application through competent 
institutions, whether national, regional or international. Both Conventions oblige 
each Contracting Party to establish a national authority, with the aim of 
harmonising national policies concerning the protection of the marine 
environment226 . 
The Conventions also provide distinctly for the establishment of 
two Regional Organizations for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the 
two areas of the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea 227 - 
The permanent headquarters of 
the Arabian Gulf Regional Organization is located in Kuwait City, while the Red 
Sea Regional Organization is based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The structure of the 
organization is similar in both cases. It is composed of a Council, a General 
Secretariat and a body for the settlement of disputes, called a "Judicial 
Commission" under the KC, and a "Committee" under the JC. 
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3.2.1.7.1 The Council 
Membership of the two Councils is i-nade up of the Contracting Parties. 
Similarly. both Conventions provide for the competence of the General Secretariat 
to call meetings of the Council, which could be held once a year, in the case of 
ordinary meetings. In relation to extraordinary meetings, according to the KC, 
such meetings may be held upon the request of at least one Contracting state, 
endorsed by at least one Contracting Party, or upon the request of the Executive 
Secretary endorsed by at least two Contracting Parties. A similar provision is 
found in Article 14 of the Barcelona Convention. Under the JC, the Council 
Parties extraordinarily, however, meet when the head of the Council finds it 
necessary or when lie receives a request from at least one third of the Contracting 
Parties. Another difference between the two Conventions is as to the meeting 
quorum. Under the KC, it is three quarters, while it is two thirds under the JC. 
The meetings of the Council are to convene in the Organization headquarters, i. e. 
Kuwait and Jeddah, but they may also be held, under the KC, at any other place 
agreed upon by consultation amongst the Contracting States or, as provided for 
under the JC, at any other place deten-nined by the Council's decision. In both 
Councils, each Party has one vote. Decisions require an unanimous vote on 
substantive matters and a three-quarters majority of the Contracting Parties present 
and voting, as to procedural issues, according to the KC, and two-thirds majority 
of the present and voting Contracting States, under the 
jC228. 
As to the functions of the Council, it is noted that in the JC, these are more 
elaborated. The common functions of the Council, stipulated under the two 
f 011OWS229: Conventions, areas I 
- to review continuously the implementation of the Conventions and their 
Protocols and the Action Plans; 
- to review and evaluate the state of the marine environment; 
- to make recommendations regarding the adoption of any additional protocols 
or any amendments to the Conventions or their Protocols; 
- to adopt, review and amend when required the annexes to the 
Conventions and 
to their Protocols; 
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to consider the reports submitted by the Contracting Parties and the General 
Secretariat; 
to establish subsidiary bodies and ad hoc working groups, when required, to 
consider any matters related to the Conventions and their Protocols; 
to appoint the Secretary General; and 
to consider and carry out any additional duties necessary for the achievement 
of the purposes of the Conventions and their Protocols. 
Besides. ) the JCI as mentioned above, granted the Council further 
authorities, such as: 
the adoption and conclusion within the aims of the Convention of agreements 
with states or other similar organizations; 
the settlement of any differences between Contracting States as to the 
interpretation or implementation of the Convention or its Protocols; 
- the adoption of financial rules determining, in particular, the contributions of 
the Contracting Parties; 
- the adoption of the financial budget of the organization; 
- the adoption of the projects and budgets of the Organization activities; 
- the approval of a report on the work and activities of the Organization for the 
infonnation of the ALESCO General Conference; and 
- the definition and development of relations between the Organization and Arab 
organizations or bodies. 
In addition to the above, the Council in both Regional Organizations is to 
supervise the activities of the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centres, the 
establishment of which is provided for, as we will see, in special Protocols (Article 
XIII of Emergency Protocols). 
3.2.1.7.2 The Secretariat 
Both Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions stipulate the establishment of a 
"Secretariat", headed by an Executive Secretary (according to the KC) or a 
General Secretary (according to the JC). The functions of the Secretariat are 
similar under both ConventionS230: 
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- to convene and prepare the meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies 
and working groups; 
- to transmit to the States Parties notifications, reports and other information; 
- to consider enquiries by and infori-nation from the Contracting Parties and to 
consult with them; 
to prepare reports on matters relating to the Conventions and other 
instruments and administration of the Organizations; 
to establish, maintain and disseminate an up-to-date relevant collection of 
regulations of Contracting Parties; 
- to provide technical assistance and also advice for the drafting of national 
legislations for the effective implementation of the Conventions and their 
Protocols; 
- to perform such other functions, as may be assigned to it by the Council, and 
- to carry out its functions, in accordance with the Protocols to the Convention 
(the KC adds). Most of these "secretariat functions"' are provided for by the 
Barcelona Convention, although the latter does not provide for the 
establishment of a Secretariat, and instead, is satisfied with the designation of 
the United Nations Enviro=ent Programme as a body responsible for the 
carrying out of the said secretariat taskS231 . 
3.2.1.7.3 The Bodies for the Settlement of Disputes 
As mentioned earlier, both Conventions provide for the establishment of a 
body for the settlement of disputes. Under the KC, this body is called a "Judicial 
Commission"', the internal regulations and competence of which were defined in 
the first meeting of the Council. Under the JC, the body is called the 
"Committee", and the authority of this Committee is to be regulated by a separate 
protoco 1232. 
3.2.1.7.4 The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centres 
The establishment of these two centres was provided for by the Protocols, 
adopted at the same time as the Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions were adopted. In 
identical language, Article 3 of the Protocols to both Conventions concerning 
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Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances in Cases of Emergency reads: 
The Contracting Parties hereby establish the Marine Emergency 
Mutual Aid Centre... 
. 
The Arabian Gulf Region Centre was established in Bahrain in 1982 at the 
suggestion made by the IMO, before the convening of the 1978 Kuwait Regional 
Conference. In providing for the establishment of a similar centre in the Red Sea 
region, the JC Protocol follows the pattern of the KC Protocol and the 1976 
Barcelona ProtocO1233 , under which a regional centre was established at Malta. 
The objectives of these Centres are also similar: 
- to facilitate co-operation among the Contracting Parties in order to combat 
pollution by oil and other hannful substances; 
- to assist Parties, which so request, to combat pollution and also to facilitate 
infonnation exchange, training and technological co-operation and assistance; 
and 
- the possibility of initiating operations to combat pollution 
234 
. 
In any case, the functions of the Gulf and the Red Sea Centres are wider than those 
of the Malta Centre. As stated in Article 3(3) of both Protocols, they include the 
collection and dissemination to the Parties of information concerning matters 
covered by the Protocols, the co-ordination of training programmes for combating 
pollution and the establishment of liaison with competent regional and international 
organizations, particularly the IMO, in order to obtain and exchange scientific and 
technological data. The Centres are also to render assistance to the Contracting 
Parties in the preparation of marine emergency contingency plans and in 
establishing procedures, whereby personnel, equipment and materials involved in 
marine emergency responses may be expeditiously transported into, out of and 
through their respective countries. 
From the above discussion on the institutional arrangements adopted by the 
two Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah, it can be concluded that these two 
instruments are distinguished for their form which presents a Regional 
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Enviromnent in the two regions of 
the Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They are also distinguished 
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in dividing the works and activities of these Organizations among four separate 
organs: the Council, the Secretariat, the body for settling disputes, and the Marine 
Emergency Mutual Aid Centre. Comparing other regional conventions, we find 
that the Barcelona Convention uses the term "organization" *in passing references 
to mean the United Nations Environment Programme, which was designated as 
ý235 responsible for carrying out certain "secretariat functions' . Under the Helsinki 
Convention, provision was made for the establishment of the Baltic Marine 
Environment Protection Commission 236 
. But, apart from the settlement of 
disputes, a function which was entrusted, as mentioned earlier, to an arbitration 
tribunal, nearly all the other tasks of the Coun6ls and Secretariats, established 
under the KC and JC were allocated to the said Commission. 
What should be noted finally, however, is that while the Regional 
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Arabian Gulf and 
its organs were established as accomplished facts and have contributed reasonably 
successfully to the protection of the Gulf marine environment, we firid on the other 
hand, that the Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden Enviroru-nent and its organs have no existence except on paper, despite 
the fact that the JC has been in force since 20 August 1985. This procrastination 
in establishing the Organization is probably attributable to the political differences 
which have been in existence since the adoption of the Convention, and which 
were behind the non-effectiveness of the Convention as a whole. As mentioned 
earlier, the membership of the Convention was confined to the Arab states 
bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In other words, Ethiopia, Israel and 
Eritrea as non-Arab states are excluded. Egypt acceded to the Convention only 
after renormalizing its diplomatic relationship with the other Arab states. Djibuti 
was not enthusiastic even to attend the Jeddah Conference in which the 
Convention was adopted. These considerations have made the Convention 
probably the least efficient regional convention for the protection of the marine 
environment of any of the LJNEP regional sea areas. In recent years, however, 
there has been a glimmer of hope with regard to the establishment of the 
Organization. In their meeting on 24 November 1993 the Arab Ministers 
Responsible for Environmental Affairs welcomed the formation of the 
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Organization with considerable status and confirmed that the Organization, when 
fori-ned, will be under the umbrella of the Arab League 237 . On 26 September 1995, 
the Organization Council, which consists of the minister concerned with 
environmental affairs in the States Parties to the JC, met (for the first time! ) 'in 
Cairo, and declared through the so-called Cairo Declaration 238 the establishment of 
the Organization. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, no conCrete steps have been 
taken in this direction. However, unless the Organization and its organs are to see 
the light of the day, the Jeddah Convention and its Protocol will remain merely ink 
on paper. 
3.2.2 The Protocols 
Following the authorisation given in the KC23 9 and jC24' relating to the :D 
adoption of additional protocols four protocols have been adopted. Three of these 
have been attached to the KC. They include the Protocol concerning Regional Co- 
operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Ernergency(197 8)241, the Protocol concerning Marine Pollution resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf (198 9)242 , and the 
Protocol 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based 
sources (1990)243. On the other hand, one protocol only was attached to the JC, 
i. e., the Protocol conceming Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil 
and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of EmergencY244 . 
The most important 
provisions of these Protocols will be examined in the following section. 
3.2.2.1 The Protocols concernin Regional Co-operation in Combatin 
Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Emergency 
These Protocols were adopted with the Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah 
and entered into force alongside them. The JC Protocol follows almost verbatim 
the KC Protocol. 
Under both Protocols, "marine emergency" is defined as: 
any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, 
resulting in substantial pollution or imminent threat of substantial 
pollution to the marine environment by oil or other harmful 
substances including collisions, strandings and other incidents 
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involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising from 
petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of 
oil or other harmful substances arising from the failure of 
industrial installationS245. 
This comprehensive definition combines the two definitions adopted by the 1969 
International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties (Brussels Convention)246 
, and the 1973 Protocol relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas In Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other 
than Oil (London Protoc 01)247. 
Unlike the Conventions, the Protocols do not confine their geographical 
scope to the "Sea Area",, described under the Conventions as the areas beyond the 
internal waters. Their provisions extend to apply to ports, harbours, estuaries, 
bays and lagoons 248 . On the other hand, the Protocols, unlike what is stipulated 
under Article 1(2) of the Brussels Convention 249 , are silent on the sovereign 
immunity of ships. In other words, they make no mention as to either to the 
inclusion or the exclusion of warships and other ships owned or operated by a 
state, and used only on government non-commercial service. However, it is very 
unlikely to be the intention of the States Parties to both Protocols to exclude such 
ships from sovereign immunity, since the Protocols themselves work under the 
umbrella of the Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah which, as mentioned earlier, 
provide for the exclusion from their provisions, of warships and other ships owned 
or oeprated by a state and used only on government non-commercial service. 
Saudi Arabia, for example as one of these states, follows, as will be seen below, a 
policy of restrictive immunity. It appears that when laying down the Protocols' 
rules, the legislators had Mi mind the fact that the marine pollution resulting 
particularly from oil is usually caused by oil tankers, owned often by private 
companies. 
The Protocols provide, as mentioned earlier, for the establishment of 
Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centres, which are designated to deal with 
emergency caseS25 0. The Parties to both Protocols are also under obligation to 
cooperate in combating imminent danger to their coastlines or related interests 
from the presence or threat of oil or other harmful substanceS25 
'. These provisions 
resemble those adopted by the 1976 Barcelona Protocol concerning Co-operation 
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in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harrnful 
Substances in Cases of EmergencY252 , and the Brussels Convention of 1969 and its 
Protocol of 1973 253 . The Protocols of Barcelona, Kuwait and Jeddah go further, 
however, to broaden the means used in dealing with the emergency cases to 
include all available equipment, ships and aircraft '54 . 
There is also a great deal of similarity between the Kuwait and Jeddah 
Protocols and the Brussels Convention as to intervention action in cases of 
emergency. Some measures adopted by these three instruments are regarded as 
exceptions to the exclusivity of the flao- state's Jurisdiction. Under the Protocols, 
the state Party faced with a marine emergency situation has the right to take 
appropriate measures to combat pollution and mitigate its damage '55 . 
The state 
concerned, however, should immediately inform the other Parties, either directly or 
through the Centre, of its action in this respect, in consultation with the Parties, 
affected states and the Centre 25 '. A similar approach is included in the 1969 
Brussels Convention, but the latter does not stipulate "prior notification or 
consultation" when the intervention becomes "necessary by the urgency of the 
-ý257 fi situation' Moreover, the Brussels Convention provi or the avoidance of 
"risk to human life" before undertaking the combating measureS258 While the 
Protocols do not. The Protocols, further, lack the provision concerning the 
46proportionality" between the "measures" and "damage", the pnnciple contained in 
the Brussels Convention 259 
The legitimacy of the intervention of the States Parties to both Protocols In 
the cases of emergency could be viewed as questionable in terms of the freedom of 
navigation, especially since, as pointed out above, the geographical scope of the 
Protocols extends to the high seas. This argument is incorrect, since, first, some 
states of the two regions of the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea are parties to the 
1969 Brussels Convention, e. g. United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait in 
the Gulf, and Egypt and Yemen in the Red Sea, and yet their right to intervene 
with the aim of combating pollution and protecting their coastlines will be justified, 
at least on a conventional basis. Secondly, the coastal states may also justify their 
intervention on the high seas on the basis of the two customary international 
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principles of self-defence and necessity. Commenting on the norm of self-defence, 
Bowett argues: 
The essence of self-defence is a wrong done, a breach of a legal duty owed to the state acting in se4f-defence. This element is 
predominant in the writings of the early jurists and is clearly 
essential if'seýfldefence is to be regarded as a legal concept. The 
breach of duýv violates a substantive right, for example the right of 
territorial integrity, and gives rise to the right ofse4f-defence 260 . 
As to the nonn of necessity he states elsewhere: 
the circumstances in which necessity may excuse the non- 
observance of the duties imposed by international law ... are those in which ..., the rights of an innocent state are infringed 
261 
. 
By and large, this doctrine of necessity may justify intervention action, if 
the degree of necessity is evaluated by balancing the interests of the shipowners 
against those of the state acting on the basis of necessity, on the understanding that 
the danger to the substantive rights of the coastal state is imminent and the 
intervention action should be to supply a remedy proportionate to the sloficance 
of the threatened rightS262. Such an approach is confirmed by the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, many parts of which reflect pre- 
existing customary international law. Article 221 of the Convention takes the law 
further from the 1969 Convention as it provides that: 
Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of states, pursuant to 
international law, both customary andý conventional, to take and 
enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the 
actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related 
interests, including fishing, ftom pollution or threat of pollution 
following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a 
casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major 
harmful consequences. 
Thus, the right of intervention beyond the territorial sea in a marine emergency 
situation is ensured to all the states of the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, whether 
on a conventional or customary legal basis. 
In sum, these two Protocols would undoubtedly be more effective if the 
said Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centres were given full competence in 
initiating operations to combat marine pollution by oil and other harmful 
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substances, at the regional level, and without seeking approval by the Council as 
stipulated under Article 111(2)(c) of both Protocols. 
3.2.2.2 The KC Protocol concerninp- Marine Pollution Resultinp- from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf 
The Arabian Gulf is known as a region containing the biggest oil reserves 
in the world. Accordingly, sea-bed activities concerning the exploration and 
exploitation of oil represent a lasting source of the marine environmental pollution. 
Aware of this fact, and in a response to the obligations imposed upon them 'in 
Articles 111(b), VII and XIX of the Kuv,, ait Regional Convention, the States Parties 
to the Convention signed (in a relatively late step) the Protocol concerning Marine 
Pollution resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf on 
29 March 1989. It entered into force on 17 February 1991. Having refer-red to 
certain Articles of the LOSC, i. e. Article 76 (on the definition of the continental 
shelf), Article 197 (on co-operation on a alobal or regional basis with regards to 
the marine environment), and Article 208 (respecting pollution from sea-bed 
activities subject to national jurisdiction), the Preamble of the Protocol highlights 
its significance in facing: 
the danger posed to the marine environment and to human health 
ky pollution from exploration and exploitation of the Continental 
Shelf, and the serious problems resulting therefrom in the Sea 
Area under ... nationaIjurisdictions. 
Under the Protocol, the term "offshore operations", which is mainly 
intended by the Protocol's provisions, is defined as: 
anýv operations conducted in the Protocol Areafor the purposes of 
exploring of oil or natural gas or for the purposes of exploiting 
those resources, including any treatment before transport to shore 
and any transport of the same by pipeline to shore. 
It includes 
also any work of construction, repair, maintenance, inspection or 
like operation incidental to the main purpose of exploration or 
exploitation 
263 
. 
The application area of the Protocol has been defined to 
include: 
the Sea Area as defined in Paragraph (a) of Article II of the 
Convention [Kuwait Regional Convention] and all parts of its 
Continental Sheýf contiguous therewith 264 . 
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Thus, in the light of the fact that the geographical setting of the Gulf renders its 
sea-bed area as a whole as a continental shelf divided between the littoral stateS265 
the present Protocol covers all sea-bed areas of the Arabian Gulf 
In its Article 11, the Protocol confirms the Parties' basic obligations, 
previously stipulated under the KC (Article VII), according to which Contracting 
Parties, individually or jointly, shall take within the limits of their jurisdiction, and 
without prejudice to the specific obligations accepted under the Protocol, an 
appropriate measures in order to prevent, abate and control marine pollution 
resulting from offshore operations. These provisions are inspired by both the 
Geneva and LOSC Conventions, which together call upon states to avoid both 
deliberate and accidental sea-bed pollution. Articles 24 of the High Seas 
Convention, and 208(l) and 214 of the LOSC provide that every state shall draw 
up regulations to prevent pollution from pipelines or from exploration or 
exploitation of the sea-bed. Article 5(7) of the Continental Shelf Convention 
obliges the states to take, in the safety zones around the continental shelf 
installations, all appropriate measures to protect the living resources of the sea 
from harmful agents. To that end, the Protocol calls for the employment of the 
best available feasible technology, but the Protocol is flexible on this requirement, 
as it connects it with the economic capability of the Parties. 
For the achievement of that basic obligation, which represents its major 
objective, the Protocol enumerated a number of "sub-obligations" or means. 
These "sub-obligations" are imposed, through each Contracting Party, 
upon the operator, which means: 
any natural or juridical person who undertakes offshore 
operationS266. 
The competence of supervision to prevent pollution from sea-bed activities in the 
Protocol is granted to every single state, separately. In other words, unlike the 
Kuwait Convention, the Protocol, for example, addresses the States Parties as 
individual entities and yet the measures for the protection of the marine 
environment from the said source are to be taken individually rather than jointly. 
Most of these measures or obligations are to be observed by the operator before 
the commencement of offshore operations. In this context, no Contracting State 
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should allow the carrying out of any offshore operation in any of the Protocol 
areas falling within its jurisdiction, ) except by virtue of a permission, granted by the 
competent authority in that state. The granting of such a licence is subject to 
certain conditions to be met by the operator: the submission of an assessment of 
the environmental impact, and the satisfaction of the competent authority that the 
operation will not lead to unacceptable damage in the Protocol Area or any 
adjacent coastal area 267 . 
In the event that the state concerned does not call for 
such an assessment, it shall consider calling for a survey of the marine environment 
268 and the aquatic life therein before the start of the proposed operation 
As to the survey works in general, the Contracting Party is to ensure the 
readiness of the operator to conduct surveys on environmental conditions in the 
vicinity of his offshore installations, whether penodically or on such occasions as 
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the competent authonty may reasonably require , including the case following the 
completion of a pipeline installation, and the case following the removal of a 
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production platform 
Aware of the fact that the installation and operation of equipment for 
drilling and production of oil and gas, represent the main pollution sources, 
detailed provisions regarding their adequacy and safety are laid down in the 
Protocol. Under the Protocol, the Parties have to take practical measures to 
ensure that offshore installations and equipment are licensed by the competent 
authority, with confirmation that they are designed, constructed, placed, equipped, 
operated and maintained in a manner that does not cause accidental damage to the 
marine environment271. 
Of the precautionary measures that precede the commencement of an 
offshore operation, the Protocol obliges the operator to prepare two kinds of 
plans. Firstly, a contingency plan must be made to deal with any event during the 
operations which may cause serious pollution to the environment. Such a plan 
should be approved by the competent state authority, and the operator himself has 
to prove his capability to implement the plan. Furthermore, the plan should be in 
harmony with the national contingency plans and those plans prepared by the 
Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre, and it must contain clear definitions of the 
roles and powers of the industry and governmental authorities 
272 
. 
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Secondly, the operator is under an obligation to prepare a "Chemical Use 
Plan", which shows the type of chemicals the operator will employ. The plan is 
subject to approval by the competent state authority, which is authorised to 
prohibit the use of any particular chemical, for the protection of the marine 
environment, taking into account the guidelines issued by the regional 
273 organization 
As regards the obligations of the Parties during offshore operations, the 
Protocol imposes a number of restrictions over the operator. First, in that part of 
the Protocol Area, designed as a Special Area: 
no machinery space drainage from an offshore installation shall 
be discharged into the sea unless the oil content thereof does not 
74 
exceed 15 mg per litre whilst undiluted2 . 
This provision is one of the significant features of the Protocol, since it adopts the 
same geographical concept of the "Special Area", as provided by the MARPOL 
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derived from drilling operations, no other discharge from an offshore installation 
into the sea shall have an oil content greater than 40 mg per litre as an average in 
any calendar month, and shall not at any time exceed 100 mg per litre, except in 
the cases of accidents or other causes beyond the control of the operator 276 . 
Thirdly, discharge points for oily wastes shall be placed below the surface of the 
sea as appropriate 277 . 
Fourthly, the operator should take all necessary measures to 
minimise losses of oil into the sea from oil and gas collecting or flared from well 
testing278 . 
Fifthly, the use and discharge of oil-based drilling fluids is prohibited in 
drilling operations in the Protocol Area except with the consent of the competent 
state authority279. Sixthly, the operator should ensure that the water-based drilling 
mud discharged from offshore operations must not contain persistent systematic 
toxins which may continue as a threat to the environment after the initial drilling 
fluid discharge 280 
, and 
finally, the operator should provide an adequate system for 
collection and proper disposal of unwanted substances, give proper instructions on 
their use, and provide for penalties for improper disposal28 
I. 
In addition to what has been mentioned, the Protocol for the protection of 
the marine environment, did not omit the subject of installations or structures, 
which are abandoned or disused. In this regard, the operator is to ensure the 
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flushing and removal of any residual pollutants from pipelines, which should be 
either buried or removed afterwards, so as not to cause any risk or hindrance to 
navigation or fishing. For the same reason, all platforms and other sea-bed 
apparatus and structures are to be removed in whole or in part, but not to be 
deposited on the sea-bed of the continental shel f82 . The latter provision is inspired 
by Article 60(3) of the LOSC, which stipulates that: 
Any installation or structures which are abandoned or disused 
shall be removed to ensure safqv of navigation... . 
Such removal 
should also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the 
marine environment and the rights and duties of other states. 
Thus, the Protocol does not neglect the obligations of the Contracting Parties 
towards the international community, particularly In relation to the freedoms of 
navigation and fishing. To that end, Paragraph I of Article V, in express language 
reads: 
Each Contracting State shall endeavour to ensure that o hore Ofs 
operations within its jurisdiction shall not cause unjustifiable 
interference with lawful navigation, fishing or any other activity 
carried on under a bilateral or multilateral agreement or on the 
basis of international law, and that in siting an installation, due 
regard shall be had to existing pipelines and cables. 
In this, the Protocol adopts the provisions, found in Articles 5(l) of the 
Continental Shelf Convention, and 78 of the LOSC. However, such measures are 
vital to be adopted by the Protocol, since in the Arabian Gulf, there are massive 
installations and structures, which may interfere with navigation and fishing, 
whether they are in operation or abandoned. 
It is worth noting that although the Protocol is designed to deal with 
in marine pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the conti ental 
shelf, it singles out one of its articles for pollution by dumping. Article X of the 
Protocol prohibits all plastics (including synthetic ropes, synthetic fishing nets and 
plastic garbage bags), paper products, rags, glass, metal, bottles, crockery, 
dunnage and lining and packing materials from being disposed into the sea. 
Besides, the Protocol prohibits the discharge of food wastes into the sea within 12 
miles from the nearest land. Sewage shall not be discharged into the Protocol 
Area from an installation permanently manned by ten or more persons, 
before 
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comminution and disinfection, and provided that it is discharged at a distance of 
more than 12 nm from the nearest land, or passed through a treatment plan 
approved by the competent state authority. The Contracting Party, for its part, is 
to provide at convenient points on its coastline, reception facilities for general 
garbage from offshore installations operating in the area of its jurisdiction. 
Comparing this Protocol with the 1972 London Convention on Dumping, it is 
noted that the latter contains more details on pollution by dumping283 . However, it 
is not clear whether the States Parties to the Kuwait Convention will be satisfied 
with these provisions, which are not strict enough, in facing the pollution of 
dumping wastes. That seems to be the case, unfortunately, at least in the short 
tenn. 
The above discussion shows that the Protocol adopts the most relevant 
international standards for the protection of the Gulf marine environment against 
pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of activities on the continental 
shelf. However, the Protocol is silent on the issue of liability and compensation, 
although, as mentioned earlier, the Kuwait Convention contains in its Article XIII, 
a general provision committing its Parties to develop a special regime for the 
determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from violation of 
the obligations under the Convention and its Protocols. Nevertheless, the Protocol 
remains of considerable significance both regionally and internationally. 
Regionally, the Protocol is designed to provide such protection as can reasonably 
be given against marine pollution emanating from exploration and exploitation of 
the continental shelf in the Arabian Gulf region, where a great deal of oil and gas 
exploratory and exploitationary drilling activities occur. At the international level, 
the Protocol, with what it contains of rules and measures, may be viewed as a 
"legal precedent", through which the Gulf States render a valuable contribution for 
the development of this aspect of international law. 
3.2.2.3 The KC Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
against Pollution from Land-Based Sources 
In a response to the obligation imposed upon the States Parties to the 
Kuwait Regional Convention in its Articles III(b), VI and XIX, this Protocol was 
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opened for signature on 21 February 1990 in Kuwait, and entered into force on 2 
January 1993. In the Preamble of the Protocol, reference is made to relevant 
obligations under relevant international legal instruments, in particular. the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Montreal Guidelines of 
1985 for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Land- 
Based Sources 2ý4 , so as to acknowledge those obligations and to make it clear that 
there is to be neither derogation from nor conflict with them. 
Among other legal terrns, the Protocol defines Land-Based Sources as: 
nizinicipal, industi-i'al oi- aai-icidtiwal sow-ces, both fixed and 
inobilc on land, dischai-ges fi-onz which i-each the Marine 
E170i'omnel7t, as outlined in Ai-ticle III q/'[the] pl_OtOCO, 
285. 
Article III elaborates on these sources to cover discharges from any land-based 
sources located within the territories of the Contracting States, whether through 
water, through the atmosphere or directly form the coast , including those from 
outtalls and pipelines discharging into the sea, those through rivers, canals, or 
other watercourses (including underg--round watercourses) and those resulting from 
fixed or mobile offshore facilities, used for purposes other than exploration and 
exploitation of the sea-bed, its subsoil and the continental shelf. However, the 
Protocol does not provide a defimtion of the term, 44fixed or mobile offshore 
facilities". In that respect, it is not clear whether the legislator intended to be 
satisfied with the definition contained in the previously discussed Protocol 
concerning Marine Pollution resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf (Article 1(12). This is one of the defects of the present Protocol. 
Back to the Land-Based Sources definition, it is noted that with minor 
differences in the formulation, the said defirution is contained in two previous 
regional conventions: the 1974 Paris Convention 
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and the 1980 Protocol for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based sources 
(the Mediterranean ProtoCol)287 . The two 
last instruments, however, go further by 
listing a number of substances, which have been classified in accordance with their 
toxicity, persistence and bloaccumulation 
288 
. 
Geographically, the Protocol covers in addition to the Sea Area, defined in 
Article 11 of the Kuwait Convention, the waters on the landward side of the 
baselines and extends in the case of watercourses, up to the freshwater limit and 
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salt water marshes communicating with the sea 289 . Thus, this Protocol, as is the 
case with the Protocols concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil 
and other Harrnful Substances in Cases of Emergency, attached to the two 
Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah, cures the defect of the Conventions regarding 
the geographical scope. Again, in that respect, the Protocol follows the patterns of 
the Paris Convention 290 and the Mediterranean Protoco1291. 
Unlike the Pans Convention and Mediterranean Protocol or even the 
previously discussed Protocols adopted in the Gulf and the Red Sea, the present 
Protocol does not initial its provisions by emphasising, in a separate article, the 
general obligation of the Contracting Parties towards the protection of the marine 
environment against pollution resulting from land-based sourceS292. Instead, the 
Protocol, having defined the pollution sources, lays down the practical measures 
leading to the fulfilment of the said obligation. These measures which should be 
obsen, ed by the Parties are mainly divided into three categories: measures on 
source control, measures on joint and/or combined effluent treatment and those 
concerning regional and local regulations and permits for release of wastes. As far 
as the first category is concerned, Article IV of the Protocol provides, similarly to 
what is contained in Article 5 of the Mediterranean Protocol, that the Parties are to 
pledge themselves to implement and develop, jointly or individually as appropriate, 
the action programmes as outlined in Annex I to the Protocol. The programmes, 
measures and the timetables for implementation, aimed at reducing pollution from 
land-based sources, shall be fixed by the Parties, and if necessary, reviewed every 
two years. 
As to the second category of measures, the States Parties are under an 
obligation to implement, whether individually or jointly, industrial location 
planning programmes as outlined in Annex 11 to the Protocol. The regional 
guidelines and standards, along with the programmes, measures and timetables for 
implementation with the aim of reducing pollution from land-based sources 
through joint and/or combined effluent treatment shall be fixed by the Parties, and 
if necessary reviewed every two years 293 
In addition to the above obligations, the Protocol provides, similarly to the 
Mediterranean Protocol (Article 7), for the development and adoption, in co- 
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operation with the competent regional and international organizations in 
accordance with Annex III to the Protocol, of- 
- regional guidelines, standards or criteria, as appropriate, for the quality of sea- 
water used for specific purposes which is necessary for the protection of 
human health, living resources and ecosystems: 
- regional regulations for effluent treatment of land-based sources of pollution; 
- national rel)-Ulations regarding methods of dischargincr effluent and Its 1-1) tn 
treatment. In the development and implementation of the said programmes, 
certain considerations are to be taken into account, i. e. the cost of 
implementation, the capacity to modify existing installations, the economic 
capacity of the Parties and their need for sustainable development294 . 
It is obvious that the above-mentioned obligations, imposed upon the 
Parties by the Protocol in its Articles IV, V and VI, and their Annexes 1,11 and III 
respecti, vely, represent a practical translation of Article 207 of the LOSC, which 
provides in its Paragraph 4 that: 
States, acting specialýv through competent international 
organi--ations or diplomatic conferences, shall endeavour to 
establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of'the marine environmentfrom land-based sources, taking into 
account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of 
developing states and their needfor economic development. Such 
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall 
be re-examinedfi-om time to time as necessary. 
Apart from these obligations, the present Protocol follows the pattern of 
both the Pans Convention 195 and the Mediterranean Protoc01296 in imposing on the 
Parties other obligations aiming at the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution from land-based sources. These obligations include: co-operation with 
the competent regional and international organizations concerning monitoring and 
data management 197 1 environment 
impact assessment298, scientific and 
technological co-operation 299 , co-operation with a view to 
formulate and 
implement programmes of scientific and technical assistance 
300, co-operation with 
regard to watercourses shared by the PartieS30 ' and finally, co-operation in the field 
02 
of exchange of infonnation' . 
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Furthen-nore, the Protocol designates its Article XIII for responsibility and 
liability for damage. However, on this issue the Protocol does no more than repeat 
certain general principles contained in both the LOSC and the Kuwait Convention. 
In identical language to Article 235(2) of the LOSC, Paragraph I of the Protocol's 
Article XIII reads: 
Conti-acting states which ensure that recourse is 
accordance with their legal systems for 
compensation or other relief in respect 
pollution oj' the marine environment by 
persons under theirjurisdiction. 
available in 
prompt and adequate 
of damage caused by 
natural or juridical 
Paragraph 2 of the same Article contains provisions similar to those in 
Paragraph a of Article XIII of the Kuwait Convention and Paragraph 3 of the 
LOSC's Article 235. It stipulates the formulation and adoption by the Parties of 
appropriate procedures for the determination of liability for damage resulting from 
pollution from land-based sources. The Protocol, however, does not clarify the 
nature of such procedures, nor does it provide any detailed guidance in this 
respect. Despite this fact, the Protocol with what it contains of legal principles and 
norrns. ) represents a landmark in co-operation among the Gulf s states as to the 
protection of the Gulf s marine environment against pollution emanating form 
land-based sources. Indeed, the mere adoption of the Protocol in the Arabian Gulf 
Region is regarded as a legal development of particular significance, and is seen as 
a turning point as to the concerns regarding control of marine pollution. As is 
known, in the past few decades, oil pollution used to be the focal point which 
attracted the greatest concern from the Region's states, while pollution from land- 
based sources has not been seriously dealt with. However, the responsibility 
remains with the States Parties to cooperate truthfully and with good will, to 
develop and implement the provisions of the Protocol both jointly and individually 
in order to provide an effective management system for control of pollution from 
land-based sources. 
3.2.3 The Action Plans 
Two Action Plans were among the legal instruments adopted in both the 
Kuwait Regional Conference of 1978 and the Jeddah Regional Conference of 
378 
1982. These plans, which were first agreed in the two said Conferences, are the 
Action Plan for Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and the 
Coastal Areas of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab EmirateS303 , and the Action Plan for the Conservation of the Marine 
Environment and Coastal Areas of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 304 . The two 
Plans are similar as to their general features, and it is clear that the Jeddah Act* 11-D ion 
Plan. adopted four years after the Kuwait Action Plan, was modelled on the latter. 
The adoption of both Action Plans by the states concerned obviously has been a 
sort of interim aiTan(-), ement in anticipation of the delay which was expected in the 
ratification and accordingly 'in the entry into force of the Kuwait and Jeddah 
Conventions and the simultaneously adopted Protocols. In other words, the 
Action Plans were intended to be the means whereby the states of both Regions 
had to realise the objectives of the Conventions and their Protocols pending their 
entry into force, something which goes in line with the general UNEP Regional tD 
Seas approach. 
In similar language, the aims of the two Action Plans were defined to be: 
(a) assessment of the state of the environment including socio-economic 
development activities relating to environmental quality and of the needs of the 
two Regions, in order to assist Governments to cope properly with 
environmental problems; 
(b) development of guidelines for the management of activities which have an 
impact on environmental quality or on the protection and use of renewable 
marine resources on a sustainable basis; 
(c) preparation of legal instruments which provide the legal basis for co-operation 
to protect and develop the Regions; and 
(d) the adoption of supporting measures, including the establishment of national 
and regional institutional structures needed for the successful implementation 
of the Action PlanS305. 
The geographical scope of both Action Plans are exactly the same Sea 
Areas defined by the two Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah 
306 
. 
In addition to the introduction, the two Action Plans are similarly divided 
into four sections: environmental assessment, environmental management, 
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institutional and financial arrangements and the legal component. Generally 
speaking, most details included under these headings are found in the Conventions 
in one form or another. However, three matters in these two Action Plans call for 
attention. First, on the question of the institutional arrangements, both Plans with 
the aim of meeting their obligations provide for the establishment of an interim 
institution until pen-nanent Regional Organizations are established. In the Gulf 
Region, this task was entrusted to LTNEP, and an Interim Secretariat was indeed 
established and undertook its farictions before it was replaced in 1981 by the 
Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME). 
In the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden Region, the Arab League Educational, 
Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO), represented in the Executive 
Directorate of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment Programme was 
designated as responsible for the purpose of implementing and supervising the 
Jeddah Action Plan until the establishment of a permanent Regional Organization 
for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment3O7 . Thus, at 
the time of writing, this Executive Directorate is still *in charge in the Red Sea and 
Gulf of Aden Region. 
Secondly, both Action Plans recommend the adoption of additional 
protocols to the Kuwait and Jeddah Conventions as: 
- pollution from land-based sources; 
- pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf 
and the sea-bed and its subsoil; 
scientific and technical co-operation; 
development, conservation, protection and harmonious utIlisation of the marine 
living resources of both Regions; 
- liability and compensation for damage resulting 
from pollution of the marine 
environment; and 
- on other subjects found important to the 
Region during the execution of the 
Action Plan (The Jeddah Action Plan adds)308. 
In response to this requirement (and also the similar requirements adopted under 
the Conventions), four Protocols, as discussed earlier, were adopted 
in both 
Regions. Being more active, the Gulf States convened three of these while one 
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only was convened in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Area. Although not referred 
to in the Action Plan. it was reported that the next protocol under development in 
the Kuwait Regional Organization Area concerns the transboundary movement of Z: ) 
hazardous waste S309. 
Thirdly, pollution of ships was given special attention in both Action Plans. 
In this regard. the Plans, in order to (give special protection to the two Regions 
ag, ainst this kind of pollution, called upon the Governments of concerned states to 
enhance the measures for protection through ratification and implementation of the 
relevant international conventions. The Kuwait Action Plan, however, went 
further by mentioning specifically those conventions which include: the 1954 
OILPOL. the 1972 Dumping Convention and the 1973 MARPOL Convention as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978. Unfortunately, no full response was given by 
the states as to the latter requirement. 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the two mentioned 
Action Plans, alongside the two Regional Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah and 
the already adopted Protocols, represent a general framework for regional co- 
operation with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, of the two semi-enclosed seas, i. e., the Red Sea and the Arabian 
Gulf Given the fact that the obligations prescribed in many Conventions' 
provisions in particular are not clearly absolute or strictly binding, since reference 
to the oblioation is usually accompanied with the phrase "appropriate measures", 
real co-operation among the Parties remains the only certain guarantee of 
combating marine pollution, which does not recognise national boundaries. This 
co-operation, provided for in Article 123(b) of the LOSC, will be rendered more 
effective through practical translation by the Parties of the said instruments' 
contents, particularly the elaboration of more specific protocols, and the 
acceleration of the Red Sea states' efforts to establish a Regional Organization for 
the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment. Such measures 
will make these general legal frameworks more comprehensive and efficient. 
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3.3 National Approach 
The main characteristic of marine pollution is its international rather than 
national nature. However, international and regional approaches for the protection 
of the marine environment remain insufficient, unless supported by national laws 
and regulations in each single state. This process is to be achieved in two ways. 
First, the absorption of international and regional rules into municipal law, whether 
via transformation or incorporation of the said rules. Secondly, through the 
adoption of national laws and detailed regulations with the aim of filling any 
anticipated legal gaps, and laying down the requirements of the international and 
regional instruments. 
The adoption of national laws and regulations has been a central state 
obligation under international and regional legal instruments concerned with the 
protection of the marine environment310 
In Saudi Arabia, with the exception of very limited references found M 
some legal instruments, the Saudi municipal regulations for the prevention of 
marine pollution are mainly set forth in the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations 
(SLR)31 1, and to a lesser degree in the National Contingency Plan for Combating 
Marine Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emergency Cases 
(NC p)312. It is clear from the adoption of these two instruments, which deal 
mainly with oil pollution, that the national policies of Saudi Arabia on matters of 
marine pollution are dominated by economic considerations, since they are closely 
linked with the national oil industry. In the following part there will be an attempt 
to highlight the general features of those instruments. 
3.3.1 Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations 
According to Article 24 of the 1958 HSC, states are under a fundamental 
obligation to: 
draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the 
discharge of oil fi-om ships ... taking account of existing 
treaty 
provisions on the subject. 
The phrase "existing treaty provisions on the subject", included in the text refers 
apparently to the 1954 OILPOL Convention, since at the time the HSC was 
drafted, that was the only adopted treaty dealing with pollution from shipping. 
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In Saudi Arabia, the largest single body of codified marine pollution 
legislation is contained in the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations. The 
Regulations, which entered into force on 9 November 1975, consist of 25 chapters 
(391 Articles), covering many different areas of Saudi maritime law. Chapter 12 
(Articles 311-3335) was singled out to deal with the protection of the marine 
environment, particularly against pollution from shipping, and to thi it was is end i 
divided into two parts: the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, and disposal of 
ship waste and refuse. 
3.3.1.1 The Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
AlthouLyh Saudi Arabia is not party to the 1958 HSC, the first article of 
Chapter 12 of the SLR provides expressly for the incorporation of the OILPOL 
conditions as ships into the Saudi statute. Article 3 11 reads: 
The condition prescribed in the International Convention for the 
Prevention o 'Pollution of'the Sea bv 011,1954 as amended in the 
year 1962, shall be applicable to Saudi ships 
Indeed, the Saudi legislation commences its provisions by defining the ten-ns "oil" 
and "oily mixture" M similar terms to those contained in Article I of the OILPOL 
Convention as amended in 1962. Thus, "oil" is identified in the SLR as: crude oil, 
lubricating oil and heavy diesel oil. OILPOL adds "fuel oil" to this list. "Oily 
mixture" means: a mixture with an oil content of 100 parts or more in every 
million parts of the mixture 313 . In what follows, there will be an attempt to 
examine the general features of this Saudi national legislation. 
(a) The Scope of Application 
Two articles are laid down in the Saudi legislation to deal with discharge of 
oil and oily mixtures. According to Article 313 of the SLR: 
Oil tankers of a gross tonnage of 150 tons or more and other 
vessels of a gross tonnage of 500 tons or more shall be prohibited 
from discharging oil or oily mixture within a distance of 100 
nautical milesfrom the Kingdom's coasts, measuredfrom the base 
line of measurement. 
Similar provisions are contained in Article 314 as to Saudi oil tankers and other 
vessels, with the same prescriptions as above, but the prohibited area was extended 
383 
in this case to cover all the seas or the prohibited zones of the seas as mentioned in 
Annex A to the OILPOL Convention. These provisions are found also in the 
Convention 314 . Annex A to the Convention as amended in 1962 classifies the sea 
areas of the Red Sea within a distance of 100 miles, measured from the baselines of 
the littoral states' territorial seas (and the Saudi Arabian area, falling within a 
distance of 100 miles from the baselines) as Prohibited ZoneS315 - The Saudi 
Regulations are also in line with the OILPOL Convention as amended 'in 1969 *in 
relation to the exceptions to the said provisions. Article 315 of the SLR regards 
the discharge of oil and oily mixtures as lawful, subject to specific conditions: 
I. For vessels other than oil tankers, if. 
the ship is proceeding en route; 
the rate of oil or oily mixture discharge does not exceed 60 litres per 
mile; 
the oil content of the oily mixture is less than 100 parts per million 
parts of the mixture; 
the discharge is made asfar as possiblefrom the coast. 
For oil tankers, if: 
- the oil tanker is proceeding en route; 
- the rate of oil or oily mixture discharge does not exceed 60 litres per 
mile; 
- the total quantiiy discharged by the tanker on a ballast voyage does 
not exceed 1115000 of its total cargo-carrying capacity. 
However, the said conditions do not apply, according to Article 316 of the SLR: 
to the discharge of clean ballast water which does not leave any 
traces of oil on the surface of the water, when the tanker is 
stationary in calln waters on a clear day. 
Identical provisions are provided under Article I 11 of the OILPOL Convention as 
amended in 1969. 
In addition to the above mentioned exceptions, there are certain cases 
where reference to the exclusion is made by implication. Article 321 of the SLR, 
which imposes the recording in the Oil Recording Book of oil escapes or 
emergency discharges, enumerates the emergency cases to include: 
The discharge of oil or oily mixturefor the purpose of securing the 
sqfeýy of the ship, preventing damage to the ship's cargo or savi . ng 
life (at sea); 
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The escape qf* oil or oi4v mi . xture resulting ftom damage to the 
vessel orfi-om a cause bevond control. 
However, the port authorities must be notified by the Master of the ship 
immediately after occurrence of the incident3l 6. 
These provisions are identical to Article IV of the OILPOL Convention as 
amended in 1969. Thus, the Saudi legislation and the Convention are similar also 
in having some ambiguity on these provisions. The Saudi statute, as mentioned 
earlier, leaves it to the Master of the ship, without laying down any criterion, to 
take "appropriate and reasonable action" to prevent or mininlise the escape of oil. 
In the same wav, the Convention provides, in order to prevent or minimise the 
escape for "taking all reasonable precautions", again without stipulating a criterion. 
It is certain that the wide interpretation of these conceptions may affect the 
efficiency of both instruments. However, it should be noted that the last group of 
exceptions are expressly mentioned in the Convention, while in the Saudi 
legislation, they are referred to by implication. The impression which can be 
drawn from this, is that while the Saudi regulations allow the discharge of oil and 
oily mixture in cases of emergency, such discharge is to be at the milmurn 
possible level. This is clear in the text of Article 321 of the SLR, which 
emphasises the necessity to indicate the: 
... reasons for and the circumstances of 
[emergenc. -VI escape or 
discharge, as well as the precautionai, ý,! measures taken to reduce 
or stop the escape. 
On the other hand, the Saudi legislation excludes warships from the 
application of its provisions, though at the same time, such ships have to take such 
precautions as may be necessary to prevent pollution of sea water' 
17 
.A similar 
approach is found in Article 11 of the OILPOL Convention as amended in 1962, 
but the latter adds to naval ships, "ships used as naval auxilia. nes". This addition, 
however, does not seem of great significance, since ships used as naval auxiliaries 
are regarded in reality as naval ships. Therefore, it is unimaginable that the Saudi 
legislator intended to exclude naval auxiliary vessels from the said exemption. 
In any case, the exclusion of warships from being subject to the provisions 
of the Saudi legislation is in full confon-nity with the 1982 United Nations 
Convention. The Convention, while confirming the immunity of warships when 
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enjoying innocent passage in the territorial sea of a coastal state 31 8, authorises the 
latter to adopt laws and regulations for the protection of the marine environment 
therein 319 , and makes the flag state responsible for any loss or damage to the 
coastal state resulting from the non-compliance by a warship with the said laws 
and regulationS320 . Furthermore, the Convention provides that in its EEZ the 
coastal state, as mentioned earlier, is also granted jurisdictional rights to protect 
the marine environment32 I, but in so doing, it should observe the sovereign 
immunity of warships and naval auxiliaries, and any other vessels or aircraft owned 
or operated by a state and used only on government non-commercial service. 
However, these categories of ships should, for their part: 
act in a manner consistent, sojar as is reasonable andpracticable, 
with [the] Convention 
322 
. 
The adoption of these provisions in the LOSC, without being a matter of 
controversy at UNCLOS 111, reflects their status as general international legal 
rules, as they were adopted previously in two major international conventions, the 
OILPOL Convention (Article 11) and the MARPOL Convention (Article 3)(3)), 
something which appears to have been taken into account by the Saudi legislator. 
(b) Methods of Enforcement 
Without an effective implementation system, any legal instrument will 
remain no more than ink on paper. The Saudi legislation established a number of 
methods, aimed at the achievement of the fundamental goal represented in the 
prevention of the discharge of oil and oily mixtures in the prohibited zones. These 
methods include: keeping record books, inspecting the record books, monitoring 
ships and the establishment of an information centre and imposing penalties. 
1. Keeping Special Record Book 
Under Article 320 of the SLR, all tankers and other ships shall carry a 
special "Oil Record Book", in which certain operations are to be registered 
whenever they take place. As is the case with the Convention, the Saudi 
legislation differentiates between tankers and other vessels. As to oil tankers, the 
operations which should be registered include: 
1. Loading of the oil shipment. 
2. Transfer of ollfrom one tank to another during the voyage. 
3. Offloading of the oil shipment. 
4. Filling cargo tanks with ballast water. 
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5. Cleaning of cargo tanks. 
6. Discharge of'ballast water containing oil. 
7. Discharge of oily residues. 
8. Discharge of water containing oilfi-om machinery space bilges 
and the methodfollowed in such discharge. 
With regard to other ships, the operations include: 
1. Filling bunker fuel tanks with ballast water or cleaning such 
tanks. 
2. Discharge of ballast water or cleaning water containing oil 
firom bunkerfuel tanks. 
3. Discharge of oily residues. 
4. Discharo,, e of ballast water containing oil and machineii, space 
bilges, and the methodfbIlowed in such discharge. 
These details are found in Article IX of the OILPOL Convention and Annex - 
Fom-i of Oil Record Book as amended in 1954. However, unlike the Saudi 
legislation, the Convention in the said Annex demands the mentioning of the ship 
or the tanker's name, and the total cargo carrying capacity in the case of oil 
tankers. The omission of these "minor" details in the Saudi legislation, although 
not justifiled, does not seem to be of great significance. 
In addition to the "Oil Record Book", the Saudi legislation goes further to 
provide for the keeping of a special record in the barges and boats which carry fuel 
to ships at Saudi ports. The record shall include information on the following 
operations and the time of their performance: loading of the barge with fuel, 
quantities discharged to ships, the name of the ship and her anchorage location 323 
2. The Inspection of the Oil Record Book 
In order to make sure that the Oil Record Book, which is expected to be 
kept permanently on board each ship or oil tanker, contains all the stipulated 
information, Article 323 of the SLR empowers the marine inspection authorities, in 
co-operation with the competent agency at the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources, with 
the right to examine the oil record books of all Saudi andforeign 
ships in the ports of the Kingdom. 
Similar provisions are adopted under Article IX(4) of the OILPOL Convention as 
amended in 1969. But it is to be noted that the Convention goes further in 
indicating that the inspection process may be conducted on board the ship to which 
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the Convention applieS324; thus, such a right may be enjoyed by Saudi Arabia as a 
party to the Convention rather than through her municipal regulations! On the 
other hand, the Saudi ship inspection rules also find support in the 1982 United 
Nations Convention. Article 227 of the latter provides for non-discrimination 
against foreign vessels by the coastal state when exercising rights or performing 
duties concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The 
same rule is adopted under the Saudi legislation, as mentioned earlier. Under 
Article 226, the coastal state is entitled to examine certificates, records or such 
other documents as the vessel is required to carry by generally accepted 
international rules and standards or any similar documents which it is carrying. 
Rather. ) the LOSC provides for further physical inspection of the vessel when: 
there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the 
vessel or its equipment does not correspond substantially with 
the particulars of those documents; 
(ii) the contents ofsuch documents are not sufficient to confirm or 
verify a suspected violation; or 
(iii) the vessel is not carrying valid certificates and records 325 
The LOSC goes further, as it entitles the coastal state where there are clear 
grounds to believe that a ship navigating in its territorial sea or exclusive economic 
zone has violated the laws and regulations of such a state respecting the protection 
of the marine environment, to inspect the ship itselP 26 . Thus, the authorities 
granted to states are wider, under the LOSC than the OILPOL Convention and the 
Saudi municipal legislation, a matter which requires reconsideration by the Saudi 
legislator with regard to the ship inspection issue. 
3. Monitoring and Information Systems 
Article 324 of the SLR establishes a monitoring system, according to which 
the competent port authorities, in co-operation with the competent agencies of the 
Frontier Force and Coast Guard, are to observe ships 
while at anchor in the Kingdom's ports or during their presence in 
its territorial waters, and incidents of pollution of water by oil 
shall be communicated to the port authorities. Port authorities 
may detain the ship which commits a violation. 
No definition or limitations have been given to the terrn "violation", but, logically, 
it may refer to the violation of the national regulations concerning the protection of 
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the marine environment. These principles are stipulated under the 1982 
Convention; rather the Convention adopts the coastal state right to detention, not 
only when the violation occurs in its territorial sea, but also when the violation 
Occurs within its EEZ 327 . 
Taking into account the fact that there cannot be an effective monitoring 
system without an effective information system, the SLR provides for the 
establishment in the Ministry of Communications of a centre, the objective of 
which is to receive information relating to pollution in Saudi ports and territorial 
waters. 
4. Imposition of Penalties 
The contravention of the regulations respecting the prevention of pollution 
of tlie sea by oil is punishable under the Saudi legislation. In this respect, the SLR 
distinguishes among four levels of violation. First, the discharge of oil and oily 
mixture by oil tankers and other ships, as prescribed above, in the prohibited areas. 
This will make the captain or owner of the ship 
liable to imprisonment jbr a period not exceeding one year, and to 
a fine not exceeding twenty thousand Saudi riyals [around $5400] 
or the equivalent thereof, plus reimbursement of the pollution, 
removal expenses, or to any one of these two penalties. Th e 
authorities concerned may detain the ship until pqýyment of the 
328 prescribedfine has been effected 
Second, the violation of Article 320 of the SLR which stipulates the 
necessity to keep an oil record book. Here, the captain of the ship will be liable to: 
a fine not exceeding three thousand Saudi ri als ($800), or the Y 29 
equivalent thereoý . 
Third, the case where the shipmaster prevents the competent authorities from 
inspecting the oil record book or refuses to submit it to the said authorities; here, 
the punishment is: 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, with a fine 
not exceeding three thousand Saudi riyals ($800), or the 
equivalent thereof, or with any one of the said two penalties 
330 
. 
Fourth, the violation of Article 321 according to which oil escapes or emergency 
discharges are to be recorded in the Oil Record Book. TIýs will make the 
shipmaster liable to: 
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a fine not exceeding five thousand Saudi riyals (S 1400) or the 31 
equivalent thereoý . 
On these sanctions decided in the Saudi legislation, a number of comments 
may be made. First, there is a great deal of flexibility in these penalties, as In each 
case the reference is given to the maximum limit rather than the minimum, and 
further, in certain cases there is room for the competent authorities to choose 
among more than one penalty. However, this flexibility may be misleading. 
Article 3386, for example , imposes, as mentioned earlier, a fine not exceeding 3000 
Saudi riyals on violation of Article 320. But Aiticle 320 provides for keeping an 
Oil Record Book , in which detailed infonnation should be registered whenever 
specific activities take place. Thus, it is not clear which action is intended; is it the 
non-keeping of the record book on board a ship or the non-registration of the said 
data? Also , if the provision refers to failure to keep the data, the question here is 
what is the minimum limit to which the said sanction is applicable? The legislation 
adapts penalties regarding the discharge of oil and oily mixture, but there are no 
specific criteria for the quantity of discharged oil which deserves the application of 
the said sanctions. Second, the financial penalties referred to may now be regarded 
as "out of date", since the present value of the Saudi riyal (or any other currency) 
is not what it was in 1974 when the Saudi legislation was issued. Third, the place 
of penalty is not the same in all cases. With regard to the first kind of 
infringement, i. e. the discharge of oil or oily mixture in the prescribed areas, the 
sanction is to be imposed upon either the master of the ship or the owner. No 
reference has been made to the criterion whereby the competent authorities may 
decide which of them is to be subject to the penalty. In other cases of violations, 
the sanctions are to be imposed only upon the master of the ship, rather than the 
owner. 
The OILPOL Convention, for its part, adopts the principle of penalties. 
The non-observance of the Convention's provisions preventing the pollution of the 
sea by oil, and providing for keeping and oil record book, is seen as a violation 
punishable by the law of the country where the ship is registered. The Convention 
provides further that the sanctions should be "sufficiently severe", and in any case 
not less severe than those sanctions that can be imposed by the law of the country 
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33-. concerned, regarding similar violations within the limits of Its territorial sea .1 
These provisions are not without ambiguity, since there is no reference to any 
guidance as to the de ree of severity of the said sanctions, something which results 9 
in interpretation dispute between the coastal state and the port state on the one 
hand and the flag state on the other. The same principles, with the same 
vagueness, are repeated, unfortunately, in the LOSC, which stipulates in its Article 
2 17(8) that: 
penaltics provided Jbi- b-v the laws and regaulations of'States foi- 
vessels l 
flving theirflag shall be adequate in severity to discourage CD 
violations wherever theY occur. 
However, in comparison with the Saudi legislation there is a big difference 
as to the body empowered to impose the penalties. According to the Saudi 
legnslation this body is the Saudi authorities, while under international law, 
represented in the OILPOL Convention and the LOSC, it is only the nag state, 
which is authorised to apply the penalties against violating vessels. Thus, the 
Kingdom as a party to both Conventions has to reformulate its national statute to 
conform to the provisions of these Conventions. 
5. Special Reguirements concerning the Construction of Saudi Ships and 
Ports Facilities 
Vessels and tankers are constructed to navigate various oceans and straits 
of the world. Thus, the agreement of nations on ships' construction specifications 
and standards becomes a necessity, since, as Henkin rightly states: 
unilateral regulation o tanker construction in particular would ýf 
make it possible for one state controlling an important passage to 333 
prescribe specifications for the whole world. 
The OILPOL Convention is the first global move to reduce chances of sea 
accidents that result from unregulated construction of ships. Annex C to the 
Convention as amended in 1971 contains a number of detailed provisions, which 
cover this issue. According to Article VI bis of Annex I to the Convention, every 
oil tanker to which the Convention applies is required, within two years after the 
date of entry into force of the Convention, to comply with the said provisions, 
if 
such a tanker falls into any of the following categories: 
(a) a tanker, the delivery of which is after I January 1977; or 
(b) a tanker to which both thefollowing conditions apply: I 
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(i) deliveiy is not later than I January 1977; and 
(ii) the building contract is placed after I January 1972, or 
in cases where no building contract has previously been 
placed, the keel is laid or the tanker is at a similar stage 
of construction, after 30 June 1972.334 
The LOSC, for its part, asserted flag states' responsibility to observe 
international standards with regard to the construction of the vessels flying their 
flags. Article 217(2) of the Convention reads: 
States shall, in particular, take appropriate measures in order to 
ensure that vessels flying their flag or of their registry are 
prohibitedfrom sailing until they can proceed to sea in compliance 
with the requirements of the international rules and standards ..., including requirements in respect of design, construction, 
equipment and manning of vessels. 
Saudi Arabia has clearly expressed its acceptance of the OILPOL 
Convention conditions with regard to the construction of her own tankers. Article 
3 19 of the SLR reads: 
The building specifications of Saudi oil tankers to be registered 
after the first of Janua7y 1977, must comply with the conditions 
prescribed in Annex (C) of the Convention mentioned above. 
(OILPOL Convention) 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has committed herself to provide her oil- 
loading terminals and ship repair ports with adequate facilities to receive oily 
residues and mixtures from tankers and ships. Article 326 of the SLR, provides In 
this respect that: 
In cooperation with the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources, studies and arrangements shall be made in order to 
provide oil loading terminals in the Kingdom with adequate 
facilities to receive oily residuesfrom tankers. 
The SLR contains also similar provisions with regard to all the Saudi ports 
including the ship repair ports 335 . Saudi Arabia 
has also committed herself to 
provide in her oil loading tenninals, 
adequate instruments and equipment to eliminate any pollution of 
the sea water kv oil at such terminals or at the facilities attended 
therefore (Article 328 of the SLR). 
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The same was stipulated with regard to all Saudi ports including the ship repair 
ports 336 . Such requirements are contained in Article VIII of the OILPOL 
Convention as amended in 1962. This comes as a response to Article 311 of the 
SLR, which stipulates, as mentioned above, the application of the Convention's 
provisions to Saudi ships. Indeed, the said facilities have been provided and 
proved reasonably successfid, especially in combating manne pollution resulting I Z: ) 
from the Gulf War hostilities. 
Apart from ships and oil tankers, but in connection with the prevention of 
the pollution of the sea by oil, Article 325 of the SLR holds the Saudi agencies 
which are responsible for the operation of oil loading ten-ninals and offshore 
floating installations and platfon-ns for oil Pumping and producing operations, 
Ve foi- ani, oil escaping 1-CSPOnSi fi-oin such installations ot- 
tei-niinals to the sea Jbi- the elitnination Qfpollution, and shall he 
liablejbi- appropt-iate conipensationjbi- dainages. 
The significance of this provision, is the fact that it is the first of its kind in the 
Saudi municipal regulations to deal with pollution resulting from sea-bed activities. 
This establishment of liability and responsibility may be seen as one of the 
measures stipulated in Article 214 of the LOSC, which obliges the states to: 
... take ... measures necessa7y to 
implement applicable 
international rules and standards ... to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment arisingfrom or in connection 
with sea-bed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from 
artificial islands, installations and structures tinder their 
jurisdiction ... 
3.3.1.2 Discharge of Ship Waste and Refuse 
The second chapter of the SLR is singled out to deal with discharge of ship 
waste and refuse. In this respect, the following provisions have been laid down. 
First, under Article 333, 
all ships are prohibitedfrom throwing waste matter, food leftovers 
and ship refuse in the ports, navigation channels or territorial 
waters of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
To this end, 
Arrangements must be made at each port to collect waste matter, 
food leftovers and ship refuse from ships lying at anchor in the 
port, and to dispose of such waste and refuse in accordance with 
the instructions issued by the Ministry ofHealth 337 . 
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The violation of this provision by any ship entails punishment by a fine not 
exceeding 10,000 Saudi riyals (around $2800), to be imposed on the master of the 
33S 
ship . Although Saudi Arabia is not a party to the MARPOL Convention, these 
provisions are inspired by this Convention, which provides in its Article 4(2) that: 
Any violation of the requirements of the present Convention within 
the jurisdiction of an -v 
Party to the Convention shall be prohibited 
and sanctions shall be established thereof under the law of that 
Parq,.. 
In this text, the MARPOL Convention employs the term "jurisdiction" rather than 
the "territorial seas", but the conception of "jurisdiction"'), however, includes the 
territorial sea. The right of the coastal state to prescribe in its territorial sea any 
legislation relating to pollution (as long as such an action does not hamper the 
right of innocent passage), is granted under customary and conventional ruleS339. 
Rather, the LOSC grants this right to the coastal state in the EEZ, which extends 
up to 200 n. m. from the baselineS340 . 
Thus, in this regard, the Saudi legislation 
falls short of international law, since the Kingdom has not yet declared its own 
EEZ. 
Secondly, the SLR singles out Saudi ships with a special article, according 
to which, these ships are: 
prohibitedfrom releasing waste matter or ship refuse at sea within 
a distance of 12 milesfrom the coast34 1. 
Any violation of these provisions renders the master of the ship liable to a fine not 
exceeding 10,000 Saudi riyals (around $2 800)342. If we compare this with the 
MARPOL Convention, we find that the Convention goes further than the Saudi 
legislation. Annex IV to the Convention prohibits the discharge of sewage from 
ships within 4 miles of land, unless a ship has in operation an approved treatment 
plant, while between 4 and 12 miles from land, sewage must be comminuted and 
disinfected before discharge 343 . 
Annex V, dealing with the prevention of pollution 
by garbage from ships, prohibits the disposal of all plastics. It also specifies 
minimum distances from land for the disposal of all the principal 
kinds of garbage, 
ranging between 3 and 25 miles 344 . 
Thus, the Saudi legislation does not seem to be 
in conformity with these provisions, since the former, as mentioned above, 
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prohi its without discrimination the discharge from the Saudi ships of all waste 
matter and ship refuse at sea within a distance of 12 miles from land. 
However, Saudi Arabia is not a party to the MARPOL Convention. 
Moreover, the very slow general acceptance of the provisions of these Annexes to 
the Convention suggests that such provisions have not yet passed into customary 
international law. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has recently acceded to the 
LOSC, which allows coastal states to establish a 200 n. m. EEZ in which all states 
are under a duty to comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal 
state. amongst which are those concer-nincy the protection and preservation of the 
marine envirorirnent345 Thus, the disposal by Saudi ships of waste matter and 
refuse even beyond 12 n. m. from the baselines of one state will be a violation of 
the LOSC provisions in the case that such a state has declared an EEZ, something 
which necessitates the reconsideration of the Saudi regulations. For the Kingdom 
herself, it is necessary to declare her own EEZ, since this will give her greater 
power to regulate for the protection of the marine environment beyond the 
territorial sea. Although it is the MARPOL Convention which allows states to 
control pollution from vessels, occurring even outside their territorial waters, the 
LOSC provisions on the EEZ can also be invoked to strengthen coastal states' 
control of pollution beyond 12 n. m., but within the 200 n. m. EEZ. 
3.3.2 The National Confinuncv Plan for Combatin Marine Pollution bv 
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emerizency Cases (NCP) 
This Plan was adopted by the Environmental Protection Co-ordinating 
Committee (EPCC) in 1984, two years after the adoption of the Jeddah 
Convention. The NCP, which consists of 9 articles and an Appendix, came as a 
response to the obligation to which the Kingdom had bound herself under the 
Kuwait and Jeddah Regional Conventions and their Protocols concerning Regional 
Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in 
Cases of EmergencY346 . Article 
2 of the Plan defines its objectives as follows: 
[The] Plan is aimed to formulate a system for responding 
immediately to, and coordinating the actions required, to protect 
the Saudi marine and coastal environmentfrom the effects of oil 
spilled. This will be done by makingfull use of the available 
resources, both regionally and internationally. This entails 
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mobilizing and coordinating all of the available equipment, 
manpower and expertise necessary to combat spill situations. 
The plan also aims to cope with the Kingdom's obligations 
embodies in the regional and international agreements for the 
protection of the marine environment and any other relevant 
agreement to whcih the Kingdom is party. 
In the following part, the general features of the Plan will be highlighted. 
3.3.2.1 The Organizational Framework 
The Plan identifies three levels of response to incidents of pollution by oil 
and other han-riful substances: national, regional (in the two regions of the Red Sea 
and the Arabian Gulf) and local leveIS347. Within this context, many governmental 
bodies and agencies participate in adopting, reviewing and carrying out national 
policies and regulations, as laid down in the Plan. These are as follows: 
(a) National Committee for Marine Pollution Combating 
The Committee consists of representatives for the following agencies: 
Ministry of Defence (MEPA as chairman and the Royal Navy), Ministry of Interior 
(represented by the Frontier Forces, Civil Defence Authorities and the General 
Secretariat for Higher Commission for Industrial Security), Ministry of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Municipality and Rural Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Saudi Ports 
Authority, General Organization for Saline Water Distillation and the Royal 
Commission for Jubail and YanbU348 . 
The reason behind the selection of these 
bodies to the membership of the Committee is that the marine environment falls 
within their competence in one way or another. 
The objectives of this Committee have been defined to include: 
to revi . ew the policy for controlling oil pollution and other 
harmful substances; 
to review the plan; 
to approve the area plans; 
tofollow-up the implementation and management of the plan; 
to review the expenses of the plan; 
to issue recommendations for equipment purchase; 
to review the status of the training programme requiredfor the 
plan; 
to discuss matters related to marine pollution; and 
396 
- to identify the responsibilitv q1' the pollutor and take the 
necessary measuresJbi-jbi-mulating a claim andfollow-up its 349 
settlement 
The decisions of this Committee are to be approved by the President of the 
Environmental Protection Co-ordinating Committee . 350 
(b) MEPA as a Central National Agency 
MEPA (the central administration for all environmental activities) was 
appointed as a body responsible for planning and co-ordinating response activities 
to control oil pollution in emergency situations at the national level. To this end, it 
is to: 
J61-inulate the national polic. y jor oil pollution control in the 
Kin, (, )-dom's marine envi . 1-017177CIlt, ' 
act in accordance with the protocols oj'regional cooperation it? 
the area oj' combating pollution, and any other similar 
reggional or international obligatIO17 in thefiaure; 
undertake surveillance, monitoring and studies necessary, for 
tracking of oil spills and the determination of oil pollution 
impact, - 
manage the plan and co-ordinate implementation procedures; 
and 
determine the equipment required ky the p an 
351 
(c) Area Operations Committee 
Article 3(b) of the Plan provides for the establishment of two Area 
Operations Committees, one each in the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf regions. The 
membership of this committee is given to the concerned responsible personnel 
from the following authorities: Ministry of Defence (represented in MEPA as a 
Regional Co-ordinator and Chairman of each Committee), Ministry of Interior 
(represented in the Coast Guard and Civil Defence Authorities), Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Affairs, Ministry of Municipality and Rural Resources and 
the Saudi Ports Authority. It is unknown, however, why membership of the said 
Committee is confined solely to the said authorities, while there are certain 
authorities which do not enjoy this membership, although they are 
directly 
concerned with oil pollution response activities, such as the General 
Organization 
for Distillation of Saline Water and the Royal Commission for Jubail and 
Yanbu- 
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The Area Operations Committee is responsible for planning and co- 
ordinating the response activities for pollution situations in the two regions of the 
Red Sea and Arabian Gulf, where the situation necessitates area 352 -wide efforts . 
To this end, it is to study the local contingency plans, identify the necessary 
manpower and equipment for combating pollution in the concerned areas, follow 
up reports concerning pollution situations in the area, follow up the training of 
staff in response activities, provide, in co-operation with the Ministry of Health, 
medical supervision to those affected by pollution incidents and prepare and 
develop a contingency plan for the whole area 353 . This Area Plan contains all 
executive procedures and instructions that are necessary for response operations in 
case of pollution in the relevant areas, including: 
-a compilation of local area plans; 
-a surveillance and monitoring system for discovery and notification of 
pollution; 
a command system for alerting the Operations Committee; 
compilation of a manual for the Area Plan; 
identification of local support agencies involved in pollution response; 
inventory of manpower and equipment available for pollution response within 
the area; 
- communication and logistic procedures for the allocation of manpower and 
equipment; 
- identification of areas and water use facilities, which are particularly vulnerable 
to pollution; 
- survey of potential pollution sources and determination of the maximum likely 
spill from each; 
- giving instructions for obtaining oceanographic and marine meteorological data 
and estimating spill trajectories; 
- keeping data records and instructions on the spiH event and documentation 
procedures; 
- determination of the preferable methods for the containment of pollution and 
cleanup and disposal techniques; and 
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- the assessment of the financial cost of combating any pollution event within the 
area 
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. 
(d) Individual Government Authorities 
Oil pollution, when it occurs, affects in one way or another a number of 
governmental authorities. These authorities are listed under Article 3(c) of the 
Plan as follows: Ministry of Defence (MEPA and Royal Navy), Ministry of Interior 
(Frontier Forces), Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and associated 
on, ranizations and companies, Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Mi *stry of I in-1 
Municipality and Rural Affairs, Saudi Ports Authority, General Organization for 
Distillation of Saline Water and Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu. These 
authorities all have marine or coastal facilities. 
All the govemmental bodies, mentioned above, which form the 
organizational framework of the NCP, participate in carrying out the various 
activities related to the emergency response operations associated with pollution. 
The central role, however, is given to MEPA, which is responsible for co- 
ordinating all these activities. The Authorities of Ministry of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources, Saudi Ports, Civil Defence and Coast Guard, in co-operation 
with MEPA, undertake the operations of surveillance and monitoring in the Saudi 
maritime zones. The surveillance and monitoring activities include: 
coastal surveillance; 
remote sensing; 
observation reports from military, civil and private aircraft 
and ships; 
any other practical means available (Article 5). 
All governmental authorities which have marine or coastal facilities, in co- 
ordination with MEPA, should: 
provide ncessary protection to these facilities including manpower, 
tools and equipment. Equipment should be operational and read 
for use in case of any pollution incident (Article 5). 
With regard to the combat activities, under Article 5, 
all organizations having marine or coastal facilities ... will 
undertake combat ofpollution within their areas and shall provide 
adequate manpower and equipment. Outside these areas, MEPA 
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shall be responsible while Saudi Frontier Forces shall extend any 
necessary capabilities available (Article 5). 
The said authorities are also responsible for: 
clean up operations within their areas and shall provide adequate 
equipment and manpower. Outside these areas MEPA and the 
appropriate municipalities will undertake clean up activities within 
the scope of the responsibility of each of them; while the Frontier 
Forces will extend any necessary capabilities available (Article 5). 
In consultation with the affected authorities, MEPA is to identify appropriate 
methods and sites for the disposal of collected oil and oiled debris. Also, MEPA, 
in co-operation with national universities and research centres, is the body 
responsible for conducting appropriate scientific studies related to the above- 
mentioned activitieS355. 
3.3.2.2 Implementation Procedures 
Under the NCp356 , the implementation procedures followed in response to 
a pollution incident, are divided into 5 phases, starting with notification and ending 
with documentation: 
(a) Notification 
There is no specific organization responsible for this task. All authorities 
having marine or coastal facilities or marine activities should report any pollution 
incident to the Area Co-ordinator or MEPA (Article 6(l)). 
Evaluation 
Following the receipt of emergency notification from the Area Co- 
ordinator, the Area Operations Committee is to meet to evaluate the situation. 
The evaluation includes a number of points: 
1. Classification of the size of pollution as indicated in the Plan 
Annex 1357 * 
2. Evaluation of the necessity for containment and clean up 
operation. 
3. Evaluation of the feasibility of various options in containment 
or clean tip operations. 
4. Undertaking of relevant actions in commencing combating 
o erations according to the area plan (Article 6(2)). p 
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(C) Containment and Preventative Measures 
This phase represents the first real step in direct dealing with the pollution. 
It includes: 
attempts to stop pollutionfirom its sources; 
placement of booms to prevent spread of spill and to protect 
sensitive installations and locations; 
minimi--ing hazards of the pollution incident, - 
use of'dispersant specýfied hy MEP. 4 and already agreed upon 
with the concerned authorities (Article 6(3)). 
(d) Cleanup and Disposal 
At this stage, the key response figUres in the local sites are to use the 
appropriate means, e. g. skimmers, sorbents, dredgers etc., to collect oil and other 
harmful substances within their facilities. Afterwards, they must follow the Area 
Plan to identify the priorities of the areas to be cleaned and the areas for the 
disposal of aggregated substances. These operations are carried out under the 
supervision of the Area Operations Committee (Article 6(4)). 
(e) Documentation 
Following the ending of the cleanup and disposal activities, the next step, 
which represents the last stage of the implementation procedures, is the collection 
of data and information on the protection and combating activities, the evaluation 
of the effectiveness of these activities, the assessment of the costs and the study of 
environmental impacts. This task is carried out by the Area Operations Committee 
in co-operation with the key response personnel. 
Within 30 days from the completion of the response operations, the Area 
Co-ordinator has to submit a comprehensive report to MEPA, containing a 
description of the incident's development, actions taken, resources utilised, 
financial costs and the problems encountered in the response operations (Article 
6(5)). 
From the above review, it is clear that with what it contains of 
organizational and procedural rules, the Plan may be viewed as a local executive 
guideline for combating oil spill and hazardous substances in emergency cases. By 
the adoption of the Plan, Saudi Arabia fulfils her duty under the LOSC, which 
stipulates in its Article 199 that: 
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... 
States shall jointly develop and promote contingency plans for 
responding to pollution incidents in the marine environment. 
However, examination of the Plan's provisions gives rise to certain 
questions. First, at the local level and within the maritime areas belonging to them, 
the Plan entrusts the response operations to certain governmental authorities, but 
here, the Plan does not provide specific limits for the said areas, something which 
may lead to confusion between these authorities and also to some delay in the 
protection and combating activities. Secondly, despite the fact that the Plan in 
itself represents a response to the Kingdom's obligations, particularly under the 
two regional Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah, it does not contain any reference 
to "co-ordination considerations", either with the other Contracting Parties to the 
said conventions, or with the two regional Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centres, 
established under the two Protocols to the Conventions concerning Regional Co- 
operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Emergency. This is despite the fact that both Conventions similarly provide that: 
The Conti-acting Pat-ties shall co-ordinate their national plans for 
combating pollution in the marine environment b oil and other y 
harmful substances in a manner thatfacilitates full co-operation in 
dealing with pollution emergencies 358 . 
3.3.3 Other Scattered Provisions on Marine Potlution Control 
Apart from the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations and the National 
Contingency Plan for Combating Marine Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances in Emergency Cases, in Saudi Arabia, there is no codified body of 
municipal regulations dealing with the other aspects of marine pollution. 
Nevertheless, there exist limited general references, scattered in some regulations. 
Article 48(d) of the Quarantine BiI1359' for example, prohibits the disposal of 
residues and faecal substances , including stagnant waters at 
the ship bottom, before 
disinfection. 
The Environmental Protection Standards, issued in 1982, identified specific 
standards for the permitted disposal of contaminated waters in the Saudi Arabian 
coastal waterS360 . The 
Enviromnental Protection Standards for the Control of 
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Disastrous Wastes, issued in 1993 
361 
, defines disastrous wastes, which should not 
be discharged into the sea waters, as follows: 
- house sewage waters and other wastes passing through the sewage network to 
the manipulation unit; 
- the final discharge of industrial waters and air pollutants emanating from fixed 
sources; 
returned irrigation waters; and 
mining residuals, remaining in the mines during exploitation operationS362. 
Moreover, the Regulations of Fishing, Investment and Protection of Marine 
Living Resources in the Territorial WaterS363 , and its Executive Bi11364 contain three 
provisions concerning the protection of the marine environment. Article 6 of the 
Regulations prohibits coastal dredging and filling operations except with prior 
permission from the Ministry of Agriculture and Waters in co-ordination with the 
National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development. This approach 
is also adopted under the Bi 11365, which further prohibits the residues of laboratories 
and factories, sewage waters, chemicals, petroleum substances, ship oils, or any 
other harmful liquids from being dumped in the Saudi maritime zoneS366 . The 
violation of any of these provisions entails i-mprisonment for a period of time not 
exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding 10,000 Saudi riyals (around $2800) 
or both penaltieS367. 
From the foregoing examination of the current Saudi national legislation 
relating to the marine environment, it is obvious that such legislation, although 
representing a positive step in the proper direction, needs to be developed to cope 
with recent legal developments, both of the international and regional levels, while 
also achieving better protection for the Saudi marine environment. 
The present national legal framework is not sensitive enough to the 
problems of marine pollution, since legislation so far adopted in Saudi Arabia 
touches only specific aspects of the pollution problem. The Saudi regulations deal 
basically, as indicated above, with oil pollution and in general terms, discharges 
from ships. This specific concern about shipping pollution is understandable, as the 
Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea both suffer heavy traffic of oil tankers. However, at 
the same time, the Gulf in particular suffers offshore drilling operations, something 
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which poses a lasting threat of damage to the marine environment , and yet there is 
no piece of le islation dealing with oil pollution from sea-bed activities. Likewise, 91 11 
other kinds of pollution, such as pollution by dumping, pollution from land-based 
sources and pollution from other human activities, have not been addressed by the 
Saudi municipal regulations. Nor are the relevant provisions of the Seaports and 
Lighthouses Regulations designed specifically to deal with shipping pollution free 
from deficiencies, since there is no provision prohibiting the throwing of hannful 
substances or dead animals into the sea waters. Furthermore, the Regulations do 
not provide for keeping on board the ship a cargo record, similar to the oil book 
record. In brief, at the national level, Saudi Arabia which has demonstrated a great 
concern with the marine pollution issues, has to develop its already existing 
regulations, to adopt new regulations to face the vario us sources of marine 
pollution, and to develop effective monitoring and information systems. tn 
Conclusion 
The previous analysis reveals that Saudi Arabia has dealt seriously with the 
problem of marine pollution, and the first real serious step in this context was the 
establishment of MEPA as a central governmental authority responsible for the 
protection of the environment In general, including the marine environment. In 
terms of the "legal protection", the Saudi Arabian policy is of three dimensionsl 
international, regional and national. 
At the international level, of the major international conventions, Saudi 
Arabia acceded to the OILPOL Convention as amended, the 1969 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part XII of which deals with the 
protection of marine environment. Thus, in the non-accession to the MARPOL 
Convention, the Kingdom seems to have been satisfied with its accession to the 
OILPOL Convention, which prohibits the discharge of oil and oily mixture within 
100 nm from the coasts of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, on the ground that 
both Conventions are the main multilateral instruments regulating pollution from 
ships. However, this assumption is not reasonable, since the MARPOL 
Convention contains a more comprehensive legal framework, under which the 
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discharge of all types of pollutants is completely prohibited, something which 
makes the excuse of the "costly reception facilities" also illogical. It would also be 
advisable for the Kingdom to be party to the London Dumping Convention of 1972 
which prohibits the deliberate disposal of waste from ships and aircraft into the sea. 
The Kingdom is also invited to ratify the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes. Further, the Kingdom needs to 
convince the other littoral states in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf which have 
not yet adopted these international measures, especially those regulating oil 
pollution, to do so, as the nonadoption of such internationally agreed critena will 
frustrate the other states' efforts, since oil pollution does not know national 
boundaries. 
At the regional level, in adopting the two Conventions of Kuwait and 
Jeddah, and their Protocols, the states of the two Regions of the Arabian Gulf and 
the Red Sea embody the regional co-operation in the context of the protection of 
the marine environment. They elaborated a vital system for combating pollution 
emergencies, and provided for the establishment of two Mutual Emergency Aid 
Centres. Both Conventions, as indicated above, impose general obligations on the 
Parties, but due to expressions employed such as "possible sources" and 
"applicable measures", these obligations do not seem to be absolute. The 
enforcement system contained in both Conventions is not effective, and the Parties 
are free to formulate and enforce national measures for the detection and reporting 
of violations. As to the implementation of the two Conventions themselves, 
comparison seems to be unfair. The Regional Organization for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment, based in Kuwait, has shown a reasonable degree of 
effectiveness in the protection of the Gulf marine environment, while its 
counterpart in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area has not yet seen the light of day. 
Moreover, in the Gulf, as mentioned earlier, three protocols have been 
introduced and attached to the Kuwait Convention in return for one protocol only 
in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area. In any case, whether in the Arabian Gulf or 
in the Red Sea, political disagreements among the Contracting Parties to these 
instruments remain the major obstacle standing in the way of more regional success 
as to the protection and preservation of the marine envirom-nent. Unfortunately, 
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some of the these disagreements have developed into armed conflicts between the 
Parties (the eight years war between Iraq and Iran, parties to the Kuwait 
Convention) or even to the occupation of one state party by another (Iraq and 
Kuwait, States Parties also the Kuwait Convention, for example). Such problems 
undoubtedly overshadow these Conventions and their protocols and make their 
efficiency a doubtful matter. 
At the national level. there still exist big gaps in the Saudi National 
legislation. The real municipal regulations on the protection of the mari 17, rine 
environment are contained in the Seaports and Lighthouses Regulations of 1974, 
which re("Lllate only oil pollution from ships, and in general terms, discharges from Z__ 
ships. Up to date, there are no specific regulations in Saudi Arabia to deal with oil 
pollution from sea-bed activities, pollution by dumping, pollution from land-based 
sources and pollution from other human activities. These considerations, plus the 
facts that Saudi Arabia is not party to certain major international conventions and 
that the two Regional Conventions of Kuwait and Jeddah are, as mentioned earlier, 
not free from deficiencies, necessitate the creation of new regulations and the 
review and development of the already existing legislation i such a way as to 
reflect the great concern of the Saudi authorities about environmental issues in 
general, and the marine environment in particular. 
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facilities, and which may be controlled by local resources of the affected authorities, and 
the local plan is applicable. 
2. major pollution incident: this is an incident which occurs within the area of any of the 
said authorities, but by reason of its size, it exceeds the capabilities of the authority 
concerned, so that assistance in combating the pollution becomes a necessity, through the 
Area Coordinator of the Area Operations Committee. 
358. Art. IX(3) of both Conventions. 
359. Passed by the Royal Order No. 21/1/1112, dated 5-5-1376 AH. Archives of the Ministry of 
Health. 
360. See supra, note 108. 
36 1. See supra, note 108. 
362. Ibid., Art. 4. 
363. Supra, Chapt. V, note 142. 
364. The Executive Bill for the Regulation of Fishing, Investment and Protection of Marine 
Living Resources, is published in Umm Al-Qura, No. 3236, dated 25 November 1988. 
365. Art. 65. 
366. Art. 63. 
367. Art. 9 of the Regulations. 
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General Conclusions and Recommendations 
Each chapter of this thesis has contained a conclusion section in which an 
attempt was made to hýighlight the general features of the Saudi Arabian marine 
policy, and specific aspects of this policy, in the light of international standards. 
The aim of this concluding section is to recapitulate some of the major issues 
contained in the previous chapters in order to make a number of observations 
concerning Saudi Arabia's behaviour with regard to different uses of the seas. In 
other words, here, there will be an attempt to assess and evaluate the Saudi 
attitudes and marine policies as a whole, and to offer some recommendations. 
The marine policy of any country will, inevitably, be a result of a number of 
factors 
, internal and external. 
Saudi Arabia is no exception, and to evaluate her 
practices and attitudes towards the legal regime of the oceans, four questions can 
be raised. First, to what extent do the Saudi attitudes and marine policy serve the 
national interests? Second , is there an integrated 
Saudi Arabian national marine 
policy, or in other words, how effective is the way in which Saudi Arabia 
approaches its marine policy problems? Third, is Saudi Arabia's practice in 
conformity with international regulations and standards, and finally, has Saudi 
Arabia contributed to the development of the law of the sea? 
To Saudi Arabia, marine policy is not a newly emerged policy area. The 
country's assertion of its legal claims to the oceans began following its foundation 
in the early 1930s. The review of the Saudi attitudes and practices reveals that 
I they were heavily influenced by security, economic and sovereignty considerations. 
The security factor has been of exceptional significance to Saudi Arabia, 
due to the Israeli presence at the Gulf of Aqaba. In this regard, two issues have 
been the subject of special concern on the part of the Saudi authorities, namely, the 
breadth of the territorial sea and the right of innocent passage. Saudi Arabia was 
not satisfied with extending its territorial sea to 12 n. m. in 1958, but in UNCLOS I 
and UNCLOS 11 she also strongly defended her position and opposed the positions 
of some maritime powers, such as the US and the UK, which were in favour of a 
more restricted limit for the territorial sea. Having in mind the Strait of Tiran, the 
Saudi position on the issue of innocent passage in the straits linking the high seas 
426 
with the territorial sea of a foreign state, was solid although unsuccessful. Saudi 
Arabia did not refer to this issue in its national legislation, but in UNCLOS I and 
UNCLOS 11 she strongly rejected the legitimacy of such passage; rather she has 
repeatedly taken this issue to the circles of the United Nations itself. The 
significance of sovereignty and security considerations are evident in the wording 
of the 1993 Marine Scientific Research Regulations, which elaborate on restrictions 
imposed on foreign vessels seeking to conduct marine scientific research in the 
Saudi maritime zones. Obviously, Saudi Arabia's sovereignty and security interests 
included the use of maritime zones as exclusionary buffers to protect its vulnerable 
coastlines. 
On the other hand, economic considerations have been a significant factor 
in formulating Saudi marine policy. Concerns for fisheries, oil and gas stand out as 
fundamental marine policy issues, and the formulation of this policy at the national 
level was mainly motivated by these issues. The Kingdom's concern to protect its 
fishery interests is quite clear in the timing of the issue of the initial regulations on 
fishing, which occurred very soon after the declaration of the country itself as a 
sovereign state in 1932. Also, aware of the Arabian Gulf s seabed resources, Saudi 
Arabia in 1949 became the first country in the region to claim sovereignty over the 
resources of the seabed and subsoil extending beyond its "coastal sea" in the Gulf. 
The 1932 and 1949 claims were followed, as seen in the foregoing chapters, by 
other claims, all of which reflect the significance of economic considerations as a 
cornerstone in directing the Saudi practice in the law of the sea. 
Furthermore, in order to provide a wider umbrella for the protection of its 
marine living resources, the Kingdom has moved to control pollution in its marine 
environment. The Saudi moves in this respect have been in three 
directions, 
national, regional and international. Nationally, apart from having a central 
body 
responsible for the protection of the environment in general, including the marine 
environment, the Kingdom has regulated ship oil pollution and 
discharges from 
ships through Part 12 of the 1974 Seaports and Lighthouses 
Regulations. 
Regionally, the Kingdom is a party to both the Kuwait and Jeddah regional 
conventions for the protection of the marine environment in the 
Arabian Gulf and 
Red Sea. Internationally the Kingdom is a party to three major conventions: the 
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1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
(OILPOL), the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part XII 
of which is devoted to the protection of the marine environment. 
The Saudi position regarding passage in the straits linking two parts of the 
high seas was mainly motivated by strategic, political and economic considerations. 
Having in mind the Strait of Bab El Mandeb at the entrance of the Red Sea and the 
Strait of Hon-nuz at the entrance of the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, 'in UNCLOS 
111, strongly and successfully defended the application of transit passage in such 
straits. 
It is clear, then, that Saudi Arabia has been one of the most active countries 
in the region in protecting its sea interests. The question which may arise, 
however, is whether Saudi Arabia, as a coastal state, has done enough to protect 
all her potential interests m the seas and whether she has taken maximum 
advantage of the law of the sea and other international treaties in this regard. 
Although this study supports the conclusion that Saudi Arabia's manne policy as a 
whole has been more of a success than a failure, the answer to the foregoing 
question is no. 
As for the contiguous zone, for example, the Saudi claim is less than that 
pennissible in the law of the sea. In the Saudi regulations, the contiguous zone is 
claimed to be 6 n. m., although under the 1982 United Nations Convention, it is 
permitted to reach, together with the territorial seas, up to 24 n. m. The extension 
of its contiguous zone beyond 6 n. m. would provide the country with more powers 
for the protection of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary interests. 
In addition, while Saudi Arabia supported at UNCLOS III the creation of 
the 200 n. m. exclusive economic zone, she has not yet declared one of her own. 
The constitution of an EEZ would provide the country with more powers, 
for 
instance, as to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures, marine scientific research and the protection and conservation of the 
marine environment. 
Also, though the Kingdom has shown great concern in recent years for the 
protection and conservation of the enviromnent in general, including the marine 
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environment, the legal approaches followed in dealing with the issue are 
inadequate. The Kingdom, therefore, needs to widen the scope of legal protection 
at all levels, nationally, regionally and internationally. At the national level, 
particularly, it is necessary for the Kingdom to develop its already existing 
legislation and to regulate other kinds of pollution, such as oil pollution from 
seabed activities, pollution by dumping, pollution from land-based sources and 
pollution from other human activities. Regionally, the Kingdom, with the other 
states concerned, should activate the 1982 Jeddah Convention concerning the 
protection of the marine environment in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. 
Internationally, the Kingdom would be well advised to accede to certain major 
international conventions, such as the MARPOL Convention, under which the 
discharge of all types of pollutants is completely prohibited, and the London 
Dumping Convention of 1972, which prohibits the deliberate disposal of waste 
form ships and aircraft into the sea. It should also accelerate ratification of the 
1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 
As far as the way in which Saudi Arabia addresses her marine policy 
problems is concerned, it is noted that although a national marine policy has existed 
since the foundation of the country itself in 1932, the evidence shows that there has 
been no integrated and comprehensive approach to deal with a variety of marine 
policy issues. In certain cases, the formulation of the Saudi marine Policy was 
accidental. Such was the case as to the Royal Decree of 1949 defining the 
territorial sea of the Kingdom. The fon-nulation of the Saudi claim in this respect 
came only on legal advice from Hudson and Young, the two international law 
experts who were required to lay down the rules governing the Saudi Arabian 
jurisdiction over the submerged areas in the Arabian Gulf In other cases, 
internally, the reaction towards certain developments in the law of the sea has 
been 
slow, or even non-existent. The Kingdom has only recently regulated marine 
scientific research in its maritime zones. It still maintains 6 n. m. for its contiguous 
zone. Furthermore, no EEZ has been declared, and many kinds of marine pollution 
have not been regulated. This situation could be attributed, in the 
first place, to a 
deficiency in the organizational approach followed in dealing with marine 
issues. 
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In Saudi Arabia, there are numerous governmental agencies which share 
responsibilities in managing the use of the ocean. Whatever the degree of co- 
ordination among different ocean-related units, the absence of a central 
governmental body is likely to make the process of national marine policy 
formulation less reactive. It will also lead to overlapping administrative 
responsibilities in the process of marine policy making. 
In view of these considerations, it would be advisable for the Kingdom to 
re-examine the organizational setting in which i 1-1) 1 its marine affairs are conducted. In 
particular, it is suggested that two specialised governmental agencies z:: ) I be created. 
The first one is to be of ministerial level (Ministry of Marine Affairs, or Ministry of 
Ocean Development, for example), and to be executive in nature. The function of 
this body would be to draw up the marine policy of the country both internally and 
externally. The second body would be advisory in nature, and could take the fon-n 
of a national marine policy council, for instance. The task of the latter would be to 
provide continuous, evaluated policy infon-nation and recommendations to the 
foriner. Such an action would help unify and harmonize the various mission- 
related activities of the many governmental organizations. It would also help avoid 
fragmented and uncoordinated approaches adopted by numerous governmental 
agencies on each marine issue. Externally, centralization in organization would put 
the Kingdom in a better position to follow developments in. the law of the sea, 
enabling the Saudi national marine policy to become both more creative and more 
reactive. 
On the question of agreement between Saudi Arabia's practice and the law 
of the sea, the evidence shows that observance of the international law of the sea 
has been generally a cornerstone in building up and forming the Kingdom's marine 
policies and attitudes. In the Saudi claims, there has always been emphasis on 
"respect for the principles of international law". 
Even when, in certain cases, Saudi Arabia had to formulate her claims while 
there were no clear international rules, such claims were based on international 
legal precedents or a considerable body of state practice. The 1949 claim 
concerning the Kingdom's jurisdiction over the submerged areas in the Arabian 
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Gulf was very much influenced by the 1945 Truman Proclamation, and as one of 
the claim's justifications, it was pointed out in the claim itself that: 
... various other nations now exercise jurisdiction over the subsoil 
and seabed of areas contiguous to their coasts. 
Similar reference to the Truman Proclamation was made by the Saudi Oil Minister 
following the 1968 claim relating to the ownership of the Red Sea resources. In 
the preamble of the 1974 Declaration concerning the limits of the Saudi EFZ , it 
was pointed out that: 
other states have at present affirmed their jurisdiction over thefish 
resources in the areas adjacent to their territorial seas. 
Further evidence of the Kingdom's commitment to the principles of the law 
of the sea is clear in its position over the two questions of the breadth of the 
territorial sea and innocent passage, which have been of special concern to the 
Saudi Government. On the first question, Saudi Arabia in 1958 extended her 
territorial sea up to 12 n. m. and strongly defended her policy in UNCLOS 1. In 
that instance, Saudi Arabia's claim was based on the then general acceptance of the 
12 n. m. limit, an approach which was re*ected at the Conference, due to the strong J 
opposition of certain maritime powers, but which was adopted later on in 
UNCLOS 111. On the question of innocent passage, the Kingdom in UNCLOS I 
and UNCLOS 11 relied, in its position rejecting innocent passage in the straits 
connecting one part of the high seas and another part of the territorial sea of a 
foreign state, on a norm, established in the Corfu Channel case of 1949, which 
allows such passage only in straits linking two parts of the high seas. 
As the principles of international law of the sea crystallized and became 
clearer on certain aspects of ocean use, Saudi Arabia modified her position on 
some issues to reflect these principles. In this respect, the Kingdom refused to sign 
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone on the 
grounds that the Convention adopted in its Article 16(4) provisions allowing 
innocent passage in the straits linking one part of the high seas with another part of 
the territorial sea of a foreign state. However, the Kingdom later on ratified the 
LOSC, although the latter contains the same provisions. 
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The Kingdom has applied this approach not only in essence, but also In 
form in certain areas. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has, in her claim of 1958, 
replaced the two terms, "territorial waters" and "coastal sea", which were used in 
the claim of 1949 with the term "territorial sea". Moreover, the 1993 Regulations 
of Marine Scientific Research were very much influenced by the wording of Part 
XIII of the LOSC regulating scientific research at sea. 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has to reconsider or clarify her position toward 
certain questions. The broad definition given to the term "island" to include 
artificial islands should be considered by the Saudi legislator. Saudi Arabia should 
also clarify the legal justifications concerning the use of closing lines for the bays 
alono- her coasts, the claim which seems to have been made on a "historic title". 
Furthen-nore, Saudi Arabia as a party to the LOSC, has to produce charts or lists of 
geographical co-ordinates for her baselines, since no such charts or lists have yet 
been produced. On the other hand, however, the Saudi policies on certain issues 
have failed to take full advantage of these standards. The Kingdom, as mentioned 
earlier, has not yet declared an EEZ of its own, and it still maintains a6n. m. 
conticruous zone limit, although it is entitled to extend this limit up to 12 n. m. On 
other issues, specifically the question of fishing, in the territorial sea, the Kingdom 
even goes further than what is adopted in international law by allowing "in 
principle" foreign fishing in its territorial sea. The Kingdom, then, is ted to re- 
ire examine its policies on these "limited exceptions", in line with its espoused des' 
to adhere to the principles of international law, a desire which culminated in the 
recent ratification of the LOSC. 
Finally, on the question of Saudi Arabia's contribution to the development 
of the law of the sea, the evidence shows that Saudi Arabia has indeed, through her 
attitudes and policies, played a noticeable role in crystallizing certain international 
principles, which have become part of the ocean regime. 
The strong support of a 12 n. m. limit for the territorial sea by Saudi Arabia 
and other Third World countries led ultimately to the adoption of this approach 
in 
the LOSC. The position of the Group of 77 states, which included Saudi 
Arabia, 
at UNCLOS III resulted in the adoption of the requirement of the coastal state 
consent for all marine scientific research activities conducted in the 
EEZ and on the 
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continental shelf, an approach which was opposed by developed nations. The 
collective position taken by Saudi Arabia and some other states, also gave rise to 
the adoption of the regime of "transit passage" in straits linking two parts of the 
high seas. 
Saudi Arabia has effected the crystallization of the continental shelf theory 
as declared in the Truman Proclamation of 1945. She was the first country in the 
region to follow Truman's pattern, and in that she was followed by many of the 
Gulf states, which firmly established the concept of the continental shelf as a 
customary one. Despite the fact that the Saudi claim in this regard (the claim of 
1949) was very much influenced by the Truman Proclamation, it should be noted 
that while the latter was based on the geological character of the shelf, the former 
was mainly based on the concept of "contiguity", and did not contain any reference 
to the continental shelf Taking into account the unique nature of the Arabian 
Gulf, the ILC with the aim of expanding the concept of the shelf to cover the 
Gulfs floor, adopted the criterion of "exploitability". Thus, the Kingdom has 
significantly contributed in the creation of this concept. 
In its maritime boundary policy, the Kingdom has obviously contributed in 
establishing a number of principles. The adoption in the Saudi national legislation 
of "equitable principles" in delimiting offshore boundaries gave this approach a 
strong thrust, although it was a departure from the "principle of equidistance", 
which was adopted in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 
In her maritime boundary agreements with certain neighbouring states, 
Saudi Arabia has established a number of legal precedents. The 1958 Agreement 
joint with Bahrain uniquely provided for the application of the notion of a 
maritime zone", according to which both parties share the net revenues of the 
zone, while the sovereignty right over the zone was given to Saudi Arabia. The 
1974 Agreement with Sudan has provided for the creation of a common zone, 
where the two parties have equal sovereign rights to exploit all the natural 
resources. The 1968 Agreement with Iran gave the Iranian island of Khaý half 
e ffe c t. All these precedents were subsequently supported and followed 
in 
conventional law and case law alike. Thus, this brief review suggests that Saudi 
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Arabia has not only accepted the principles of the international law of the sea, but 
she has also effectively contributed to the formulation of these principles. 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded, generally speaking, that 
Saudi Arabia's marine policy has been more of a success than a failure. 
Nevertheless, this policy, as seen earlier, still suffers certain defects. This prompts 
the suggestion that Saudi Arabia needs to re-examine some aspects of her current 
marine policy if she is to enjoy the use of the ocean more reasonably and efficiently 
in the future. In particular, there is a need for creation of a more integrated, 
centralized organizational framework for the discharge of responsibilities for 
marine affairs, to achieve more creativity and reactivity towards future 
developments in the law of the sea. Given the lack of expertise in law of the sea 
matters, there is also a need to train new cadres to handle the expanding marine- 
related interests of the Kingdom. 
As far as the Saudi national legislation is concerned,, the need is urgent to 
re-fon-nulate some of its aspects, taking into consideration the developments 
contains in the new ocean regime. The Kingdom should re-define its contiguous 
zone by extending it up to 12 n. m. It should also reconsider the wide foreign 
fishing rights in its territorial sea and the broad definition given to the term "island" 
in its legislation. The generality M the wording of some domestic regulations 
invites the suggestion that there should be detailed bills to remove the possibility of 
any ambiguity in interpretation. Furthermore, it would be advisable for the 
Kingdom to consider the possibility of involving the private sector in policy 
formulation. In order to avoid any future conflicts on maritime boundaries, the 
Kingdom is invited to take the initiative in entering serious negotiations with those 
states whose maritime boundaries with the Kingdom have not yet been settled. 
As to marine pollution control, the Kingdom has a lot to do. It is in need of 
rom. ships, especially with re-examination of its current legislation in oil pollution f 
regard to liability and penalties. There is an urgent need to introduce legislation to 
control other kinds of sea pollution. Regionally, the Kingdom with other 
concerned states, especially those bordering the Red Sea, needs to activate regional 
co-operation and to "revive" the 1982 Jeddah Convention concerning the 
protection of the Red Sea environments Internationally, the Kingdom would 
be 
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well advised to consider seriously the possibility of acceding to major international 
conventions on the protection of marine environment, such as the MARPOL 
Convention and the London Dumping Convention. Such actions would 
undoubtedly provide the Kingdom with a wider umbrella against pollution in its 
rnanne environment. 
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